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ABSTRACT
HIGH COURTS IN A SYSTEM OF SEPARATED POWERS: CONFLICT ORCOOPERATION? A VIEW FROM MASSACHUSETTS
MAY, 2002
MICHELE DeMARY, B.A., MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
M.A, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sheldon Goldman
The separation of powers is an institution which lies at the core of the American
political system. The theory underlying this method of structuring power is that it will
commonly produce conflict. On the other hand, separating powers, with each branch
performing the task for which it is best prepared, can be an efficient way to structure the
allocation of responsibilities in a political system. This dissertation asks which of these
theoretical assumptions is most prevalent when the separation of powers is put into action. It
analyzes the role of the state supreme court of Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court, in
that state's political system. The activities of this court from the 1970s through the 1990s
were analyzed to determine the degree to which it moved outside traditional judicial roles
and then to determine how such activities are viewed by the primary policy making body in a
democracy, the legislature.
This study found that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was involved
regularly in making policy for the state through statutory interpretation and through the
development of both common and constitutional law. Contrary to the widespread
assumption underlying the separation of powers, however, this activity has not generated
Vll
major conflict. In questions as important as the right-to-die, the death penalty, funding for
abortions, and governmental tort immunity, the state's high court has been a major player in
setting public policy for the citizens of Massachusetts, sometimes by itself and at other times
in cooperatton with the legtslature. While there were a few challenges leading to conflict in
these years, and some examples of an efficient allocation of powers leading to cooperation,
the system of separated powers in Massachusetts led more frequently to avoidance of
difficult political questions, happy to allow the appointed justtces of the state's high court to
lead the way.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS THF nnrciAL POWFR?
Students of American political thought tell of the importance of liberal political
ideals to the American founding. In the minds of the majority of these theorists,
principles of liberty and equality provide the foundation for the American political
regime. 1 Debates have occurred over the degree to which these liberal principles
dominated America's early years, with other writers finding the founding period in
American history to focus on republican principles, classical ideals, basic notions of
economic self-interest or a hybrid of ideas. 2 All of these debates, however, concern the
first tier of founding principles, the ideological tier. There is a second tier of principles
which is also deserving of attention. These are the organizing principles of American
politics that structure American governance in practice, particularly federalism and the
separation of powers. The second of these provide the focal point for the analysis
which follows. 3
1
The classic statement of this theory is found in Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955). See also Daniel Boorstin, The Genius ofAmerican Politics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
For instance, see Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation ofthe Constitution (New York:
Macmillan, 1930) for a discussion of the founding which emphasizes economic principles and J.G.A.
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republic Tradition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) for a view of the founding from a republican perspective.
For two views which see the founding as pluralistic, recognizing a variety of philosophical influences on
the this era, see Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins ofthe American Revolution, Enlarged edition
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The
Intellectual Origins ofthe Constitution, Reprint edition (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986).
For the classic statement on the founding as essentially a brilliant political act, see John Roche, "The
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, American Political Science Review 55 (1961), 799-816.
For a historical view which confronts the paradox of America's tradition of exclusive definitions of
citizenship in a democratic system of government, see Rogers Smith, Civic Ideal (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999).
3
There is, of course, a strong connection between these organizing principles and the theoretical
principles. This will be discussed in more detail below.
1
In Federalist #47, James Madison highlighted the importance of this system of
separated of powers which was incorporated into the Constitution.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that on
which the objection [to the newly written U.S. Constitution] is foundedThe accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in
the same hands...may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny[.]
The importance of the separation of powers to an understanding of American
politics has been assumed since these words were written by Madison in 1787. No
study of the American regime can ignore this foundational principle. Studies of the
public policy process have been particularly attentive to the influence which the
separation of powers has on the political system since the cooperation of at least two
branches of government is necessary to the enactment of any coherent public policy.
This is true whether the policy deals with education, health care, or national defense. 5
From this perspective the focus is often on the separation as a barrier, with the question
being how (or whether) the gap between institutions can be (has been) bridged to obtain
various policy goals. An emphasis on the separation of powers becomes less obvious,
however, in most studies of specific institutions in the political system. While always
containing at least a nod to the fact that the institution under study must interact with
4
James Madison, Federalist #47 in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist
Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), 301.
5
For instance, see Bryan C. Hassell, The Charter School Challenge: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Fulfilling the
Promise (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999) regarding educational policy; Deborah R.
McFarlane and Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics ofFertility Control: Family Planning and Abortion
Policies in the American States (New York: Chatham House, 2000) regarding a component of health care
policy; and James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) regarding defense policy. For a compilation of studies
which assesses legislative-executive interaction in policy development see Robert Gilmour and Alexis A.
Haley, eds., Public Policy?: The Strugglefor Control Between Congress and the Executive (New York:
Seven Bridges Press, 1994).
2
other branches of government, the foeus of these works tends to be on developing a
deeper understanding of the internal workings of that particular institution and the
individuals who fill its ranks. While the democratic relationships (those between the
branch and "the people") are recognized as vital in these works, the interaction between
the branches is often relegated to secondary status. 6
This study adopts a somewhat different approach, emphasizing the separation of
powers while focusing on a single branch of American government, the judiciary, to
determine how such a separation has framed the activities of this institution. 7 While
studies of political institutions which focus on internal operations and on the
individuals who perform the duties within these institutions are valuable, the
institutional portraits which they paint can be incomplete. Placing the institution and
actors in the sometimes cooperative, sometimes conflictual, arena created by the
separation of powers provides a deeper, albeit more complex, look at our institutions of
government and the powers which they wield. It asks the question: "what is 'the
judicial power'?" as distinct from the other powers of government. 8
' Many of the classic works on the Congress, the President, and the Courts would fit in this category.
This is not to criticize the importance of such works, only to recognize that no one study can do
everything. As this is a generalization there are, of course, exceptions. One is Morris Fiorina's seminal
work, Congress: Keystone ofthe Washington Establishment (Mew Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)
which emphasizes Congress' relations to other branches, especially the executive branch agencies. Other
examples are those works which focus on specific tasks requiring interbranch cooperation. For instance,
see Henry Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1985) regarding the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices; Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1997) regarding the appointment of lower court judges; Louis Fisher,
Presidential War Power (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1 993) and Presidential Spending
Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
7
From this perspective, the separation of powers is less a barrier to be overcome, as it is in policy
studies, and more a "crcational" principle which shapes judicial activity.
8
U.S. Constitution, Article III: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
3
This study also differs from others in that the speeifie foeus is not on the United
States Supreme Court but on the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts' eourt of last resort. To the degree that the judiciary's place in a system
of separation of powers has been analyzed by others the emphasis has been on the
federal judicial system, usually on the Supreme Court, so that our understanding of "the
judicial power" is really knowledge of "the federal judicial power."9 The assumption
which could be drawn from this national focus is that the judicial role in a system of
separated powers is the same whether it be exercised on the national or the state level. 10
This assumption is problematic, predominantly because of the "other organizing
principle" in American politics, federalism. Beginning and developing within different
kinds of political systems, federal and state judiciaries differ in the way in which they
were created, in the history of their relations with executives and legislators, and in
their respective places in a federal system of government. Bearing in mind such
differences, it is unreasonable to expect that the kinds of power-sharing relationships
which developed in the two systems necessarily would be the same. As Henry Glick, a
well-known scholar of state high courts, has said, "[sjtate supreme courts are not simply
duplications of the national court at a lower level of the judicial hierarchy. Instead,
they are distinctive institutions which are integral parts of state political and legal
systems."
1
1
It is important to look more closely at the states.
12
9
While there have been an increasing number of studies of state high courts in the past 20 years, the
studies tend to emphasize the place of the state high court within a system of federalism rather than
within its own state's system of separated powers.
10 A second assumption could be that the work of the states and their courts aren't important enough to
study. The problems with this assumption will be addressed later in this chapter.
1
1
Supreme Courts in State Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1971 ), 5.
4
The theory underlying the separation of powers contains seeds for potential
conflict; the question of how this conflict is operationalized in Massachusetts is one of
the central questions which is explored in the pages which follow. Stating that one
branch should possess the legislative, one the executive, and one the judicial power
sounds nice and neat in theory. However, the actual exercise of power requires a clear
definition of what the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are. 13 The theoretical
lines of demarcation between one power and the next tend to run into each other as one
moves to the realm of practical politics. This problem can be envisioned as follows. If
one assumes that the separation of powers establishes a political system with three
separate and co-equal parts of government, the system can be seen as three circles of
equal size which meet in the middle, overlapping slightly. 14 Those areas where there is
no overlap are widely recognized as legitimate activities for the branch of government
in question. Much of the work of any one branch is uncontested, at least on grounds of
institutional legitimacy. Conflicts that do occur in these realms rest on ideological
differences and not on questions of whether the institution in question is acting within
the boundaries imposed by the separation of powers. A prime example would be the
politics that surround passage of a state or national budget. While the authority of the
12
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the differences between the Massachusetts and U.S.
systems and the effects of these differences on their respective judiciaries.
1 Some theoretical literature will make an important distinction between the terms "power" and
"authority," with authority indicating that the activity is recognized as legitimate by those over whom the
entity in question is acting. However, unless indicated otherwise I will use the terms interchangeably,
implying that the power to which I refer is being exercised legitimately. Of course this assertion will
always be debatable since the view of whether an act of power is legitimate, like the view of what is
beautiful, may lie in the eye of the beholder.
14 Whether one describes the "circles of power" as having only slight overlap (perhaps 5-10% for
purposes of description) or a greater degree of overlap (25% plus) depends, of course, on how one
defines each of the powers. In addition, whether these "circles" are of equal size is probably also open to
debate.
5
legislature to pass the budget is unquestioned, there is often a great deal of debate over
the details of what these economic documents should contain.
The conflicts change in nature as one moves closer to point at winch the circles
intersect and overlap. Here, while ideological overtones may still be present, the
potential for conflict becomes increasingly institutional, with the predominant query
being whether the activity in question is being performed by the appropriate branch of
government. Some of this conflict is built into the constitutional structure of the
separation of powers as it has been established in the United States through what are
generally known as "checks." For instance, the executive veto is recognized by most to
be an exercise of legislative power (placing it in the "overlap") but this power is clearly
granted to executives in all American constitutions, federal and state. There arc other
exercises of power which may fall into the overlap but which arc not checks as
traditionally understood. Rather, they represent the exercise of a recognized power by a
branch of government which may, in some instances, compromise the independence of
the other branches. To use the budget process as an example again, while a
legislature's power over the budget includes the ability to determine overall spending
for a governmental unit, this action may seriously affect another branch when the
legislative determination limits the operation of the executive or the judiciary.
This study focuses on the judicial power in an attempt to determine what
activities fall within the circle. While some time is devoted to the "routine" work of the
Court, the primary emphasis is on the areas of overlap, particularly in the relationship
between the SJC and the state's legislature, the General Court of Massachusetts. 15 This
includes those activities of the state's high court which come closest to the legislative
There will be some discussion ofjudicial-executive interactions as well, but these arc less frequent.
domain (circle) as well as some administrative oversight performed by the Legislature
which touch upon the judiciary. Two closely connected questions guide tins research:
1) What do the justices of the state's high court understand to be the role of the
SJC in a system of separated powers and to what degree do they feel free to pursue that
role?
2) How does the system of separated powers in Massachusetts shape or
influence the activities of the state's high court?
Before presenting the results of this study it is important to provide a broader
context within which these more detailed findings can be placed. This begins with a
review of the most common debate regarding the place of the judiciary in a system of
separated powers - the courts and policymaking.
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING - IS IT LEGITIMATE?
The role that should be played by the justices who sit on the United States'
highest courts has been a subject of debate throughout the nation's history. Not
surprisingly, the debate has been the most heated when the courts' decisions have
touched on the most politically divisive issues. These have included questions of the
role the state and national governments should play in the issues of slavery, of
economic regulation, of balancing standards of due process with public safety, of
regulating abortion and, most recently (again), of limiting school sponsored prayer.
Much of the debate stems from the volatile nature of the subject matter. No matter
which institution of government has made decisions on these questions it has been
subject to criticism. The critique of the courts, however, takes place on a different level
7
smce the concern is not only over the direction a policy question should take, but also
over whether the judiciary is the proper institution for making policy decisions at all.
The impetus for this additional concern generally stems from questions of democratic
accountability. Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and of the high courts of almost
one-quarter of the states are appointed to their positions for extended periods of time
and are virtually immune from direct democratic action in response to their decisions. 16
These individuals are unlikely candidates for deciding important policy questions in a
democracy. Yet they do make such decisions. Frequently this has raised the question
of what right they have to do so. This question became even more important in the
20th century as legal realists destroyed the myth of the neutral role which justices play.
Ifjustices aren't able to apply principles of statutory and constitutional interpretation by
some objective standard, their role in determining public policy questions is more
problematic.
Despite these concerns it is recognized by almost everyone today that courts,
state and national, trial and appellate, make "public policy." 17 In an edited work
dealing with all types of American courts, Gates and Johnson note that "American
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are appointed by the President, with the advise and consent of the
Senate, for life. Eleven of the fifty states employ an appointment process for choosing the justices of
their highest court as well. These states include the following (numbers in parentheses indicate the term
of office; all are eligible for reappointment): Connecticut (8); Delaware (12); Hawaii (10); Maine (7);
Massachusetts (life - age 70); New Hampshire (life - age 70); New Jersey (7); New York (14); Rhode
Island (life); South Carolina (10); and Vermont (6). (The Book ofthe States, 1998-1999 [Lexington, KY:
National Council of State Governments, 1998], 129-137.)
17
"Stated most simply, public policy is the sum of governmental activities, whether acting directly or
through agents, as those actions have an influence on the lives of citizens." B. Guy Peters, American
Public Policy: Promise and Performance, 4th ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishing, 1996), 5.
Technically any decision of a court, whether it be interpreting the details of a basic contract between two
individuals or interpreting the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, will influence the lives of its
citizens. More frequently, however, judicial policymaking generally refers to the second type of action,
one which will clearly have influence beyond the parties to the suit. As will become clearer in the
methodology discussion below, however, which decisions should be called judicial policymaking and
which should not is not so easy to determine.
courts do make public policy and...much of this policy is politically significant and
enduring." 18 Stumpf and Culver echo this sentiment in their work on state judicial
systems. "Courts and judges are seen not in legal isolation nor as separate from politics
but inevitably and inextricably part of the larger political process." 19 And speaking of
state high courts, Tarr and Porter noted that «[s]tate supreme courts have always been
active policymakers, particularly in the development of complementary and
institutional policy."20 Normative debates aside, the reality is that courts do make
policy.
21
These two perspectives create a conflict which provides a hotbed for studies of
judicial decision making. On one side is the demand for judicial accountability to be
sure the United States does not become a legal dictatorship. On the other side is a
desire to guarantee the judicial independence which is necessary for justices to decide
cases on something beyond what the most vocal interest group demands. 22
Explorations ofjudicial decision making generally examine the actions ofjustices
within the framework of this accountability-independence debate. Especially
John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson, The American Courts: A Critical Assessment (Washington
D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 1.
19
Harry B. Stumpf and John H. Culver, The Politics ofState Courts (New York: Longman, 1992), 5.
20 Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), xxii-xxiii.
21
Shortly after beginning this project I found an interesting anecdotal quote which reflects an
understanding of this fact in the legal world. A newspaper account of a Cape Cod case involving the
fishing rights of Wampanoags quoted a Barnstable County assistant district attorney as saying, "Our plea
is to both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Legislature. Give us an answer that has some clarity to it
so that members of the Native American community, who want to hunt, and police, who are charged with
enforcing the laws fairly, know what their rights are out there when everybody is carrying a gun." New
Bedford Standard Times, July 17, 1998, B2. There was little concern about who made the policy
determination, just that it be made.
22
Continuing concerns about judicial independence in the face of an increasing awareness ofjudicial
policymaking proves that while justices make policy there is a difference between judicial policymaking
and that of legislatures and executives.
9
interesting to study are opinions which involve differences, whether these be between
various eourts of a similar jurisdiction over time, within one court on a specific case, or
even in the jurisprudence of one justice in different cases. It is these differences winch
make the judicial process seem most "political." For some these differences are
explained primarily in terms of the political ideologies of the justices. 21 For others it is
a problem inherent in any endeavor requiring the interpretation of language, an
admittedly imperfect medium for expressing ideas. 24 And for still others, the difference
can be explained by looking at the various strategic circumstances confronted in each
case.
25
These explanations differ in their view of what may account for court
variations; they also diverge in the degree to which they are willing to concede a role
for legal factors in decision making, if they acknowledge any at all. While not denying
the potential explanatory power of any of these three approaches to understanding the
job of a justice, this study presents a supplement to these views. Rather than
emphasizing questions of democratic accountability, the focus is on the place of the
judiciary as an institution within a democracy which is premised upon the separation of
For the most prominent, current work which presents this view see Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth,
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This
perspective has generally been at the heart of criticisms of the Supreme Court. For instance, see Robert
Bork, Tempting America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).
24
See, for instance, John Brigham, Constitutional Language (Westwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987) or
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
25
The foundational work in this regard is Walter Murphy's Elements ofJudicial Strategy (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1964). Much contemporary work which can be seen as a part of the
"positive theory of institutions" also Fits this mold. See, for instance, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight,
Choices Justices Make (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1998) and Forrest Maltzman, James Spriggs, and
Paul Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000). Much of the work of Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace also fall in this
category such as "Order in the Courts: A Neo-institutional Approach to Judicial Consensus," Western
Political Quarterly 20 (1987), 147-168 and Melinda Gann Hall, "Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting
in State Supreme Courts, Journal ofPolitics 54 (1992), 427-446.
10
powers. This approach incorporates the democratic perspective, but moves beyond it to
look at the parameters circumscribing the role of the courts in the system of
government in American states.
A VIEW FROM THE STATFS
Professors Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, the moving forces behind the
newly developed State Supreme Court Data Project, described this project in a recent
Judicature article. In doing so, they noted that "[p]erhaps the most fundamental
questions that needs to be addressed in this project is 'Why study state supreme courts
at all'?"
26
This is a question with which all scholars who study state courts is faced, so
it is a good place to begin.
"WHY STUDY STATE SUPREME COURTS AT ALL?"
There are fifty-three courts of last resort in the United States. 27 One of these,
however, has received the majority of attention from judicial scholars over the years.
In comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court the other fifty-two institutions, the state
supreme courts, operate in relative academic (and public) obscurity. 28 The attraction to
"Comparing Courts Using the American States, Judicature 83 (2000), 250-265, at 253.
27
Throughout this paper I will use the terms "state supreme court," "state high court," and "state court of
last resort" interchangeably. This allows for some linguistic variation although it is not technically
accurate. Only 43 states use the term "supreme court" for a single court of last resort. In Maine and
Massachusetts it is called the Supreme Judicial Court; in Maryland and New York it is called the Court
of Appeals; and in West Virginia it is called the Supreme Court of Appeals. Oklahoma and Texas also
differ from the other states having two courts of last resort (which explains why there are 53 courts of last
resort), the Supreme Court for civil cases and the Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal cases. To
round out the confusion in names, the Supreme Court in New York refers to the highest level trial court.
28
See, Lawrence Baum, "Judicial Politics: Still a Distinctive Field," in Political Science: The State ofthe
Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983);
Martin Shapiro, "Public Law and Judicial Politics," in Political Science: The State ofthe Discipline If
i I
the U.S. Supreme Court is understandable. While it issues a small number of opinions
eaeh year (eighty-one in 1999/2000) the opinions issued by the justices of this august
body have wide-ranging effects, influencing many citizens for years after the decisions
are issued. One need think only about American public policy in areas as diverse as
affirmative action, redisricting, and prayer in schools to realize this impact. 2" Interest
in this Court is also aided by the fact that it provides a centralized focus for purposes of
research. In contrast, the study of state high courts presents scholars with the perennial
problem associated with the study of any state institution: how to conduct a study
which is small enough to be manageable while not being so small as to be parochial/0
The benefits of looking at these important political institutions, however, make this a
worthwhile challenge to tackle.
It is true that the activities of any one state supreme court rarely have the
immediate, wide-ranging impact which most decisions of the Supreme Court have.
There are at least four reasons, however, why the study of these courts of last resort is
as important as a study of the U.S. Supreme Court. Looking at numbers alone we get
some indication of the potential importance of these "other" supreme courts. The
highest appellate court in each state issues at least as many written opinions (and often
perspective in the decade between the two analyses, he still critiques the field for being too narrowly
focused on the federal courts in general and on the Supreme Court in particular. While I am addressing
one concern of these commentators by looking at the state level I do not address the other, that the
general focus of most judicial research is on appellate courts at the expense of trial courts.
29
For a discussion of the impact of Supreme Court decisions, see Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C.
Canon, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 19X4).
3(1
"Because of daunting data collection burdens, scholars in most instances have been forced to choose
between intensive case studies of single states or small numbers of slates, and 50-statc studies conducted
at high levels of aggregation." Brace and Hall, "Comparing Courts," 252. I have chosen the single state
approach. This problem with this will be discussed in more detail in the next few pages.
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more) as the nation's highest court. 31 Minimally, this means there are fifty times more
opinions being
.ssucd on an annual basis by these relatively neglected bod.es. While
quantity alone may not establish a sufficient reason for pursuing an interest in these
courts, the substance of their decisions should. Despite the ongoing
"statutification" of
American law, common law precepts arc still vital to the law regarding torts, real estate,
probate, divorce and child custody. Most legal controversies involving such questions
arc resolved on the state level, with the state high courts being the most prominent legal
voice in settling these questions of law. 32 Additionally, most criminal law in the United
States originates in the states and state supreme courts regularly apply and interpret
these laws in the cases before them. Substantively, the work of these courts seems to
be as important as the work of the U.S. Supreme Court. 33
The quantity and substance of the decisions issued by state high courts have
always been sufficient grounds to justify an interest in their activities. Trends in
American politics over the last twenty years, however, make this an even more
interesting time to study institutions of state government. The congressional changing
of the guard that occurred in 1994 marked the potential for a dramatic change in
American federalism. The new Republican majority had campaigned on a platform
31
ln the 15 years studied for this project the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) issued an
average of 244 opinions/year. This compares with the 81 full opinions issued by the Supreme Court in
the 1999/2000 term. Data for all state supreme courts in the 1990s was developed by Brace and Hall.
"Based on data we collected for 1994, we have estimated that each state court of last resort issues an
average of 228 decisions per year, while some issue as many as 1,500." ("Comparing Courts," 263.)
3
"
"In certain areas of the law, basic legal rules have been established almost entirely through state court
decisions rather than statutes. ...The most important common law areas arc property law. ..contract
law...and tort law. While legislatures today play a more active role in the common law fields, courts
remain the primary decision makers." Lawrence Baum, "Supreme Courts in the Policy Process," The
State ofthe States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1996), 144.
I do not mean to imply that no studies have been done on state law as developed by state courts. Law
reviews are full of such studies. I am referring, instead, to the limited amount of research which has been
done on the institutions which "make" this law, the states' supreme courts.
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which included several items to challenge the existing status quo in the relationship
between states and the federal government.34 They began this change with the
limitation on unfunded mandates ,n 1995. This was followed by 1996's welfare reform
legislation which broke with over fifty years of practice, giving state governments a
much larger role in the development of welfare policy. Congress was aided in making
these changes by former Arkansas Governor William Jefferson Clinton, a Democratic
president, who signed both pieces of legislation. Adding to this wave of change was
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in U.S. v. Lopez when, for the first time since 1936,
the Court struck down a piece of federal legislation as extending beyond Congress's
power under the commerce clause. The Court determined that the enactment of federal
legislation to regulate guns within 1,000 feet of a school was beyond Congress'
recognized authority. 35 This shift of power from the federal to the state level brings
with it increased responsibilities for the states' high courts. If this political trend
continues, it becomes even more important that we understand all we can about these
institutions.
A final reason for studying these institutions is that they can provide a unique
lens for comparative study, not only between state courts themselves, but also with the
U.S. Supreme Court. Because the nation's high court stands alone atop the hierarchy of
the federal court system it is generally studied as a single, unique institution. While
there is an increasing number of comparatives works which look at the U.S. Supreme
34
See Newt Gingrich, Bob Schellhas, eds., Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt
Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation (New York: Times Books,
1994).
35
U.S. v. Lopez 115 U.S. 1624 (1995). While the Court in 1976 did find that applying the Fair Labor
Standards Act to state and local employees extended beyond Congress' commerce power, the intervening
federalism issue makes the case less clear. The Court did not strike down the law in its entirety. It only
limited the application of the law. See National League of Cities v. Usery 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Court from a comparative perspective with other national high courts, it is still
understudied from a comparative perspective.- There are enough similarities between
the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts, however, that comparisons here arc
valid as well. 37 In both instances one finds a high court with supervisory power, both
as regards the law and administrative questions, over a cadre of lower courts. Both are
the final voice in interpreting their respective constitutions, and both operate as a co-
equal branch of government with a legislature and an executive in a system of separated
powers. These similarities allow for comparisons regarding questions ofjudicial
administration, development of constitutional law, and the use ofjudicial review and
bring us back to an earlier question: is the role of the United States Supreme Court in a
democratic system of separated powers the prototype or may such a system produce
different sets of relationships? The comparison between the high courts of the United
States and Massachusetts which is presented in Chapter Two shows that the historical
and constitutional place of every court within its system of separated powers is not the
same as that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The question of why state high courts are deserving of attention is an easier one
to answer than the related question which this study inevitably must tackle -- is
Massachusetts (or any single state) alone worth studying? What can be learned from
Massachusetts which is of interest more broadly? For citizens of the state, of course,
learning about Massachusetts alone has value. Beyond this local interest, however, an
36
See, for example, Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) and Theodore L. Becker,
Comparative Judicial Politics: The Political Functionings ofCourts (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).
37
This is not to deny the differences between these institutions, not the least of which is the authoritative
place which the Supreme Court holds in questions of federal-state conflict. These differences do not
necessarily preclude comparison in all instances, however.
1
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in-depth study of the high court of one state is of interest for two reasons. First, it ean
be added to an ever-growing number of single state studies which are being done.
While not organized around a common theme or organizing perspective, book length
studies have been done of the supreme courts of Alabama, New York, Virginia, and
Washington. 38 As more works are completed, there will be more substantive data upon
which to draw comparisons. With a long and proud history, Massachusetts should be
one of the states included in the first round of studies.
There is a second reason why relying only on multi-state, quantitative studies
provides an insufficient basis for understanding the role of state supreme courts. While
they provide good data for comparative purposes, studies of much more than three
states must be somewhat superficial. The more states which are incorporated in a
study, the more the researcher is required to rely on quantitative data over qualitative
analysis. The shortcomings of such an approach can be seen in this study. To assess
the role of the SJC in the state's policymaking process by looking only at quantifiable
data (exercise ofjudicial review, constitutional interpretations, number of advisory
opinions issued) would have underestimated the degree to which the SJC has
influenced major areas of the law in the Commonwealth. The Court's extensive
involvement in developing policy through both statutory construction and the
38
See, Robert J. Frye, The Alabama Supreme Court (University, AL: Bureau of Public Affairs,
University of Alabama, 1961); Francis Bergan, The History ofthe New York Court ofAppeals, 1847-
1932 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Thomas R. Morris, The Virginia Supreme Court
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1975); and Charles H. Sheldon, A Century ofJudging:
A Political History ofthe Washington Supreme Court (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
A related type of study which should not be overlooked is G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter,
State Supreme Courts in State and Nation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988). Tarr and
Porter present an analysis of the high courts in three different states, Alabama, New Jersey, and Ohio.
They use a model which views the states' high courts in relation to the federal courts (vertical
federalism), to courts in other states (horizontal federalism), and to its place in the state's political
system.
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development of common law would be overlooked." While there j. no denying the
comparative advantages of large-scale quantitative studies, they will pan,, only w
incomplete picture if they are not supplemented by in-depth, qualitative studies. On the
other hand, single-state stud.es like this must rely heavily on the research which has
been done by others in order to make most use of its "data." A look at some of these
studies follows.
WHAT DO WE ALREADY KNOW?
While the Supreme Court has been the dominant focus of much research, a
variety of interesting and informative studies have been conducted on state supreme
courts over the past thirty years. They can be divided broadly into three categories:
those which focus specifically on one or more state high courts and its justices, those
which focus on the place of state high courts within a system of federalism, and those
which consider the place of the state high court within a system of separated powers.40
Added to this is the rapidly growing body of comparative state court research from
those associated with the State Supreme Court Database Project, especially Brace and
Hall.
41
See Chapter 4 for an analysis of this activity in Massachusetts.
40 As previously noted, there are also studies on the law of each state.
41
See, for instance, Brace and Hall, "Comparing Courts Using the American States," Judicature 83
(2000); Hall and Brace, "Integrated Models of Judicial Dissent in State Supreme Courts," Journal of
Politics 55 (1993), 914-935; Hall and Brace, "Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior,
American Politics Quarterly 20 (1992), 147-168; Hall and Brace, "The Vicissitudes of Death by Decree:
Forces Influencing Capital Punishment Decision Making in State Supreme Courts," Social Science
Quarterly 15 (1994), 136-151; and Hall, "Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual
Notes and a Case Study," Journal ofPolitics 49 ( 1 987), 1 1 1 7- 1 1 24.
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Much of the research which fits into this first category has been an appli
to states of research questions wh 1Ch were first raised in the study of the U.S. Supreme
Court and other federal courts.42 For instance, a plethora of studies in the 1960s and
1970s were published on the relationship between partisan and ideological variables
and the decisions of state supreme court justices. 43 Individuals have also followed
concerns from the federal level to the states in the study of state high court agenda-
setting
44
and of the affect of amicus curiae participation in the opinions of state high
courts.
45
Like some of the most famous works on the U.S. Supreme Court, some
studies on state supreme courts have taken a historical approach to research on these
institutions. A prominent series of studies was conducted by a team of researchers
which focused on the workload of state supreme courts over a 100 year period between
42
This is in addition to the comprehensive single states studies mentioned above.
Attitudinal studies of state supreme court justices include, David Adamany, "The Party Variable in
Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study," American Political Science Review 68 (1966), 57;
Kathleen Barber, "Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan," Case
Western Reserve Law Review 20 (1969), 401-416; Lawrence Baum, "Policy Goals in Judicial
Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction," American Journal ofPolitical Science
21 (1977), 13-33; Edward N. Beiser and Jonathan Silberman, "The Political Party Variable: Workmen's
Compensation Cases in the New York Court of Appeals," Polity 3 (1971), 521; Malcolm Feeley,
"Another Look at the 'Party Variable' in Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan
Supreme Court," Polity 4 (1971), 91-104; Robert A. Heiberg, "Social Background of the Minnesota
Supreme Court Justices: 1858-1958," Minnesota Law Review 5 (1969), 901-937; Dean Jaros and Bradley
C. Canon, "Dissent on State Supreme Courts: The Differential Significance of Characteristics of Judges,"
Midwest Journal ofPolitical Science, 15 (1971), 322; John W. Patterson and Gregory J. Rathjen,
"Background Diversity and State Supreme Court Dissent Behavior," Polity 9 (1976), 610-622; Glendon
Schubert, "The 'Packing' of the Michigan Supreme Court," in Glendon Schubert, ed., Quantitative
Analysis ofJudicial Behavior (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Political Party
Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court," Journal ofPublic Law 1 1 ( 1 963), 352-362; and Kenneth
Vines, "Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations," Western Political Quarterly 18 (1965), 5-
18.
44
Lawrence, Baum, "Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearings in the California Supreme Court: Patterns in
Court and Individual Behavior," Santa Clara Law Review 16 (1976), 713-744 and Victor E. Flango,
"Case Selection by Courts in the Georgia and Illinois Supreme Courts," Justice System Journal 12
(1987), 398-401.
45
Lee Epstein, "A Comparative Analysis of the Evolution, Rules, and Usage of Amicus Curiae Briefs in
the U.S. Supreme Court and in State Courts of Last Resort", paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Southwestern Political Science Association, Little Rock, AR (1989).
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1870-1970.46 Specific studies and edited works on individual courts have also
approached their topic from a historical perspective. 47 All of these works prove the
value of state high court research as a tool for comparison, both between state courts
and with the U.S. Supreme Court.48
The second broad category of research on state supreme courts has focused on
the place which these institutions play in a system of federalism, analyzing either the
state high courts' interactions with the U.S. Supreme Court ("vertical federalism") or
their interaction with sister courts in other states ("horizontal federalism").49 Analyses
of the relationship involved in vertical federalism can be further divided into two
general categories. The first of these are compliance studies which focus on the
reaction of state high courts and other implementing populations to controversial
rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, especially in the realm of religion and criminal
process.
50
The second category of studies focuses on the movement known as the new
Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, and Stanton Wheeler, "State Supreme
Courts: A Century of Style and Citation," Stanford Law Review 33 (1981), 733; Kagan, Cartwright,
Friedman, and Wheeler, "The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970," Stanford Law Review 30
(1977), 121; Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, and Wheeler, "The Evolution of State Supreme Courts,"
Michigan Law Review 76 (1977/1978), 961; Kagan, Bobby D. Infelise, and Robert R. Detlcfsen,
"American State Supreme Court Justices, 1 900- 1 970," American Bar Foundation Research Journal 37
1
(1984); and Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman, "Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead? Winning
and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970." Law and Society Review 21 (1987), 403. For a critical
review of this series, see Stephen Daniels, "A Tangled Tale: Studying State Supreme Courts," Law and
Society Review 22 (1988), 833.
47
Bcrgan, The History ofthe New York Court ofAppeals; Russell K. Osgood, ed., 77z<? History ofthe Law
in Massachusetts: The Supreme Judicial Court 1692-1992 (Boston, MA: Supreme Judicial Court
Historical Society, 1992); and Sheldon, A Century ofJudging.
48
The works of Brace and Hall can be seen as following newly emerging trends on general judicial
research (begun, as usual, on the national level) as they apply concepts from the rational choice "class" in
the "school" of new institutionalism to state supreme courts. For a discussion of "new institutionalism"
see Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist
Approaches (Chicago: Unversity of Chicago Press, 1996).
49 Terms come from Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation.
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judicial federalism, the action taken by some state high courts to decrease their reliance
on the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and to increase their efforts to develop an
independent body of state constitutional law. 51 Stud.es which look at federalism Iron,
the horizontal perspective have included studies ofjudicial innovation m newly
developing areas of law such as "right to die" and the diffusion of these and other legal
precepts from one state to another. 52
Finally, we come to the third category of research which raises questions about
a state supreme court's position as one of three co-equal branches of government.
While some research has focused on the place of the state high courts in a system of
separation of powers, it is here that our knowledge is thinnest. 53 Judicial selection
studies are concerned with this relationship at the point of appointment or election but
they do not consider the ongoing relations between the branches. 54 State policy
50
See studies cited in Stephen Wasby, The Impact ofthe United State Supreme Court: Some
Perspectives (Homcwood, IL: Dorscy Press, 1970) and in Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon,
Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984).
M Many articles have been written on this topic since the 1970s. A bibliography of some of the earlier
works can be found in G. Alan Tarr's "Bibliographical Essay" in Porter and Tarr, eds., State Supreme
Courts, 201-209. Also see the Selected Bibliography in Barry Latzer's State Constitutions and Criminal
Justice (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). This phenomena in Massachusetts will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5.
5
These studies include Caldeira's research on the reputation of state high courts, his seminal piece being
Gregory A. Caldeira, "On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts," Political Behavior 5 (1983), 83-108.
Also included in this category arc studies on the diffusion of policy innovations among state courts. See,
for instance, Lawrence Baum and Bradley C. Canon, "Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations,"
American Political Science Review 75 (1981), 979-987; Henry R. Glick, "Judicial Innovation and Policy
Re-Invention: State Supreme Courts and the Right to Die," Western Political Quarterly 45 (1992), 71-92;
and Peter Harris, "Structural Change in the Communication of Precedent Among State Supreme Courts,
1 870- 1 970," Social Networks 4 ( 1 982), 20 1 -2 1 2.
51
In addition to a view from the perspectives of horizontal and vertical federalism, Tarr and Porter also
incorporate this intrastate perspective into their broader study of the stale high courts of Alabama, New
Jersey, and Ohio.
54 Among the many studies on judicial selection sec Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial
Elections and the Questfor Accountability (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980); Henry R.
Glick and Craig F. Emmert, "Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of Stale
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analyses may occasionally include discussions of the courts, but the activities of the
other two branches is more frequently highlighted. 55 The exception to this
generalization, however, was the study of role theory and its application to state
supreme courts which was pioneered by Henry Click and Kenneth Vines in the late
1 960s and early 70s. 56 Starting from an assumption that justices do not operate in a
vacuum, that their activities on the bench are constrained by the institution on which
they serve and by that institution's relationship to the other branches of government
within the state, role theory is vitally connected to an understanding of the judiciary's
place in the broader political system and can help to provide some perspective on the
place of the judiciary in the development of public policy.
Supreme Court Justices," Judicature 70 (1986), 228-235; Charles H. Sheldon and Linda S. Maule,
Choosing Justice: The Recruitment ofState and Federal Judges (Pullman, WA: Washington University
Press, 1997).
55 An exception to this may be in the area of school financing where some state courts have taken a
leading role in policy development. See Richard Lchne, The Questfor Justice: The Politics ofSchool
Finance Reform (New York: Longman, 1978) and Doug Reed, "Twenty-five Years After Rodriguez:
School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism," Law and Society Review 32
(1988), 175.
56
Henry R. Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, "Law-Making in the State Judiciary: A Comparative Study of
the Judicial Role in Four States," Polity 2 (1969), 142-159. Other role theory works include: Theodore
Becker, "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations,"
American Political Science Review 60 (1966), 677-680; James L. Gibson, "Discriminant Functions, Role
Orientations and Judicial Behavior: Theoretical and Methodological Linkages," Journal ofPolitics 39
(1977), 984-1007; James L. Gibson, "Judges' Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decisions: An Interactive
Model," American Political Science Review 12 (1978), 91 1-924; Henry Glick, Supreme Courts in State
Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1971); John Patrick Hagan, "Policy Activism in the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals," West Virginia Law Review 89 (1986), 149-165; J. Woodford Howard, Jr.
,
Courts ofAppeal in the Federal Judicial System (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981); Charles H
Sheldon, "Perceptions of the Judicial Roles in Nevada," Utah Law Review, 1968 (1968), 355; Kenneth
Vines, "The Judicial Role in American States: An Exploration," in Frontiers in Judicial Research, eds.
Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus (New York: John Wiley, 1969); and John T. Wold, "Political
Orientation, Social Backgrounds and Role Perceptions of State Supreme Court Judges," Western
Political Quarterly 27 (1974), 239-248.
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WHEN SHOULD COURTS RRCQMF. 1NVOI vi n >
Views on the appropriateness ofjudicial policymaking do not tend toward the
absolute. Rather, there is a continuum of positions in answer to the question of"when
can courts legitimately make policy," marked on one end by the absolute position of
"never" with "always" at the other end. 57 Most individuals who think about this
question would put themselves somewhere in the middle. When pitted against each
other, however, advocates ofjudicial restraint and advocates ofjudicial activism push
each other toward the ends of the spectrum. 5 * On the one hand are views like the
extreme position taken by Justice Roberts in U.S. v. Butler which makes the job of a
justice almost mechanical.
There should be no misunderstanding as to the function of this court in
such a case. It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to
overrule or control the actions of the people's representatives. This is a
misconception.. ..When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in
the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial
branch.. .has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former. 59
At the other extreme are arguments like that of Justice William O. Douglas. "1
speak, of course, from the viewpoint of one who believes that the judiciary should be
alert to construe the Constitution and laws of the United States as providing a strong
arsenal for protection of the individual, whatever his place in the spectrum of ideas may
57
According to James Gibson, this is the perspective adopted by role theory. "In essence, the role
orientation construct represents a unidimensional continuum of legitimate discretion in decision making -
- the degree to which legitimate opportunities for decisional creativity do exist." "The Role Concept in
Judicial Research," in American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behavior, cd. Sheldon
Goldman and Austin Sarat (New York: Longman, 1989), 441.
58
1 use these terms to differentiate those who feel the judiciary should have only a limited role in
policymaking at best (restraint) from those who would justify a role in this realm (activism).
59
297 U.S. 1
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be."
60
Yet, if these two individuals were to work together to search for common ground
in their positions rather than for differences, it is likely they would find they aren't very
far apart. Justice Roberts would admit that justices must, at some times, make policy
while Justice Douglas would note that there are some limits to judicial policymaking.
The question then moves from "should they or shouldn't they" to "when is it
appropriate?" This is the question which a separation of powers view of the judicial
role can help to answer.
ROLE THEORY - A PARTIAL EXPLANATION
Differences between justices in their willingness to engage injudicial
policymaking have been described and analyzed from the perspective of role theory. 61
"Used in its technical sense, role refers to the sets of normative expectations which
individuals have regarding the proper behavior and personal qualities of the occupants
of specific social or political positions."62 These expectations regarding the activities
appropriate to a role come from the actor (ego) herself. They also come from others
(alters) with whom the individual interacts in her role. Expectations of "alters" may
limit an actor even if her own role orientation would dictate otherwise. In the field of
judicial decision making, these orientations have generally been placed on the
policymaking continuum with "law interpreters" at one end, "lawmakers" at the other
60
The Court Years, 1939-1975: The Autobiography of William O. Douglas (New York: Random House,
1980), 245.
61
According to one researcher who has actively employed this method, "role theory to date has generated
few empirical payoffs — the potential of the approach has not been realized....As a heuristic device, role
theory may have some utility: As a theory of decision-making its utility has only rarely been
demonstrated." Gibson, "The Role Concept in Judicial Research," 440.
62
Glick, Supreme Courts in State Politics, 7. Much of this paragraph draws from Glick's description.
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and "pragmatists" in between. 63 This theory can help to explain unexpected variations
between justices which attitudinal variables may not. If a justice is a liberal but has
internalized a role orientation as a 'law interpreter," she is unlikely to use her position
to move the law in a new direction even if it matches her ideological position.
Conversely, a liberal who is also a "law maker" would be less hesitant.
In addition to providing explanations for judicial decisions when other theories
may not, there are two other advantages which role theory has over those theories
which analyze judicial decision making with a focus on judicial ideology, background,
or partisanship.64 First of all, role theory presents a model which is closer to reality in
that it starts from an assumption that justices do not operate in a vacuum. It recognizes
that their activities on the bench are constrained by the institution on which they serve
and by that institution's relationship to other actors. Rather than focusing only on the
personal characteristics of the individual justices, role theory looks at the context within
which these individuals operate. 65
These categories are Glick's. The law-interpreter represents the traditional orientation to the law
which is similar to "Blackstone's essentially passive view that judges decide cases on the basis of
established law and that they never legislate[.]" (26) It is the view represented by the quote from Justice
Roberts presented above. A law-maker is a justice who "was fully aware of the debate over lawmaking
and law-interpreting, but usually did not acknowledge that the distinction between the two positions was
meaningful." (40) The pragmatist rests in a halfway position between the two extremes. "Judges must
remain flexible in their outlook, however, because deciding cases requires them to adhere to precedent as
well as to innovate depending upon the circumstances raised in specific cases." (28).
64
This is not to deny that some of this research has benefits which role theory does not. Role theory is
difficult to operationalize, has depended largely on the self-reporting ofjustices, and may be only a
surrogate for other motivations. As with the debate over the appropriateness ofjudicial policymaking
which is pushed to extremes when in opposition, the debates in public law over the appropriate
methodology and theory for best understanding judicial behavior would probably be best served by the
various schools working together rather than fighting for dominance in the field.
65
This is also an advantage of much of the scholarship which falls under the rubric of "new
institutionalism." For the more positivist approach to this method of study see Epstein and Knight,
Choices Justices Make. For a variety of articles which emphasize the historical approach, see Clayton
and Gillman, eds., Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches. See also much of
the work by Brace and Hall cited above.
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The second advantage is that role theory recognizes the influence of legal,
institutional, and ideological factors in the judicial decision-making process. Unlike
attitudinal studies which emphasize the ideological motivations ofjustices, role theory
allows room for legal and institutional motivations as well. Chief Justices Taft and
Burger come to mind as jurists who appeared to be at least as motivated by institutional
concerns as ideological ones, being as concerned with the reputation of the Court as
with the outcome of the cases.66 On the state level, Chief Justices Heflin of Alabama
and Vanderbilt of New Jersey would also fit this characterization. 67 In addition, while
some strict attitudinalists assume that any justice who claims to be motivated by legal
factors like precedent or deference to the legislative branch are only posing to further
their own ideological perspectives, role theory stems from an assumption that political
explanations alone are not sufficient. 68 This assumption is made clear in the conclusion
to Glick's 1971 work, State Supreme Courts in State Politics.
A task for judicial politics research is not that of determining whether
legal or political interpretations are most useful in explaining judicial
behavior, but in understanding the interactions between both sets of
values and demands and identifying those aspects of the courts which
are most affected by features of both systems. It is also important to
note that legal and political values frequently cannot be separated easily
and that each may have implications for the other. 69
66
Chief Justice William Howard Taft is widely known for his efforts at institutional reform which
resulted in the Judiciary Act of 1925 and in funding for the building of the present Supreme Court
building. Chief Justice Warren Burger also lobbied hard for a variety of administrative reforms to ease
the workload of the federal judiciary. See David O'Brien, Storm Center, 5 lh ed. (New York: Norton,
2000), chapters 2 and 3.
67
See Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation.
68
For a particularly strong criticism of the validity of the legal value ofjudicial restraint, see Jeffrey Segal
and Harold Spaeth's critique of Justice Felix Frankfurter in The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 299-332 passim. This second advantage which I claim
for role theory obviously stems from a personal bias that judicial decision making is framed by more than
personal attitudes. I hope this research will show that this is at least true for the justices who serve on the
SJC in Massachusetts.
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Role theory provides at least a partial explanation for the varying reactions of
different justices when presented with the opportunity to make public policy. Whether
justices see themselves primarily as lawmakers, law-interpreters, or pragmatists will
affect the decisions which they make on the bench. One limitation of this theory as it
has been used to study state high courts, however, is that it assumes a judge adopts a
single role orientation and maintains this no matter what kind of question she is
confronting. While helping us to understand general differences between justices (and
between high courts of different states), this assumption does not provide any
explanation for those differences between one case and another on the part of a single
70justice. Strict attitudinal theory would have us believe this results solely from the
ideological preferences of the justices. An alternative theory, and one which comports
more closely with the approach taken by role theory, can be found through a closer look
at the institution of the separation of powers.
A SUPPLEMENTAL EXPLANATION - SEPARATION OF POWERS
The concept of separation of powers is generally recognized as a fundamental
building block in the creation, development, and operation of government in the United
Glick, Supreme Courts in State Politics, 150.
70
This need not be the case from a theoretical perspective. As Glick notes, the ego-alter relationship is
really a set of relationships or dyads. The relationship between a justice and her colleagues on the bench
may set up one type of expectation while that between the justice and the governor who appointed her
creates a different expectation. Individual justices may adopt different roles depending on which dyad is
exercising the most influence on them in that specific case. As it has been opcrationalized, however,
each justice is generally seen as adopting a single role orientation throughout her career. Gibson has also
been critical of this simplistic view. "The position ofjudge is incredibly complex. Consequently,
judges' beliefs about the limits of proper behavior are also complex. Simplistic typologies of role
orientations, such as the lawmaker-law interpreter distinction and orientation toward precedent, are
unlikely to be of much utility for understanding judges' role orientations or behavior." "The Role
Concept," 445.
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States on both the national and state levels. It is also a basis for understanding the roles
of the actors in each of the three branches of government. Because of the concept of
separation, legislators are expected to perform certain functions and executives others.
The same holds true for justices of the nation's courts. As a result, the principles
underlying this theoretical construct provide a helpful lens through which to view the
judicial role.
This building block is an important second-order principle in American politics,
its primary purpose being to ensure free, democratic government. However, according
to one scholar who has studied for many years how the theory of separation of powers
plays out in practice, "the concept of 'separation of powers'. ..has few rivals for
ambiguity. There are wide differences of opinion as to what the Framers intended by
the expression."71 More specifically, there are at least three purposes which have been
assigned to this institution called the separation of powers. Powers are separated: 1) as
a check to protect citizens from the minority in power in the formal organs of
government, maintaining democratic rule; 2) to bring about greater efficiency in
government; and 3) as a check to protect the fundamental rights of the individual from
the tyranny of the majority. 72 An analysis of these three theoretical justifications for
71
Louis Fisher, "The Efficiency Side of Separation of Powers " Journal ofAmerican Studies 5 (1971),
1 13. This ambiguity puts the separation of powers in the same position as the theoretical concepts which
lie at the core of American politics, liberty, equality, and individualism, for they also engender debates
over their specific meanings.
72 More specific support for each of these claims will be presented below. Most commentators combine
these into two categories: efficiency and preventing tyranny. "The most familiar [reason for the
separation of powers] is a fear of tyranny, but another is promoting the efficient operation of government
and the rule of law." Roger Kersh, Suzanne B. Mettler, Grant D. Reeher, and Jeffrey M. Stonecash,
'"More a Distinction of Words than Things': The Evolution of Separated Powers in the American
States," Roger Williams University Law Review 4 ( 1 998): 7. "Preventing tyranny and ensuring effective
governance may be the chief aims of separation of powers law." Robert A. Schapiro, "Contingency and
Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse," Roger Williams University Law Review 4 (1998),
107. "A careful re-examination of the origins and the classic elaboration of the American separation of
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separating the executive, judicial, and legislative powers is key to understanding the
interplay of the formal institutions of government in the policy making process because
each purpose may result in a different kind of interbranch relationship. In regard to the
legitimacy ofjudicial policymaking this means justices may be willing to be lawmakers
in some cases while limiting their role to that of law-interpreter in others. The degree
to which their involvement in the development of public policy is found to be
acceptable may vary according to how that policy category Tits" the purposes for
which the powers of government are separated in the first place. The ambiguity
surrounding the purpose of the principle of separation of powers means that judicial
policymaking may be legitimate in some realms but not in others.
The most common purpose which has been put forward for the separation of
powers is to protect the majority from the minority in power by ensuring that no one
person or group of powerful persons can impose their will on the citizens of a state or
the nation through their control of all the powers of government. 73 James Madison is
usually cited as a primary supporter of this position. He noted in Federalist #47, "[t]he
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands
powers doctrine demonstrates that constitutional structure embodies a dual commitment to ensuring
effective governance as well as to protecting liberty." Jessica Korn, The Power ofSeparation: American
Constitutionalism and the Myth ofthe Legislative Veto (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 14.
The differentiation of tyranny of the minority in government from tyranny of the majority seems to be
more aptly applied to separation of powers discussions involving the judicial branch as in this study. "As
important as the 'protection' of one branch from another is, in this case the executive from the
legislature, the underlying goal ofjudicial enforcement of separation of powers principles is the liberty of
its citizens." Robert F. Williams, "Rhode Island's Distribution of Powers Question of the Century:
Reverse Delegation and Implied Limits on Legislative Power," Roger Williams University Law Review 4
(1988), 171.
73
"The impression pervades not merely college textbooks but scholarly circles as well." Fisher, "The
Efficiency Side of Separated Powers," 1 14. For an argument that protection from tyranny of a minority
in government was the purpose of the Bill of Rights sec Ahkil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights: Creation
and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
28
...may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 74 These same sentiments
were echoed in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1 780. 75
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them-
The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or
either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and
executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government
ot laws and not of men.
From this, the Madisonian perspective, powers of government are divided
between three separate and co-equal branches to be certain that the government never
becomes powerful enough to develop an interest separate from the citizens. It aims to
protect democratic government, guaranteeing that the will and actions of those in power
will result in policies which represent the interests of the many and not the few. It
results in a policy process which often favors obstruction over efficiency. "According
to this view, the Framers adopted a separation of powers to obstruct the process of
government -- to slow it down and frustrate the designs of one branch over another." 77
Issues which fall under this category would involve questions of the constitution's
distribution of powers between the branches of government and questions regarding the
ability of one branch to maintain its independence from the other branches through its
"checking powers." While admitting that the line between process and content
74
The Federalist Papers, 30 1 . For purposes of labeling, I have called this the Madisonian purpose,
although Madison could just as easily be associated with what I have chosen to call the "libertarian"
purpose, as well.
75
Constitutions of 40 other states contain a similar provision. G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 14.
^Massachusetts Constitutions, Part the First, Article 30. Part the First of the Constitution is more
commonly called the Declaration of Rights and I will use that name throughout the rest of this work.
Similarly, references to an article in the Declaration, as well as in the Articles of Amendment to the
Massachusetts Constitution, are always referenced by the justices as "art.", and I will follow that practice
as well.
77
Fisher, "The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers," 1 14.
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questions is often hazy, these type of questions would generally affect the process by
which public policy is determined, the attempt being to maintain some sense of
Madisonian balance between the three branches. Judicial policymaking, according to
this view, would be most acceptable when undertaken to restore balance in a
legislative-executive conflict.
The second purpose for which the separation of powers has developed as a
mechanism of governmental organization is to achieve efficiency. In his seminal article
promoting this perspective, Fisher emphasizes the importance of this goal to the
Framers. "1 do not claim that their search for administrative efficiency, and their
adoption of separated powers for that purpose, represents the whole truth. Yet I find it
to be more than half the truth, and since this side of the story is given so little attention
it should be told."7* Separation is not intended to achieve efficiency in the same way as
a dictatorship might (the trains may not run on time) but it is designed to ensure that
each activity of government is being performed by the branch most adequately prepared
for the task. It is designed to recognize the strengths of each branch and divide
governmental power so as to make best use of these areas of expertise. 79 In a
representative democracy, the most appropriate branch of government to make laws is
the legislature. It is designed so that its members are the closest to the citizens and it is
set up to gather the variety of information on problems and solutions which is necessary
to develop democratic legislation. The administration of the laws, however, requires a
n
Ibid., 115.
79
See Fisher, "The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers," for review of the views of Adams, Hamilton,
Jay, Jefferson, Madison, and Washington which support this position. See Korn, The Power of
Separation, for an argument which counters the critique of the separation of powers as being inefficient
and unable to respond to the needs of a modern, democratic nation. This view can be traced to
Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government: A Study in American Government (1885. reprint ed.,
Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973).
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greater degree of dispatch than can be obtained by a collective body so American
political theory has generally supported energy and efficiency in the executive, unifying
lines of authority and providing them with sufficient authority to adequately carry out
the laws.
80
The judiciary's responsibility according to this view of the separation of
powers is to resolve conflicts between individuals, between the individual and the
government, and between different branches and levels of government. This is what
the courts do best. Through the interpretation of statutory law and the application of
common law, judiciaries making sure the law is reasonably applied to the individual
cases before it. As with the first purpose underlying the separation of powers, the
desire is to protect the majority from the minority but while the process resulting from
the first reason tends toward conflict and delay, the policy process stemming from an
efficiency goal is one of greater cooperation and action. Policy questions arising under
this banner would also involve process, but they focus on the question of which types
of action are best handled by which branches of government. Once specific
constitutional limitations have been met, this set of questions comes into play.
The final purpose for the separation of powers is to protect the "unalienable
rights" of individuals. In contrast to the first two purposes for the separation of powers,
this one is particularly concerned with protecting minorities from the majority.
Questions regarding the distribution of power only require that each branch stay within
80
See Alexander Hamilton's argument for an energetic executive in
,
Federalist #70, Federalist Papers,
423-43 1 . Hamilton argues that unity in the executive is one of the necessary ingredients to efficient
government. Most states, Massachusetts included, do not meet this requirement. "Only New Jersey has
no elected executive-branch officers beyond the governor, and many states have several independently
elected executive officers who undertake important administrative responsibilities and who need not
share the governor's political affiliation." Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 17. In Massachusetts
the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are elected together, but there are four other independently
elected executives. These are the Attorney General, the Auditor, the Secretary of State and the Treasurer
and Receiver General.
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its own realm (i.e., the executive does not exercise legislative powers). 81 Tins purpose
for the separation is to ensure that even when a branch of government is acting within
its own domain, it does not infringe upon the fundamental rights of individuals,
generally understood to be the rights delineated in the federal and state bills of rights.
As the framers noted, discarding the hereditary monarchy for a republic would not
eliminate this problem. "It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustices of the other part....If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights
of a minority will be insecure." 82 A system of separated powers was intended to guard
against the tyranny of the majority, and the courts were seen as particularly appropriate
for this role.
83
This, the libertarian purpose for separating powers, provides the
justification for the greatest level of involvement by the judiciary in the policymaking
process. From this perspective the separation of powers was intended to eliminate
violations of civil rights and civil liberties by any branch of government, even when,
procedurally, it is acting in its own realm. In contradiction to the other two purposes
for separating powers, this purpose involves questions of substance. Those questions of
public policy which fall under this category would include general civil liberties issues,
policies regarding due process and criminal process, and those public questions which
touch on issues of civil rights.
8l
Obviously, neither the federal or state constitutions provide for a complete separation. The concept of
"checks and balances" precludes such a strict application of this standard.
82
Federalist #51, Federalist Papers, 323.
83
"If, then, courts ofjustice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of
judicial officersf.]" Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #78, Federalist Papers, 469. Once again there is
some difference between the federal and state governments in this regard. Most states don't have
lifetime tenure for their judicial offices. See following footnote.
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These three purposes for separating governmental powers in the American
politieal system, the Madisonian, efficiency, and libertarian purposes, are each accepted
as legitimate arguments for the existence of the institution which is called the
separation of powers and yet these three purposes lead to potentially conflicting
expectations for government. As applied to the state high courts, they lead to different
assumptions about the role a court should play in the state's policy making process.
The Madisonian and efficiency arguments provide basic support for the expectation that
courts should not "make policy."*4 From these two perspectives the legislature is both
the most legitimate body (constitutionally) and the best equipped to make law. This is
the default position on judicial policymaking in a system of separated powers, and is
the one followed in many instances by the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts. In
many cases in which the SJC has the opportunity to make policy it defers to the
legislature or the executive or the local government. 85
The high court of Massachusetts is involved in policymaking, however. While
the restraint on judicial policymaking imposed by the separation of powers is real, there
arc a variety of exceptions which arise from different perspectives on the purposes for
84
Thc argument that state supreme courts are "the least democratic branch" of state governments and
therefore should be least involved in making policy is not as clear for states as it is on the national level.
Justices in over three-quarters of the slates must answer to the electorate in some form of election al least
once during their years on the bench. While these selection methods may make justices more
democratically accountable than systems of appointment (as followed in the federal courts and one-
quarter of the states, including Massachusetts), the courts are slill the least democratic of the stales' three
branches. (For an example of the exercise of democratic control over justices who were seen as too
involved in the policy making process, or at least on the wrong side of the policy, see John T. Wold, "The
Defeat of the California Justices," Judicature 70 119X7J: 348-355).
8S
There are really three types of cases when it comes to policymaking potential: cases in which policy is
made, cases in which it could be made but isn't, and those cases which do not offer the chance to make
policy. These distinctions are discussed in more delail below.
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separating powers. They provide legitimate arguments for a greater role on the par. of
the justices in making policy for the citizens of the Commonwealth. Fu st, different
views of the Madisonian and efficiency arguments tor separating powers can combine
to justify a more aetivc role for the ji.dieia.-y. There are times when the actions of the
two other branches may conflict, raising questions ofwhich branch in the constitutional
system has the legitimate authority to act. The resolution of these "Madisonian"
questions would call upon the expertise of the courts as bodies whose primary talent is
resolving conflicts as fairly as possible. Such conflicts would not pit the judiciary
against a "democratic" branch ofgovernment but would require the judges to choose
between the actions of two, competing "democratic" branches. In the following study
of Massachusetts judicial opinions there were a few cases in which the powers of the
legislature and the executive were in conflict, arising most often over budget questions
during the advisory process discussed in Chapter Six.
Efficiency arguments can also justify the policymaking by the SJC which is
described in Chapter Four. This involves questions of common law development and
statutory interpretation. The courts, in applying the generalities of the law to specific
cases, are best able to make the policy adjustments which arc required to make the law
"fit" specific cases. In addition, while the majority of these adjustments are
incremental, the courts arc occasionally involved in cases which raise questions which,
to be adequately resolved, require more substantial policymaking. While the Court
may develop these policies on their own (as with the development of right-to-die law
discussed in Chapter Four), the justices of the SJC also recognize the efficiency
argument for separating powers. As the discussion of the development of
34
governmental tort immunity will show, they have encouraged the leg lslature to take
responsibility for developing policy in areas in which they feel the state's elected
officials are best able to determine the appropriate response to a problem, in this case
how to deal with the increasingly outmoded concept of governmental immunity.
Judicial inv olvement in questions of civil liberties and civil rights has been the
source of many claims over the years that the judiciary has usurped democratic power.
These actions, however, can be supported by the libertarian goal of the system of
separated powers. An inherent conflict between democratic processes and libertarian
results is recognized by most students of government. If the notions of fundamental
rights and equality are to have any real meaning they require some safeguard from
momentary whims of the most democratic branches of government. As the high court
justices are the least directly accountable of all public officials, and as even elected
justices are expected to make judicial determinations based on the facts before them
and not on popular opinion, their insulation makes them potential guardians of
fundamental rights and liberties. 86 Alexander Hamilton described why this role needs
to be open to the judiciary.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community. 87
86
I am not arguing here that high courts are always guardians of liberties. Many decisions by both the
United States Supreme Court and state high courts over the years can be found to prove that they can
disregard these liberties just as easily as a democratic body. However, conventional wisdom over the
past 50 years (borne out to some degree by the facts) has generally found civil liberties and civil rights to
be more adequately protected by the judicial branch than by either the legislative or executive branches
of the state or national governments.
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Cases discussed in Chapter Five will explore how the SJC has dealt with these
questions. The Court is regularly confronted with civil rights and civil liberties churns
in constitutional questions; these queries generally pit the individual against the
executive carrying out the will of the legislature. This study shows that the SJC has
never avoided these questions and has declared actions of co-equal branches to be
unconstitutional in such important areas as abortion funding, the death penalty, and the
exclusionary rule.
The separation of powers is an institution which is often referred to with the
assumption that "we all know what it means." As these three justifications for the
institution show, however, we could each be "meaning" something different when we
make our assumption, and each meaning carries different expectations for what
constitutes legitimate judicial activity. 88 The separation of powers can provide a
justification for judicial involvement in policy making in some instances and an
argument for severely limiting any policy role for state supreme courts in others.
Recognizing this may help to explain why a single justice may be willing to be activist
in some instances but restrained in others.
Federalist #78, Federalist Papers, 469. While Hamilton was probably most concerned about "the
people" using their power to tax the minority whO were wealthy, the argument is equally valid as regards
the protection of other minorities, whether they be racial or ethnic minorities, defendants fighting the
strength of the community's criminal justice forces, or an individual with unpopular ideas.
88
There may be some similarity here with the "multiple orders" approach to the study of institutions
presented by Stephen Skowronek in "Order and Change," Polity 28 (1995/1996), 91-96. While his
approach finds political disorder arising from the conflicts between the meanings of different institutions
which are present in the same polity, I am arguing that in this instance the competing meanings are
inherent in one institution, separation of powers. While focusing on role theory, this position was voiced
by J. Woodford Howard. "Strain among expectations within a role perhaps characterizes their [Circuit
Court justices] situation better than does the concept of conflict between roles." Courts ofAppeals in the
Federal Judicial System
,
166. This strain stems from different theoretical justifications for the same
institution.
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Role theory, with its basis in sociological stud.es, helps explain how pre-court
socialization, institutional arrangements, small group dynam.es on an appellate court,
and differences in state political cultures may lead to different attitudes toward judicial
policy-making by different high courts.89 Focusing more specifically on the varying
roles required by the three justifications for the institution of the separation of powers
may further explain differences in willingness to be involved in policymaking from one
case to another on the same court, and even explicate some of the seeming
inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of individual justices. Role theory, especially as
applied to state high courts, has always been intricately connected to the separation of
powers. It is premised on the fact that the place of the courts can be understood only to
the degree that one understands their relationship with the other branches. By drawing
more specifically on theoretical arguments for the justification of the separation of
powers to explore the activities of the Massachusetts high court and the role which its
justices see themselves as playing this study makes explicit what has always been
implicit in role theory -- that the High Court docs not operate in a vacuum. 90
Looking at the varying purposes for the separation of powers provides another
benefit for studying the role of state high courts. While the textbook notion of
separated powers leads to assumptions of conflict, the recognition of other purposes,
especially the efficiency perspective, provides a reminder that policymaking by the
court does not necessarily result in conflict. Looking only at those cases in which the
89
For a work which combines these and other factors into a model to explain decision-making in stale
supreme courts see Susan P. Fino, The Role ofState Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987).
90
I should make clear that I use the separation of powers lens in this study as a heuristic device, not as a
predictive one. There arc no operationalized variables here or predictions of future judicial activities. I
say this not as an apology but merely to let the reader know what to expect in the pages which follow.
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Court is involved in a conflictual relation with the legislature or the executive would
result in an incomplete picture of the times when the Court is involved in making
policy. It would overlook the various times when judicial involvement in the policy
process is part of an ongoing dialogue with the other branches or the result of benign
neglect. In either instance the Court is making decisions which have important effects
on the lives of the residents of the State of Massachusetts.
THE SUPREME IliniCIAL COURT AND
MASSACHUSETTS POT ITICS - AN OVERVIF
W
In 1997 Representative Henry Hyde, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
filed HR.1252
- The Judicial Reform Act of 1997. The bill was filed, in the words of
the Chair, to address "the infrequent but intolerable breach of the separation of powers
by some members of the federal judiciary."91 Concerned with recent problems which
he and co-sponsors of the legislation saw in issues ofjudicial discipline and recusal
questions, the legislators responded by filing legislation to limit the authority of the
federal courts. Similarly, in 1998 the New Hampshire Supreme Court came under
criticism from the legislature and the governor. The Court was accused by some of
overstepping its bounds in declaring the state mechanism for funding education to be
unconstitutional. The High Court's decision forced the state, a state which has long
prided itself on having no income tax, to come up with alternative taxing plans to
correct for educational funding inequities. "Critics say the courts have become too
powerful and judges too arrogant because they get lifetime appointments and aren't
accountable. They accuse the Supreme Court of failing to protect the public from bad
Quoted in Stephen B. Burbank, "Unwarranted Distrust of Federal Judges," Judicature 8 1 (1997), 7.
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judges and lawyers, enaeting court rules that contradict state law, and making 'activist'
rulings that tread on legislative and executive power.- Concerned about tins ruling
legislators filed 20 pieces of legislation in 1998 which would Hunt the authority of
New Hampshire's Supreme Court.
Despite claims that the separation of powers was developed to promote
efficiency and not just to hinder activity, these and many other examples could easily
lead to the assumption that conflict is the order of the day in the relationship between
legislatures and high courts throughout the nation. On the other hand, an interested
observer of Massachusetts politics would see no indication that this kind of interbranch
conflict exists. Preliminary research into the state High Court led to the same
conclusion. This seeming contradiction between trends on the national level and in
other states and the relationship between branches in Massachusetts lead to the original
question which motivated this research: is there no conflict because the SJC makes no
policy?
METHODOLOGY - FINDING POLICYMAKING ON THE SJC DOCKET
The question of how often the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has a
significant effect on public policy became the focal point of this study. Fifteen years of
SJC activity, running from 1981 to 1995, were looked at in detail to address this
92
Katharine Webster, "Judges Struggle to Keep Their Independence in Face of Court Reform," 3/22/99.
<http://www.fosters.com/news99a/mareh/ww/hn0322b.htm> (March 21, 1999). In addition to (or some
might say because of) the school financing decision, in 2000 a variety of ethics concerns were raised
regarding the behavior of several of the justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court . The result was
one resignation (Steven Thayer) and the impeachment of the Chief Justice. He was acquitted by the
Senate on October 1 1 , 2000 on all four charges, but the Judicial Conduct Committee admonished him for
violating legal codes of ethics in April of 2001.
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question.
- This fifteen year time span covers an era in which the membership on the
Court was almost constant. From the end of 1981 through 1995 only eight justices
served on the seven member court. 94 They operated under the leadership of two
different chiefjustices, Edward F. Hennessey from 1981 to 1989 and Paul J. Liacos
from 1989 to 1995. 95
In looking at the activity of the Court over these years it soon became apparent
that determining the extent of SJC involvement in significant policy decisions involved
two closely related problems: 1) vagueness of the terms, and 2) difficulty in gathering
data. From the start it was clear that the term "significance" was vague and open to
interpretation. Since the theoretical question which motivated this work concerned the
way in which the separation of powers affects the SJC and its justices, it was decided to
use the justices' views of significance as determined by the language of the opinions.
A careful reading of the opinions provided the following kinds of indicators as to the
significance of a case: phrases such as "we consider for the first time," specific
comments that the opinion will have a broad impact, dissenting opinions which take the
majority to task for intruding into the Legislature's realm by making law, or language
Some cases from before and after this time period are also discussed as they relate to specific points or
areas of law being discussed in this 15 year period.
94
Since much of 1981 was a year in transition an argument could be made for beginning this research in
1982 so as to limit the research to "natural" courts. However, the Court issued a decision regarding state
funding of abortion services in 1981 which I felt was important to include in the data base so all of 1981
is included. Three seats changed hands in this year with Justices Joseph Quiroco, Benjamin Kaplan, and
Robert Braucher retiring. They were replaced by Justices Joseph R. Nolan, Neil L. Lynch, and Francis P
O'Connor respectively. They joined Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey and Associate Justices Herbert
P. Wilkins, Paul J. Liacos, and Ruth L Abrams. The only change to membership after this came in 1989
when Liacos replaced Hennessey as Chief Justice and John M. Greaney was appointed Associate Justice.
95
Hennessey originally became Chief Justice in 1976 and Liacos served until October, 1996.
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which indicates a break from previous common law or constitutional decisions.96 A
reading of all 219 opinions issued during the 1981 calendar year found such references
in approximately 30% (64) of the cases, while another 65% (143) could be categorized
as "routine" with a fair degree of certainty.97 Referring back to the image of separation
of powers as three overlapping circles, these 143 cases would tall easily into the large
portion of the "judicial circle" which stands alone, not overlapping with the executive
or legislative circles. In most instances these cases involved non-discretionary matters
(most especially appeals in first degree murder cases, tax questions coming from the
Appellate Tax Board, or unemployment questions coming from the district courts). 98
Also included as routine cases were those involving the reading and application of a
specific document to the case at hand (contract or will) as well as those cases in which a
long-standing statutory interpretation or common law standard was being applied."
While acknowledging that this coding of cases was still somewhat subjective, a
careful reading of each opinion cut down on the problem. Such a method of analysis,
however, led to the second problem in attempting to answer this question: time
96 Of course one can never be certain at the time an opinion is issued what impact it will have in the
future. For instance, it is hard to imagine that Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the SJC from 1830-1860,
had any idea when he wrote for the Court in Webster v. Commonwealth, 5 Cush. 386 (1850) that his
definition of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would still be the standard almost 150 years later. See 1996
Model Jury Instructionsfor the District Court (Boston: Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education).
97
Coding of cases tended to err on the side of "significant" rather than on the side of "routine." The
remaining 1 1 cases were impossible to categorize with any certainty.
98 A more thorough discussion of the SJC's caseload, including questions of discretionary and non-
discretionary matters, will be found in Chapter 4.
99
This codification of non-discretionary cases as "routine" admittedly conflicts in some ways with the
notion that the SJC's screening process is established to ensure that only the most "important" cases are
taken by the state's high court. (See Chapter 4.) Some of the difference could come from the fact that
the SJC may take cases which, upon full consideration, turn out to be less important than originally
considered. The remainder are likely due to the fact that a case which is significant for legal purposes
may not be as evidently important for questions of public policy.
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constraints. To carefully read fifteen years of SJC opinions (at an average of 244/year)
would have been a nearly impossible task. To attempt to find a more quantifiable
measure of "policymaking," and to make the data gathering task more manageable, it
was decided to focus on the SJC's opinions in two types of cases: those which ra.se
questions ofjudicial review and advisory opinions issued by the Court under
constitutional authority. 100 The 178 questions involving judicial review, and the thirty-
three in which the Court were asked to issue advisory opinions were analyzed in
detail.
101
The results of this research are presented in Chapters Five and Six
respectively.
As the 1981 data discussed above indicates, however, presenting only this
information would leave a misleading impression of the role which the SJC plays in
this system of separated powers, especially in relation to the Legislature. There are
many times when the SJC has a voice in the policy process beyond these obvious
cases. The Court can be involved in making policy in cases which do not present
conflict. To ignore these cases is to overlook all the times in which the Court works
with the Legislature (or at least with their acquiescence) to develop public policy. The
100
The Massachusetts Constitution grants the SJC the authority to issue advisory opinions upon request
of either house of the Legislature, the Governor, or the Governor's Council. Massachusetts Constitution,
Part II, ch. 3, art. 2 as amended by art. 85 of the Articles of Amendment.
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Cases were located as follows: The easiest were advisory opinions. Since 1982 they have been
printed at the end of each volume of the Massachusetts Reports (beginning with page 1 20 1 ). Questions
raising judicial review were found through a brief review of all 3660 cases, and were confirmed by
double-checking against those cases listed under "Constitutional" in the index of each volume of the
Massachusetts Reports. While a Lexis search would undoubtedly provided the same results, I never
would have discovered the materials regarding common law and statutory interpretation which are
essential to understanding the SJC's role in the policy process as discussed in Chapter 4.
1 An interesting indication of the degree to which cases which do not involve cither judicial review or
advisory opinions are seen as important can be seen from the following. When the Massachusetts
Lawyers ' Weekly published its list of the most important SJC opinions over a 25 year period (1972-1997)
only three involved questions ofjudicial review and none were advisory opinions. "The Most Important
Opinions of the Past 25 Years," September 22, 1997, B5-6.
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time in
problem was to identify these eases without expending an inordinate amount of 1
data gathering. The resulting solution was to gather general data on all 3,660 eases for
which full opinions were issued from 1981 to 1995. lw In addition, the headnotes of all
cases were skimmed to find quick indicators of interesting and important cases. This
was supplemented by a review of the Massachusetts Law Review, the Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly, and major law reviews from Massachusetts to find areas of law or
specific cases which had engendered interest in the legal community. Further
indicators came from a review of the Boston Globe index from 1982 to 1995 for an
indication of important political opinions. From these sources come the data which was
analyzed for Chapter Four. The results of this process, while probably underestimating
the policy impact of SJC decisions over these fifteen years, provides at least an initial
perspective on the degree to which the Court is welcomed and involved in the state's
policymaking process.
In addition to analyzing opinions of the Court, interviews were conducted as a
means of gathering data. These taped interviews were conducted with seven of the
eight justices who served on the Court during these years. 104 All interviews lasted for
1
This information included the citation, a list of participating justices, the author of the opinion, authors
of dissenting and concurring opinions, information on amicus curiae briefs, the primary area of law
involved, the point of origin of the case, and trail it followed in getting to the SJC. This type of
information, while readily available on some courts, had to be developed from scratch for this project.
I did not include rescript opinions in this study. Theses are shorter, more summary opinions issued
by the Court in less significant cases (although they do have precedential value). The Court issued 336
such opinions between 1981 and 1995, or just under 23 per year.
1(14
Interviews were conducted with Associate Justices Abrams, Nolan, Lynch, O'Connor, and Greaney
and with former Chief Justices Hennessey and Herbert P. Wilkins who was an Associate during the years
under study and who served as Chief Justice from 1996 to 1999. Only former Chief Justice Paul Liacos
was unable to be interviewed for this project. He was ill when I began the research and died in the spring
of 1999. Audiotapes were made of all interviews, seven of which were transcribed. Unfortunately, a
malfunction of the taping equipment resulted in a loss of information from the interview with Chief
Justice Hennessey. I became aware of this problem immediately after the interview ended and recreated
the interview as best as possible from memory. I was also able to rely on two books which the Chief
43
at least one hour with two lasting two hours or more. Questions were aimed at
gathering two general types of information. First were questions focused on developing
a more thorough understanding of the internal procedures of the Court. 105 The second
set of questions attempted to discern the justices' understanding of the place of the
Court in a system of separated powers. While a script was used, interviews were fairly
free-flowing so that not all questions were asked in all interviews.
A second set of taped interviews were also conducted with key staff persons
who had worked for the Court throughout the period under study. These five staff
persons together filled positions as the Chief Legal Counsel (Daniel Johnedis and
Henry Clay), the Administrative Assistant to the SJC (John Burke), the Deputy
Administrative Assistant (Robert Bloom) and the Executive Assistant to the Justices
(Maria Mossaides). These individuals had over seventy years experience working for
the SJC.
106 Questions presented to staff differed depending on their area of expertise.
Ms. Mossaides had been most involved in administrative matters, Mr. Burke and Mr.
Bloom in administrative matters as well as legislative-judicial relations, and Mr.
Johnedis and Mr. Clay had worked exclusively on matters involving cases which came
before the Court. Interviews lasted from one and one-half hours to three hours. In two
Justice has recently written which address many of the questions which I raised. Judges Making Law
(Boston: Flaschner Judicial Institute, 1994) and Excellent Judges (Boston: Flaschner Judicial Institute,
1997).
1 5
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, little of this information regarding internal process is
described in writing. As a result I spent much time learning about such things as case screening
procedures and how the unique Single Justice session worked. Even when information is available, it is
written for practicing attorneys and is often not presented in a way which is most useful to the research of
a political scientist.
106
In addition to these staff interviews, preliminary meetings were held with Ms. Catherine Ledwidge
who had served as a clerk to Justice O'Connor and Mr. Brownlow Speer, Director of the Appeals Unit of
the Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services (the public defender agency in Massachusetts)
in preparation for meetings with the justices and staff.
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instances follow-up telephone interviews were also conducted. The material from all
interviews can be found interspersed throughout the remainder of this work.
THE RESULTS - A PREVIEW
The six chapters which follow present an answer to the two interrelated
questions which motivated this research: does the SJC play a role in the policymaking
process in Massachusetts and, if so, how is it shaped by the institutional structure
known as the separation of powers? The short answer, not surprisingly, is yes, justices
do play a role in policy making. The longer answer is yes, but not in all instances.
Separation of powers provides a helpful heuristic device to understand when the
justices seem to feel such activity is legitimate.
The system of separated powers in the United States with which most people are
familiar is that which operates on the national level. However, "separation of powers
must be understood as a contingent principle that has different applications in different
settings. Even if the general goals of avoiding tyranny and ensuring effective
governance could be ascribed to separation of powers in both the state and federal
systems, the meaning of these ends and how best to achieve them will vary widely." 107
Chapter Two provides an explanation of the various ways in which the theory of
separation of powers differs in operation between Massachusetts and the U.S.
government.
Continuing to focus on the place of the SJC in the state's political system,
Chapter Three describes the interactions between the Supreme Judicial Court and the
Legislature "outside the courtroom," in struggles for control over the internal
107
Schapiro, "Contingency and Univcrsalism," 100.
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operations of the judicial branch through rule-making authority. Over the years the
Court has gained increasing power over the judicial branch's internal operations but the
General Court still maintains substantial authority. While most conflicts over these
issues have been resolved through compromise, the potential for a power struggle in
this areas is ever-present. A second area of analysis in Chapter Three concerns the
legislative-judicial relationship regarding administration over the lower courts.
Struggles by the Court to achieve the minimal court reform legislation enacted in 1992
will be analyzed as representative of this area of struggle. This chapter shows that
while administration of the state judicial system in its entirety has been one of the most
contentious areas of interaction between the two branches, these interactions have not
had the effect of interfering with the SJC's ability to operate as an independent, co-
equal branch of government.
Aside from these interactions over activities outside the courtroom, the SJC
operates in frequent isolation from the other two branches of government so that the
relationship is predominantly one of "benign harmony." As Chapter Four shows, this
can be attributed to the fact that the majority of cases which come to the Court for
resolution do not require the that judgment be made upon the actions of its partners in
1 08
government. This chapter will provide a picture of the overall caseload which the
SJC handled from 1981 - 1995. Two points emerge from this picture. First, the
primary institutions with which the lower courts "interact" are really the lower courts
of the state. In other words, the emphasis one sees in an analysis of the Court's
workload is on exactly what one would expect from a court of last resort - the majority
108
Since the SJC has almost total discretion over its caseload, this chapter begins with a review of the
process by which the justices choose to hear cases.
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of cases involve relatively ^controversial applications of state statutes and common
law precepts to controversies from Massachusetts residents, either correcting errors in
the application of law by the lower courts or further refining the interpretation of law,
applying it to new fact patterns. 109
Secondly, however, this Chapter will also discuss those less frequent, but
individually more important, instances where the Court is involved in "the
policymaking process." While discussion of the lawmaking power of our nation's
courts frequently focuses on questions involving judicial review, this represents an
incomplete understanding, at least as to the ways in which the SJC influences the law of
the Commonwealth. Chapter Four focuses on a variety of cases in which the Court's
opinions have had influence well-beyond the individual parties to a case.
Chapters Five and Six focus on the two types of cases which have the greatest
potential to bring the SJC into potential conflict with the other, "political," branches of
government. Chapter Six details the SJC's activity in the issuance of advisory
opinions, a power which is granted to the Court in the state's constitution. Such a
power, one which is not exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court and is given to the high
court in only nine other states, is particularly interesting since it is a constitutional
requirement which clearly draws the Court into conflict with principles underlying the
separation of powers. Recognizing this, the Court has generally been cautious in its use
of this power, avoiding any question which is moot or otherwise does not meet the
criteria they have set out over the years for meeting the "solemn occasion" requirement
set out in the Constitution. Once these requirements have been met, however, the Court
109
While this summary refers to these opinions as relatively routine, I do not mean to imply that the SJC
is not making incremental policy decisions in any case it hears. I am only stating that their decisions in
these cases are treated as routine by other political actors, indicating that they are legitimate.
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provides extensive and detailed answers to requests about the constitutionality of
proposed legislation or executive actions. These opinions and the way in which this
institutional power has influenced the relationship between the SJC and its co-equal
partners in government is the focus of this chapter.
Chapter Five focuses on the other type of case which tends to bring the SJC into
direct contact with the other branches, those which call upon the Court to exercise
judicial review over the acts of the Legislature. As with the advisory power, the SJC
justices have exercised judicial review cautiously. However, their caution should not
be confused with trepidation, since the Court has never hesitated to rule in even the
most controversial of areas, public funding for abortion and the death penalty being but
two examples, when they feel that constitutional rights are being usurped by legislative
action.
110
Chapter Seven presents a summary of the role which the SJC plays in the
policymaking process in Massachusetts. Contrary to common assumptions of
democratic concerns regarding appointed officials having authority to make law, in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts the SJC not only plays a role in this process, but it
often does so in cooperation with the other branches of government. Rather than
debate, which is assumed to be the primary mode of discussion in the view of the
separation of powers as a struggle for power, the judiciary in Massachusetts is engaged
in a dialogue with the General Court with their conversations resulting in public policy
for the citizens of the Commonwealth.
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See, Moe v. Secretary ofAdministration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629 (1981) (public funding for
abortion), and District Attorneyfor the Suffolk District v. Watson, 38 1 Mass. 648 ( 1 980) and
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) (the death penalty).
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CHAPTER 2
SEPARATION OF POWERS: MASSACHlISFTTS AND US Compaq
There are many similarities between the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts (SJC) and the nation's highest court, but there are also some important
differences. While this is not a comparative study per se, a comparison of these two
judiciaries and the place each holds in its respective political system is important to a
fuller understanding of the SJC. Readers tend to be more familiar with the relationship
between branches of government in Washington, D.C. than in Boston or any other state
capital." 1 To understand the role which the SJC plays in Massachusetts its unique
features must be delineated - its role can be defined not only in positive terms but also
by recognizing what it is not. The differences between the SJC and the United States
Supreme Court lead to different understandings of the way in which the separation of
powers shapes the judiciary's role in each level of government. Much is known about
the United States Supreme Court, and it tends to be our model for understanding the
place of a court of last resort within a system of separated powers. As will be shown,
however, this assumed similarity between the national court of last resort and the state
supreme courts may not be accurate." 2 This chapter will explore some of the essential
differences between the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. These differences may explain, in part, why the high court of
1
In almost all states the three branches are located in the state's capital. California is an exception to
this with the legislature and the governor headquartered in Sacramento while the California Supreme
Court operates out of San Francisco.
1 12 While he is speaking here of theories of constitutional law rather than theories regarding the
separation of powers, Alan Tarr's observation seems appropriate. "Legal scholars announce
constitutional theories that actually encompass only the federal Constitution -- the rough equivalent of
propounding a literary theory that pertains to a single novel." Understanding State Constitutions
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 1.
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Massachusetts appears to have a more cooperative relationship with its state
counterparts than has been the case with the United States Supreme Court and its co-
equal branches on the federal level." 3
Some of the differences between the SJC and the United States Supreme Court
are obvious (the national impact of the Supreme Court's decisions comes immediately
to mind), while others are less well-known. The similarities and differences between
the two will be assessed from two perspectives, the first being a description of the
historical development of the SJC. Predating the Supreme Court and having a long-
standing place in the state's political system which dates back to colonial times, the
SJC's development over time has changed with the developing needs of the state.
Contrasted with this is the relatively consistent place of the nation's high court in the
American system of government. Secondly, the difference between these two
judiciaries is explored through the roles and responsibilities they are assigned by their
respective constitutions as well as their different places in the system of federalism.
These differing institutional factors have the potential to promote varying relationships
between branches." 4
113 Some comparative information will also be provided about the high courts of other states. Each state
may vary in the degree to which its role in the polity is more conflictual (as on the federal level) or is
more cooperative (as in Massachusetts).
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Federal-state differences are not the only way in which judiciaries differ. State courts differ from each
other as well, not only in their history and their constitutional roles, but also because of that amorphous
but unavoidable concept called "political culture." See, Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View
from the States, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
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HISTORIES COMPARED - A PRACTICAL DFVFI opm^t
AND A THEORETIC Al F\FRfK£
Historians and justices of the SJC often point to the long, proud tradition of
judicial activity on the part of the state's highest court, a tradition which began long
before that of the U. S. Supreme Court. From this perspective, one of the differences
between these two institutions, and one whose effects on the place of the judiciary in a
system of separated powers may be overlooked, is the respective "age" of the two
institutions. While the United States Supreme Court clearly dates its beginning to the
implementation of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, the SJC traces its roots to the
Supreme Court of Judicature which was created under the charter which established the
Province of Massachusetts Bay in 1692. 115 It proudly lays claim to being "the oldest
court in continuous service in the hemisphere." 116 On one hand, tracing its history to
early colonial times may seem a little far-fetched -- how can the same political body
exist under British rule and under American independence? It seems that this political
shift would be substantial enough for all institutions operating after the Revolution to
be seen as new. At the very most, it would seem that the SJC could only lay claim to
115
This Charter was granted by King William and Queen Mary on October 17, 1 69 1 , but the SJC
generally traces its "birth date" to the act of the General Court (the colonial legislature) on November 25,
1692 which created the Superior Court of Judicature. For a discussion of the early history of the
judiciary in Massachusetts, see the following articles in Russell K. Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law
in Massachusetts: The Supreme Judicial Court, 1692 - 1992 (Boston, MA: Supreme Judicial Court
Historical Society, 1992): Barbara Aronstein Black, "The Concept of a Supreme Court: Massachusetts
Bay, 1630-1686" (43-80); David Thomas Konig, "The Virgin and the Virgin's Sister: Virginia,
Massachusetts, and the Contested Legacy of Colonial Law" (81-116); and Russell K. Osgood, "The
Supreme Judicial Court, 1692-1992: An Overview" (9-42). Also see Edgar J. Bellefontaine, "The
Lawyers and the Judges in the Court's Earliest Years," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly Special Edition,
October 19, 1992, 6-10, and Catherine S. Menand, "The Revolutionary Moment and the Supreme
Judicial Court," Massachusetts Law Review 1 (March, 1992), 22-30.
116
Benjamin Kaplan, "Introduction: An Address," in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in
Massachusetts, 4. Kaplan was an associate justice of the SJC from 1972 through 1981. The various
articles in this book form the core of much of the history in this chapter as this is the most detailed
history of the SJC available. It was compiled by the SJC Historical Society on the occasion of the
Court's tricentennial.
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being nine years older than the United States Supreme Court, noting its creation in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. While this political shift was happening, however,
the Court as an institution remained relatively unchanged. From tins view the S.IC was
really only the Superior Court of Judicature under a new name. The membership,
general rcspons.bilities, and law which the justices applied remained largely unchanged
in the transition from colonial status to independent statehood. In fact, the justices
"appear to have been deemed to be justices of the new court [SJCj without even the
passage of enabling legislation to establish that Court." 117
Whether or not one accepts 1692 as the birth date of the SJC, it is certainly the
case that Massachusetts (along with the other twelve colonies) had extensive experience
operating with a judiciary as a separate institution within their local political systems
long before the United States became an independent political entity. This allowed for
an evolving notion of the separation of powers, arising more out of practical experience
than out of theories from the books of Locke and Montesquieu. From earliest colonial
times, the distinction between the executive, judicial, and legislative powers began to
develop. Before 1692 the colonial legislature in Massachusetts, the General Court," 8
exercised a variety ofjudicial functions. One scholar presents an early view of the
melding and dividing ofjudicial duties in the early years through the eyes of Governor
Winthrop, the first Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
It is clear to me that Winthrop suffered no more from this variety of
confusion [regarding division of duties between legislature and
judiciary] than we do, which is to say no more than is inevitable in the
nature of things, which is to say, rather a lot. Winthrop understood the
117
Osgood, "The Supreme Judicial Court," in Osgood cd., The History of the Law in Massachusetts, 1 7.
118
This is still the formal name for the state's legislature, and I will use it interchangeably with
"Massachusetts Legislature" throughout the remainder of this work.
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distinction between legislation and adjudication very well indeed well
enough to understand its weaknesses, as well as its strengths and his
approach to the General Court as an adjudicative body brilliantly reflects
his understanding of both. 119
In the years between 1692 and the Revolutionary War, concern with delineating
authority and power between branches, especially between the legislative and the
judicial branches, gave way to a broader concern with maintaining the courts as
independent entities as they came under increasing pressure from the Crown. 120
Nonetheless, judicial "specialization" continued throughout these years. By the time
the Massachusetts Constitution took effect in 1780, the three branches, especially the
legislature and the judiciary which had operated relatively independent from the
Crown, had a working relationship which this written constitution only formalized.
The importance to the citizens of the new state of Massachusetts of having co-
equal branches of government can be seen in two articles found in the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, the state's bill of rights. Article 29 declares, in part, that "[i]t is
the right of every Citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the
Barbara Aronstein Black, "The Concept of a Supreme Court," in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law
in Massachusetts, 79. This article provides an excellent discussion of the factors tending toward a
separation of powers in the early years, as well as those factors which hindered a fuller development of
this organizing principle. Overall, her view of the distinction between legislative and judicial powers as
being parts of a continuum as opposed to the perspective which tries to draw a clear line of demarcation
between the two powers is one which I share.
120 Some historians have argued that these battles for judicial independence were as important in the
broader revolutionary movement as the more well-known struggles over taxation, general searches, and
quartering troops. "The dispute over judicial independence was a major cause of opposition to the royal
government in Massachusetts, and the struggle to control the court and its judges was central to the
revolutionary crisis." (Menand, "The Revolutionary Moment," 22.)
This is an early example in American politics when the centrifugal effect of competing power
institutions within a local political system (colony or state) were offset by the centripetal effects of a
conflict with an "outside" power on those same institutions. While the sense of threat from "the Mother
country" was clearly greater than contemporary states in the United States ever feel from the federal
government, this offsetting influence, continues to be an important difference in the systems of separated
powers on the federal and state levels.
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lot of humanity will permit." 121 For this reason, the framers of the Massachusetts
Constitution avoided what one commentator has called "some premature Jacksonian
preference" for elections ofjustices, mandating that justices of the SJC be appointed for
"as long as they behave themselves." 122 In addition to providing for the independence
of the judiciary, the Constitution stated that a clear separation of powers should exist
between the judiciary and the other two branches.
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them:
The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or
either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and
executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government
of laws and not of men. 123
It could be argued that the United States Supreme Court started out in 1789
where the SJC had ended up in 1780. The difference, of course, is that the SJC reached
its position after a long period of growth and development within a political system of
The full text of article 29 reads as follows: "It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every
individual, his life, liberty, property and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws,
and administration ofjustice. It is the right of every Citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and
independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the
security of the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that the judges of the supreme judicial Court
should hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well; and that they should have honorable
salaries ascertained and established by standing laws."
According to one scholar, the 1778 draft Constitution which was rejected in Massachusetts was
criticized, among a variety of reasons, for the fact that it made the judiciary subordinate to the legislature.
See, Kinvin Wroth, "The Maine Connection: 1620 - 1820," in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in
Massachusetts, 189.
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Kaplan, "Introduction," in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in Massachusetts, 3.
123
Article 30, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. While this language seems particularly clear and
unambiguous I would emphasize two points which are important in light of my project. First, the
language assumes an understanding of what the various powers (executive, judicial, and executive)
entail. As emphasized in Chapter 1 , there may be times when an agreement on how each power is
defined is, in fact, the source of much conflict. Secondly, despite such strict limits, Part II of the
Constitution which outlines the "Frame of Government" includes violations of this provision. Most
notably, these include the right to veto legislation which is given to the Governor (an obvious legislative
power) and, most interesting to me, the power given to the SJC to provide advisory opinions to both the
legislature and the Governor. This clearly allows the SJC to be involved in legislative and executive
activities in a way not found on the national level. The Massachusetts Constitution is not unique in this
declaration of separation. Forty other states have such declarations. (Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, 14.)
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separated powers. In contrast to this history (which was shared to some extent by most
of the other colonies124), a national judiciary did not even develop with Independence;
it was not until the U.S. Constitution was ratified .n I7S7
.Ik., a federal judiciary was
created
-
and tins creation was not wimout conflict. 125 According to its detractors, one
of the many problems which the government had faced under the Articles of
Confederation was a lack of a national judiciary to ensure that federal law was applied
and that it was done uniformly across the country. From the perspective of those who
favored retaining a confederation instead of adopting the federal system of the new
Constitution, however, this was not a problem. It was easier to avoid the tyranny of a
strong national government if the national law could only be applied and interpreted in
state courts. With this in mind it is ironic that it was men at the Constitutional
Convention of 17X7 who favored a weaker national government vis-a-vis the states who
ended up supporting the creation of the Supreme Court as a vehicle for ensuring federal
supremacy. It was a case of the lesser of two evils - while not wanting a federal
judiciary to enforce federal laws, they preferred this to the proposal of "nationalists" to
124
While all colonics had this depth of experience with a separate judiciary, the way in which these
branches developed in each slale was different. For a history of the New York Court of Appeals, that
bale's highest court, see, Francis Bergan, The History ofthe New York ( 'owt oj Appalls, 1847-1932
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), chapter 2. A brief history of the New Jersey Supreme
Court can be found in (i. Alan fair and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme ( 'ourtS in State and
Nation (New I laven: Yale University Press, I98X), chapter 5. In contrast to the Massachusetts history,
these high courts were created out of the hybrid system which had grown up in the years alter
Independence. The New York Court of Appeals was created in 1847, replacing the New York Supreme
Court which had been in existence from 1791-1X46. According to one Student of that court, its creation,
"with judges elected statewide was a reaction to the predominant sentiments of .lacksoiuan democracy."
Luke Bicrman, "Paths to the Bench: Judicial Selection on the New York Court of Appeals," paper
presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, September 2-5, 1993, Washington,
D.C, The New Jersey Supreme Court was developed in 1947 to replace the outdated Court of Errors ami
Appeals. While not an original colony, another interesting history of a state high court can be found m
Charles Sheldon's A Century ofJudging: A Political History ofthe Washington Supreme ( 'ourt,
125 The majority of the information in the rcmaimlci oi this paragraph comes from the work of John 1,.
Schmidhauser ami Larry L, Berg in The Supreme ( 'ourt and ( 'ongress (New York: flic f ree Puss,
1972), especially, Chapter 3 - "Legitimacy and Judicial Power."
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give the nation's legislative or executive branch the power to override unconstitutional
state laws. What is most interesting about this history is that «[t]he issue of federalism
had a far greater bearing upon the creation of a Supreme Court than did the concept of
separation of powers, although the latter was discussed, albeit inconclusively, during
the convention." 126
While it is impossible to assess with any certainty what difference these
respective histories may have made in regard to the relationship between the
institutions of government as they exist today, there is one potential impact these
different roads of development may have made. At least in the early years, the
legitimacy of the SJC vis-a-vis the legislature and the governor would seem to have
been much more firmly established than that of the Supreme Court in relation to the
Congress and the President. This legitimacy and acceptance was not just the result of
constitutional mandates but of many years of experience ~ sometimes cooperative and
sometimes conflictual - which laid the foundation for the interactions which were to
occur post-Independence. This is not to say that such a history is necessarily better
than starting anew, only that it is different. 127
Perhaps in part due to their different histories, the paths of development which
these two high courts have taken from the end of the 18th century until today have
varied as well. There are two distinctions which seem to be of particular importance.
126
Schmidhauser and Berg, p. 24.
127 An example of the way in which pre-Revolutionary history helped to shape the institutional
arrangement of power in Massachusetts can be seen in the hesitancy of the legislature to grant equity
power to the courts of the Commonwealth. It was not until 1877 that the SJC was given plenary
chancery jurisdiction. (Osgood, "The Supreme Judicial Court," Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in
Massachusetts, 26). See, also, Konig, "The Virgin and the Virgin's Sister," in Osgood, ed., The History
of the Law in Massachusetts, 100-1 15, for a comparison of Massachusetts and Virginia in this regard,
with his explanation for the difference resting largely on cultural differences between the two colonies.
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First is a difference within a similarity. From their inception, both high courts were
expected to function both as courts of original jurisdiction and as courts of appeal. The
difference between the two, however, was that the predominant role of the U.S.
Supreme Court was to hear appeals involving federal questions so as to ensure
consistency in, and compliance with, federal law from one part of the country to
another. This was one of its primary reasons for being created. In contrast, the SJC
wasn't really "created" for any reason but simply continued as it had during the
colonial period. The General Court did enact legislation in 1 782 which stated that this
"new" SJC would have five justices (one chiefjustice and four associate justices) and
would perform a variety of duties, formalizing what had largely existed under the
Superior Court of Judicature. 128 This statute also "defined the jurisdiction of the Court
in the broadest common law, but not equitable, terms,...provided for appellate review of
certain matters and for the Court to regulate admission to the bar and 'all other Rules
respecting Modes of Trial, and the Conduct of Business'." 129 With all of these duties,
however, the SJC continued to operate predominantly as a trial court for serious
criminal and civil matters until 1859 when the Massachusetts legislature established a
statewide trial court system with the creation of the Superior Court Department. 130 The
128
St. 1782, c.9. Since 1873 the SJC has been composed of seven justices: 1 chiefjustice and 6 associate
justices (St. 1873, c.40). Before that time the total number ofjustices required by statute ranged from a
low of four to a high of six.
1
Osgood, "The Supreme Judicial Court," in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in Massachusetts, 18.
For further discussion of the Court's rule-making authority see Chapter 3.
130 An early history of this development can be found in William T. Davis, History of the Judiciary of
Massachusetts (Boston: Boston Book Co., 1900). For a more contemporary account see James B.
Muldoon, "Massachusetts Politics and the Founding of the Superior Court," Massachusetts Lawyers
Weekly Special Section, October 1 9, 1 992, 19-21. See also James B. Muldoon, You Have No Courts with
Any Sure Rule ofLaw: The Saga ofthe Supreme Judicial Court ofMassachusetts (Peterborough, NH
:
Lookout Hill Press, 1992).
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SJC still retained some trial jurisdiction after 1859 but the focus of its role changed at
this point, with appellate work beginning to predominate. As one observer has
commented, «[t] he process facilitated the transformation of the Supreme Judicial Court
from a great trial court with ancillary appellate authority to a great appellate court with
ancillary trial jurisdiction." 131 From the mid-19th century on, the original jurisdiction
of the Court was removed piece by piece, leaving the SJC with only appellate
jurisdiction. 132 Ironically, while the U.S. Supreme Court has always been
predominantly a court of appeal, it still maintains some original jurisdiction today. The
SJC, which until the 1860's had a much heavier original caseload, no longer maintains
any original jurisdiction. 133
As with the change in the balance of original and appellate jurisdiction, another
change in the Court's workload also occurred more slowly in Massachusetts than on the
federal level. This was the ability of a high court to control its own docket. The
Supreme Court gained a large measure of control over its own docket with the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1925. 134 It was not until almost 50 years later that the
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Daniel J. Johnedis, "Creation of the Appeals Court and Its Impact on the Supreme Judicial Court," in
Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in Massachusetts, 445.
132
"The earliest change in the period from 1860 to the present was the gradual legislative denuding of the
Court's trial jurisdiction and its conference on the Superior Court. For instance, tort trial jurisdiction was
removed from the Supreme Judicial Court in 1880. Capital cases were removed wholesale in 1891.
Contract and replevin were finally transferred in 1905." Osgood, "The Supreme Judicial Court," in
Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in Massachusetts, 23 (citations omitted).
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There is one small exception to this statement. There is one grant of original jurisdiction to the SJC
under art. 101 of the Articles of Amendment in the Massachusetts Constitution regarding redisricting of
legislative districts for the Governor's Council and the State Legislature. This power is rarely invoked,
but see Town ofBrookline v. Secretary ofthe Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 406 (1994).
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is outlined in U.S. Constitution, Article III, §1. The
number of cases of original jurisdiction which the Supreme Court hears are minimal; since its creation in
1 789 the Court has decided about 1 75 cases under its grant of original jurisdiction. (Henry Abraham,
The Judicial Process, 7th ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 171.)
134
This was further supplemented by the 1988 Act to Improve the Administration of Justice which
eliminated all rights of appeal to the Supreme Court except in cases involving reapportionment, those
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SJC gained any real control over its own docket when, in 1972, the Legislature created
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals to handle almost all mandatory appeals. The only
non-discretionary appeal to the SJC which still has any impact on the Court's workload
involves convictions from capital crimes. 135
Despite the different timelines which the United States Supreme Court and the
SJC have followed in regard to both jurisdiction and docket-control, there is an obvious
similarity which emerges from this brief look at their development. This is the fact that
the legislatures, both the Massachusetts General Court and the U.S. Congress, can
exercise a great degree of control over the judiciary by controlling their workload. This
is hardly an earth-shattering observation, but it is important as a reminder that despite
their differences, both of these institutions are constrained by the separation of powers.
The other similarity is that the degree of control which the respective legislatures have
chosen to exercise over the high courts has diminished over time, with the trend in
legislation being toward greater freedom for their respective courts of last resort in
controlling their workload.
The differing paths by which each political system developed in this regard
affects the contemporary understanding of the role of the two high courts in their
respective political systems. There are two important things which may happen when a
court of last resort is given a great degree of discretion over its docket, both tending
involving the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Presidential Election Campaign Act
of 1974, or "actions challenging the constitutionality of any statewide legislative bodyf]" (Abraham,
The Judicial Process, 180.)
135 See GL c.278, §33E. There are a few other types of appeals over which the SJC has no discretion.
These include appeals from Single Justice sessions, certification of questions from the courts of other
jurisdictions, and requests for advisory opinions. For a more thorough discussion of the source of cases
on the SJC's docket and the process by which cases come to the Court, see Chapter 4.
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toward the same result. The first effect is predominantly practical; the general
workload of the Court diminishes. No matter how hard-working the justices may be,
no justice wants to rush through cases so quickly that she cannot adequately consider
the issues being presented before reaching a conclusion. The second effect is that the
justices need to establish a system for determining which of those discretionary cases
they want to hear. The result which both effects tend toward is a judiciary that has the
time and the inclination to take on 'important" questions - questions which may be
more likely to overlap with the issues being considered by the other branches of
government. Instead of having to hear any appeal involving routine judicial matters,
the Supreme Court has had authority and the time for over 70 years to confine its
activities to those questions coining to their attention which the justices find to be
important. The result has been described by David M. O'Brien as follows: "[t]he
Court now functions like a roving commission, or legislative body, in responding to
social forces."
136
It has not been until the last thirty years that the SJC has had this
discretion. A briefer experience with "freedom" could explain, in part, why the SJC is
rarely described as being as "political" as the fairly typical description which O'Brien
gives of the U.S. Supreme Court. There have been fewer years (ergo fewer
opportunities) in which the two institutions could come into conflict.
It is interesting to note, however, that the SJC has taken on an increasingly
visible role in the last twenty years, less in relation to other branches of the
Commonwealth than in relation to the federal government. As a prominent state high
court in the movement known as the new judicial federalism, the SJC has been more
136 Storm Center, 2nd ed., (New York: Norton and Company, 1990), 194.
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willing than many of its counterparts throughout the country to interpret the
Massachusetts Constitution to provide greater protection for individual civil liberties,
especially for criminal defendants, than are provided by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 137 So, while the SJC has been restrained in its
interactions with the Legislature, they have not hesitated to exercise their power in
breaking from the course set by the U.S. Supreme Court. Such is not the path which
would be followed by a timid court afraid to move beyond the very traditional notions
ofjudicial power.
INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES - BROAD SIMILARITIES.
SUBTLE DIFFERENCES
While having taken slightly different paths to get there, the United States
Supreme Court and the SJC share many institutional traits today. They are both the
final appellate authority for their respective political systems, exercising almost total
discretion over their caseload, and supervising a three-tiered judiciary. While the
Supreme Court has nine members and the SJC only seven, they are both composed of a
chiefjustice and associate justices who are appointed to serve for life, assuming good
• 1 38 •
behavior. Broad similarities, however, mask three, specific differences between
these two high courts which are imposed upon them by constraints of their respective
See Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
Latzer finds Massachusetts to be one of the four states with the highest rates of rejecting current Supreme
Court precedents when interpreting its own constitution in regard to the rights of criminal defendants.
See also, Michele DeMary, "Protecting the Individual: Search and Seizure and the Massachusetts
Constitution," paper presented at the New England Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April
22, 1994, Salem, Massachusetts; and "Banned in Boston? Free Speech Under the Massachusetts
Constitution," paper presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
November 11, 1994, Providence, Rhode Island. This practice is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
138 As will be noted below, "for life" in Massachusetts only means until the age of 70, at which point
retirement from the bench is mandatory.
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constitutions. Again, these distinctions differentiate the system of separated powers
on the federal level from that in Massachusetts.
First, and most evident, is the fact that the SJC is only the ultimate appellate
authority for its political system if there is no federal question involved. While the
state's justices provide the final judicial voice on the interpretation of stale law and the
state's constitution, they arc not the final word on whether these state laws conflict with
a federal law or the U.S. Constitution. When such a question arises, the Supremacy
Clause dictates that the Supreme Court can determine that the statute, or the
interpretation of the state's constitution, must fall. 140 This distinction has implications
for the study of these two high courts and the role they play in their respective systems
of government. The result of federal supremacy on the state system is that the SJC
must follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in settling federal questions.
When a state statute is challenged on federal constitutional grounds, the SJC is more
constrained in its response. Federalism becomes an intervening variable in the
relationship established through the system of separation of powers.
141 How this played
l3
' There are also differences in the way in which the two courts exercise their discretion in choosing
cases and in supervising their respective judicial branches. These differences, however, arc a result of
rules and norms established by the Courts (and sometimes by legislative action) and not of constitutional
constraints and will be discussed elsewhere. The criteria and procedures which the SJC employs in
choosing cases will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Their role in supervising the lower courts
will be included in Chapter 3.
1 0 The Supremacy Clause is found in the United States Constitution, Article VI. "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United Slates, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
141
I would add that the organizational principle of federalism also has a powerful influence on the
national level, in the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court. Many of the more
controversial decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the last 40 years have not overturned federal
legislation but arc aimed at state action: abortion, due process rights, desegregation, school prayers. As
a result, some of the tensions which have existed between these two bl anches on the federal level have
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out in the fifteen years under analysis in this study will be discussed more thoroughly in
Chapter 5. In general, it should be noted that there are two, contrasting results which
the pressure of federalism could have on the system of separation of powers in the
states. On the one hand, the realization that "the feds" may be challenging the state
could cause the three branches to work more closely together than might otherwise be
the case in the absence of this pressure. This sort of threat from "outside" may
introduce a motive for cooperation to counter the traditional notions of separate
branches battling for their respective powers. 142
Conversely, the fact that the SJC may not operate as the final voice on the
constitutionality of a law could encourage division, allowing the losing branch in the
challenge before the SJC to take its claim to the United States Supreme Court. While
this could happen if the SJC were to interpret the Massachusetts Constitution in a way
which conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, the more likely occurrence would be when
the SJC's decision rested on an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 143 It is possible
less to do with a struggle for power between the two branches than with a struggle between the states and
the Court.
14 An example of this "cooperation" can be found in Attorney General v. The Travelers Insurance Co.,
391 Mass. 730 (1984) in which state legislation requiring minimum mental health coverage in health
insurance policies was challenged as conflicting with the federal Employment Retirement Security Act
(ERISA). Travelers Insurance had made a similar claim in 1982 (385 Mass. 598) which the SJC had
denied. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court which vacated the judgment and remanded it for
further consideration in light of a 1983 decision, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines (463 U.S. 85). Despite this, the
SJC continued to hold that the state statute did not violate federal legislation. The following language
from their 1984 opinion is indicative of the "us" v. "them" sense of which I speak. "It may be argued, on
the basis of intimations in Shaw, that the Supreme Court would reach a different result, but we decline to
anticipate such a ruling. We think that nothing in the congressional language or in the language of the
Supreme Court requires us to sacrifice our State policy" (733).
143
The obvious way for the Court to avoid this problem is to rest all decisions on state constitutional
ground. This depends, however, on the appellant raising a state constitutional claim. (For a discussion of
the intricacies of this practice, see Stanley Friedelbaum, "Independent State Grounds: Contemporary
Invitations to Judicial Activism," in Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, eds., State Supreme Courts:
Policymakers in the Federal System [Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982].) This was the practice
followed by the SJC in cases like the following: District Attorney ofSuffolk County v. Watson, 381 Mass.
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thai this avenue for challenging the SJC could weaken its perceived authority in the
eyes of the oilier two branches (and of the public). 144
The differing place of each court within the American system of federalism is
not the only institutional distinction within the seemingly similar structures of the SJ(
and the United States Supreme Court. A second difference is in their method of
appointment. 145 The justices of the Supreme Court, of course, are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate."" While the nation's chief
executive exercises sole authority m choosing a potential nominee, the 100 members of
the Senate, especially those of the majority parly on the powerful Judiciary Committee,
exercise a palpable influence on the appointment process. This is true even in the
nomination phase since the president, if she wishes to see the nominee confirmed, must
648 (1980) (provision in art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment prohibits the use of the death penalty); Moe v. Secretary ofAdministration andFinance, 182
Mass. 629 ( l ( >XI ) (due process of art, 10 ol the Declaration of Rights provides that legislation prohibiting
the USeoi slate medical assistance funds for abortion procedures is unconstitutional); Commonwealth V
Upton, 394 Mass. 563 ( 1985) (art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights provides greatei protection to
individuals than does 4th Amendment); Opinion ofthe Justices, 406 Mass. 1201 (1989) (proposed law to
"shield" child witness from defendant in Child sexual abuse cases would violate the art. I 2 guarantee ol
face-to-face confrontation.)
' " While rare, this is similar to what happened in two 1984 eases involving search and seizure claims. In
these eases, however, it was dislricl attorneys' offices challenging the Court rather than a co-equal branch
Of government, In the original cases, (he S.K ' followed what it thought was appropi late precedent in
applying the 4th Amendment to a search and seizure claim, slating that the state guarantee under Article
14 was similar lo this federal protection. (( 'ommonwealth V. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 4XX
I
1 9X2 1 and
( 'ommonwealth V. Upton, 390 Mass. 562
| 1983]), The district attorney in each case appealed lo the
Supreme Courl which reversed in light of new developments in search and seizure law in the opinion of
Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). {Massachusetts v. Upton, w>(> Mass. 727 1 1984] and
Massachusetts v, Sheppard, 46X U.S. 9X1
|
I9X4|.) Upon rehearing, the SJC continued to interpret the
state constitutional provision so as to be more protective of the right to be free ol unreasonable searches
and seizures, (Commonwealth V, Sheppard, 394 Mass. 3X1 | 19X5| aiul Commonwealth v, Upton, 194
Mass. 363 [1985].)
1 ,S
( )f course the fact that the S.K ' justices are appointed, especially for life, differentiates them from the
majority of justices on the high COUrtS of other slates. Thirty-nine slates use some form of election
(partisan, non-partisan, retention). Of those who do use an appomlmenl process, only two others (New
I [ampshire and Rhode Island) have life time appointments, See, The Hook oj the Stales 2000 2001
(I exington, KY: The Council of State Governments, 1998), chapter 4.
146
U.S. Constitution, Article II, §2.
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bear in mind the potential preferences of the Senators. This is not to deny that the
president has the upper hand in this process, but only to emphasize that the Senate also
has a distinct and discernible influence on the choice ofjustices who sit on the nation's
highest court. 147 Contrasted with the federal process, the justices of the SJC are
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Governor's Council, a
governing body remaining from Massachusetts' colonial past. 148 There is no legislative
involvement by either the House or the Senate in this process. 149
This variation in the selection processes raises the potential for an interesting
difference between inter-branch relations in Massachusetts and in Washington, D.C.
Assuming the appointing authority can influence the judiciary by the appointment
process, an assumption that some U.S. presidents would deny, the Massachusetts
selection system provides the setting in which a much stronger connection could
develop between the executive and the judiciary in Massachusetts than could
7
For a review of the appointment process for Supreme Court Justices, see: Stephen L. Carter, The
Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appointments Process (New York: Basic Books, 1994);
John Anthony Maltese, The Selling ofSupreme Court Nominees (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995); Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics ofSupreme Court Confirmation
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1 994), and David A. Yalof, Pursuit ofJustices: Presidential Politics and the
Selection ofSupreme Court Nominees (Chicago: University of Chiacago Press, 1999). While the Senate
has some influence on Supreme Court appointees, that institution's influence increases as one move
down the judicial hierarchy. On the U.S. Courts of Appeal and federal district courts see, Sheldon
Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1997). Also see, Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A
Constitutional and Historical Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).
148
Massachusetts Constitution, Part II, c.2, §1, art. 9. The Governor's Council is composed of eight
members who are elected biennially from districts throughout the state. In addition to their responsibility
for approving all judicial appointments, they must approve all pardons and commutations, and approve
warrants for all expenditures by the Governor's office. New Hampshire also uses a Governor's Council
(composed of five members) to approve judicial appointments. (Book ofthe States, 136.)
149
For a comparative view of the way in which other states choose their justices, see Philip L. Dubois,
From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Questfor Accountability (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1980); Charles H. Sheldon and Linda S. Maule, Choosing Justice: The Recruitment ofState and
Federal Judges (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1997); and Lyle Warrick, Judicial
Selection in the United States: A Compendium ofProvisions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: American Judicature
Society, 1993).
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necessarily be assumed on the federal level. It also presents the possibility of a more
independent stance toward the legislature in Massachusetts than in the nation's capital.
There is little indication that the appointment process has this sort of influence,
however. In the fifteen years under analysis the Governor's authority was challenged
in very few cases and, when it was, the judiciary generally dismissed the action as
against the Governor. 150 Furthermore, the judicial-legislative relationship which
emerges from these same years shows the SJC to be relatively deferential to the
legislature, despite the fact that there is no connection in the appointment process.
Since the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 took effect, 141 justices have
been appointed to the Court and the formal process for these appointments has not
changed. 51 The process has changed in practice, however, as Governors throughout
150
"The Governor and the Legislature should be dismissed as parlies, even though any judgment entered
concerning them would be in their favor. Declaratory relief is not available against the Governor or the
Legislature. Mandamus is available neither against the Governor nor against the Legislature. Judicial
unwillingness to order the Governor or the Legislature to act is founded on separation of powers
principles expressed in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In most (but not all) cases,
relief, if deserved, can be obtained against the Commonwealth or some defendant other than the
Governor or the Legislature." (Town ofMilton v. Commonwealth, 416 Mass. 47 1 [1993].) While not
researching this directly, I only came across two cases between 1981 and 1995 in which an action of the
Governor was found to be unconstitutional. The first was in 1981 when Governor Edward King, in
action reminiscent of President Harry Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, issued
an executive order to take control of the MBTA during a fiscal emergency. Like the U.S Supreme Court
in 1952, the SJC declared this action to be beyond the powers of the Governor. Unlike its federal
counterpart, however, the Court was extremely deferential to the Governor. "On the other hand, we
recognize... that the Governor was confronted by the prospect of a public disaster.... In such
circumstances, deferral of coercive judicial remedies to permit action by the appropriate branch of
government is a familiar expedient." {Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Advisory Board v.
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 382 Mass. 569 [1981], 578-9.) The Court authorized the
Governor's continued operation of the Authority until the Legislature could be called into session to deal
with the fiscal emergency. The second case concerned the action taken by Governor Weld to remove a
county sheriff from his position. This case is interesting from a separation of powers perspective because
the Court found that if anyone should have this authority, it is the SJC itself. "We note that, additionally,
for certain elected county officials, including sheriffs, the Legislature has provided a distinct procedure
for removing such an individual crom office. GL c .21 1, §4, provides this court with broad authority to
remove a sheriff[.]" (McGonigle v. The Governor, 418 Mass. 147 (1994), 149.)
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In January. 2001, the newest justice, Robert J. Cordy was sworn in as the 141st justice of the SJC.
Five of the other six justices of the Court are also quite new to the bench of the high court: Chief Justice
Margaret Marshall, appointed - 1996, Justice Roderick Ireland - appointed 1997, Justices Francis X.
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IS IS
the recent past have brought additional players into the process to screen judicial
nominees for all courts in the Commonwealth before nominations are sent to the
Council for approval. Considering the low visibility of the Governor's Council, this
an important check on the Governor's appointment power. 152 Unlike the public interest
in the appointment process which is generated by the Senate's approval of the
President's appointees to the United States Supreme Court, the approval process of the
Governor's Council generates little interest beyond the parties immediately involved. 153
While not confirmed by any study, it seems fairly safe to say that the Governor's
Council is an unknown entity to the large majority of Massachusetts citizens, especially
when their Councilor is an individual without further political aspirations and when
Council hearings generate relatively little media coverage. This is generally the case
since appointments to the SJC tend to generate relatively little controversy among the
Councilors. 154
Spina and Judith A. Cowin - appointed 1999, and Justice Martha B. Sosman - appointed 2000. Justice
John M. Greaney is the most veteran member of the current Court, having been appointed in 1989.
1 52 j * •
For a discussion of the relationship between justices' concerns with democratic accountability and the
number of participants involved in their selection process, see Charles H. Sheldon and Nicholas P.
Lovrich, "Democratic Theory and Judicial Selection," in John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson, eds.,
The American Courts: A Critical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991).
153 A recent exception to this was the nomination for Associate Justice Margaret Marshall to replace
Justice Wilkins as the Chief Justice of the SJC. From the day before her nomination by Governor
Cellucci on August 27, 1999 until her confirmation by the Governor's Council on October 13, 1999 (by a
vote of 6-3) the Boston Globe carried at least 15 stories on the nominee, 10 articles and 5 editorials. Part
of the interest in Marshall's appointment was due to the fact that if confirmed, she would be the first
woman to head the SJC. Further interest was generated, however, over questions raised by Cardinal
Bernard Law, Archbishop of Boston for the Roman Catholic Church, about Marshall's potential bias
against Catholics due to certain actions which she took while serving as general counsel at Harvard
University.
154
In addition to the Council's 6-3 split in the approval of Chief Justice Marshall which was discussed
above, the other exception to this statement was seen in the appointment of Justice Charles Fried in 1995.
Fried was a Harvard Law School professor who had served as Solicitor General under President Reagan
from 1985 to 1989. His appointment generated much controversy due to the conservative positions he
pursued under Reagan's administration in cases involving abortion, civil rights, and organized labor. In a
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The editorial board of the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly concurs in tins
assessment of public knowledge of the Governor's Council. In a 1995 editorial which
appeared after there had been some criticism of the Council's rejection of a Superior
Court nominee, the paper said, "Although the quality of the Governor's Council has
arguably improved some in the last couple of years, few citizens - and few lawyers -
know who their representative on the council is, and when the council meets or what
the council does besides approving judgeships. For a body with significant power, that
is simply not appropriate." 155
The invisibility of this process makes the addition of more players to the
selection process important. Since 1972 all governors have brought more voices into
the nomination process by using a judicial nominating committee (presently called the
Judicial Nominating Council - JNC). The JNC is a volunteer body of gubernatorial
appointees, composed predominantly of attorneys, which screens applicants for judicial
positions and recommends a pool of individuals (usually three to five) to the governor.
While there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that these bodies exist, both
Republican and Democratic governors have used JNC's since Governor Sargent
rare break with recent history, Fried's appointment was approved by a vote of 5-4 with Lieutenant
Governor Paul Cellucci forced to vote to break the tie on behalf of Governor William Weld's appointee.
While Fried's nomination would probably have generated controversy anyway, he was also caught up in
a growing concern by activists that a justice of color had never served on the SJC. This concern
continued to be voiced when Margaret Marshall, a white woman born in South Africa, was appointed as
an Associate Justice in 1996, although her appointment was approved by a vote of 7-1. Those concerned
about the need for minority representation on the Court finally saw a victory in 1998 when Justice
Roderick Ireland, an African-American male, was appointed to the SJC.
155 May 8, 1995, 10. According to Professor Mark Miller, the Council is even overlooked by the
politically astute. "In fact, the Governor's Council is so obscure that its members are not even listed in
the Massachusetts Political Almanac.'" ("Lawmakers' Attitudes Toward Court Reform in
Massachusetts," Judicature 11 [1993], 37.) Reacting to a political squabble between Acting Governor
Jane Swift and the Governor's Council in the spring of 2001, an editorial in the Boston Globe proposed
the elimination of the Council. "The abolition of the council would entail a lengthy constitutional
amendment process, but it would save $400,000 a year that could go to useful state programs.
Councilors only invite such action with shabby shenanigans." May 11, 2001, A30.
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developed the praetiee in 1972. 156 The use of the JNC is clearly an attempt to make
judicial appointments less "political," or at least to minimize the appearance Of politics
in the appointment of these individuals who, in the words of the state's Constitution,
should be "as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit." 157
Today the JNC's various committees (four regional committees and the executive
committee) are composed of gubernatorial^ appointed members (predominantly of
attorneys) from throughout the state. The Council advertises vacancies and solicits
applications, reviews the extensive questionnaire completed by applicants, and
conducts background checks and interviews to find those most qualified to serve on the
bench based on "the quality of their intellect, judgment and integrity[.] ,,l5x While there
is still opportunity for a governor to influence this process, and while there are many
who continue to believe that "a judge is a lawyer who once knew a governor," the
development of JNC's over the last thirty years clearly represents an acknowledgment
of the importance of qualified, non-partisan appointments. 159 This was reinforced in
In 1 972 Massachusetts voters enacted a constitutional amendment requiring all justices to retire ai age
70. As a result, 40 vacancies occurred on courts throughout the Commonwealth on the same day.
Governor Francis Sargent responded to this situation by creating "an ad hoc judicial nominating
committee, noteworthy for its broad citizen representation. ...Sargent publicly committed himself to
abiding by his nominating committee's recommendations." Thomas H. Martin, "Governor Sargent's
l egacy to the Judiciary," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, November 23, 1998, 1 1 . According to Martin,
Sargent's legacy was the establishment of "non-patronage judicial appointment which his successor
governors honored."
157
Art. 29, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
158
Executive Order No. 420, April 26, 2000.
1S9While an assessment of this appointment process is beyond the scope of this project, it seems as
though the process is neither so "pure" as seen by some or as "political" as seen by others. On the one
hand, the Slate Justice Institute of the American Judicature Society lists the Massachusetts selection
system as being one which employs a "commission" plan in its appointments. They quote from the
Executive Order establishing the JNC to note that "[b]y executive order of the governor appointments arc
made on a nonpartisan basis from names submitted by the judicial nominating commission." (Lylc
Warrick, Judicial Selection in the United States.) My reaction would be to say, "yes, but..." The reality
is that the governor, through her power over the membership of the Council, as well as through the
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the summer of 1999 by Governor Cellucci when he developed a special nominating
committee to assist him in the task of appointing four new justices to the SJC for
retirement vacancies which were expected from the summer of 1999 through the year
2000. Leonard Lewin, the governor's chief legal counsel, announced at the time the
committee was created that "[t]he governor is trying to do the right thing since
choosing four SJC justices is a oncc-in-a-lifetime, significant task." 160
The other screening panel that participates in the selection process is the Joint
Bar Committee on Judicial Appointments. Composed of representatives of the Boston
Bar Association and the Massachusetts Bar Association, this committee provides
comment to the Governor on the individual she intends to nominate for consideration
by the Governor's Council. Since former Chief Justice Paul Liacos' appointment asis a
ability to change the executive order which establishes the JNC, exercises more control than this
description would indicate. If the process was so non-partisan, there would have been less concern voiced
by Republicans in the state when Justice Marshall, a recognized liberal (and likely a Democrat) was
appointed to the state's high court by Governor Weld, a Republican. (Sec Frank Phillips, "Harvard
Counsel Marshall is Weld's Nominee for SJC," Boston Globe, September 4, 1 996, A 1
.) On the other
hand, while there arc complaints to be heard about the quality of the stale's judges, complaints made both
formally before the Judicial Conduct Commission and informally in the halls of courthouses throughout
the stale, 1 would note that the process probably weeds out the least qualified candidates. Justice Lynch
noted the increased quality ofjudges appointed to the lower courts. "But, you know the appointing
system is so far superior today to what it once was." (Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25, May, 1999.)
It is interesting to note that complaints about this process emphasize problems with existing judges and
justices. Rarely is a complaint heard that a qualified individual who submitted an application to the JNC
lor consideration was denied. This could mean that the quality of individuals being appointed has less to
do with the appointment process than it docs with the pool of self-selected individuals who are interested
in sitting on the bench in the first place.
160 Quoted in Paul D. Boynton, "SJC Search Committee: 'No Hidden Agendas'," Massachusetts Lawyers
Weekly, June 14, 1999, 32. It is interesting to note that the tone of this article and of the lead article on
this issue in the Boston Globe continued to emphasize the tension between the Governor and members of
the committee on the one hand who claim their only goal is to find the best candidates possible and
critics of the governor on the other hand who are skeptical of this claim. " 'The governor has pretty
much made up his mind that he wants judges of a certain ideological stripe, and in picking a diverse
committee of lawyers to enlist applicants and to screen them, I think he's trying to give himself political
cover,' said Boston Defense lawyer Harvey Silvcrglate." Tina Cassidy. "Cellucci Appoints Group to
Select SJC Candidates," Boston Globe, May 21, 1999, Bl
.
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justice by Governor Michael Dukakis in 1976, all candidates recommended to the
Governor's Council have received the approval of the Bar Committee. 1(11
The second subtle distinction between the institutional arrangements of the SJC
and the U.S. Supreme Court is in the terms of office which justices serve. While both
are appointed to serve for good behavior and are removable by impeachment, the
justices of the United States Supreme Court serve for life with no mandatory retirement
age.
162
While this was originally the case under the Massachusetts Constitution, the
voters, at the urging of the League of Women Voters and others, amended the
Constitution in 1972 to require all judicial officers to retire at age 70. 163 This difference
161
Justice Liacos, who was chosen by the judicial nominating committee, was rated "not qualified" by
the Bar Committee. Governor Dukakis nominated him anyway and he was approved by the Governor's
Council in April of 1976. Dukakis was highly critical of the Joint Bar Committee on Judicial
Appointments who had given Liacos (and seven other Dukakis nominees) the "not qualified" rating. See
Philip Brunelle, "BU Law Professor Chosen for Bench," The Springfield Union, March 18, 1976. At this
point in time the Bar Committee received the names and commented upon all five of the JNC selections.
Since the late 1 970's however, the process has changed so that the Bar Committee gets only the name of
the final nominee. (Some of this information comes from my Interview by Justice Lynch, Boston, MA,
25 May 1999. Justice Lynch had been the Chief Legal Counsel to Governor Edward King [1978-1982]
and was therefore very involved in the judicial nominating process at the time.) Considering the timing
of this change, it is possible that the conflict over the Liacos appointment led to this change.
162
In addition to impeachment in Massachusetts (Part II, Chapter 1, §2, art. 8 and § 3, art. 6), justices can
be removed by "the Governor, with consent of the Council...upon the address of both Houses of the
Legislature" (Part II, Chapter 3, § 1 ), or by the "governor, with the consent of the council. ..after due
notice and hearing retire them because of advance age or mental or physical impairment." (Art. 98 of the
Articles of Amendment). In his interesting anecdotal history of the SJC, James Muldoon, who served as
Secretary of the Massachusetts Judicial Council from 1964 to 1991, explained the difference between
impeachment and address as follows. "A judge can be removed by the process of Address, which is not a
judicial proceeding. The result is nothing more than the loss of the office. If a judge is convicted of
impeachment, it is possible that he or she may be indicted and punished for the offense leading to the
impeachment, if indeed such offense is criminal. An impeachment also has the effect of disqualifying
the individual from any further public service. A judge removed by Address does not necessarily bear
any stigma as guilty of 'high crimes and misdemeanors'." You Have No Court, 90. This history presents
only one instance when a justice of the SJC was removed from office. One Theophilus Bradbury was
removed by Address in 1803, not for any wrong-doing but because he was physically incapacitated and
refused to resign (82). Two evidently political attempts to remove justices by Impeachment took place in
1900 and 1921 but were rejected by the Legislature. (See pp. 165 and 200-212.)
163
Article 98 of the Articles of Amendment. While the merits of such a plan are obvious, I can't resist
the opportunity to point out that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. left his position as Chief Justice of the SJC
to assume a seat on the United States Supreme Court at the age of 72. His twenty-year tenure on the
nation's highest court was, by almost any measure, a very productive one.
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has little effect from a separation of powers perspective, except as it indirectly affects
the appointment process. Since passage of the Amendment, it has generally been the
practice of most justices of the SJC to serve until they reach the age of 70 (or to retire at
the end of a term or a calendar year preceding their 70th birthday). This has had the
effect of making rotation on the SJC more predictable than it is on the Supreme Court.
There is frequent curiosity at the federal level among court-watchers about when more
senior justices will retire, especially near times of presidential elections. In
Massachusetts this is generally not the case. An exception to this practice of retiring at
age 70 resulted, at least in part, from the very predictable nature of the Massachusetts
judicial transitions. An indication of how unusual an "early retirement" is can be seen
from the following headline of a page 3 article in a 1996 edition of the Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly - "Liacos Shocks Bar, Announces SJC Retirement." 164 What was
"shocking" was the decision of Paul Liacos, justice since 1976 and chiefjustice since
1989, to retire three years before he reached the mandatory retirement age of 70.
Reporting on the press conference at which Liacos announced his decision, the
Lawyers
'
Weekly noted that Liacos said he was stepping down for "personal and
family reasons." In addition, however, he acknowledged that the fact he was one of
four justices who would turn 70 in the same twelve month period influenced his
decision.
165 By stepping down in 1996, his replacement would be chosen by the sitting
governor, and whoever was elected in 1998 would appoint only the other three. The
lf>4
June 24, 1996,
165
The other three were Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins (who retired in August, 1999), and Associate
Justices Neil L. Lynch and Ruth 1. Abrams who retired upon turning seventy in 2000.
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article further stated that Liacos "felt it was very important not to have a single
governor select four justices to the SJC...whoever it may be." 166
This comparison of the appointment and tenure arrangements for the SJC and
the U.S. Supreme Court show there to be superficial similarities which mask subtle but
important differences in these two institutions. Even more misleading would be an
assumed likeness between the federal and state courts because they are both the court of
last resort in regard to their respective constitutions. The U.S. Constitution and the
Massachusetts Constitution are obviously two different documents and an analysis of
these differences, especially those which affect each court's relationship with its co-
equal partners in government, is important to this project. As already mentioned, the
fact that one of these documents is "the Supreme Law of the Land" puts the two courts
in potentially different places vis-a-vis the other two branches of government. The
supremacy of the U.S. Constitution, however, could sometimes be forgotten in and
amongst some of the rhetoric one finds written about the Massachusetts Constitution,
both by justices and commentators. 167 The document of which these commentators are
166
Ironically, the unusual decision by Justice Charles Fried to step down from the Court in 1999, after
less than four years on the bench, to return to a faculty position at the Harvard Law School still left the
"new " Governor, Argeo Paul Cellucci, with four seats to fill on the Court. Fried's decision to resign
rather than to retire is unique in the Court's recent history.
167
Examples like the following are indicative. "Our Constitution precedes and was, in large measure, the
model for the Federal Constitution. In light of this court's reaffirmation today of its desire to develop
further our own constitutional jurisprudence, I cannot but wonder why the court and the dissenting
Justices decline to examine more thoroughly the protections afforded by art. 2 of the Declaration of
Rights[.]" Attorney General v. Paul Desilets, 418 Mass. 316 (1994), 335 (Liacos, concurring). "How
does one describe this document? What superlatives will suffice?. ..Most of the states have drawn freely
from it...and it was a model for the Constitution of the United States several years later." Edward F.
Hennessey (former Chief Justice of the SJC), "The Extraordinary Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,"
Suffolk University Law Review, (1980), 873-885, at 873. "Permitting study of the U.S. constitutional law
to eclipse study of state constitutional law in this fashion is particularly inappropriate in Massachusetts.
The constitution of Massachusetts.. .is at least the equal of the Constitution of the United States." Charles
H. Baron, "The Supreme Judicial Court in its Fourth Century," Massachusetts Law Review 77 (1992),
35-43 at 35.
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so proud was ratified in 1780, and the citizens of the state have lived under this same
document (and its 1 17 amendments) since that time, making the Massachusetts
Constitution "the oldest still-governing constitution in the world." 168 The original
document was composed largely by one of the Revolutionary era's great constitutional
minds, and one of Massachusetts' pre-eminent public figures, John Adams, who
claimed that the U.S. Constitution drew largely from his work. 169
Despite claims that the U.S. Constitution draws on the Massachusetts
Constitution, there are many important differences between the two. The differences
which are immediately evident stem from the different natures of the two forms of
government which each established; the federal government was established as a
limited government with only specific powers while Massachusetts, like all state
governments, was to be a multi-purpose government with complete police powers. 170
In his recent work on state constitutions, Alan Tarr presents an interesting comparison
l68
William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth, in The Constitution ofthe Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (Boston, MA: Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1996), iii. If one tries to read the
Constitution, however, one could argue that the state would be well-served to allow for a rearrangement
of the document. While the state would give up its "claim," it might have a document which would be
more accessible to its citizens.
169
The greatness of the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as Adams' role in its development can be
exaggerated. As one commentator notes, "Adams. ..might have overstated things a bit when he wrote, T
made a constitution for Massachusetts which finally made the Constitution of the United States.' Letter
from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 28, 1807) in 4 MASS. HIST. SOC. 377 (5TH Ser. 1878)."
Aviam Soifer, "The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the 1780 Constitution," in Osgood,
ed., The History ofthe Law, 209. In addition to Soifer's article, two excellent sources for discussion of
the creation of the Massachusetts Constitution are: Oscar Handlin, The Popular Sources ofPolitical
Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
1966); and Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Amherst, MA: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1978). A political history of the development of 18th century state constitutions
more generally can be found in Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, chapter 2. See also the
Bibliography of that work (21 1-235) and Tarr's "Bibliographic Essay" in Constitutional Politics in the
States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns, ed. G. Alan Tarr (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1996), 203-209.
170
See William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996) for an analysis of the states' police powers.
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of federal and state constitutionalism in his assessment ofMcCulloch v. Maryland.' 71
"What is most striking about Marshall's constitutional analysis is how little of it applies
to American state constitutions." 172 One result of this is that the description of the
duties and responsibilities of the three branches is, in many instances, even vaguer in
the Massachusetts Constitution than is the case with the U.S. Constitution. For
instance, unlike the list of powers found in Article I, §8 which details the reasons for
which Congress may make laws, there is a general statement in the Massachusetts
Constitution of the General Court's power to enact "all manner of wholesome and
reasonable, Orders, laws, statutes and ordinances, directions and instructions, either
with penalties or without; so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this
Commonwealth[.]" 173 The broad nature of the power granted to the state's legislature
gives the SJC one less tool in its kit when confronted with questions regarding the
constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. While the Supreme Court can declare an
act of Congress to be unconstitutional because it exceeds congressional authority, this
ground for voiding an act of the state legislature is less available. 174 On the other hand,
state constitutions tend to have more limitations on state legislatures in clauses other
171
4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
172
Understanding State Constitutions, 7.
I7
' Part II, Chapter 1, §1, art. 4. Art. 4 also gives the General Court the power to raise taxes and to
arrange for election and selection of public officials. Article 3 outlines the legislature's power to "erect
and constitute judicatories and courts of record...." This, of course, does not imply that the U.S.
Constitution is necessarily clear and detailed, only that the Massachusetts Constitution is even less so.
174 While the Supreme Court had been reticent to use this basis for declaring an act of Congress to be
unconstitutional since the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937," it has been much more willing of late to
challenge the authority of Congress, especially under the Commerce power. See, for instance, U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Court declared the Gun Free School Act unconstitutional as beyond
Congress' power to regulate commerce).
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than the traditional protect.ons for civil liberties and civil rights which may prohibit
legislative action.
175
These can be found in either the body of the Constitution or in
amendments. Such clauses in the Massachusetts Constitution include the following;
prohibiting the Legislature from suspending the laws, 176 requiring frequent meeting of
the Legislature, 177 requiring vote of two-thirds of both houses for borrowing and
limiting the uses to which borrowed money can be put (effectively requiring a balanced
budget), 178 limiting legislative authority over local cities and towns to only general
laws,
179
and requiring motor vehicle tax revenues to be used only for transportation
I SO
purposes.
The constitutional provisions for the executive power varies in all states from
that of the federal constitution since the executive power in state governments is not
unified.
181
In contrast to the President of the United States who is the constitutional
executive, the Massachusetts Constitution recognizes five, independent constitutional
These include not only express limitations but also implied ones. "[I]n contrast with federal
constitutional interpretation, which historically has focused on the implied powers of Congress, the
fundamental interpretive issue under state constitutions is the implied limitations (if any) on state
legislative powers." Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 16.
176
Part the First, art. 20.
177
Part the First, art. 22.
1
Articles of Amendment, art. 62.
179
Articles of Amendment, art. 89.
Articles of Amendment, art. 104. It should be noted that all legislative powers, even when exercised
under the state's police powers, are subject to general restraints of being reasonable and enacted for the
public good. "The Legislature may act pursuant to a valid exercise of its police power for the general
good of the public, even though contract previously entered into may be affected....An impairment will
be upheld if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company v. Commissioner ofInsurance, 397 Mass. 416 (1986), 423.
181
The only exception to this is New Jersey which has a unified executive. See Book ofStates:2000-
2001.
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offices which share executive responsibilities. 182 The best known is the office of
Governor which will be discussed below. 183 The other four offices include the Auditor,
the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Treasurer and Receiver General.
All serve for four years and, except for the Auditor and Treasurer, have some specified
constitutional duties. The Attorney General is assigned responsibility for ensuring that
initiative petitions meet formal criteria and that they do not cover excluded topics. 184
The Secretary keeps the official records of the Commonwealth, certifies election
results, and performs a variety of duties in the initiative and referendum process. 185
While the division of executive duties in the state makes an exact comparison
difficult, the Governor does have many powers similar to the national executive but, as
with the description of the Legislature's power, the description of the Governor's power
in the Massachusetts Constitution is also quite vague. For the most part it provides
greatest detail of her authority as commander-in-chief of the state militia. 186 The
Governor is also granted certain powers which are similar to those which the U.S.
I8
" It is unclear how Massachusetts compares to other states in this regard. According to a recent article,
the average per state is 10.2 independently elected executive officials. It would appear that
Massachusetts is well below this average unless they counted the members of the Governor's Council in
which case Massachusetts would have 13 independently elected executive officials. Thad Beyle,
"Governors: The Middlemen and Women in Our Political System," in Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob,
eds., Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1996), 229.
1
Art. 86 of the Articles of Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution (which took effect in 1966)
effectively eliminated the Lieutenant Governor as an independent entity. This Amendment requires the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor to run for office as one. The only real duty which the Lieutenant
Governor has is to preside over the Governor's Council when the Governor does not, and to serve as a
member of the Council when the Governor does preside. (Massachusetts Constitution, Part the Second,
ch. 2, §2.)
184
Articles of Amendment, art. 74. It should be noted that all officers have other statutory and traditional
duties. I am speaking here only of their constitutional authority.
185
Part the Second, ch. 2, §4, art. 2; Articles of Amendment, art. 101; and art. 74 and 108.
186
Part II, Chapter 2, §1, art. 7, 10, 12.
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Constitution grants to the President on the federal level. These include the power to
veto acts of the legislature, to pardon those convicted of violating state law, to appoint
all judicial officers, and to adjourn the legislature.'* 7 In addition, the Governor has the
"authority from time to time, at his discretion, to assemble and call together the
Counsellors of this Commonwealth for the time being, and the Governor with said
Counsellors, or five of them at least, shall, and may, from time to time, hold or keep a
Council, for the ordering and directing the affairs of the Commonwealth, agreeably to
the Constitution and the laws of the land." 188 As with the General Court, the authority
of the state's chief executive is stated in the broadest possible terms.
It would be easy to assume that a state-federal comparison of constitutional
provisions regarding the high courts might be different. A quick look at Article 111 in
the U.S. Constitution leads easily to a conclusion that the Massachusetts Constitution
could not possibly say less about the SJC than its federal counterpart says about the
U.S. Supreme Court -- but such a conclusion would be wrong. None of the five articles
in the section of the Constitution entitled "The Judiciary" deals specifically with the
SJC's judicial power. 189 The only specific reference in this section to the state's high
court details not its judicial power but the granting of a quasi-legislative power to the
Powers of the Governor arc detailed in Part II, Chapter 2 (pardon - art. X; appointment - art. 9; adjourn
legislature - arts. 5 and 6) except for the veto power which is found in Part II, Chapter I , § 1 , art. 2. These
constitutional powers, except the veto, require approval of the Governor's Council.
IXK
Part II, Chapter 2, §1, art. 4. This is an interesting example of how the language of the Constitution
can remain the same while the practice of government changes. It is obvious from the language that the
framcrs expected the Governor to work closely with the Council, not unlike in colonial times. Today,
except for gaining acceptance of the Council on specifically designated tasks (pardon, appointment,
expenditures), the Governor never works with the Council.
189
Part II, Chapter.!.
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Court
-
that of providing advisory opinions, upon request, to the Governor, Council, or
either branch of the legislature. 190
A fuller discussion of the SJC's advisory power and how the Court has used this
over time can be found in Chapter 6. However, it should be noted that this unique
power certainly can help to shape the relationship between the Court and the state's
legislature and executive. This institutional feature involves the Court more closely in
the lawmaking process than is the case on the federal level and marks an essential
difference between the two courts. 191
The Constitution's lack of specificity regarding the SJC's judicial duties is
directly related to the history of the Court which was discussed above. 192 It was
assumed that the SJC would simply be a new name for the Superior Court of
Judicature, performing the same duties which its predecessor had performed under
190
Part II, Ch. 3, art. 2, amended by art. 85 of the Articles of Amendment to read as follows: "Each
branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the council, shall have authority to require the
opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn
occasions." The amendment only clarified the question of whether the original wording of "Governor
and Council" meant that both must agree to send a request to the SJC or if each could make a request
independently. The 1 964 Amendment made it clear that either the Governor or the Council,
independently, could request such an opinion.
191
This also puts the SJC in a different place than most of the other state high courts, although seven
other state constitutions authorize the high court to give advisory opinions. In Colorado, Maine,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island the state's high court can respond to requests by either
their legislature or their governor. In Florida and South Dakota only the Governor may request such
opinions. In addition, Alabama and Delaware provide statutory authorization for advisory opinions.
Considering recent debates between the NH Legislature and the state's high court, the existence of the
advisory power alone certainly does not appear to lower the conflict level between branches in a state.
See discussion in Chapter 7.
1
It also seems to differentiate it from some other states in which the state constitutions have very
detailed provisions for the judiciary. While the Massachusetts Constitution does contain some provisions
for other sections of the judiciary, it is not as detailed as some which Alan Tarr describes. "[S]everal
states have chosen to set up their entire judicial system by constitutional prescription rather than by
statute. The judicial articles in these states establish all state courts, specify each court's jurisdiction,
delineate the boundaries of the districts in which the courts shall operate, and provide for the selection of
judges to serve on them." Understanding State Constitutions, 18. While this isn't clear from Tarr's
discussion, it is likely that these states are operating under revised constitutions and not their original
charter. In Massachusetts these things have been more likely to be handled via statutory change while
leaving the discussion of the judiciary in the Constitution as is.
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colonial charter. This notion of continuity which applied, to some degree, to all
branches of the new state government and which was absent on the federal level
reinforced by two articles in Part 11, Chapter 6. Article 6 allowed for the continuati
of all former laws until changed by the General Court and article 9 stated, in part, that
"all courts of law shall proceed in the execution of the business of their respective
departments." 193 This continuity in regard to the Courts meant that the SJC would, and
did, continue as the judicatory for important civil and criminal cases, as well as being
the final appellate court in some instances.
In carrying out these judicial duties the power of the SJC is protected by art. 29
of the Declaration of Rights which guarantees lifetime appointment ofjustices with
"honorable salaries." 194 Amendments to the Constitution have provided additional
protection to the SJC and the other courts of the Commonwealth, not only from attacks
on their authority from other branches of government but also from the citizens. When
the initiative and referendum process was added to the Constitution during the 1 9 1 7-
1918 Constitutional Convention, there were a few matters excluded from this process.
Initiative and referendum petitions cannot include consideration of measures related to
Art. 6 reads: 'All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used and approved in the Province,
Colony or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practiced on in the courts of law, shall still remain
and be in full force until altered or repealed by the Legislature: such parts only excepted as arc repugnant
to the rights and liberties contained in this Constitution."
Art. 9"s applicability to all branches is found in the following: "To the end that there may be no
failure of Justice, or danger arise to the Commonwealth from a change of the Form of Government - all
officers, civil and military, holding commissions under the Government and people of Massachusetts Bay
in New England, and all other officers of the said government and people, at the time this Constitution
shall take effect, shall have, hold, use, exercise and enjoy, all the powers and authority to them granted or
committed, until other persons shall be appointed in their stead...."
l94
Furthcr protection for salaries is found in Part II, Ch. 2, §1, art. 13.
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"the appointment, qualification, tenure, removal, recall or compensation ofjudges; or to
the reversal of a judicial decision; or to the powers, creation or abolition of courts." 195
While the SJC is protected in an effort to maintain a government of co-equals,
there are constitutional checks on its authority as well. As already mentioned, the
appointment process puts the governor and the governor's council in control of who
will sit on the SJC as well as on the bench of the lower courts. Once there, the
Constitution provides for removal of a judge or justice through the previously discussed
methods of impeachment (legislature alone), address (legislature and governor
together) or "retirement" (governor alone). Another potential check on the judiciary
(although more as a check on trial courts) is the pardoning power which is given to the
governor and the council. Finally, the legislature's power to "erect and constitute
judicatories and courts of record," combined with their power over meetings times and
places forjudges of probate and over determining jurisdiction regarding marriage,
divorce and alimony, combine to enable the legislature to establish a degree of
administrative control over the lower courts and to effect the workload of the state's
highest court.
196
The final perspective which needs to be added in a discussion of how the
constitutional powers are divided between the three branches of government by the
Massachusetts Constitution regards the provisions which are made to enable the SJC to
maintain its power through checks on the other branches. In the original Constitution,
195
Art. 48 of the Articles of Amendment.
196 Power to establish Courts is detailed in Part II, Chapter 1, § 1, art. 3. Power to establish meeting times
and places for probate issues is found in Part II, Chapter 3, art. 4 and to control cases of marriage,
divorce, and alimony in art. 5. It is interesting to note that this article originally placed the power to
determine "all causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony, and all appeals from the Judges of Probate" in
the hands of the Governor and the Council "until the Legislature shall, by law, make other provision."
8
1
the only partial check granted to the SJC is the Advisory power. 197 This is a
particularly weak check, however, due to its voluntary nature. It is unlikely thai the
governor or the General Court will request an opinion ifthey are considering an action
which will directly challenge the authority of the Court. Furthermore, even if they were
to do so, these opinions of the SJC are only advisory in nature. There is no guarantee
that the opinion of the Court will be followed. While this is the case with the exercise
Of all judicial power in a system of separation of powers, enforcement authority is even
weaker in regard to advisory opinions. 198
On the other hand, the constitutional recognition of the SJCs authority to
provide advisory opinions may have provided more constitutional support and
legitimacy to the Court's exercise ofjudicial review from the start. This power, of a
court to declare acts of the other branches of government to be unconstitutional, is
clearly the most potent weapon the judiciary has at its disposal to protect itself from
attacks by the other branches on its authority. Like its counterpart on the federal level,
however, the SJC has no specific constitutional support for the exercise of this power.
Constitutional support for the Court's participation in the legislative and executive
processes found in the Massachusetts Constitution in the form of the advisory opinion
147 Two amendments have specifically added to the authority of the SJC to check the other branches. Art.
91 of the Articles of Amendment, ratified in 1968, deals with a vacancy in the office of governor. This
can occur through notice of the governor personally that s/he is unable to perform the duties of office or
by notification to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House by "the chiefjustice and a
majority of the associate justices of the supreme judicial court. ..[by] their written declaration that the
governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office[.]" This power has never been
exercised. Art. 101 of the Articles of Amendment, ratified in 1974, changed the size of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives and the Senate, requiring that a redislricting plan be developed.
Section 3 gives the SJC "[or iginal jurisdiction. ..upon the petition of any voter of the
Commonwealth. ..for judicial relief relative to the establishment of House of Representative, councillor
and senatorial districts."
198 As I discuss in Chapter 6, however, the House and the Senate have generally followed the direction
outlined by the SJC in advisory opinions.
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process may help to explain why the SJC has more consistently used tins power from
1805 to the present, while the Supreme Court used it sparingly until after the Civil
War. 199
This potential effect on the recognized legitimacy of the respective courts'
exercise ofjudicial review is, of course, time-bound, judicial review has long been
recognized as a legitimate use ofjudicial power on both the state and national levels.
The continuing debates about this power today tend to concentrate on how the courts
should interpret their respective constitutions when exercising this power. 200 Since
many of the cases in which the high courts are asked to use this power involve
guarantees of individual liberties, a comparison should be made between the U.S. and
Massachusetts Constitutions concerning their respective bills of rights. 201 To some
degree the history of their development is similar. The stories regarding the battles for
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, with the Anti-Federalists holding out for an
inclusion of a bill of rights, are a common theme in American history classes, as is the
recognition that the passage of the Bill of Rights only two years after ratification of the
original document is largely the result of these battles. Similarly, the original attempt at
199
First use ofjudicial review by the Supreme Court to declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional
was in 1803, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137. The first recognition of this power in the Massachusetts
reports is found in 1805, Mountfort v. Hall, 1 Mass. 443. A more thorough discussion of the SJC and
judicial review is found in Chapter 5.
200
The recent New Hampshire debate over school financing provisions is an example of this. See
Chapter 7. So too was the controversy in California over the death penalty which resulted in the defeat
of Rose Bird and two colleagues in a retention election for their seats on that state's Supreme Court. See,
"Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California," Judicature 70 ( 1 986); Betty
Medsgcr, Framed: The New Right Attack on ChiefJustice Rose Bird and the Courts (New York: Pilgrim
Press, 1983); and Preble Stolz, Judging Judges (New York: Free Press, 1981).
2(ll
This shift, from judicial review to protect the judicial domain to its use to protect individual liberties,
parallels the discussion in Chapter 1 of the Madisonian and libertarian purposes served by a system of
separation of powers. Of course some justices argue that upholding the constitution, especially in regard
to the protection of individual rights, is also part of the "judicial domain," an area in which justices are
the experts.
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writing a constitution in Massachusetts was rejected in 1778, in part because it, too,
failed to include a guarantee of rights. 202 This response from voters in Essex County to
the proposed 1778 document represents this view well.
We think a bill of rights ascertaining and clearly describing the rights of
conscience, and that security of person and property, the supreme power
ot the state is bound to afford to all the members thereof, ought to be
fully ratified before, or at the same time with, the establishment of any
constitution.
As a result of this and similar concerns from other towns in Massachusetts, the
Constitution of 1780 opens with a Preamble, followed by "Part the First, A Declaration
of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."204 The thirty
articles of the Massachusetts Declaration contain almost all the guarantees which are
found in the Bill of Rights and many more. Missing, however, are two rights found in
the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and two in the Fifth Amendment. The
most glaring of these, and the one which has attracted the most attention from historians
over the years, is the essential requirement of a state religion found in article 3. This is
obviously different than the guarantee of religious freedom and protection from
establishment of religion which are found in the First Amendment to the U.S.
While one could have been persuaded in 1787 by the argument of the Federalists that a bill of rights
was not essential for the protection of individual rights against the power of a limited government which
the U.S. Constitution established on the national level, the lack of such protections in a state constitution
against a government empowered to exercise general police powers is a more glaring oversight.
203 From the Essex Result, quoted in Henry Clay, "The Supreme Judicial Court: Liberty and
Community," in Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly Special Section, October 19, 1992, 1 1.
204
This is the pattern in most states. "[F]ew state constitutions have followed the federal practice of
appending the declaration of rights to the end of the constitution." Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, 12.
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Constitution. 205 This requirement for public support of churches was eliminated with
passage of article 1
1
of the Articles of Amendment in 1833* The other interesting
(and seemingly unstudied) difference is that while article 16 of the Declaration contains
a statement guaranteeing freedom of the press, it contains no similar guarantee for
speech. This was not added to the state's constitution until 1948. 207
The Massachusetts Declaration also lacks specific language concerning two of
the criminal due process guarantees found in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. These are guarantees of indictment by grand jury as well as protection
against double jeopardy. These have never been added through the constitutional
amendment process. However, beginning in 1854 the SJC recognized grand jury
indictment for offenses imposing a state prison sentence to be a part of the article 12
guarantee of due process. By the 1930's the Court recognized a common law
protection of individuals from double jeopardy. 208 As a result of these amendments and
judicial determination of rights, the Massachusetts Declaration today contains all
guarantees found in the U.S. Bill of Rights.
In addition to these the Declaration of Rights contains additional protections
which are not found in its federal counterpart. This gives the SJC a potentially broader
205
Article 2 does provide for protection of the "right and duty of all men in society. ...to worship God in
the manner and season most agreeable to the Dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious
profession or sentiments...." (Emphasis added.)
6
For an interesting discussion of this history, see Leonard Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion
and the First Amendment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), especially chapter 2.
207
Art. 77 of the Articles of Amendment. "Article XVI of Part the First is hereby annulled and the
following is adopted in place thereof: Article XVI. The Liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right office
speech shall not be abridged."
2<)8
For grand jury indictment for crimes involving state prison sentences see, James v. Robbins, 74 Mass.
329 ( 1 854). For double jeopardy see, Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 1 99 ( 1 93 1 ).
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can
array of limitations on which to draw in addressing the constitutionality of legislative
and executive actions. 209 In addition, as mentioned previously, the state high court
interpret similar provisions in its constitution differently than the Supreme Court has
interpreted the U.S. Constitution, a practice in which the SJC has willingly engaged,
albeit with some dissent.210
One final difference between the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions is the
ease of amending the state's document and the concomitant frequency with which the
Massachusetts document has been amended in comparison to the federal constitution. 21
The cumbersome process for amending the U.S. Constitution has resulted in only 17
amendments being added since the Bill of Rights in 1791. While the Massachusetts
Constitution does require the action of two consecutive sessions of the state legislature
as well as a vote of the citizenry to amend, this process is easier to see to completion
than either of the processes established for proposal and ratification of amendments to
Protections found in the Massachusetts Declaration which are not specifically provided in the U.S.
Constitution include: art. 5 - all officers in the state must be accountable at all times to the people; art. 7 -
right of people to "reform, alter, or totally change" the government; art. 8 - rights of people to ensure
regular rotation in office by elected officials; art. 9 - right to free elections and to all eligible citizens to
be elected; art. 1 1 - right to remedy "by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he
may receive in person, property, or character."; art. 22 - provision that the legislature will meet
frequently for "redress of grievances, correcting, strengthening and confirming the laws, and for making
new laws, as the common good may require."; art. 23 - guarantee of no taxation without consent; as well
as the art. 29 guarantee of an independent judiciary and the art. 30 provisions for a government of
separated powers which have already been discussed in this chapter. For a discussion of the wide array
of protections found in the constitutions of other states see, "Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for
State Bills of Rights," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 8 (1973), 271-350 and Robert F.
Williams, "State Constitutional Law Processes," William and Mary Law Review 24 (1983), 169-228.
210
The participation of the SJC in new judicial federalism provides some insight into the role which the
Court sees itself as playing not only vis-a-vis the federal government, but also in relationship to the other
two branches of government in the state. This will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5.
211
Again, this is similar to most states. In fact, the 117 amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution is
equal to the average of amendments to all state constitutions. See Donald Lutz, "Amendment Patterns,"
in Tarr, ed., Constitutional Politics in the States, 3 1
.
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the U.S. Constitution required by Article V.212 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Massachusetts Constitution has been amended 1 17 times since 1780.213
This difference has two potential effects on the contrasting place of the United
States Supreme Court and the SJC in their respective political systems. The fust is
similar to one mentioned above in regard to the Declaration of Rights. The more
requirements and limitations there are in the written document, the more easily the
justices of the SJC can justify their exercise ofjudicial review. 2 ' 4 As will be discussed
more thoroughly in Chapter 5, the amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution
prohibiting progressive taxation has engendered as many claims that statutes are
unconstitutional as has any of the civil liberties protections of the Declaration aside
from the broad due process and equal protection guarantees. 215 Secondly, the general
ease with which the constitution can be amended, and the relative acceptance of this
process, puts the SJC and the General Court in a somewhat different relationship than
The constitutional amendment process is detailed in art. 48 of the Articles of Amendment as amended
by art. 74 and 81. The process allows for either citizens (with signatures of 3% of those voting for
governor in the last election) or legislators to submit an amendment for consideration. The legislature
must meet in joint session to consider such proposals, and only 1/4 of the members must support an
amendment proposed by citizens (a majority must vote for legislator initiated amendments). This must
happen in two consecutive legislative sessions before the amendment can be put on the ballot at the next
general election for approval by a majority vote by the citizens. In addition to the relative case of
winning passage of such amendments, it should be noted that the state process also differs from the
federal process by the greater role allowed for citizen involvement and for the absence of requirements
for supcrmajorities as arc required in the federal process.
213
It should be noted, however, that only fifty-one of these passed as a result of the process described at
note 102 above. The first nine were a result of the Constitutional Convention of 1821 . The next 35 were
passed following an earlier amendment procedure (art. 9 of the Articles of Amendment) between 1821
and 1918. (A Constitutional Convention of 1853 resulted in no changes to the Constitution.) The
remaining 22 amendments came out of the Constitutional Convention of 1 9 1 7- 1 9 1 8. For a comparison
of this process to that followed by other states, see Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions.
14
According to the research of Donald Lutz, 63 percent of all amendments to state constitutions deal
with matters which have no place in the national constitution. These topics include local government and
state and local debt. Lutz, "Amendment Process," 36.
215
Art. 44 of the Articles of Amendment.
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exists between the Supreme Court and Congress. While amendments to the U.S.
Constitution can, and have, been enacted to counter a Supreme Court interpretation of
the Constitution, such corrections of SJC "errors" are easier to make. 216 This could
give the justices of the SJC a greater sense of freedom in interpreting the constitution
and exercising judicial review, knowing that major public dissatisfaction with their
decision can be overturned through the Amendment process. 217
THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK - DIVISION OF
POWERS v. SHARING OF POWERS
It should be clear by now that any understanding about the place of a court of
last resort in a system of separation of powers which comes from studying the United
States Supreme Court is filled with potential pitfalls for understanding such a
relationship in the states. Even a state like Massachusetts, whose high court shares
many general characteristics with the U.S. Supreme Court, has many important
differences. In general, the history and the constitutional structure which the U.S.
Constitution establishes for the U.S. Supreme Court puts the Court in a position of
tension vis-a-vis the Congress while the judicial-legislative relationship in
Massachusetts tends to represent a continuum. The U.S. Supreme Court began its life
216 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution which are seen as overturning Supreme Court decisions include:
1 1th Amendment (in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 [1793]); 14th Amendment (in
response, in part, to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 [1857]); 16th Amendment (in response to
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 [1895]); 26th Amendment (responding to
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12 [1970]). The most recent case in Massachusetts in which a
constitutional amendment was passed in response to the decision of the SJC was in 1982 when art. 116 of
the Articles of Amendment was enacted. This article states, in part, that "[n]o provision of the
Constitution, however, shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death."
This amendment was in direct response to the SJC's decision in District Attorneyfor Suffolk County v.
Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980).
217 As will be seen in Chapter 5, this theoretical freedom has not led to frequent practice ofjudicial
review to overturn actions by the state legislature.
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in controversy, in contrast to the SJC whose existence was simply a continuation of an
existing, accepted institution. From the beginning the U.S. Supreme Court was clearly
given "the judicial power" as something distinct from legislative and executive powers.
The Massachusetts Constitution, however, continued the development of "the judicial
power" which had been occurring before the Revolution. The fact that the Governor
and Council continued to maintain authority over issues of marriage and divorce is
representative of this. 21 * In sum, the origin of the U.S. Supreme Court and the system
of separated powers was more contrived, while the SJC was allowed to develop more
naturally, both as an independent institution and in relation to the other branches of
government. The result was a greater sense of tension between the branches on the
federal level than existed in Massachusetts where distinctions between powers of
government were based more on practice than on any clear theory of separated powers.
This difference continued as the two institutions developed within their
respective political systems. From its inception, the U.S. Supreme Court had the
opportunity to be more "political" than did the SJC. It could devote its time to
appellate cases from the start, in contrast to the SJC which retained a substantial degree
of original jurisdiction till the 1860's. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court exercised
more discretion over its workload at a much earlier date (1925 as opposed to 1972).
Both of these factors made it easier for the U.S. Supreme Court, should it so desire, to
take on new and difficult issues than could the SJC whose workload would be
iposed of much routine judicial fare, those duties which all recognize as beingcom
218
This development could be seen as a continuation of the process begun in early colonial times (pre-
1690) as described by Barbara Aronstein Black, "The Concept of a Supreme Court," in which she
describes the legislative-adjudicative distinction as a continuum rather than a clear separation.
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an
"judicial" in nature. Again this paints a contrasting picture. On the one side is
institution taking on difficult issues from the start since appeals, by their very nature,
are generally more hotly contested than cases at trial. On the other side is the SJC, an
institution which "grows into" its appellate authority and which, by the time it is
granted discretion over its workload, has developed a solid institutional acceptance of
its place in a system of separated powers.
This contrast between the role of the courts of last resort in state and federal
systems is presented to highlight the need to look at both systems to see that the
separation of powers does not lead to only one kind of interbranch relationship
between the judiciary and its co-equal branches. In addition, it may go part of the way
toward explaining the findings of this study, that the relationship between the judicial
and legislative branches in Massachusetts is more cooperative than is often assumed to
be the case on the federal level.
However, the reader should not think that there is no tension between branches in
Massachusetts. While the more natural development of the Massachusetts system may
provide a path for smoother relations between branches than did the more contrived
birth and development of the federal system, there will naturally be a tension between
various power sources within one political system. To what degree this is true can be
seen in the next chapter, as we move to a look at the sometimes contentious relationship
between the SJC and the General Court in the attempt to exercise administrative and
budgetary control over the state's judicial system.
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CHAPTER ?
JUDICIAL ADMINSITRA TION - SOURCES OFlNTERBRANCH rnvr, ,r r
There is, no doubt, a connection between "how government operates" and "what
government does." While not denying this link, the goal of this project was to focus
predominantly on interbranch relations in regard to the second question. As a result,
the majority of this work reports findings from research which assessed judicial-
legislative interaction in policymaking. The relation between the legislative and
judicial branches from that perspective was found to be one of greater cooperation in
the years under study than had been expected. Throughout the course of the research,
however, it became apparent that interactions between the SJC and the General Court
were not always harmonious. More conflict seemed to occur in questions of "how
government operates." Therefore, it seemed as though this study would be incomplete
without a discussion of some of the conflicts between the judicial and legislative
branches which have taken place in regard to judicial administration in the recent past.
Such conflicts are to be expected, especially since the concept of separation of
powers is intricately connected to that of checks and balances. While each branch is
working to fulfill its duties as it sees fit, the others are on guard to make sure no branch
moves outside its realm of authority, or more importantly, to make sure it doesn't step
into the sphere of power of another branch. In judicial-legislative relations, the
Legislature can check the High Court through control of the budget as well as through
legislation aimed at administrative duties affecting the work of the Court, most notably
in administrative supervision of lower courts, in control over court structure, and in
development of court rules and procedures. The theory is that if the SJC interferes in
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the legislative sphere while it is exercising us recognized powers ofcommon law
development, statutory interpretation, or judicial review, then the Legislature can rein
in the Court via these legislative or budgetary mechanisms. On the other hand, some
would argue that the judiciary has inherent powers (whether constitutionally recognized
or not) in a system of separated powers to control those facets of its operation which are
essential to maintaining independence. Not surprisingly, these include the same factors
mentioned above control of fiscal affairs and ofjudicial administration.219
Conflict has occurred as a result of attempts by both the Legislature and the SJ(
!
to exercise authority in these realms in the last thirty years. I lowever, these conflicts
actually lend support to the overall picture of cooperation which is seen between the
Court and the Legislature in the development of law in Massachusetts since most of
these disagreements had little to do with substantive poliey matters.220 Rather, they
more often concerned battles lor control of "who runs government." In addition, to the
degree that the justices of the SJC seemed to have a strong position on administrative
matters, resolution of the conflict eventually resulted in the change the justices desired
in most instances.
For a general discussion of this concept, sec (ail Baar, "Judicial Activism in State Courts: The
Inherent Powers Doctrine," in Porter and Tarr, State Supreme Courts. For a review of the theory of
inherent powers as applied Injudicial reform in Massachusetts, sec William Burnett Harvey, "The
Inherent Power to Reform: An Essay on the Massachusetts Judiciary," Massachusetts Law Review 11
(1992), 8-20.
220
While I recognize that decisions about administrative matters like personnel, the structure of the
judiciary, and the development of rules of COUrt are policy questions of a sort, I would argue thai (hey arc
different from questions of the substance of the law.
221 i - . , (
I would note that (he information presented throughout this chapter, unlike the findings in the other
chapters in (his work, was not the result of systematic research. Rather it developed out of side
comments made in several interviews with court personnel, as well as from anecdotes in a variety of
secondary materials on the ( 'ourt. While I did not search out this information, the cumulative effect of
these miscellaneous pieces of information was impossible to overlook. While future research will
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JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION - CONFLICTS OVFR
POLICY OR PATRONAGE?
The story ofjudicial administration in Massachusetts from the 1970s on tails
into two different phases. With respect to most of the major administrative changes
which occurred through the 1980s, one sees eventual cooperation between the judiciary
and the legislative branch, as is seen in questions of "the law," although with a little
more tension before consensus is reached. As will be noted, there was less consensus
on these matters in the early 1990s.
Many of these changes took place in the 1970s, the decade when the
Massachusetts judiciary began to enter the modern era. Some of the least controversial
reforms during these years included an increased professionalization of both the bar and
the bench under the control of the High Court. 222 In 1972 the SJC adopted the Rules of
Professional Responsibility which were modeled on the ABA's model code, and in
1974 the Board of Bar Overseers and Clients' Security Board was created to oversee
and ensure compliance with the new code by the state's attorneys. According to Chief
Justice Wilkins, this action was done, appropriately, by the judiciary alone.
It is appropriate that the Supreme Judicial Court established the new
process wholly within the judicial branch of government. Any attempt
to create such a system by legislation would undoubtedly have generated
greater controversy than existed in the debate before the court and would
have created substantial separation of powers questions. I have never
heard a serious question raised as to the constitutionality of the court's
action in creating the board and in establishing a system of annual
assessments to finance the board and the clients' security fund. 223
2
According to Professor Harvey, the power to "supervis[e] and discipline] personnel within the
judicial system is perhaps the least controversial" of the Court's inherent powers. ("The Inherent Power
to Reform," 16.) Judicial control of the bench was solidified in 1978 with the creation of the Judicial
Conduct Commission. Statutes 1978, c.478, §14, inserting c.2 1 1 C into the Massachusetts General Laws.
223
Herbert P. Wilkins, "A Justice's Perspective of the First Twenty Years of the Board of Bar
Overseers," Massachusetts Law Review 79 (1994), 136. The results of these efforts can be seen in SJC
Rule 3:07 - Canons of Ethics and Rule 4 - Bar Discipline and Clients' Security Protection.
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The structure of the judiciary in Massachusetts changed in the 1970s as well.
The first of these developments, while requiring legislative action, occurred largely due
to the efforts of Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro: the establishment of the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals as an intermediate appellate court in 1972. 224 According to a former
Legal Counsel to the SJC, and a leading scholar on the development of the Appeals
Court, while the workload of the SJC made the creation of such an institution
important, and while other states were adopting a three-tiered judicial system, "it
appeared doubtful [at the end of the 1969-1970 term] the movement in Massachusetts
would succeed in the foreseeable future[.]"225 These prospects changed, however,
when Tauro was offered the position of Chief Justice of the SJC by Governor Sargent
in the fall of 1 970. Tauro accepted this nomination, but not before getting a guarantee
from the Governor that he would put his political power and will behind the creation of
an intermediate court of appeals. 226 This promise was combined with Tauro's ability to
draw together diverse members of the judicial and legal community from which most
objections to this measure originated.227 Within two years of Tauro's appointment, and
"4
While debates may occur over the proper role for legislative and judicial activity in questions of
judicial administration, the power to create new courts clearly falls under the constitutional authority of
the Legislature as Part II, c. 1
, § 1 , art. 3 gives the General Court the "full power and authority to erect and
constitute judicatories and courts of record."
225
Daniel J. Johnedis, "Creation of the Appeals Court," in Osgood, ed., History ofthe Law in
Massachusetts, 463. See also transcripts of interviews with Johnedis and John L. Burke, former
Executive Secretary to the SJC, on file with the author for more of this history.
226
Johnedis, "Creation of the Appeals Court," in Osgood, ed., History ofthe Law in Massachusetts, 465.
Tauro was Chief Justice from 1970 to 1976. The Justice Tauro with which many Massachusetts residents
are familiar, Joseph L. Tauro of the Federal District Court of Massachusetts, is the son of the former
Chief Justice. Such family ties aren't unique in Massachusetts. Chief
Justice Tauro was appointed to the position on the SJC upon the retirement of Chief Justice Raymond
Wilkins, father of Herbert P. Wilkins who served as an Associate Justice of the SJC from 1972 to 1996
and as Chief Justice from 1996 to 1999.
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with the Governor's support, the Legislature passed legislation which created the
Appeals Court. 228
Most interesting for purposes of examining the relations between the
Legislature and the SJC is that while there was some conflict related to this
development, it centered mostly upon who would control positions in the newly
developed institution. According to Johnedis' history of this development, there was
little legislative concern with the creation of an Appeals Court until the final push in
1 97 1
,
229
At that point Senate President Kevin B. Harrington and Senate Chair of the
Judiciary, William Bulger, indicated that they were less than pleased with the degree of
judicial involvement in what was predominantly a legislative responsibility. In 1972,
however, these concerns gave way and the statute was enacted. The acquiescence of
the Senate leadership on this matter seemed to coincide with the decision to guarantee
in the legislation that the clerk of the SJC for Suffolk County (the single justice session)
and the clerk for the newly developed Appeals Court would be the same person.230
Whether or not this move (which gave a powerful Boston area political figure, John
Powers, control over both clerks' offices and therefore control over all of the positions
Concerns from the legal community seemed to center on two issues. First, there were concerns that
the creation of an intermediate appellate court would result in the SJC eventually becoming too involved
injudicial administration at the apex of a growing judicial system while being less involved in the
development of the law. Secondly, there was a feeling among some that all appeals deserved to be heard
by the state's highest court, and that to create a system which prohibited this would be to deny justice.
228
Statutes 1972, c.740, inserting GL c. 21 1 A.
229
Johnedis, "Creation and Impact of the Appeals Court," 472-473.
230 The Single Justice session of the SJC will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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within both offices) had anything to do with the final passage of this bill is an
interesting question. 231
The second major structural change within the judiciary that occurred in
Massachusetts in the 1970s was the quasi-unification of the trial court system under the
Trial Court Department in 1978. 232 Previous to thus time, the trial courts were locally
controlled and local in character.
In the late '70s, the "extremely fragmented" courts were administered by
counties rather than the state and six of those counties boasted the
highest court delays in the country. Judges and lawyers say that "local
ficfdoms" controlled judicial budgets, personnel and courtroom
procedures, creating confusion and inefficiency among counties. The
1978 Act reduced the number of budgets from more than 300 to one, and
the allocation of resources went from a "free for all," to an objective,
need-based system.
The fact that six of the twelve counties in the country with the longest trial
delays were in Massachusetts was closely connected to this confusing method of
administration. These problems were so bad that momentum for change seemed to
come from a variety of sources. Most notable was the Cox Commission, a committee
formed at the request of Governor Michael Dukakis in 1975 and chaired by Archibald
The timing of these events was confirmed by John Burke, interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May
1999.
232
Statutes 1978, chapter 478. I use the term "quasi-unification" because while all seven trial courts
were combined under the umbrella of the Trial Court Department, they each maintained their separate
identity. The reorganization did, however, move the control over the state's courts from the individual
counties to the state. The seven trial court divisions are: Boston Municipal, District, housing, Juvenile,
Land, Probate, and Superior. For a full description of the organization of the Massachusetts judiciary,
see, Michele DeMary, "The Court System in Massachusetts," Unpublished paper, 1995. For a broader
view of 1970s court unification efforts, sec Larry Berkson and Susan Carbon, Court Unification: History,
Politics and Implementation (Washington, D.C.: National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, 1978).
Meghan S. Laska, "The 20 lh Anniversary of Court Reform," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly,
November 16, 1998, 1 . The descriptive terms in this quote come from Henry L. Barr, the first
professional trial court administrator. Unless otherwise indicated, this article is the source of much of the
information in the paragraph which follows.
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Cox. The Commission issued a report in 1976 calling for a variety of reforms, drawing
some ideas from previous findings of an earlier Massachusetts Bar Association
committee. While Chief Justice Tauro (then retired) was on the Committee, as was
Chief Justice Hennessey, the SJC did not appear to take the lead in this reform effort. 234
Despite these problems with judicial management, it took another two years
before the Court Reform Act was signed into law. 235 While the history of this
development is well beyond the scope of this paper, the interesting point which was
raised in news articles of the time and in interviews with SJC staff is that the concerns
which delayed these obviously much-needed reforms came largely from two sources. 236
On the one hand, some local legal communities, courts and attorneys, benefited from
the decentralized system and wanted to keep it that way. Judges had a great degree of
freedom and control, and attorneys who knew the "ins" and "outs" of their local court
could use this knowledge to their advantage. Parochialism was at the root of the second
source of resistance to change as well. This came from those legislators who were
thought to have a certain degree of control over the many patronage jobs in a
courthouse, including court officers, clerks, and probation officers. As one of the last
bastions of patronage in Massachusetts, these legislators were loath to make changes.
Change nonetheless occurred, albeit involving some compromise. While the
Cox Commission had called for a unified trial court department, the 1978 act kept the
separate identities of the seven trial courts (Boston Municipal, District, Housing,
234
John Burke, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999.
235
Statute 1978, c.478.
236
This information comes largely from Laska, "The 20th Anniversary of Court Reform," as well as from
the following interviews: John Burke, interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999; Robert Bloom,
interview by author, Boston, MA, 6 May 1999; Maria Mossaidcs, interview by author, Boston, MA, 26
April 1999; Edward F. Hennessey, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 4 May 1999.
97
Juvenile, Land, Probate and Superior) within a general Trial Court Department headed
by a Chief Administrative Justice to operate as the primary manager of the new
Department. This way each trial court maintained its own institutional identity (which
was particularly important to the Superior Court) while still allowing for some of the
benefits of unification. According to Hennessey who served as Chief Justice of the SJC
at the time this reform occurred, «[t]his was an excellent compromise, because the
single trial court, which was at first proposed, would have required subdivisions
dictated by function [anyway], and would require sub-chiefjustices of some kind."237
As will be seen in the following chapters, there appeared to be more conflict in
regard to changes in administrative matters than had occurred in regard to any of the
policymaking efforts of the SJC in the recent past. As with the creation of the Appeals
Court, these conflicts centered less on policy concerns and more on concerns over
controlling jobs and other local advantages in court management which could be lost
with unification. While this makes perfect sense, it is unlikely that it is necessarily the
kind of thing that Madison was concerned about when he discussed "ambition
countering ambition." Even more interesting is that the conflicts didn't divide cleanly
along a legislative-judicial divide. Rather, it was much more of a division within the
judicial branch, with parochial concerns of local courts (closely mirroring concerns of
local legislators) challenging the statewide perspective of the state's leaders of the bar
and bench, including justices of the SJC.
237
Laska, "The 20 ,h Anniversary of Courl Reform." Not everyone agreed that this compromise was
necessarily for the best. See Maria Mossaidcs, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 26 April 1999.
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CONFLICT IN R1TI.F-MAKING - A n.AKSir
MASSACHUSETTS RFSOT ITTIOM
While the SJC was involved in reform efforts regarding the structure of the
judiciary, the constitutional authority for such changes clearly rested with the
Legislature. There has also been conflict between legislators and justices in a different
kind of administrative matter, rule-making. In this realm, the authority for making
change is less clearly delineated so, not surprisingly, there has been greater tension
between the branches in these matters. There is really no constitutional basis for either
branch to control these questions, although as previously noted some commentators
would say that high courts have inherent authority to control those administrative
matters which are essential to their operation.238 Chief Justice Wilkins described the
tensions over this authority in his interview.
There has always been an uncertainty as to the extent to which we may
issue rules and the Legislature may.
. .enact laws which govern the way
in which courts operate. And there can be a tension between what the
Legislature says should happen in a court, or how a particular kind of
case should be handled[.]...We regard... there being a core area of
judicial control over which the Legislature may have nothing to say and
we, therefore, would hold unconstitutional any intrusion which
interfered with the significant operations of the court[.].
. .Now, when we
adopted the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, the Massachusetts
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate
Procedure, it was a coordinated effort with the Legislature. We
suggested what the rules would be. A group combed through the
General laws to identify inconsistencies. There was a bill prepared
which the Legislature considered and it, I would say, graciously said
'OK, now these are the matters that are going to be governed by
whatever the relevant rule of the Supreme Judicial Court is,' and we
really got into no confrontation at all, and that has proceeded pretty
According to one commentator, the Court in Massachusetts has been more hesitant than he feels it
should have been in using this power. "Such reluctance as the courts have shown, in Massachusetts and
other states, to assert their inherent power directly against the legislature rests, I suggest, on political
prudence rather than constitutional limitation." Harvey, "The Inherent Power to Reform," 16.
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much along those lines ever since and that's been about twenty-
iive... years. 3
There are two important points which can be drawn from the Chief Justice's
comments. First, he indicates that the legislative-judicial interaction over these
questions has, for the past twenty-five years, been relatively cooperative. The
implication is that this is distinguishable from the period which preceded the adoption
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 240 This point is reinforced in an interesting history of
the adoption of these same rules.
The legislature did give the Supreme Judicial Court supervisory
authority over the lower courts in 1956 and created the office of
Executive Secretary to assist the Court in carrying out its new
responsibilities. This legislation, however, did not confer broad
rulemaking authority, a point made clear by the defeat of a court
rulemaking bill that same year. The legislature also refused to authorize
pre-trial oral depositions in spite of considerable bar support for the
measure and longstanding Judicial Council approval. 241
After the Legislature turned down the above-mentioned legislation regarding
pre-trial oral depositions, the SJC, upon petition of the Boston and Massachusetts Bar
Associations, promulgated a rule on its own to address this problem. Thus, despite a
contrary decision by the Legislature, and despite the concerns of some in the legal
239
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 26 April 1999. The Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate
Procedure were adopted in 1974 while the Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1979.
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This statement, like so many others of the Chief Justice during his interview, was informed not only
by his own tenure on the bench, but also by what he knew of activities during his father's tenure as chief
justice from 1956 to 1970. As a result, the historical perspective of Wilkins II spans more than just his
tenure as a justice.
The fact that relations in administrative matters may have been better in the 1970s and 80s means
that the cooperation which this study found in the policymaking realm in the 1980s and 1990s may be
time-bound.
241
Robert G. Bone, "Procedural Reform in a Local Context," in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe Law in
Massachusetts, 42 1 . This lack of trust between the branches in the 1 950s is recognized as well in John
Burke's comments regarding the creation of the Executive Secretary position. "[T]hey referred to the
Executive Secretary. Originally the bill talked about a Director and there was opposition in the
Legislature and of course a Director sounded too forceful[.]" Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May
1999.
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community, the SJC enacted the rule.242 This 1965 aet,on was called a "virtually
unprecedented dynamic exercise of the Supreme Judicial Court's rule-making
power."243 While there was a legislative attempt to override this action in 1966, it
failed (despite the fact that the Legislature had originally been set against this change).
The path was opened for a more pro-active high court in the area of rule-making. 244
What remained to be seen was whether the Legislature would become more accepting
of this exercise of power on the part of the justices.
The adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1974 seems to mark a turning
point in this relationship. While the details of this reform effort are interesting, the
portion of the story most relevant to this study concerns the manner in which the
potential tensions between the Legislature and the judiciary were resolved for it shows
that while tensions between branches exist, they are not primarily policy oriented. In
the above-cited quote from Chief Justice Wilkins, he noted that the Legislature
reviewed a bill which detailed the necessary statutory changes for enactment of the
newly developed rules and "graciously" said, OK. This is what happened, but the story
The rule was referred to as Rule 3:15. Today it is incorporated into Rule 30 of the Massachusetts
Rules of Civil Procedure. The opposition which is referred to came from the Massachusetts Trial
Lawyers Association which filed a petition against the adoption of the rule and which was active in
encouraging the Legislature to overrule the rule.
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Larkin & Smith, "Rule 15: Pretrial Oral Discovery in Massachusetts," in Annual Survey of
Massachusetts Law 13, §24.1 (1966), 347, quoted in Bone, "Procedural Rules Reform," in Osgood, ed.,
History ofthe Law in Massachusetts, 432. According to Bone there was not then, nor is there now, any
statutory authority for the SJC to take this action.
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It should be noted that the justices may have paid a price for this independence at the time. According
to John Burke, Massachusetts Representative Conrad Kieman, House Chair of the Judiciary Committee,
made the following comment to Mr. Burke upon hearing that the SJC had adopted the rule despite
negative action on this same matter during the last legislative session. "Go back and tell your friends [the
justices] that they've got their rule now, so they can take it to the bank and cash it because they're not
getting their pay raise." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999. According to a Lexis-Nexis
search, the statute establishing the salaries for the justices of the SJC was amended in 1963 and 1966, but
not 1965, the year in which Rule 3:15 was enacted.
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of why the Legislature said "OK" is a little more colorful than this description might
have one believe. After the Committee which the SJC had formed to develop the new
rules had completed its job,, t was still necessary for the Legislature to act to eliminate
any statutes which were inconsistent with the rules. As the story is told by John Burke,
former Administrative Assistant to the SJC, individuals had as much influence on the
process as any overriding concerns regarding the influence of institutions. 245
1 was called over to see Kiernan [House Chair of the Judiciary
Committee] because the courts had submitted a bill which was about
that thick [holding fingers approximately two inches apart] which
contained all the amendments that would be necessary to make the rules
come into play. And Kiernan told me that he wasn't going to go through
all that stuff. He said what I want you to do is get a letter from Judge
Moynihan, who was Chairman of the Committee. And he said, if
Moynihan will write me a letter saying that the intent of all these
amendments is merely to make the statutes conform to the rules, and
there's no gimmicks here.
.
.he said I trust Moynihan.
. .I'll let the bill go
through, report it favorably out of Committee. So I went and talked to
Moynihan. Moynihan wrote him the letter.246
Judge Moynihan was a well-respected member of the Massachusetts legal
community. He had served as a Superior Court justice as well as a faculty member,
first at Boston College Law School and then, when required to retire from BC at age
70, at Suffolk University Law School. As Bone notes in a footnote to his history of the
development of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] number of people whom I
interviewed stressed the key role that Judge Moynihan played in bridging the gap
between the Advisory Committee and the legislature and smoothing the way for
legislative acceptance of the Rules....And several also pointed to the Boston College
connection that Judge Moynihan shared with alumni who were serving in the
45
The position of Administrative Assistant to the SJC replaced that of Executive Secretary in the Court
Reform Act of 1978.
246
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999.
102
legislature."247 While each institution may have had concern for its own authority, the
personal connections between certain individuals were enough to ease such concerns. 248
The broader story of this development makes clear that this is a little more than the
"great man" theory of history. A variety of broader factors led to a situation in which
Moynihan could make a difference. However, this story points to the possibility that
the relatively small nature of the Massachusetts legal community, which crosses over
into the legislative and executive branches, especially as connected through the alumni
network of Boston area law schools, may be the grease that makes the system of
separated powers in Massachusetts move smoothly.
One more example of relations in administrative matters from the 1990s will
show that the system may not always work so smoothly. This time, though, the
of conflict comes not only from concerns over patronage but also from personality
conflicts.
source
LEGISLATIVE TOOLS TO CHECK THE JUDICIARY?
As noted above, the stereotypical view of checks and balances within an
American system of governance, federal or state, is of each branch having powers to
check the others if the others overstep their bounds. To that end, one could see the
Legislature's control of the purse strings as a potential check on the justices of the SJC.
To be effective, however, a check must be perceived as such. By this standard, there is
no check. To an individual, when asked whether or not they were concerned that the
47
"Procedural Rules Reform," 438.
24x
This leads to an interesting theory of change in intergovernmental relations, especially since the
barriers, once broken, never seemed to have been raised quite so high again. The new relationship,
opened up by the respect for one individual, seems to become an institutional norm.
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legislators may try to trim the sails of the justices if they issued opinions with which the
majority of the Legislature may disagree, the justices all gave answers which indicated
that they weren't very concerned with this possibility. Presenting a humorous response
when asked whether he was concerned about this, Justice O'Connor said, "I don't....
Maybe that's one reason that they don't pay us very much. We don't have that much to
lose."
249
Justice Nolan presented a direct response. "No. I'm bold enough to say that
that not only was [it] never discussed, but I don't think it was ever considered."250 Less
adamant but just as skeptical was Justice Lynch. «[Y]ou how that it's conceivable,
and I suppose that, I wouldn't want to say that such a thing could never happen, but
I've never been particularly concerned about it."251 As Justice Abrams noted, "[t]hey
don't have a vindictive policy."252
Overall, interviews with both justices and judicial staff of the SJC indicated that
the Legislature generally funded the SJC as was needed, treating their budgetary
requests with the degree of respect that a co-equal branch of government deserved.253
As Chief Justice Wilkins noted, "they take good care of us because, probably because
we decide maters they care about."254 The only limit may be the overall economic
Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999.
50
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.
25
1
Interview by author, Boston, MA 25 May 1999.
252
Interview by author, Boston, MA 25 May 1999.
253
This is not to say that funding for overall operation of the state's judiciary has always been adequate.
I am referring here only to the funding for the SJC specifically.
254
Interview by author, Boston, MA 23 April 1999.
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climate. As Justice Abrams noted, "when the economy is good our budget is good. If
the economy is bad, then [our budget isn't as good]."255
This is not to say that the Legislature does not take interest in the judiciary's
budget, only that it doesn't interfere with the SJC's budget. The Trial Court
Department, with local courts in legislator's local districts, is of more interest to some
legislators. So, to the degree that the SJC understands its responsibility to include
management and oversight of the lower courts, the Legislature may interfere. 256 Again,
however, this is done not in reaction to a policy position of the SJC, or because of the
SJC's intrusion into the legislative sphere, but comes from a desire to control jobs.
"[W]c now have civil service, and we [courts] arc about the only remaining part of
government where you can put people. And some of the jobs... don't require an awful
lot of credentials, so one can find constituents who meet that standard very easily and
propose them. It's a constant struggle, relating to the Legislature in terms ofjobs. ,,257
Interview by author, Boston, MA 25 May 1999.
256
In addition, there are ongoing struggles over funding to reduce case backlog and to improve court
facilities in Massachusetts. While I see these issues as distinct from the judicial decision-making portion
of the SJC's duties, this is not true for everyone. In a 1997 editorial, Dan Ring of Ottaway News Service
was critical of the Legislature's actions on a bill for upgrading court facilities in light of a certain case
pending before the SJC. "The bill was passed by the House and Senate more than a month ago, but it
wasn't until this week that the Legislature finally took a procedural step to create a conference committee
to craft a final version. Is it just a coincidence that the biggest boosters of the courthouse bill - the
justices of the state Supreme Judicial Court - are set to rule in June on the legality of term limits for state
lawmakers and other officeholders? Probably not." "Almost two years away, 1998 elections cast a
spell," New Bedford Standard Times, March 15, 1997.
257
Herbert P. Wilkins, interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. The problems with patronage in
the trial courts is not a hidden issue. Paul O'Neill, the plaintiff in a 1999 discrimination lawsuit heard by
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, was a court officer who had attempted to obtain
a transfer to a court nearer his home because of a medical condition. In a Boston Globe article, Mr.
O'Neill criticized the court personnel system. "They're allowing people with political connections to
transfer to courts closer to their homes for whatever reason, but court officers with seniority who wish to
transfer are told they aren't allowed." He further noted, "I have no one at the State House and I wish 1
did." Sacha Pfeiffer, "Court Officer Sues Over Transfer," September 9, 1999, B 1
.
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Probably the greatest checks which have been employed against the SJC
directly in the past twenty-live years occurred in the early 1990s when the Court was
operating under the leadership of Chief Justice Liacos. The relationship between the
Chief Justice and the Legislature was often strained, and this resulted in one clear
retaliatory action on the part of the Legislature, as well as some suppositions that the
1992 Court Reform Aet was watered down due to this conflict. The obvious retaliation
was the insertion in the 1995 state budget of language which denied Liacos the use of
an office in the Peabody District Court (near his home) when he wasn't working at the
SJC's offices in Boston. The proponent of this measure, Representative Brian Lees,
said he "pressed for the amendment as part of an ongoing effort to cut waste and
duplication in state government."258 Comments made by other legislators, however,
indicate that the real reason may have more to do with ongoing tensions between
Liacos and legislators. Interestingly, the fact that Justice Liacos was an outspoken
proponent of civil rights seems to have had little to do with this. It wasn't the Chief
Justice's efforts to independently interpret the state's constitution in a substantially
more liberal direction than the federal courts were moving, nor his opinion overturning
the death penalty which motivated legislators. 259 Rather, press stories said that Liacos'
personality was the overriding impetus. "Beacon Hill sources said Lee's move, which
has won bipartisan support from top legislative leaders, reflects many lawmakers'
desire to tweak the chiefjustice, who they feel is often rude, arrogant and
condescending toward them."260 The childishness of this action speaks for itself.
2 " s
Frank Phillips, "Judge Might Defy Law," Boston Globe, June 24, 1995, I 7.
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Liacos' positions on these issues will be presented in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 below.
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More serious, and more clearly connected to the administrative activities of the
Court overall, were changes made to the SJC's proposal for court reform in 1992.
Nineteen ninety-one marked the first time that the seven justices of the SJC joined
together in filing a court reorganization plan with the Legislature. In 1992 a court
reform proposal was passed, and it was signed by the Governor in January of the
following year. 261 There were major differences between the two plans, however. One
of the differences between the two versions, both of which were aimed at further
unifying the trial court system, lay at the apex of the reformed administrative structure.
While the SJC version would have given the SJC more control over administrative
matters, the final legislation replaced the existing administrative officer, the Chief
Administrative Judge, with that of the Chief Justice of Administration and Management
(CJAM). This was more than just a change in titles, as the new CJAM would have
almost total control over the Trial Court Department. While she is chosen by the
justices of the SJC, she can be removed only for misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance. As Chief Justice Wilkins noted, "[I]t's a very strongly protected position.
The Chief Justice of Administration and Management's power to get rid of a trial court
chief is a lot stronger."262 In addition, this reform bill added conditions to MGL c.21 1,
§3, the law which gives the SJC superintendence power over lower courts, both as to
law and administration. 263 While not making any change to the SJC's authority of
260
Frank Phillips, "Office Politics Heats Up as Liacos Defies Bid to Vacate," Boston Globe, June 30,
1995, 25.
261
Statutes 1992, c.379.
262
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
263
Before the 1992 amendment, the second paragraph of §3 read in part as follows. "[T]he justices of the
supreme judicial court shall also have general superintendence of the administration of all courts of
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superintendence "to correct and prevent errors and abuses..
.if no other remedy is
expressly provided" (generally considered its authority over superintendence of the
law), the 1992 legislation put relatively severe limitation on the Court's exercise of
general superintendence in the "administration of all courts of inferior jurisdiction" as
outlined in the second paragraph of GL c.21 1, §3.
.
.
.provided, however, that general superintendence shall not incudc the
authority to supersede any general or special law unless the supreme
judicial court, acting under its original or appellate jurisdiction finds
such law to be unconstitutional in a case or controversy; and provided
further that general superintendence also shall not include the authority
or power to exercise or supersede any of the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the chiefjustice for administration and
management.
.
.in any general or special law except under extraordinary
circumstances leading to a severe, adverse impact on the administration
ofjustice; provided, that the majority of the supreme judicial court shall
issue a written order that sets forth the basis for a finding that, absent
such action, there would be a severe and adverse impact on the
administration ofjustice in the commonwealth.
This legislation clearly placed greater limitations on the authority of the justices of the
SJC to oversee administrative matters in the lower courts than had existed before. In
addition, §227A of the 1992 legislation added a non-severability clause so that if the
justices were to strike down the changes to §3 as an unconstitutional violation of the
principle of separation of powers, the entire bill would fall.
Research into the reasons for this reaction on the part of the Legislature is
beyond the scope of this study. However, at least two individuals who were
interviewed for this project commented on the fact that the portions of the 1992 court
reform legislation which were discussed above could be viewed as "Liacos retaliatory'
inferior jurisdiction... and it may issue such writs, summonses and other processes and such orders,
directions and rules as may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance ofjustice, the regular execution
of the laws, the improvement of the administration of such courts, and the securing of their proper and
efficient administration." This paragraph, expanding on the superintendence power of the SJC over the
administration of the courts, was added to the laws in 1956.
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measures. ' Giving the Legislature its due, it is unlikely that this reaction stemmed
solely from what some may have viewed as Liacos' arrogant treatment of legislators. It
is more likely that it was an attempt to be sure that the Legislature maintained control
over the trial courts, especially as Liacos had been making full use of the powers at his
disposal since his appointment as Chief justice in 1989 to modernize the administration
ofjustice in Massachusetts and centralize it in the hands of the SJC. 265 Much of this
work was done by committees whose membership was drawn from justices and staff in
courts throughout the state. The following list of reports of committees issued during
Liacos' tenure as Chief arc indicative of the level of activity. They include:
"Reinventing Justice 2022" (Chief Justice's Commission on the Future of the Courts,
1992), "Five Years Toward Gender Equality" (The Supreme Judicial Court's
Committee for Gender Equality, 1994), "Supreme Judicial Court's Commission on
Juvenile Justice Final Report and Executive Summary" (The Commission on Juvenile
Justice, 1994), "Equal Justice: Eliminating the Barriers" (Supreme Judicial Court's
Commission to Study Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 1994), "A Matter of Just
Treatment: Substance Abuse and the Courts" (The Supreme Judicial Court's Substance
Abuse Project Task Force, 1995), and "Moving to a Preferred Future" (The Supreme
Judicial Court's Franklin County Futures Lab Task Force, 1995).266
264 Upon request of the interviewees, I will refrain from naming the individuals who made such
comments.
265
However, if these same actions had been taken by his predecessor or his successor, both ofwhom had
more cordial relations with the Legislature, one can't help but wonder if the reaction of the Legislature
would have been different.
6 The number of committees has not diminished since Liacos' tenure, however. A 1999 article in the
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly lists 23 such committees, 14 of them standing committees. For a critique
of the non-judge membership on these committees, see this article by Eric T. Berkman. "Inside SJC
Committees," March 8, 1999, Bl.
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When asked upon his retirement how he would like to be remembered as Chief
Justice, Liacos said, as one who "fought for an independent judiciary."267 [n an
interview conducted just before he left the bench, Chief Justice Liacos reflected on the
tensions he had experienced over the years with the Legislature. The following excerpt
from an article developed from this interview explains why he felt this tension existed.
"I felt the system was going down the tubes and I had to change it," he
says. "I had to change attitudes. I had to make it a unified system."
Members of the bench and bar have said that Liacos got off to a bad start
with the Legislature - due in part to his personality - and never
recovered. But Liacos says legislative leaders were merely being
territorial - accusing him of being an "emperor" for advocating more
independence for the judicial branch. "When I becamse chief I had a lot
of trouble with the Legislature because they were used to controlling the
judicial branch," he says. "It wasn't that 1 wanted to be the emperor or
the king or all that other kind of nonsense. I was fighting for an
independent judiciary in reality. And they didn't like that. ...Some of
them still don't like it."268
While there is no doubt that Liacos' style was different than that of his
predecessor, Chief Justice Hennessey, or of his successor, Chief Justice Wilkins, it is
unlikely that this alone would have caused the tension between branches. 269 However,
Liacos' efforts to further control the administration of the lower courts did anger the
legislators. Of most interest for this study, though, is that the anger did not stem from a
desire to "check" the judiciary for abusing power by entering the policy-making
Paul J. Martinck, "Preserving an Independent Judiciary," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, September
23, 1996, Bl.
28
Martinek, "Preserving an Independent Judiciary," B6.
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If the tone of the following Annual Message of the Chief Justice is any indication, however, Liacos'
confrontational style probably didn't help matters. For instance, his discussion of actions of both the
Executive and the Legislature in the "Annual Report on the State of the Massachusetts Judiciary"
published in the Massachusetts Law Review in March, 1992, were quite critical. Liacos referred to
"Draconian underfunding by the executive and legislative branches." He noted that "[I]n economic times
such as these, unwarranted restraints on the judiciary's ability to operate more efficiently are wholly
unacceptable and must be dissolved." And he warned the readers of his report that "we shall not yield.
Too much is at stake to allow the temporary setbacks of the past year to frustrate our goal" (5 1 - 53).
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domain in a way which was inappropriate. Rather, it seemed to come from a desire to
continue to control the operation of local courts, including the question of who fills the
non-judicial positions. Patronage was at the crux of conflict between the Legislature
and the SJC.
There is little doubt that patronage is a source of power for elected politicians.
Efforts by local legislators to control such positions should come as no surprise to
anyone schooled in practical politics. What is most interesting to this study, however,
is that the legislature's use of checks over judicial administration seems to have been
largely a tool to control jobs and not to rein in an overactive judiciary. One reason for
this could be that the SJC was so restrained in its involvement in potential policy-
making matters that no checks were seen as necessary. As will be seen in Chapter
Four, however, the SJC has played a substantial role in the development of law in
Massachusetts. This fact leaves open the possibility that the Legislature does not
attempt to check the judiciary because it is accepting of the SJC's role in lawmaking, a
possibility which will be explored in the following chapter.
1 1
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CHAPTER 4
THE SJCAND THE LEGISLATURE^ COOPERATION OVER CONFLICT
DIALOGUE OY ER DEBATE *
The American system of separated powers can be a source of conflict between
the judicial and legislative branches of government. One of the assumptions underlying
this system is that the branches will often compete for the final word, each branch
struggling to enact their view into policy. The system of separated powers as it
operates in Massachusetts has not been immune from conflict. As seen in Chapter
Three, there have been tensions between the Court and the Legislature over questions
concerning administrative control of the lower courts and over the rules of procedure
affecting these same courts. These conflicts, however, stem not from a desire to control
judicial decisions and legal interpretations of the Court, but from a concern for local
affairs affecting individual legislators. As one of the last bastions of patronage in the
Massachusetts political system, legislators have jealously guarded their control of local
trial courts. Similarly, concerns about rules changes have been generated by local
lawyers (who may also be political supporters), and legislators have been hesitant to
approve a change in rules until enough of their constituents are willing to accept the
change. What these battles did not indicate, however, was a desire of the Legislature to
use their powers to make sure the SJC did not abuse its authority as the final arbiter of
legal conflicts in Massachusetts.
This becomes even more evident if we consider the justices' perspectives as
portrayed in Chapter Three ~ the justices of the SJC feel autonomous in their authority
as the final arbiter in conflicts which come before them. While the Legislature can
check the high court through legislation, through control of the budget, and through
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removal from office, justices of the SJC don't feel these powers have ever been used to
influence (of if they were, they have not had the intended effect of influencing) the
independent authority of the Court to hear and decide questions of law in the cases
which come before it. The interesting question which emerges from this finding is
why: why haven't the checks built into this system of separated powers been activated?
Has the Court never given the Legislature cause to feel it was overstepping judicial
boundaries, venturing into the legislative realm of lawmaking? This question provides
the focus of this chapter and the two which follow. Chapters Five and Six respectively
look at the way in which the SJC has used its power ofjudicial review and its power to
issue advisory opinions to discover the degree to which the Court has challenged the
authority of the Legislature. These chapters show the comparatively restrained role
which the justices of the Massachusetts high court have adopted which gives some
credence to the view that the Legislature has not had to check the Court as it has rarely
acted in ways which threaten the legislative authority of the state's elected
representatives.
This view is accurate as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. The material
presented in the remainder of this chapter will attempt to fill in the picture of the
relationship between the SJC and the Massachusetts Legislature. Here the same
question is addressed but from a different perspective - do the SJC's opinions tread on
ground which could be seen as belonging to the Legislature in cases which do not raise
questions ofjudicial review or which aren't advisory in nature? As mentioned in
Chapter I, the brief answer to this question is "yes." This chapter will explore this
answer more fully, explaining the role the Court has played it in cases involving
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common law development and statutory interpretation. It is a role involving the SJC in
policymaking, yet one which the Legislature has generally accepted without challenge.
In contrast to traditional understandings of the operation of the separation of powers,
the relationship between the two branches which emerges from this analysis is one of
cooperation rather than confrontation. Instead of clashing with and challenging the
Legislature, the two branches have often worked together in the development of
important public policies. Furthermore, the Legislature has been more likely to use the
system of separated powers to avoid responsibility and to allow the Court to make
policy than to challenge the judiciary's authority. As a result, the role of the Court has
often been one of "encouraging" the Legislature to act rather than prohibiting them
from acting as is the case with judicial review. Just as the Legislature will fight to
maintain friends in their districts, they will avoid acting in ways which could make
enemies.270
Before presenting these findings, however, it is important to understand the
degree to which the SJC is free to establish its own workload. A proclivity on the part
of the state's justices to involve themselves in shaping public policy and an acceptance
of this action by the Legislature would have no effect if the justices did not also have
the time to act. The control which the Court has over its docket and way in which it
exercises this power provides perspective on the degree to which the Court can involve
itself in policy questions and of the role which the justices feel they should play within
the state's political system.
70
Legislatures are not alone in avoiding issues which could be politically harmful. The use of the
political question doctrine by judiciaries is proof of this.
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APPEALS BF.FORF THF S|C - CAN POLITIC A I QIJESIIQNSBECOME LFC4L QUESTIONS?
"There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner
or later turn into a judicial one."271 This frequently cited quote from the 19th century
French observer of American society, Alexis de Tocqueville, has been debated just as
frequently. While debates over the substance of the statement may be interesting (Do
most political questions become legal questions?), they often overlook the procedural
puzzle which the quote contains. That is, how does a "political" question turn into a
"judicial" one? When asked to distinguish the judicial branch from the state's other
two branches of government, Chief Justice Wilkins pointed out one of the problems
which is inherent in Tocqueville 's observation, the reactive nature of the judiciary.
Let me start off by saying our function normally is to deal simply with a
case that comes before us. We do not have the broad license that the
Legislature has to announce what the answer is on a whole variety of
problems. We only get involved...with real cases, and if the issue never
gets here we never are going to deal with that particular subject. So that
is the major restraint on the courts. 272
No political question will become a judicial one unless someone brings the
question to the Court. The second procedural hurdle which needs to be jumped in
* 71
Alexis dc Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Harper and Row, 1969),
270.
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Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. This is not to say that the courts are necessarily
passive in this matter. Jurisdictional boundaries, some of which are set by court rule, help to determine
which conflicts will and which will not make it into the judicial system. High courts, in particular, can
make it clear that they are interested in hearing certain cases and the justices of the SJC may convey their
thought regarding still unanswered questions in footnotes found in opinions like the following: 'The
case does not raise the issue of the constitutionality of standards for approving private schools,
curriculum requirements, or the qualifications of private school teachers. We do not consider these
issues, and we intimate no view on them. The defendants do not argue that our State Constitution
provides greater protection than the United States Constitution. Thus, we do not consider any issues of
State constitutional law." Attorney General v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367 (1982), 368. Whether or not these
questions will arise in a future case is dependent on whether a party to an appeal raises the question.
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movintig a question from the political realm to the judicial comes from the Court itself
since the SJC, like most courts of last resort, has almost complete discretion over its
caseload. Therefore, few questions will become judicial ones unless the justices of that
court so desire. Whether or not an appellate court is involved in deciding questions of
policy depends on the right question being asked and on the justices of the court being
interested in providing an answer to that question. How and why these procedural
barriers are crossed is important to understanding the broader question of what role the
justices and the public think a court of last resort should play within its political system.
Most research on appellate courts has focused on the second condition - when
do justices choose to take appeals which are brought to their attention.273 While some
of these studies have involved state courts of last resort,274 the most well-known are of
the case selection process which is employed by the United States Supreme Court.
Studies by Doris Marie Provine and H.W. Perry, Jr. have greatly increased our
273
While some research focuses on the question of which conflicts enter the judicial arena, much of this
centers on the trial court level. Some of the studies in this regard come from the extensive data gathered
through the Civil Litigation Research Project. See, Joel B. Grossman, et. al., "Dimensions of
Institutional Participation: Who Uses the Courts, and How?" Journal ofPolitics 44 (1982), 86-1 14.
Other research focuses on the role of interest groups in bringing such litigation, both to the trial court and
to the appellate level. See, for example, Lee Epstein, "Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist
Court Era," Journal ofLaw and Politics 9 (1993), 639-717; Kevin T. McGuire and Gregory A. Caldeira,
"Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court,"
American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 717-726; and Karen O'Connor, Women 's Organizations'
Use ofthe Courts (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980). Studies of when losing parties to a suit
choose to appeal tend to emphasize either the general role of interest groups (see previous cites) or to be
part of the "story" of how an important case finally reaches the Supreme Court. See, for example,
Edward Geary, Beyond the Burning Cross (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Richard Kluger, Simple
Justice (New York: Vintage Press, 1975); and Anthony Lewis, Gideon 's Trumpet (New York: Vintage
Books, 1964). An exception to this is Gregory J. Rathjen's "Lawyers and the Appellate Choice: An
Analysis of Factors Affecting Decision to Appeal," American Politics Quarterly 6 (1978), 387-405.
74
See, Lawrence Baum, "Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearings in the California Supreme Court:
Patterns in Court and Individual Behavior," Santa Clara Law Review 16 (1976), 730-740; Robert L.
Dudley, "Coalition Building on the California Supreme Court: Votes on Access and the Merits," in
Sheldon Goldman and Charles M. Lamb, ed., Judicial Conflict and Consensus (Lexington, KY:
University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 254-274; and Victor E. Flango, "Case Selection in the Georgia and
Illinois Supreme Courts," Justice System Journal 12 (1987), 398-401.
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understanding of which cases justices of the U.S. Supreme Court find to be certworthy
and how they make these determinations. 275 From these studies we have learned that
the U.S. Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari to a case in which one or more
of the following are present: United States as a petitioner, inter-circuit conflict, conflict
with Supreme Court precedent, a certain ideological position of lower court rulings, and
the presence of amicus curiae briefs. These indicators tell us something about the role
which the justices of the nation's highest court feel they should play in the nation's
political system. At the very least they indicate that the justices feel they should
provide a consistent body of law throughout the nation and that they should pay
attention to the cues of others (the executive branch or interest groups) who feel a case
raises a significant question of law.
While the research conducted for this project was not developed to provide a
direct answer to the question of what cases the SJC is most likely to hear, the data
provides a view of some important facets of this step in the judicial process in
Massachusetts. Insight can be gained from the following information which was
gathered in the course of this project: the process by which cases reach the SJC (both
what the rules say and what the justices say) and the kinds of cases which the SJC
chooses to hear.
275
This research is necessitated by the fact that Rule 10, the Supreme Court Rule which outlines the type
of cases to which the Court will grant certiorari, is written in general terms and subject to interpretation.
While it provides a preliminary indication of when a case will be heard, justices obviously do further
sifting to develop their docket. Doris Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) and H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in
the United States Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). It would seem remiss
not to mention as well the seminal work on agenda-setting on the U.S. Supreme Court upon which all
later studies built. See Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin and Daniel Rosen, "The
Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory," in Glendon Schubert, ed., Judicial Decision
Making (New York: Free Press, 1963), 1 1 1-132.
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HOW TO GET TO THE SJC - THE MANY AVENUES
Cases come to the highest court in Massachusetts from one of five sources. By
far the largest percentage of cases which appeared on the SJC's docket between 1981
and 1995 came directly from one of the seven trial court departments - 76% (2793) of
the 3660 cases came from this source. 276 (See Table 4. 1 for a summary of the numbers
referenced throughout the next few pages.) Secondly, cases may arrive at the SJC after
the Appeals Court has heard and decided upon the case. 277 This makes up a smaller
percentage of the Court's docket, only 9% (343) in the fifteen years under study. The
third avenue of appeal is from the Single Justice Session of the SJC, an unusual
procedure for handling appeals. According to former Chief Justice Wilkins, "We have
a Single Justice Session which is unique to the Commonwealth, even Maine doesn't
have it, which is derived from us."278 This session is used to perform a variety of
gatekeeping functions for the Court. From 1981 - 1995, 429 cases (12%) came to the
full Court from a Single Justice session. It is from these three sources that the SJC
draws almost all of its cases and in the majority of instances, the Court has discretion in
choosing which cases it will hear. In addition, all three of these procedures have unique
components to them which makes them interesting in assessing the role which the
Court plays in the state's system of government. Before looking at these procedures in
276
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1 1 (application for direct appellate review). See
also GL c. 21 1 A, §10. This also includes cases which came directly from one of several administrative
tribunals. These included the Appellate Tax Board, the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, and the
Labor Relations Commission.
277
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 27. 1 (application for further review). See also GL
c. 211A, §11.
278
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
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more detail, however, there are two other sources for appeals which are not
discretionary. While almost all cases on the SJC's docket come from the trial courts,
the Single Justice session or the Appeals Court, a few come from a court of another
jurisdiction or from another branch of Massachusetts government. The first of these is
similar to the practice in most other jurisdictions. In these cases questions of law can
be certified to the SJC from federal courts of other states to clarify a point of
TABLE 4.1 - SJC:1981-1Q95 - Sources of Appp.k
Source: Data Compiled by Author from Massachusetts Reports, Volumes 382-421.
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Massachusetts Law with which they may be eoneerned. Accepting such requests is not
absolutely requ.red. SJC Rule 1 :03 says only that «[t]his court may answer questions of
law certified to it...when requested by the certifying court[.]"279 While in theory the
Court could refuse to answer the question, there is no indication that this ever occurs
which may be connected to what the justices see as an essential role for the state's high
court in a federal system of separated powers. The certification process is a reminder
that in a federal system of government questions which require the interpretation of a
state's constitution, statutes, regulations, or common law, are to be answered by the
high court of that state (and not the U.S. courts or the court of another state). Each state
has the authority to make the definitive statement of what its own law means. The
interesting point concerning the role of the judiciary, however, is that questions
regarding administrative regulations are not certified to the Governor and questions
regarding statutes are not certified to the Legislature. Rather, all questions, by rule of
the Court, go to the SJC, a persistent reminder of the role of the High Court in a system
of separated powers.280
The second source for non-discretionary questions involves cases which come
to the Court for an Advisory Opinion from either house of the General Court, from the
Governor, or from the Governor's Council. 281 The importance of this process to an
understanding of the Supreme Judicial Court in the state's system of government is
279
Emphasis added. There is no statutory basis for this procedure. As seen in Table 4.1, only 30 cases
came to the SJC from this source between 1981 and 1995.
280
For a discussion of one justice's view of the certification process, see Herbert P. Wilkins,
"Certification of Questions of Law: The Massachusetts Experience," Massachusetts Law Review 74
(1989), 256-258.
81
Advisory Questions come to the Court under constitutional authority, Massachusetts Constitution, pt.
1 , c. Ill, art. 2, as amended by art. 85 of the Articles of Amendment. See Chapter 6 for a more thorough
discussion of this process.
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analyzed in more detail in Chapter 6. As regards workload, however, only 33
(less than 1% of the total) arrived on the Court's docket as requests for Advisory
Opinions.
cases
non-
In addition to certification and advisory questions, a variety of other
discretionary cases came directly from the trial courts in the years under analysis, the
large majority of them being appeals involving first degree murder convictions. 282 By
statute, all individuals found guilty of such charges must be granted, upon request, a
review of "the whole case for its consideration of the law and the evidence."283 During
the 15 years under analysis non-discretionary cases from all of these sources made up
17% of the Court's caseload. 284
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - THE HOW AND THE WHY
The mandatory portion of the SJC docket represents less than one-fifth of the
caseload in the 15 years under analysis. This means that the other 83% of the cases in
those years consisted of discretionary cases and it is to these which we return to attempt
There are a few miscellaneous categories of cases which also fit in this category during the years
under analysis. While very small in number, non-discretionary matters filed directly with the SJC include
disciplinary matters involving judges and clerks of court, although most of these come through the Single
Justice session first. In addition, through 1986 the SJC was the first court of appeal for cases coming
from the District Court and Boston Municipal Court Appellate Divisions, from the Appellate Tax Board,
and from the District Court decisions in unemployment cases. This was due largely to an oversight when
the legislation was written to create the Appeals Court. Legislation enacted in 1985 (at the urging of the
Court) changed this, making the Appeals Court the first line of appeal for these cases. Massachusetts
Statutes 1985, c. 314. Daniel Johnedis, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 14 April 1999.
3 GL c. 278, §33E. This is a holdover from the days when the Commonwealth had a death penalty. It
does, of course, give some indication of the role which the legislators feel the state's high court should
play — a final check to be certain that the conviction is as accurate and the process as fair as humanly
possible in a case where the ultimate punishment is being imposed.
284
In more recent years, the percentage of non-discretionary cases to the overall caseload of the SJC is
rising, coming close to one-half. This seems to be due largely to the increase in first degree murder
appeals. See Annual Report on the State ofthe Massachusetts Court System, Fiscal Year 1998, 16-17.
Henry Clay, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999. Mr. Clay is the Chief Staff Counsel of the
SJC.
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to answer the question of why the Court chooses to hear some eases and not others.
What might this tell us about the role which the justices feel they should play in the
Massachusetts political system? To answer this we come back to the sources of the
Court's discretionary workload, the Single Justice Session, the Trial Courts, and the
Appeals Court.
The Single Justice Session, formally known as the Supreme Judicial Court for
Suffolk County, appears to be a holdover from the early years of statehood. 285 In its
unique, gatekeeping role, the Single Justice hears appeals authorized under numerous
statutes, but the most common basis for appeal is the general superintendence power
which the SJC has the authority to exercise over inferior courts under GL c.21 1, §3. 286
Petitions for such actions "abound at almost every single justice hearing [yet] ....they
are rarely allowed."287 While these petitions are most often denied, the Single Justice
can grant the petition and decide the appeal on the merits, or grant the petition and
reserve and report the case to the full Court for consideration. It is interesting to note
that the ability of a single justice to reserve and report a case to the full bench allows
one justice's views of what cases the full Court should hear to determine part of the
caseload for the entire Court.
288
This is an interesting power, although not used often.
285
1 have been unable to find any history on this unique institution except for a brief reference to its
existence in the late 1700's in William T. Davis, History ofthe Judiciary ofMassachusetts (Boston, MA:
Boston Book Company, 1900), 177. As noted in Chapter 2, many practices from colonial times were
simply incorporated into the practice of the state judiciary after the Massachusetts Constitution was
adopted in 1780 so the practice of using such an institution could predate statehood.
286
See discussion of this power in Chapter 3. One of the best basic discussions of the statutory bases for
appeals to the Single Justice session appears in the Annual Report ofthe Massachusetts Court System,
Fiscal Year 1998, 18-19. According to this source, there are 24 statutes which authorize an appeal to the
SJC for Suffolk County.
287
Joseph Nolan, Massachusetts Practice: Appellate Procedure, Vol. 41 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing,
1991), 58.
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coming to the SJC between L981 and L995. In either instance me case is Only 308
cases heard in these years came to on report from a Single Justice.289 Since the history
of this unique institution is not known, h is hard to determine why the SJC for Suffolk
( lounty was developed as a separate vehicle for handling appeals. The existence of this
speeial session since the end of the 1 700's, however, provides the ( !oun with a greater
capacity for fulfilling .is role of superintending the judiciary in more routine matters
while also having the time to decide importanl questions of law and public policy.290
The trad which the large majority of discretionary appeals followed from 198]
to I 995 was from the trial conn directly to the stale's highest court. Tins can happen
either through an application for direct review filed by the parly taking the appeal (22%
;kh...
rhere may be a similarity here with the actions of Justices of the I is Supreme Court win,, hearing
emergency appeals upon assignment to a circuit, refer an appeal to the lull ( !ourt, Tins happens more
rarely, however,
it is likely thai any "wayward" justices would be "checked" by her colleagues on the bench, Should
one justice report too many cases, or report cases loo frequently which Ihe justices led do not merit their
attention, they would probably make this known through internal communications, As much of the
contemporary research on the strategic actions ofjudges reminds us, appellate justices operate in a small
group selling which conditions their range of actions. Sec Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The < 'hoU es
Justices Make (Washington, D.C.: CQ Pr ess, 1998).
li is interesting to note thai these cases increased from an average of24/year from I ( >.x I to 1989 to
35/year between I wo and 1995. The increase appears to be largely from appeals from Single Justice
decisions. Perhaps an increase in the murder caseload (with the conconulant increase in inlerloculory
appeals) may explain this Subtle but consistent shift,
' li is also possible thai the long term existence of this institution may reinforce a seemingly ongoing
understanding that the siaie's high courl has importanl business to conducl as a co equal branch oi
government.
The Single Justice session of the SJC seems to have engendered another process which is relatively
unique lo Massachusetts. This is the practice of the Court regularly sitting m panels of five rather than a
lull seven. During the years under sludy in this work, panels ol five justices decided over 70% ol Ihe
appeals before the SJC. (This practice was largely abandoned when Wilkins became ( lucf Justice in
1996 SO thai all seven justices hear and decide most cases today.) Wilkins explained Ihe development of
this live-justice panels as follows: "Bui because one of Ihe justices was busy on thai
|
Single Justice
session | al least one day of ihe sitting week, il may have been that | inaudible | didn't sit the whole crowd,
There is another reason which is more practical. I fntil we had an Appeals ( 'our! there were an awful lol
of junky cases." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April I ( ' ( > ( >.
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of these appeals) or, more frequently, by an order of the SJC. 29 ' Tins occurred in 1432
cases (39%) not heard unless two justices of the SJC feel they should hear the appeal
directly rather than allowing the Appeals Court to resolve the conflict. In both cases
the Court can choose which cases to hear, leaving the others to the intermediate court o
appeals. The second of these procedures, by which the SJC "reaches down" and takes
appeals directly (also called sua sponte - on its own initiative), is relatively unique.292
According to former SJC Legal Counsel Daniel Johnedis, it was also unique to
Massachusetts.
The impetus for this historic change in the outlook of the Court came
from the Associate Justice Edward F. Hennessey, who was the junior
justice at the time the new [Appeals] court appeared and later became
chiefjustice of the Court....Justice Hennessey designed a simple system
that enabled the Court to regulate its appellate caseload and,
contemporaneously, to help retain the Court's national reputation as a
leading state appellate court. His proposal was challenging and
unorthodox: the Court would review every case entered in the Appeals
Court before it was argued and transfer cases deemed particularly
important (as measured by the statutory criteria). 293
Procedurally, all discretionary appeals must first be filed with the Appeals Court with an additional
application filed for direct review with the SJC. Court orders in response to applications for direct
appellate review, unlike those concerning further appellate review, are not printed in the Massachusetts
Reports so it is not possible to develop a chart similar to Table 4-2 below which details what percentage
of applications for review are accepted. However, in Annual Reports of the State of the Massachusetts
Court System beginning in 1994, such data was included. From FY91 to FY98 the number of
applications for direct review remained fairly steady (annual average of 96.5), while the percentage of
applications granted dropped steadily from approximately 65% in the early years to under 50% by the
latter years. This is directly connected to the decreasing number of spaces on the docket which are
available for discretionary cases as the number of direct entries is climbing.
292 i •
According to Harry Stumpf and John Culver, a similar practice occurs in five states whereby all
appeals are filed with the state supreme court and then the state supreme court distributes appeals
between the high court and the intermediate court of appeals. While the procedure is different (in
Massachusetts, except for the exceptions regarding direct appeal, all appeals are filed with the Appeals
Court first and the SJC reviews on its own initiative from those filings) the result is similar.
Interestingly, though, the Massachusetts example is not discussed in Stumpf s book. The Politics ofState
Courts (New York: Longman, 1992), 25.
293
Daniel Johnedis, "Creation and Impact of the Appeals Court," 479 in Osgood, ed., The History ofthe
Law in Massachusetts.
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This procedure, which still operates as originally established in the early I970's,
represents an attempt to make wise use ofjudicial resources. The most important eases
w.ll be heard by the state's high court while avoiding duplication of efforts by the
state's two courts of appeal was a primary concern in the creation of the state's two-tier
appellate system.294
The question still remains, however: which cases are most important? What
criteria do the justices use to determine when a case should be heard directly and what
does this tell us about their perspective on the role of the Court in the state's system of
governance? In the fifteen years under study, 61% of all cases came to the SJC directly
from the trial courts by discretion of the justices. Rule I 1 of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure list three criteria which the SJC will use to determine if it should hear an
appeal directly. 2
" 5
It will hear such cases if they raise: 1 ) novel questions or questions
of lust impression; 2) constitutional questions concerning the Massachusetts or U.S.
Constitutions; or 3) "questions of such public interest that justice requires a final
determination by the full Supreme Judicial Court."
Not unlike Rule 10 of the United States Supreme Court which provides the
criteria for granting cert, the SJC's criteria are broad and open to interpretation. One of
the questions which was presented to the justices and staff in interviewing for this
294
For a list of studies which laud this unique process see Johnedis, "Creation ami Impact of the Appeals
Court," 4X9-490. The actual screening is done by a committee of three justices (often the most junior
justices on the Court) who meet once a month with the Chief Staff Counsel and the SJC Clerk to screen
applications for direct review and the recommendation of the Staff Counsel's office about which cases
from the Appeals Court docket should be taken sua spontc. (Daniel Johnedis, Interview by author,
Boston, MA. 14 April 1999 and Henry Clary, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999. In
contrast, applications for further appellate review (discussed below) are distributed to all seven justices
and votes are taken in conference to determine if the application should be allowed. Information on the
process for screening further appellate review applications comes from Daniel Johnedis, telephone
Interview by author, 27 April 1999.
2 ',?
See also MGL, c.211, 10.
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project focused on this process in hopes of developing a clearer sense of these
criteria.
296
Their answers provide little insight into the role the justices feel the SJC
should play in the state's political system. Rather than refining the terms of Rule 11,
justices tended to paraphrase one or more of the criteria set forth in the Rules. 297 When
asked what factors determined when they thought the SJC should take a case in the first
instance, answers tended toward the following. "Well, clearly on direct we should hear
something of first impression."298
"Ifit's a serious question of constitutional law, either
state or federal, then almost by definition we should take it."299 The only other criteria
which appeared in the answers of more than one justice was similar to that expressed by
Justice Lynch: "[Y]ou look at how important is the issue. Does it have system-wide
significance? Does it have significance to more than just the litigants?"300
Overall, the formal criteria for case selection, as well as the justices' responses,
are consistent in what they don't contain: there is little concern with ensuring justice in
296
While not a part of the present project, it would be interesting to conduct an in-depth study by
comparing potential appeals which were not chosen with those the Court chose to hear over a period of
time. Such research would be different than studies of most other appellate systems because of the
unique screening process which the SJC uses. For instance, unlike research on the U.S. Supreme Court
which focuses on which cases are chosen out of all applications for a writ of certiorari which are filed,
the universe of potential appeals for the SJC would be comprised of all appeals filed with the Appeals'
Court. This would be a not insubstantial task as the number of such appeals topped the 1000 mark
throughout the 1980's and numbered more than 2000 in the 1990's.
While providing me with no clearer sense of what these broad criteria mean to the Justices, the degree
to which the responses of the justices and staff mirrored the language of the rules is interesting. Whether
it means they're only repeating the language of the rule to give the "expected" answer or that they've
internalized the criteria is impossible to tell.
298
299
Justice Nolan, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.
Justice Lynch, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 April 1999. While this is a close paraphrase, it
should be noted that he distinguishes serious constitutional questions from more routine matters. If the
SJC were to choose to hear every constitutional question they would take almost all criminal matters on
appeal.
300
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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individual cases. Rather, they show a predominant concern with deciding questions
whose impact extends beyond the part.es to the appeal, a Stance similar to most high
courts in a system with an intermediate court of appeal.301 While tins doesn't shed
much light on specific instances when policy-making mighl be an acceptable role for
the justices to play, it does show that the court's rules (recognized in legislative statute)
reinforce an acceptance of the SJC's authority to take actions which will have broad
public ramifications.
The second source lor discretionary appeals which come to the SJC is the
Appeals Conrt. The losing party to an appeal in the Appeals Court has the right to
apply lor further appellate review (FAR) by the SJC. Nine percent (343 eases) came to
the SJC via this route from 1981 to 1995. Such applications "shall be founded upon
substantial reasons affecting the public interest or the interests ofjustice."302 Three of
the seven justices of the SJC must feel that these criteria have been met before a case is
taken for further review. As with the criteria for direct review, this standard is very
broad. Also similar were the responses of the justices as to when this criterion might be
met, often paraphrasing the appropriate Rule. Beyond this, however, the justices
presented two general guidelines for determining when they will consider taking a case
for further appellate review. The first of these is if they feel the "that the Appeals Court
might not have gotten it quite right."303 This could apply to their interpretation of the
U
" "By definition, the vast majority of cases heard on appeal in the Males are disposed of by the stale
lAC's. As we saw, this was the primary...purpose lor which they were created -- to act as screening
devices so that the stale courts of last resort could concentrate on the important policy issues in the law."
Slump!', The Politics ofState Courts, 145.
102
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 27.1. Sec also, MGL C. 2 I I A, § I I
.
,IH
Justice Lynch, Interview by author, Moston, MA, 25 May 1999. Speaking somewhat more bluntly,
but with no clearer definition of the criteria. Justice Nolan presented his view as follows: "Or vou might
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law or the- decision as It affects the individual part.es. The second guideline involves
the relevance of the legal question which the appeal raises. Does it reach beyond the
part.es to the appeal?304 The only concrete indication that most justices gave as to
when a case would be accepted lor further review was when there was a dissenl coming
out of the Appeals Court.305
This information, while limited, reinforces the general sense found in looking at
cases accepted on direct review of the role - or roles - which justices believe the SJC
should perform in a system of separated powers. As distinguished from direct review,
however, both the justices' comments and the rules guiding this procedure show the
Court to have two roles to play in FAR cases. While the two are not inherently in
conflict, tune constraints will force the justices to juggle them. The fu st of these is not
found in concerns regarding direct review. It is the role which the Court has of
applying the law to all individuals fairly and of guaranteeing that conflicts are equitably
resolved. This is reflected in the second criteria found in Rule 27.1, to serve the
interests of justice, and in justices 1 concerns that the Appeals Court just didn't get it
right or that an individual may be unjustly imprisoned. Unlike in cases in which the
SJC is considering whether to take the conflict on direct review, the High Court here is
the final avenue of appeal for most litigants, making questions ofjustice in individual
gel a unanimous opinion from them [Appeals Court] but say, this is wrong. That's all (here is to it."
Interview by author, Boston, MA 3 May 1999.
04
Justice Lynch noted an important distinction between criminal and civil appeals. "And. ..of course, if
it's a criminal case and somebody's in jail that shouldn't be, we ought lo take the case. Il'it's a civil case,
il may have lo be something more than maybe they didn't gel il right." Interview by author, Boston, MA,
25 May 1999.
305
The Appeals Court hears appeals in panels of three; the justices say they arc more likely to consider
an application for further appellate review in a 2-1 opinion from the Appeals Court. Unfortunately, data
to confirm these statements was not gathered during the course of this project.
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o\ or
cases more pressing. The second role concerns the Court's responsibility to the
community beyond the parties to the case: to serve the public interest. Concerns
who and how many are affected by the decision of the Appeals Court indicate a
recognition that the SJC's role extends beyond the traditional concept ofjudicial power,
of applying the law fairly to the conflict at hand. Perhaps most interesting is that except
in cases of serious injustice affecting individuals, the SJC is generally more concerned
with addressing broader policy questions. 306
A comparison of the number of applications for further appellate review and the
number granted indicate that these criteria for further review are rarely met. This
would be a comfort to original opponents of creating an intermediate court of appeals in
Massachusetts whose predominant concern was that valuable judicial time and energy
would be wasted on many cases getting two appeals. Largely to avoid this problem, the
SJC has developed a review philosophy with an "underlying theory that everybody is
entitled to one appeal, but only one appeal, so that when Nve grant further appellate
review that's sort of an acknowledgment that the system didn't work in this particular
case."
307 A quick look at the numbers proves that the system does work most of the
time.
()h
I realize that this is similar to most other high courts in the United States. The point is not to present
this as some sort of neNv and unusual support for judicial lawmaking. Rather, the point here, as
throughout the Chapter, is to show how institutional supports (rules of court and legislation) and views of
justices combine to promote a role for the SJC which extends beyond the traditional judicial role of
adjudicating individual cases.
307
Justice Lynch, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999. This could mean the system failed in
one of two ways, each relating to one of the two roles of the Court mentioned above. On the one hand
the failure (in the eyes of the SJC) could have been on the part of the Appeals Court in that it did not
"serve the interests ofjustice" in making its decision. On the other hand, the SJC could have erred in not
taking the case in the first place, not recognizing that the case presented a unique and important question
of law which the state's highest court should decide in the first instance. A 1984 study of FAR in civil
cases lends credibility to the position that in civil cases (as distinguished from an improper imprisonment
as Justice Lynch noted), justices were concerned predominantly with "maintaining a uniform body of law
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Table 4.2 - SJC: 1981-1995 - Father AnnHl.to Rovio,
Calendar
Year
Application for
Further
Appellate
Review
Number of
Application
s
Granted
Percentage
of
.
Applications
Granted
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Total
308
252 1 15 l 12.3%
276 lb 9.4%
319 J 1 9.7%
274 A 1 15%
339 1 T51 9.4%
299 in 10%
230 17 J.J/O
263 22 8.4%
243 11 4.5%
238 19 8%
295 27 9.2%
344 26 4.6%
440 30 6.8%
431 29 6.7%
541 39 7.2%
4784 411 8.6%
by author from Massachusetts Reports, Volumes 382-421.
As Table 4.2 shows, of the 4784 applications filed in these years, only 41 1 were
granted which means that in less than 9% of the cases did three justices agree with the
losing party that another appeal was necessary. For the most part, the justices have
limited parties to one appeal in the state's judiciary. 309 Credit for this lies largely with
the unique system which the SJC has developed for taking cases directly for review. 310
in the Commonwealth." (Byrgen Pickering Finkelman, "Further Appellate Review in Civil Cases: How
the Court Decides What Cases to Take," Massachusetts Law Review 79 [ 1 994], 116.) As a matter of
fact, Finkelman found only one case in 10 years (out of 127 cases) which the Court appeared to take
"solely because further appellate review was in the interest ofjustice in the particular case" (120).
08
Since volume 393 of the Massachusetts Reports is missing a page (1101) there are no entries for
7/27/84-1 1/2/84. Therefore, the numbers for 1984 (as well as the totals for the 15 years) are not a perfect
reflection of SJC activity in this regard.
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These are the five paths by which eases reach the SJC. In the 1 5 years under
study the Court had no discretion over 1/3 of its easeload. Composed primarily of
appeals from first degree murder convictions, this portion of the easeload represents the
polity's view that there are some cases which are so important that they must be heard
and determined by the state's highest court. This applies in particular to cases
involving an individual who is paying a penalty under conviction of the most serious
criminal charge. The other 2/3 of the SJC's caseload however, is composed of
discretionary matters. This means that an average of 161 cases per year provide the
potential for the Court to have an impact on major questions affecting public policy
concerns. On the most basic level this shows that the justices have the necessary
control over their docket to take only those cases which they feci arc most important.
The justices have the opportunity to turn these political questions into legal one if they
are raised.
WHICH QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED? SJC CASELOAD ANALYSIS
The cases which did make it onto the Court's docket in the 15 years under
study, combining discretionary cases with those which were directly entered onto the
The Table also shows part of a larger trend in the SJC's workload. While increasing numbers of
applieations arc being filed, the SJC is granting fewer requests. In an attempt to keep their workload
fairly consistent, discretionary appeals will diminish as mandatory appeals increase. Finkelman found
that the SJC accepted FAR in approximately 13% of the requests between 1973 and 1982. This further
confirms the existence of this trend (with 1982 marking a shifting point). It should be noted, however,
that Finkelman's study covered only civil cases and not criminal.
310
The term "credit" does not imply that there is unanimous agreement that limits to one appeal are
necessarily good. It clearly makes for more efficient use of judicial resources. However, errors by the
Appeals Court as they affect parties to the appeal may not be corrected, even if there is some agreement
by SJC justices that an injustice had been perpetrated.
131
SJC's docket, had the following characteristics.3" The I Ugh C ourt issued 360(1 full
opinions from 1981 to 1995. An analysis of the category of cases considered in these
years shows that an average of30% dealt with private law, almost 40% concerned
criminal matters, and another 30% covered a variety of other public law matters." 2 As
Figure 4.
1
indicates, there are no real trends that emerge front the subtle shift in
numbers within each category from one year to the next.
Figure 4.1 SJC Caseload hv General Calegnries. 198I-I99S
^
S
tff
Year
-— Private Law
-
— Criminal
Public Law
Unless indicated otherwise, all data on cases was developed by the author from analysis of opinions as
reported in the Massachusetts Reports.
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" Private law cases were those concerned with the following issues: business, private employment,
probate and family, real property and tort. Public law cases included the following issues: governmental
budget and expenditures, civil liberties and civil rights, court oversight, democratic process, public
employment, local government, social services and education, state regulations, taxation, and torts
involving public entities. For a comparison of this caseload with a historical look at the activities of state
high courts throughout the nation, see Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman, and
Stanton Wheeler, "The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870 - 1970," Stanford Law Review 30
( 1 977), 121-156. While a direct comparison is impossible due to differences in categorizing cases, it
appears as though the SJC caseload from 1981 to 1995 differed from the average caseload described by
Kagan, ct. al. in the 1940-1970 era with more criminal and public law cases in Massachusetts (almost
10% higher in each category) and a correspondingly lower percentage of private law cases.
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While these general categories remained fairly steady over the years of study,
there was one specific category of cases which did change in ways which indicate a
trend. Tort cases (combining both private and public appeals) averaged 10% of the
easeload from 1981
- 1984. From 1985 - 1995, however, tort claims comprised almost
1 7% of the decisions which the SJC issued. As indicated in the discussion of the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act later in this chapter, these numbers are confirmed by
interview data and other research on the SJC. The Court, often working with the
Legislature, was essential to several important developments in tort law in the 1980's.
The Supreme Judicial Court, like all judiciaries in the American political
system, is limited in what it can do by the fact that it can only answer questions which
are brought to its attention. Once questions are raised however, the Court has both the
authority and the opportunity to take appeals and issue opinions which have a broad
impact on the polity. The fact that they take advantage of this, albeit in a restrained and
deferential manner, is a fact which will become more apparent in the pages which
follow. The rules and judgments by which the importance of cases is determined,
however, support a conclusion that the justices recognize they have a more involved
role to play in the political system than merely adjudicating cases. They understand the
role of the SJC is to resolve broader questions of law, thereby making public policy for
the state. However, when asked what the state's high court should definitely NOT do,
to a person the justices said the SJC should not legislate. Is this only a matter of
semantics or does the separation of powers make judicial policy-making more
legitimate in some instances than in others?
313
Chief Justice Wilkins made some
313
This research assumes that the difference is more than just semantics. As Chief Justice Hennessey has
noted, "[t]he great power ofjudges in making law, and in reviewing the act of the other branches for
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distinction between roles when asked if there were times when it may be more
appropriate to make policy.
Well, certainly, if the Legislature has spoken, we've got to recognize it
assuming it's constitutional for them to have spoken. There are some
'
areas where we may feel it helpful not simply to decide the given case
and discuss policy considerations applicable to it, but to go on and talk
about related matters that are likely to come up in subsequent cases
which will follow whatever we've done. That's known as [inaudiblel
dicta. Sometimes it's very helpful to lay out a road map as to how these
things can be handled. 314
Discussing the role of the Court in relation to the Legislature, Justice Lynch
described the problem of differentiating responsibilities as follows. "There's always...a
dividing line. All law, and all judicial functions involving line drawing. Where does
one stop and the other one start?"315 For Justice Nolan, this line was to be drawn
between making law and legislating. "After all, it's inaccurate to say that the Court
should not be making laws because the Court makes law any time it decides a case. So,
to be more accurate about the thing, we should have to say the Court has no right to
legislate -- in other words, to enact law by legislation."316 The remainder of this
chapter will provide a more detailed look at what the justices of the SJC choose to do
with those cases which they decide. This will fill in the picture a little so that we can
understand the difference the justices see between "making law" and "legislating."
constitutionality, lends extraordinary importance to the judicial selection process. Rhetorical devices in
judicial opinions cannot obscure the great power of the courts." Judges Making Law (Boston, MA:
Flaschner Judicial Institute, 1994), 64.
314
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. In a later interview, Justice O'Connor was critical
of this technique of influencing policy. "Or they're talking about something that really isn't this case, it's
another case. And I'd say, you're not supposed to talk about some other case....[I]f you want to deliver a
message about something else then wait until two lawyers, both capable, have different views and they
bring that issue to you instead of.. .predicting what ought to be." Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA,
21 May 1999.
315
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
1,6
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.
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Perhaps it is similar to that centaies old practice in American politics ofturning
political questions into legal ones. 117
THE S I) PR F, IMF, JUDICIAL QO^fRT AS I ,A\viyi a k~ k»
In its simplest form, the theory of separation ofpowers means thai legislatures
make the law, executives implement the law, and courts adjudicate disputes. Checks
and balances complicate this a little by granting each branch certain defined powers
winch overlap into the circles of power of another branch. Tins simple version of the
theory assumes that all powers, whether part of a branch's original powers or part of its
power to check, are clearly delineated. The practice of separating powers of
government, however, has never been that simple. Even the most restrained justice
would acknowledge that all judges, especially those who sit on courts of last resort,
make law when interpreting statutes, and in the development of common law and
constitutional law. As Chief Justice Hennessey reminds us in his treatise Judges
Making Law, "[t]he proposition that judges merely find the law that was always there is
a fiction."
318
The most obvious instance ofjustices affecting public policy is in the exercise
ofjudicial review. While there may be debate over the appropriateness of such an
action in a democracy or the constitutional legitimacy of such power, there is no
question that the power to stop actions of an elected legislature (or, less frequently, an
" 7
Following Justice Nolan's lead, 1 will continue to use the term "legislating" to refer to instances when
it is argued that the Court is overstepping its authority. As discussed in Chapter I, the terms lawmaking
and policymaking will be used interchangeably to refer to actions which have system-wide impact but
which are more arguably legitimate.
llh
Hennessey, Judges Making Law,l,
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executive) has an effeet on public policy. This power to check is a powerful one, but
the Massachusetts SJC has used this power sparingly over the years as will be d.scusscd
in Chapter Five. To focus on that power alone, however, would be misleading for the
High Court of Massachusetts also exercises influence over the making of public policy
in more subtle and less confrontational ways. The justices clearly see and accept
(although sometimes grudgingly) that they have a role to play with the Legislature in
making law through the development of common law, through statutory interpretation
and through constitutional law.^ Perhaps the cooperative nature of these endeavors as
opposed to the confrontational assumptions of a system of separated powers helps the
justices to distinguish between setting policy and legislating.
THE SJC AND THE COMMON LAW - A TRADITION OF LAWMAKING
Common law is often referred to as judge-made law, a clear recognition of the
fact that judges have made law for hundreds of years. No longer pertinent in the federal
courts, common law is still important to the body of law which governs states. 320 The
long history of common law authority which the U.S. courts inherited from their British
forebears adds a veneer of tradition which legitimizes the practice ofjudge made
319
The role of the Court in developing constitutional law will be analyzed in Chapter 5 with the
discussion ofjudicial review.
320
Federal courts stopped developing federal common law after the United States Supreme Court ruling
in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Former Chief Justice Hennessey presents a
slightly different view of this matter. "The Erie principle has not prevented the creation of a large area of
federal law which can only be called common law. The Congress, like state Legislatures, has used
generality oflanguage in a number of statutes with the clearly implied intention that judge-made law
should be a supplement. ...From the federal and state constitutions, directly or indirectly, have also come
large areas of law made by the courts in giving substance to general terms." Judges Making Law, 6.
While I would not disagree with Hennessey on the fact that judges have great leeway in applying broad
principles to specific cases, I follow the more traditional avenue of handling such policy-making cases
under the rubric of statutory interpretation and constitutional law respectively. For an argument that
federal courts have been developing a new strain of federal common law, see Wayne M. Scrra, "New
Criticisms of the Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine," Cleveland State Law Review 46 (1999), 1.
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law.
- The continuous use of this power by states from colonial days to the present
may make it more acceptable for state courts to be involved in policy-making than on
the federal level. Not only does the existence of common law provide greater
opportunity for judicial involvement but the ongoing nature of this power may make
judicial policy-making in general more palatable.
Increasing
"statutification" has reduced the role of common law in state
jurisprudence over the years, but it is still very much alive. As Justice O'Connor noted,
"[m]uch of our law is common law, not legislative law at all. You know a lot of our
tort and contract law and our others is not legislative at all."322 All justices shared
O'Connor's recognition that they have a duty to develop and enforce the common law.
How does this differ, in their eyes, from legislating, which all justices noted was not
their job? The most important distinction seems to be that common law decisions of
the Court stand as the law of the Commonwealth for only as long as the Legislature
allows them to stand. While the SJC can speak, they are not the final voice on the
matter and the justices are well aware of this fact. "We have taken some positions I'm
sure they [the Legislature] are unhappy with.. .and if they don't like something they can
1 An example of this tradition in Massachusetts can be seen in the common law right to forcibly resist
an unlawful arrest which the Court has traced to a 1709 English decision which was adopted by the SJC
for Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Crotty in 1865 (10 Allen 403). It was not until 1983 that the SJC
modified the rule established in Crotty, noting that "[s]ince 1709 society has changed. In this era of
constantly expanding legal protection of the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings, an arrestee
may be reasonably required to submit to a possibly unlawful arrest and to take recourse in the legal
processes available to restore his liberty." Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 (1983), 599. This
is also an example of the slow, incremental nature of change in the common law.
322
Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999. For a discussion of the shift in U.S.
jurisprudence from common law to statutory law, see Willard Hurst, Law and Social Order in the U.S.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977). Even in criminal law, the most "statutificd" area of law,
the previously mentioned crime of resisting arrest was not made criminal by statute until 1995. GL
c.268, §32B, inserted by Statutes 1995, §276.
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control by statute they go ahead and pass a statute."323 This awareness that the
Legislature holds the final authority is one factor wh1Ch differentiates lawmaking via
the common law from the legislating which the justices strive to avoid. 324
A second way in which policy development via the common law differs from
"legislating" stems from the motivational source for changing the law. In general,
legislative changes come about by pressure from various interests while change
emanating from the judicial branch develops in the context of an individual conflict.
From this perspective, the development of common law by judges in Massachusetts is a
primary example of the way in which a system of separation of powers encourages a
division of labor between branches of government according to task and expertise, with
the courts making law when the Legislature is not. While the Legislature is confronted
with a variety of new issues each legislative term, there will always be public policy
questions which do not come to their attention, sometimes because there are too few
individuals who are immediately concerned with the issue. Legislatures are established
so as to be more responsive to concerns of larger numbers of people, often people who
are organized in ways to make their voices more effective. 325
323
Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
3 '4
This is a point of which the justices are reminded when they are confronted with the question of
whether a specific statute overrules a common law precedent. See, Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass.
387 (1981) (statute regarding homicide by motor vehicle does not impliedly repeal common law crime of
involuntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123 (1981) (rape statute overrules
common law exemption of husband from prosecution for raping wife); Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 415
Mass. 402 (1993) (common law right of out-of-state bail bondsman to capture bonded fugitive
superseded by Uniform Criminal Extradition Act); PACE v. Signal Technology Corporation, 417 Mass.
154 (1994) (common law regarding misrepresentation as regards hiring benefits is superseded by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
325 n
See Steven B. Kramer, "Case Comment ~ Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding Cases
Pending Legislative Determination of Law," Boston University Law Review, 58 (1 978), 8 1 8-840 for an
interesting claim that in the question of governmental tort immunity (to be discussed in more detail
below) the SJC wrote an opinion with these broader communities in mind, assuming that the Court's
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Courts, on the other hand, handle concerns on a case by case basis. As a result,
many issues are likely to arise in a case confronted by the state's judiciary before
anyone has thought of it as an 'issue." For example, the SJC considered for the first
time in 1983 whether or not a child can be compelled to testify against a parent in a
grand jury proceeding regarding a crime allegedly committed against a non-family
member. 326 Such a question would probably never arise in a legislative context, but the
concrete process of adjudicating a criminal complaint brought the question to the fore.
While the decision was only immediately applicable to the case at hand, the
ramifications extended far beyond this since it involved a question of balancing the
needs of the criminal justice system with the needs of individual families. 327 In this
instance, the Court refused to use its common law powers to develop such a privilege,
recognizing that the Legislature has developed some privileges over time but has not
created such privileges within families other than for spouses. The message of the
opinion in this case was, if the Legislature wants it, the Legislature should develop it. 32 ^
While following a line of restraint, the SJC made it clear it was entitled to act in this
instance if it so chose.
opinion would mobilize various interests (most notably local municipalities) so that the Legislature
would act.
326
Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357 (1983).
327
The dissenters in this case presented the importance of this policy question most strongly. "The court
should recognize a public policy against imposing on the conscience of a child responsibility for
incriminating his or her parent. Society's interest in its children should be recognized as sufficiently
important to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice. ...Not
only does society have an interest in children being free from unreasonable public demands, but society
also has an interest in fostering the unity of the family." Three Juveniles, O'Connor dissenting, 366.
328
In contrast, the SJC has used its common law authority to establish and maintain a privilege between
attorneys and their clients. This most likely represents the special relationship which the Court exercises
over the bar and the bench. See, Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89 (1832).
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Many cases m which the SJC's common law authority is invoked involve the
interpretation of specific documents such as contracts or wills. For instance, in
interpreting the provisions of a will in 1987 the Court overruled previous common law,
declaring that the definition of "issue" will no longer be limited to children born in
wedlock unless specifically provided for in the document. 329 Recognizing the need for
public policy to keep up with contemporary practices, the Court made a change that
was probably accepted by other policy-makers and by the citizenry at large. Yet
without a sponsor who was particularly interested in the subject, this change would not
have been made
- it would never have survived in the legislative maze, not because of
opposition, but because of apathy. 330
This is not to say that the SJC is prone to making broad and sweeping changes
in the common law. On the contrary, the development of common law is slow and
incremental. 331 This is a third way in which lawmaking through common law powers
Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650 (1987).
330
The SJC has been increasingly active in recent years in the definition of family. This is represented
by two 1999 cases regarding visitation rights. In Youmans v. Ramos (429 Mass. 774) the Court upheld a
Probate Court decision granting visitation rights to an aunt who had been intimately involved in a raising
a child. More controversially, the Court in E.N.O. v. L.M.M. (429 Mass. 824) found that the lesbian
partner of a child's biological mother who had been a "de facto" parent could be granted visitation rights.
As distinguished from most SJC cases, these two decisions were relatively widely reported upon. See,
Sacha Pfeiffer, "Rulings Broaden View of Family," Boston Globe, August 8, 1999, Bl; Irene Sege,
"When Mom and Mom Split", Boston Globe, November 23, 1999, CI; and Meghan Laska, "The Future
of Visitation Rights," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, October 4, 1999, Bl. There was some conflict,
especially over the second decision, as seen in the dissent of Justice Charles Fried and in quoted
comments from the Catholic Action League of Massachusetts. Despite these concerns at the time, there
is no indication yet that the Legislature intends to react to "correct" these decisions.
331
While the following case may be more accurately categorized as a constitutional law decision (6th
Amendment or Article 12 guarantees of a fair trial) rather than common law, the language in an opinion
in which the Court developed the law on admission of polygraph tests in criminal trials is representative
of the careful, case-by-case approach the justices of the SJC take to development of the law absent
legislative direction. "The question of the admissibility in this Commonwealth of such evidence to
corroborate (or impeach) the testimony of a witness, other than a defendant, was an open one at the time
of the trial. ...To this point, we have carefully left undecided the question of the admissibility of the
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can often be differentiated from legislating. Except in the area of right-to-die policy,
the Court did not use its common law authority in any one case to declare a dramatic
new direction in the law during the fifteen years under study. 3" While the SJC directed
substantial changes over time in the law regarding torts and in employment law, these
changes came about slowly, with overarching principles of law emerging out of the
individual opinions for specific cases. 333 The slow development of the law provides
further legitimization ofjudge-made law in a system of separated powers since it allows
legislators to take the necessary action to modify or overturn changes in the common
law before any drastic effects are felt. 334
The state's highest court is regularly confronted with new issues arising out of
specific conflicts which come to the judicial branch. Its role as the arbiter in these
disputes makes it the ideal branch to refine policy through the common law as new
situations confront old tenets of law. While the SJC may refuse to use its common law
powers in these cases (as with the question discussed above of developing a new
privilege against testimony for a child against her parent), the justices accept this power
as an appropriate part of their job. It is legitimate as distinguishable from "legislating"
results of a polygraph examination given to a witness other than a defendant.. ..[However], [t]he issue
cannot reasonably be avoided in this case." Commonwealth v. Dilego, 387 Mass. 394 (1982), 396-397.
332
Right-to-die cases will be discussed below.
333
For a discussion of the development of the law regarding termination of employees at will without
cause, see Hennessey, Judges Making Law, 9-10. In addition to cites in discussion below regarding the
Massachusetts Torts Claims Act, review of some of the tort law changes can be seen in Daniel J.
Johnedis, " The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity," Massachusetts Law Review 63 (1978), 75-
81. William J. Brisk, "Tort Law -- Interspousal Immunity," Massachusetts Law Review 66 (1981), 105-
106.
334
The incremental nature of common law development connects back to the history ofjudicial
lawmaking in the English/colonial/American system of law. Even before judicial power under common
law could ever have been considered as a challenge to the authority of other governmental bodies, it had
a tradition of being incremental and conservative with the judiciary being bound to the past by its
traditions and previous decisions.
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since then- aeons arc no, final, since they often handle specie questions which would
never come to the Legislature's attention, and since (he effeel of their individual
decisions is often minimal (although the cumulative effeel of these decisions can he
major). These restraints on the common law legitimate judicial policymaking and
reinforce the fact that dividing responsibilities between branches leads to a more
efficient dcvelopmcnl of law, one which brings law close, to .he concrete realities of
life as lived by the residents of Massachusetts.
STATUTORY INTI RI>K1 [ ATION THE COIIUT
gPEAKg I OK [ Hi; LKXiISI All \\i I
The responsibility of the judiciary for the development of the common law ends once
(lie legislature has acted. Passage of legislation, however, doesn'1 eliminate the Court's
voice, [f this were the case, the importance of the I ligh Court's policymaking role in
the lives of the citizens Of Massachusetts would dimmish over lime as more and more
common law is replaced by statutory law, a phenomena which continues to this day.335
What the enactment Of a statute does is lo change the way in which the Court is
involved. In common law the Court speaks in a series of long statements which often
go uninterrupted for so long dial they appear lo be monologues. In most instances the
monologue ends when the Legislature enters the conversation by passing a law. Il is
here that a dialogue begins. The players in each branch may change as the conversation
develops, but the dialogue will go on. There will be instances in which the Court's
us
in advising legal practitioners of the importance of learning more about statutory construction, one
commentator has described the increase in statute law as follows. "[T]he terrain of the common law
shrinks and the reality ol' legislative enactments shaping. ..almost all human interrelationships expands| . |"
I awrence l). Shubow, "Statutory Construction in Massachusetts," Massachusetts Law Review 79 1 1994),
1 14. Shubow is a retired District Court justice.
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discret,onary role in this process will be limited by the fact that the legislation is
concrete and specific, but this is not often the case. Certainty in legal language, "where
all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; where men may express their
purposes, not only with accuracy, but with fullness" is, in the words of James Bradley
Thayer, a "lawyer's Paradise."336
Separation of powers grants to each branch of government a distinct, primary
responsibility. For the judiciary it is the power to apply the law, often in the form of a
statute, to a specific situation. Necessitated by the reality that statutory language, like
all language, is often vague, the Court will become an active partner in developing
policy. 337 The need to interpret the law in this process provides the justices with a
second potential avenue for judicial policy-making. The degree to which the potential
exists, and the degree to which a judicial determination is accepted, depends on how
ambiguous or concrete the legislation in question is. An example of a concrete statute
which gives the judiciary little room for interpretation was presented by Justice Lynch.
If, for example, the Legislature should pass a law that says the speed
limit on the Massachusetts Turnpike is 65 miles an hour and somebody
protests that and we say, well they didn't really mean 65 miles and hour,
they meant 60 miles an hour, that to me clearly is legislating. 338
Lynch continued, however, by noting that "[t]he English language isn't always as
precise as we would like it to be. And sometimes the legislation isn't as carefully
drafted as we would like it to be." It is, of course, in these instances that the courts
must determine exactly what the Legislature meant.
336 A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1899), 428-429.
337 Of course statutory language may be even more vague than other language if the legislation resulted
from compromises which would make clear definitions of legislative intent problematic.
338
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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cases
According to one commentator, approximately 20% of appellate court
involve issues of statutory construction. 339 In reviewing 15 years of SJC decisions, few
controversial cases involving statutory construction were evident. 340 This of course
does not mean that the Court wasn't involved in making policy, it only means that the
policy which they made was generally uncontested. 341 When the justices determine that
a flare gun is not a weapon under the terms of GL c. 269, § 10, the position is hardly
controversial and it is probably in tune with the intent of the Legislature in passing this
law which makes it a crime in Massachusetts to carry a dangerous weapon without a
1
• 342 »
license.
-
Agreement with the decision, however, doesn't make this any less an
exercise in policymaking. Slightly more controversial, as indicated by the presence of a
dissent, was the decision in O'Donnell v. Chasdi in which the SJC interpreted the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act to allow for civil action to be brought in any case
charging intimidation, threats, or coercion aimed at individuals who are guaranteed
equal protection of the laws under art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 343
These cases, neither of which was widely controversial, are representative of the way in
which the SJC is generally involved in policymaking through the power of statutory
construction. They are speaking on behalf of the Legislature in a way which the elected
m Shubow, "Statutory Construction in Massachusetts," 123. 1 quote this figure with some trepidation
because Shubow presents only this statement with no citations or clarifications.
340
While I cannot guarantee that there weren't more, there were no indicators, either in headnotes to the
cases or in journal articles, that there were more. See methodology discussion in Chapter 1
.
34
1
For a list of cases from the early years of this study (through 1984) which involved an exercise of
statutory construction, see Hennessey, Judges Making Law, 35-39.
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Commonwealth v. Sampson, 383 Mass. 750 (1981).
343
400 Mass. 686 (1987). In dissent, Justice Lynch described this decision as follows: "I believe the
court by its decision today so broadly construes the Massachusetts Constitution that it has created a
boundless right of one citizen to sue another which is both unprecedented and unwarranted." (695)
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officials and others who may challenge then view find acceptable. Furthermore, in
most cases the Legislature does not try to control this power of statutory construction.
"The number of statutes in this commonwealth generally defining statutory meanings or
restricting the role of courts in this area is very small....[T]he law of statutory
interpretation has developed as a common law subject, its controlling principles found
in court decisions."344
There was, however, one particularly interesting and potentially controversial
interpretation of a statute which occurred during the years under analysis. 345 In contrast
to many of the cases discussed in this chapter in which the emphasis has been on the
incremental, cooperative and often uncontested use ofjudicial power, this decision,
both in its effect and its language, shows a Court seemingly intent on legislating from
the bench. The case of Commonwealth v. Cass presented the justices with the
"question whether a viable fetus is a 'person' for purposes of our vehicular homicide
statute."
346
In a decision which the majority itself calls "unforseeable," they decide that
it is.
347
It is perhaps most unforseeable because they recognize that this is a question of
legislative intent but they give only circumstantial evidence that the Legislature ever
344
Shubow, "Statutory Construction," 115-116. A good example of this can be found in the law
regarding murder which is discussed below.
345
1 say potentially because there didn't seem to be much attention paid to the decision. The 1984
Annual Index to the Boston Globe (281) lists only one article on this decision. This is contrasted with the
nine articles which appeared in the same year regarding the more controversial issue of the SJC's
decision on the death penalty. (The SJC's activity on the death penalty will be discussed in Chapter 5
below.) In addition, while the Legislature has amended GL c. 90, §24G since 1984, the word "person"
still appears as before with no further clarification or definition. (Statute 1986, c.620, §§15, 16.)
346
392 Mass. 799 (1984), 799. The vehicular homicide statute is found in GL c.90, §24G.
347
Cass, 807. Justice Wilkins, writing in dissent for himself, and Justices Liacos and Abrams, satirically
comments on this fact. "The court rightly says that its 'decision. ..may have been unforseeable. '...The
court further characterizes the conclusion it reaches as '[a]n unpredictable judicial decision.' I think the
court is right. I never would have guessed it" (809, citations omitted).
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intended to depart so drastically from past statutory and common law practice regarding
homicide law in the Commonwealth when it enacted this statute in 1976. Writing for
the majority, Chief justice Hennessey shows how deeply the contrary practice was
embedded in the state.
We turn now to the common law definition of homicide. Since at least
the fourteenth century, the common law has been that the destruction of
a fetus in utero is not a homicide. Although this court has never had a
case that directly presented the question, we have assumed that the
stated rule is a part of our common law, and we have restated it as a part
of our common law, and we have restated it as recently as 1976 The
rule has been accepted as the established common law in every
American jurisdiction that has considered the question. But the antiquity
of a law is no measure of its soundness. 348
The decision in Cass is not representative of the way in which the justices of the
SJC generally view their position in state's policymaking network. 349 Both the majority
and the dissenters recognize that the normal practice of the Court has been to suggest
that the Legislature make such sharp and sweeping changes through the legislative
process. This is one case in which the majority does not seem to have differentiated
well between legislating and lawmaking by the judiciary and conveys an important
reminder. While the justices of the SJC seem to be more restrained and deferential than
their federal counterparts, when confronted with potentially "hot button" issues, the
justices of the SJC may be just as swayed by personal preferences as the next judge.
Cass, 805. Citations omitted. This perspective on how to treat a viable fetus was then expanded in
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378 (1989). Here the principle was applied not only to the
interpretation of a specific statute but to the common law crime of murder in general. By this time the
Court felt the decision should have been anticipated; they applied the definition to the case at hand rather
than prospectively as they had done in Cass.
349
Justice Nolan presented a forthright perspective on the extent to which the SJC has, in his eyes,
abused the power of statutory construction. "Now we've taken statutes, turned them on their head, which
in effect is legislating...I don't say we do it often, I mean I don't want to exaggerate, but that clearly is an
impropriety in terms of separation of powers." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.
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These kind of questions, which make up a relatively small percentage of the Court's
docket, are determined, as Justice O'Connor says, by "whose kitehen...you gr[e]> up
in. You know a lot of them [Supreme Court justices] grow up with a certain amount of
value judgment....They're the kind of questions you can't say, 'Oh well, what the hell
then; if three of you think that, good. I'll sign'."350
Most Questions of statutory interpretation which the SJC confronts, however,
involve less volatile issues like the interpretation of a clause in a tax law or a phrase in
a conflict of interest statute. Justice Lynch described what the justices do in
interpreting such statutes.
I don't think we ought to make public policy as much as discern public
policy. I mean if there is something that is universally recognized as
favorable, we ought to recognize it.. ..The Legislature has enacted a
number of statutes that in essence say that minor children should be
adequately supported by their parents. That is well recognized and not
contested by anyone that I know -- a public policy. So when we're
interpreting some of those statutes, we have to keep in mind what's the
paramount interest here? Paramount interest is to see that these kids are
supported, that they're properly taken care of.
351
The power of statutory interpretation, like the power over the common law, can
be differentiated from legislating. As with the development of common law, justices
interpret statutes in specific cases which come before them. This not only limits the
Court to a reactive position in policymaking, but it also provides a check on the
legislative process. The Legislature speaks in generalities but the law is applied by the
courts to individual cases. It is not until this occurs that potential shortfalls or gaps in
the legislation become apparent. From this perspective, the separation of powers often
350
Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999. He voieed a similar opinion in "The Art of
Collcgiality: Creating Consensus and Coping with Dissent," Massachusetts Law Review 83 (1998), 93-
96.
351
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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acts more to ensure efficiency than to provide checks against abuses of power.
Secondly, statutory construction is similar to common law development in that the
interpretation of statutes generally proceeds incrementally. 352 And finally, as with the
common law, the SJC is not the final voice. This slow development of the law by the
Court in a system of separated powers means that legislators can act to modify or
overturn the interpretation when it is contrary to their intent. That they can do so is a
fact. Whether or not they will, however, is another question.
THE COURT SPEAKS - IS THE LEGISLATURE LISTENING?
The judiciary has authority to develop common law and to interpret statutes, but
it operates in a system in which someone else has the final voice. The Legislature has
the ultimate power over these questions and can enact legislation to overturn most
decisions of the SJC. The belief that they will do so if they feel it necessary (thereby
ensuring democratic accountability) rests on two assumptions: 1) that each branch pays
attention to the activity of the others, and 2) that each branch wants to take
responsibility for all policy matters. Both of these stem from the view that a system of
separated powers will lead to conflicts between branches over who will make the laws
in the polity, with each branch jealously guarding its own territory against
encroachment by others and fighting to have their own views made into law. Applying
the first assumption to this question, one would hypothesize that the Legislature pays
attention to the activities of the SJC, monitoring its opinions to be certain that it is not
abusing its power or acting contrary to the Legislature's desire. In their interviews,
most justices were able to recall some evidence of this occurring, with the General
352 The case of Cass is an obvious exception to this statement.
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Court enacting legislation in reaction to one of their opinions. 353 These examples were
only anecdotal, however, and no justice mentioned more than one case in which this
had occurred. 354 In contrast to these specific examples were the justices' general views
that the Legislature would be most likely to act if the decision of the Court would affect
an organized constituency: "[A]nd 1 think any vested interest in whatever we did might
well move the Legislature to act/'355 However, not all such decisions of the Court will
affect a vested interest. These limited observations raise the possibility that the
Legislature may not always be the "watchdogs" envisioned under separation of powers
theory.
356
A look at the views of legislators in Massachusetts lends support to the thesis
that they may not always be concerned with the output of the state's highest court. In
research conducted in 1991 to determine if there was a difference in the reactions of
lawyer legislators and non-lawyer legislators in regard to court reform proposals in
Not surprisingly, justices were most likely to remember instances in which the Legislature reacted to
an opinion they had authored, although Justice Lynch cited the passage of the "Castle Defense" (law
allowing the use of deadly force in one's home, with no need to retreat) as a reaction to an opinion
authored by former Chief Justice Hennessey. "He [Hennessey] maintained that they didn't understand
the opinion but, nevertheless, clearly that statute was passed because at least of a legislative perception of
something we had done." (Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.) Chief Justice Wilkins
remembered well the actions of the Legislature in "stretch[ing]" the statute of limitations in certain tort
actions. "1 wrote an opinion that said that it really was outrageous, or at least not permissible, when a
suit is brought against A on theory Y, after the statute of limitations has run in any claim against B on
theory Z, that it would be OK to add B to the case and hook up to the original action, being timely,
therefore the addition is timely. It's one thing to add an issue, it's one thing to add a party on the same
theory but when you did both, we wrote, I wrote, that it seemed outrageous. And the Legislature, within
a very short period of time, passed an act which said it was perfectly all right." (Interview by author,
Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.)
354
This is not to say that the justices' responses represent an accurate accounting of all instances when
the Legislature enacted legislation in response to an SJC opinion, I am implying only that the times when
such actions occurred did not stand out as particularly relevant in the justices' memories.
355 Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
35 The term watchdogs was used by Justice Nolan to describe how the Legislature interacted with the
judiciary. He felt that the Legislature did keep an eye on the SJC. "Oh boy, they're watchdogs. They
watch, they may not agree with us." (Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.)
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Massachusetts, Mark Miller asked
. randomly selected sc. of 64 legislators a variety of
questions, one ofwhich is particularly pertinenl
,s/
. Responding to a question regarding
how much attention they pay to decisions of the SJC, over 1/3 of all legislators in the
survey responded with "none" or "not much." The responses of non-lawyer legislators,
who made up 72% of the General Court in 1991, were ev en more surprising with 45%
Showing little or no interesl in the decisions of the SJC. Conversely, only 22% say they
pay a great deal ol" attention to such decisions.
Tins research does show that 42% of all legislators polled claimed to pay
"sonic" attention to SJC decisions, but a second question asked of the respondents
indicates that attention is drawn to such opinions only if the case is covered in the
media. As was assumed by several justices in their interviews, the legislators lend to
rely on outside sources to review the work of the suite's high court. This means that
those cases which arc "sexiest," or those affecting an organized constituency, arc most
likely to come to the attention of the majority ol" legislators. As recent activities ovet
the Louise Woodward trial show, the sexiest cases may often have nothing to do with
broader public policy questions. 159 And while some of the Court's policy-making
" The findings from this research are presented in Judicature 77 ( 1993), 34 4 1
.
The Following table is taken from page 38 of Miller's study and gives complete information on the
legislators' sources of information,
Table J. Legislators' sources of information aboul SJC decisions
Read lobby/ Memb/ From
Media ( ases Constituent Staff Judges Other
Lawyers 73% 67% 28% 11% 17% 6%
(n IX)
Non- 85% 4% 39% 33% 22% 7%
Lawyers
(n=46)
(Individual legislators may have given up to three responses, so percentages will not add to 100 percent,
,s
' Woodward was the English nanny who was found guilty of second degree murder in the death of a
child in her care in the Boston aiea. The s.k ' heard the ease on appeal lo determine a variety of
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decisions will be highlighted by pressure groups, no, all such decisis necessarily
affect an organized constituency360
.
An example of such low salience policy decisions can be found in a series of
cases decided between 1982 and 1990 dealing with questions of paternity and
illegitimacy. No one of these cases had a strong constituency, nor did they necessarily
have immediate policy implications which were broad enough to attract media
attention. However, when looked at all together these cases present a very different
state-sanctioned view of family and familial obligations than had existed only a decade
before. For instance, in a 1982 case, the SJC overturned a 19th century Massachusetts
rule of law (adapted from an English common law rule dating from the early 1700's)
which would prohibit a man from making a claim for annulment of a marriage on a
claim that the child born to his wife was sired by another man if the husband had had
"criminal intercourse" with the wife before marriage361
. As Chief Justice Wilkins noted
for the Court, "[w]e would no longer follow that rule. Its harshness is apparent, and
today we see no salutary quality in such a rule." Concerned again with questions of
paternity, the Court in C.C. v. A.B. determined that as a matter of common law there is
"no longer any need for a presumption of legitimacy" in cases where a child is born to a
married couple, increasing the opportunity for a putative unwed father to claim
questions, the primary one concerning the authority of the trial court judge to reduce the verdict of the
jury to involuntary manslaughter. There was more media coverage of the Court's decision on this matter
than on all other cases which it decided in 1998.
360
It is possible that the leadership of the House and the Senate watch the SJC more carefully and only
respond to a decision when they feel it is worthwhile. If this were the case the role of the High Court in
the policy-making process could be seen largely as a consensus of elites, with legislative controversy
becoming apparent only when the elites disagree. Considering the close working relationship which
seems to exist within the legal community (and associated with Boston's law schools), this may not be as
far-fetched as it sounds. For discussion of elite theory, see the classic, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
361 Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, (1982).
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paternity when the mother is married to another man. 3" One final example of changes
in the common law which present a challenge to traditional notions of family was the
SJC's decision in 1987 that the traditional definition of the term 'issue" when found in
a will or trust would be changed so as to no longer exclude children born out of
wedlock. 363
No one of these decisions alone presented a dramatic challenge to the existing
order of events. Even combined they only seem to parallel changes in society at large,
and support for these changes can be found in the common law in other states as well as
in state statutes. However, these and similar cases show that the SJC, in exercising its
authority over the common law, does make policy which may easily go undetected by
the Legislature. Attracting the attention of neither the media nor any advocacy
organization, such policies are judge-made law created without the assumed oversight
of legislators.364
The development of law by justices through statutory interpretation or the
common law can be limited by the Legislature but the Legislature is not always aware
of what the SJC is doing. Even when they are paying attention, however, the
406 Mass. 679 (1990), 686. The importance of this decision as a public policy statement was
recognized by Justice O'Connor in dissent. "I would strongly disagree with the policy declared by the
Court because it is antithetical to the Commonwealth's legitimate interest in promoting family harmony
for the care and protection of children and affording legitimacy to children whenever possible. I would
not accept the proposition that it is sound public policy to recognize a man's interest in maintaining a
relationship with the child that he claims to have fathered by an adulterous, and therefore criminal, see
G.L. c.272, §14 (1988 ed.), relationship with the child's mother at the expense of making the child
illegitimate and disrupting a 'unitary family'." (697.)
363
Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650 (1987).
364
This is not an argument for or against this exercise of power by the Court (nor for or against the
policies being discussed). It is simply intended to describe the Court's activities. Whether or not the SJC
should be the institution to act is a separate question. As previously noted, the Court's activities in this
regard continue apace.
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Legislature may choose not to act for a variety ofreasons which counters a second
assumption underlying a separation of powers theory which emphasizes conflict
Adopting such an approach one can tend to overlook times when an absence of visible
conflict does not necessarily mean agreement. Instead, it could mean that while the
Legislature may not necessarily agree with the law being made, it allows lawmaking by
the Court to go unchallenged because the perceived costs of working to change a policy
position established by the SJC would be greater than their desire to see the policy
changed. 1 " 5 In these cases, the communication between the two branches would be an
accepted monologue- the SJC speaks while the Legislature listens. One sub-category
of such cases would be those winch in winch the Legislature's inaction results from
relative apathy. This lack of action is explained by one legislator as follows. "There is
a great deal of inertia in response to the [Supreme Judicial Court], except in the most
central areas, that is, the most important issues politically. There aren't many of those
cases in this state." In these instances the costs of acting wouldn't necessarily offend
anyone, they would simply be opportunity costs, taking time away from more pressing
matters.
There are times when the Legislature chooses not to act even when the Court is
encouraging them to engage in a dialogue. Included here would be instances where the
See, Mark A. Graber, "The Nonmajoritiarian Difficulty," Studies in American Political Development
7 (1993), 35-73. Graber's thesis is that not all policymaking on the part of high courts is necessarily
countermajoritiarian. While he ties this specifically to the United Slates Supreme Court in its exercise of
judicial review, the challenge it presents to common notions of struggles over the power to make public
policy in a system of separated powers is applicable as well to other high courts exercising a wider array
of activities. Instead of the assumption of conflict in this regard, Graber recognizes that "[e]lcctcd
officials in the United Stales encourage or tacitly support judicial policymaking both as a means of
avoiding political responsibility for making tough decisions and as a means of pursuing controversial
policy goals that they cannot publicly advance through open legislative and electoral politics." (37)
6
Miller, "Lawmaker Attitudes Toward Court Reform," 39.
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SJC has recognized that the common law is not adequately addressing a problem or that
the statute(s) affecting an area of law need clarification. Justices will make reference in
opinions regarding the need for the Legislature to enact comprehensive legislation to
replace the case-by-case law which the Court has developed. While the Legislature
may agree, in theory, that the problem should be addressed, the time and effort required
would not be worthwhile, or worse, could be politically damaging. An example of the
former can be seen in the development of the murder law in the Commonwealth. In the
1980 appeal of a murder charge in which a primary challenge was to the jury
instructions concerning the expression "malice aforethought," Justice Kaplan wrote in
concurrence to emphasize the problem with this expression. 367
As the court indicates, instructions on this matter, even when more
carefully devised, must remain obscure to the ordinary juror as long as
they derive from the text of the present statute. It is a serious reproach
to the administration of criminal justice in this Commonwealth that in
the trial of a grievous offense with high penalty a jury may have to
proceed under so feeble a light. The beginning of a remedy would be to
revise the statute.. ..Without this help the system will continue to turn up
instructions for which this court will be making rueful apology. 368
No change was made to the statute regarding murder and ten years later the
Court again encouraged the Legislature to act. This time the Court criticized the
murder law more broadly, concerned that legislative inaction had led to the law of
murder developing piecemeal as a mix of statutory and common law, resulting in a
367 GL c.265, § 1 defines murder and reads as follows. "Murder committed with deliberately
premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission of attempted
commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree.
Murder which docs not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second degree."
ib%Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423 (1980), 430-431. Justice Braucher's majority opinion for
the Court made the same point, although in less forceful language. "We have long recognized that
'malice aforethought' is a... 'very technical and somewhat misleading expression of the law. '...Those
terms probably convey the intended meaning imperfectly to the ordinary juror, and drastic simplification
is doubtless desirable. ...Modernization ofjury instructions on the subject, however desirable, would
savor of statutory revision, a Legislative prerogative" (428-429).
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body of law which was confusing and needed clarification. "There is no doubt of the
desirability of legislative consideration of the homicide law with a view toward
simplification and modernization. However, in the absence of definitive action by the
Legislature, we must bring our involuntary manslaughter law in line with the Matchett
decision[.]"369 The lack of action by the Legislature in such matters is largely a factor
of the issue's relative unimportance in the overall universe of problems confronting the
legislators on a regular basis. When asked if he thought legislators were aware of such
"messages" which the SJC sends in its opinions, Justice Lynch explained their lack of
action as follows. "I think they're aware of it. But, again, whether or not, when we say
this is sort of tough to understand and some clarifying language would be helpful, I
don't suppose that necessarily goes to the top of their legislative priorities list. I think
probably they'd straighten all those things out [if they had time]."370
When the Legislature does not have time to develop a comprehensive, coherent
set of statutes regarding the law of homicide (or to address any other policy question
confronted by the Court), the system of separation of powers results in the judiciary
enacting public policy by default. The Courts are not necessarily chomping at the bit to
take on additional authority. However, since their primary responsibility as a branch of
government is to adjudicate individual disputes, and since such questions must be
answered to properly adjudicate, the SJC must make a stand. The SJC speaks, trying to
Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779 (1990). In this case the Court redefined the law of
manslaughter based on the specifics of the case which only added one more piece on to an already
complicated puzzle of law. As of 2001, the Legislature has taken no action in this regard.
370
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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engage the elected officials in a conversation, but they are not answered by the
Legislature. 371
THE RIGHT TO DIE - LET THE COURT DECIDE
Silence on the part of the Legislature in the face of policymaking by the
Supreme Judicial Court could also stem not from apathy but from cither a desire to
avoid taking a stand on a particularly controversial issue or an inability to develop a
working majority which could get legislation passed. Whether or not the state's highest
court is particularly anxious to take on some of these difficult issues, they must make a
decision when a case comes before them. 372 One area of law which has presented the
justices of the SJC with such challenges is the right-to-die. 373 Throughout the I970's
and 1980's the Commonwealth's highest court was faced with making decisions in a
variety of cases involving the right to die with no legislative direction. 374 In his
interview, Justice Lynch presented his perspective on why the Legislature had not acted
in this field of law.
371
While the justices clearly feel this is a duty which would be better managed by the Legislature, this is
a concern motivated by questions of effectiveness and efficiency, not of democratic accountability. If the
Court began to adjust the definitions associated with the law of homicide in a way which the citizenry
would find unacceptable, the Legislature would most certainly act. While unlikely in this instance, lack
of action by the Legislature could also indicate that they find the Court to be the best institution for
refining definitions as they are faced with the specifics of the cases which come before them.
372
Unless, of course, they too can avoid this issue with a doctrinal construct such as the doctrines for
political questions, standing, mootness, or ripeness, among others.
See Henry R. Glick, The Right to Die (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). Click's study
of policy innovation in this area of law includes case studies of the legislative and judicial activities
undertaken in three states: California, Florida, and Massachusetts. See 121-132 for a specific discussion
of Massachusetts.
m
According to Glick, the SJC would have had difficulty avoiding these questions. "[TJhc right to die
has remained on the [state's political] agenda partly because of a steady stream of appellate cases (their
number is equaled only in a few other states." (120.) This is not surprising since the avenue by which
the SJC chose to develop their right to die policies required the involvement of the judiciary in each case.
Sec discussion below.
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think that s one of those areas where the Legislature is very happy to
eave the ultimate decision in our laps. I think we'd be just as happy toleave it in the Legislature's. Unfortunately, if there's somebody in a
coma somewhere with a feeding tube stuck in them, somebody has got
to decide whether to leave it in or take it out. 375
In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion of In the
Matter ofKaren Quinlan which established the right of an individual or their family to
determine whether or not to partake of life-prolonging medical treatment. 376 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the next state high court to issue an opinion
on this question. In doing so, it broke with the path begun by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. Rather than leaving this decision to the family and the doctor, the SJC
determined that such decisions could be made only with judicial intervention.
Thus, we reject the approach.. .of entrusting the decision whether to
continue artificial life support to the patient's guardian, family, attending
doctors, and hospital "ethics committee." For its part, the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that "a practice of applying to a court to
confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only
because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical
profession's field of competence, but because it would be impossibly
cumbersome." We do not view the judicial resolution of this most
difficult and awesome question -- whether potentially life-prolonging
treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of making his own
decision - as constituting a "gratuitous encroachment" on the domain of
medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to
require the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision
that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was
created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower
court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to
represent the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how
highly motivated or impressively constituted. 377
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
376
3 5 5 A. 2d 647 (1976).
377
Superintendent ofBelchertown Hospital v. Saikewicz 373 Mass. 728 (1977), 758-759 (citations and
footnotes omitted). While this quote is long, it was included to give a full flavor of the difference
between the Massachusetts and New Jersey opinions.
157
The SJC acted because it had to - the family of Mr. Saikewicz, a sixty-seven
year old man who was mentally retarded and who had recently been diagnosed with
cancer, wanting to save him from the pain and agony of chemotherapy treatment, had
petitioned the Probate Court to use its equity powers to intervene and stop treatment.
This was undoubtedly a case of such importance that the state's highest court would
have to hear the appeal. And then, no matter what the Court had decided in this matter,
they would have been "making law" since they were breaking new ground. Had they
allowed the chemotherapy treatments to go forward, they would have been establishing
a policy which recognized the importance of promoting state interests (preserving the
sanctity of life) over the wishes of the individual (or her surrogate). 378 By prohibiting
the treatment, the Court recognized, in some form, a right to die in Massachusetts. Ever
mindful of their power, however, the justices were careful to set out procedures to be
followed in each case rather than to establish a broad set of guidelines. "We decline
the invitation... to formulate a comprehensive set of guidelines applicable generally to
emergency medical situations involving incompetent persons. Such a wide-ranging
effort is better left to the legislative branch after appropriate study."379
The SJC has actually recognized four state interests which must be considered in cases involving the
right to die. " (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the
prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession."
Superintendent v. Saikewicz 373 Mass. 728 (1977), 741.
379
Saikewicz, 755. Glick distinguishes the decision of the SJC in this regard from those of the high
courts of California and Florida. While all three courts made innovative decisions in this realm, the SJC
"ha[s] not called for legislation.. ..they have allowed judicial and legislative agendas and policy to remain
separate." Why Glick does not consider this to be a call for action is unclear. While the Florida court did
present their "call" in more forceful (confrontational?) language, the intent was the same. (110.)
California falls in a different category because the high court of that state did not decide any cases until
after the Legislature had already taken preliminary action in passing the Natural Death Act in 1976,
making this a case of legislative-judicial dialogue in regard to statutory interpretation rather than a clear
case of common law development. (100).
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Despite this invitation, the General Court did not enaet legislation to gu.de the
Court until the passage thirteen years later of health care proxy legislation in 1990.380
According to Click, the expected action of the Legislature would be to enact a living
will statute as had been happening in other states throughout the country. (Forty-two
states had enacted some form of such legislation by 1990.) However, he finds that two
related factors combined to keep such a law from passing in Massachusetts, despite the
fact that bills had been introduced in each legislative session since 1975. These factors
were: (
1
)the influence of the Catholic Church in Massachusetts, exercised through (2)
Senate President William Bulger, the church's "key spokesman in the state senate."381
While there were proponents of living will legislation, they weren't able to battle cither
the power of the Senate President (which was renowned) or the pervasive influence of
the church on many individuals and organizations throughout the state. 382 Third, since
the SJC was dealing with the issue, many legislators probably agreed with one who
noted that "he opposed living will bills and preferred, instead, to have the courts make
decisions on a case-by-case basis."383
It is interesting to note that while the SJC recognized the ultimate authority of
the Legislature to determine overall policy guidelines in this matter, the justices did not
hesitate to use their power to establish policy as cases arose. The requirement for
MGL Chapter 20 ID, added by St. 1990, c. 332. Health care proxies are seen as less protective of the
rights of the patient since they simply allow the individual to appoint another as the person to make
health care decisions on their behalf should they become incapacitated. Unlike living wiils, they do not
allow the individual to spell out their wishes regarding specific kinds of medical treatment. The
individual must rely on the representative's ability to adequately express their wishes.
381
Glick, Right to Die, 120.
382
Glick makes special mention of Representative Richard Vokc (D - Chelsea) as an active proponent of
this legislation from within the General Court.
3X3 Quote in Glick, Right to Die, 122-123. This was a summary of a statement found in The Boston
Globe, September 23, 1986, 25.
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judical involvement was inherent m then requirement ofjudicial involvement every
lime an individual or family wanted to terminate an individual's medical treatment
which was established in Saikewicz, This position placed the Court squarely in line to
continue to make law on a ease-by-ease basis in tins Held. While many eases would
begin and end in the trial courts, some would inevitably be appealed and the SJC would
continue to refine its policy. 384
In 19X6, the Court was again asked to assert its authority, and again the justices
felt they had to aet since the Legislature had not. This time the ease was more complex,
involving not the refusal of medical treatment but the question of whether a feeding
tube can be removed from a non-terminal patient in a persistent vegetative state.385
Sensitive to the significance and complexity of our decision, we do not
shirk our responsibility, for we are aware that the advances of medical
science and technology are "compelling the public, through the courts, if
not the Legislatures, to formulate new standards and procedures for
measuring the conduct of persons involved in the health care of persons
with irreversible brain damage."'^
The Court decided that the rights of Paul Brophy to stop the feeding, as
presented through the substituted judgment of his family, dictated that he be moved to a
facility in which his feeding tube would be removed.387 While clearly a more difficult
384
Sec, Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255 (1979) (Commonwealth's interest in
upholding orderly prison administration decisive against prisoner's assertion of privacy rights); Harnish
v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152 ( 19X2) (individual's right to he free of
nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity and the burden ofproving privilege to override this right
rests with physieian); Rogers v. Commissioner ofthe Department ofMental Health, 390 Mass. 4X9
( 1983) (substituted judgment in non-emergency setting).
™Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital. Inc., 398 Mass. 417 (19X6).
m
Brophy, 419, quoting Sevems v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A. 2s 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980).
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Mr. Brophy needed to be moved as New England Sinai felt that their assistance in removing his
feeding lube would violate their ethical obligations as medical providers. The fact that this was a more
difficult decision can be seen in the voice of dissenters to Brophy . "Unlike other eases, typified by
Superintendent ofBelchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 (1977), and Matter of Conroy,
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case, the Court did not hesitate to aet, this time following New Jersey's lead taken in ft
Re Conroy decided in 198 5.388
The Legislature finally accepted the Court's invitation to join the dialogue when
it passed the Health Care Proxy Act. This established a procedure by which an
individual could appoint a proxy who is empowered to make medical decisions on
behalf of the individual should she become incapacitated. In instances when such
proxy arrangements exist unchallenged, the Court is removed from the process, a result
about which few justices would complain if Justice Lynch's previously quoted reaction
is any indication. For the most part, the statute mirrors the law as it have been
developed by the SJC. There is only one possible inconsistency between the law of
Saikewicz and its progeny and the Health Care Proxy Act. The statute states that the
attending physician shall not be prohibited from providing "comfort care or pain
alleviation" as she feels necessary. 3 '9 Glick points out that in living will legislation in
other states such provisions have been seen as requiring that food and water be
artificially administered. 390 If this were the interpretation applied to the Health Care
Proxy Act, it would conflict with policy as established by the Court in Brophy. Since
the passage of the Health Care Proxy Act the Court has decided no cases involving
98 N.J. 321 (1985), this case does not involve an individual's substituted choice to live for as long as
possible without seriously burdensome treatment rather than to undergo such treatment in order to
prolong life for a brief and uncertain time. Instead, this case raises for the first time in this
Commonwealth the question whether an individual has a legal right to choose to die, and to enlist the
assistance of others to effectuate that choice on the ground that, irrespective of the nature of available life
prolonging treatment, life in any event is not worth living and its continuation is intolerable." Brophy,
O'Connor dissenting, 449.
388 /\98 N.J. 321, 344 (1985). In his analysis, Glick indicates that Brophy, like Conroy, also marks a turn
away from the requirement ofjudicial involvement in each case. While there is less emphasis on the role
of the courts in this opinion, I see no clear indication that the Court had retreated in this matter.
389
Act 332 of 1 990. Language regarding comfort care can be found in § 1 3.
390
Glick, 128.
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interpretation of this provision,- We ean get some indication of how the Court might
interpret such a question from those cases the Court has decided since 1990 in "right to
die" cases in which no health care proxy arrangement existed. One of these cases dealt
specifically with the question of removing a nasoduodenal tube inserted for the purpose
of artificial hydration and feeding and the court, applying the principle of substituted
judgment for a baby in state custody who was in a persistent vegetative state,
authorized removal of the tube.392 If this is any indication, the Court will continue to
apply the same principles in cases involving conflicts over health care proxies.
The Massachusetts experience with the question of the right to die provides a
good example of the way in which the state's highest court influences the development
of public policy of a state in cooperation with the state's Legislature. First, we see that
the SJC was setting policy in this field of law through its common law and equity
powers long before the Legislature spoke. While there was debate over this issue
among the justices, these debates stemmed from ideological differences and were not
about the legitimacy of the SJC's actions. 393 Second, we see that the manner in which
the Legislature finally handled this subject followed the more conservative approach of
391
While the justices could do something different when confronted with a specific statute, it is likely,
absent a strong legislative indication of an alternative intent, that they would interpret the statute in a way
which is consistent with their previous jurisprudence.
392
Guardianship ofJane Doe, 41 1 Mass. 512 (1991). The other three cases involved authorization of a
DNR (do not resuscitate order) for a child in state custody (Care and Protection ofBeth, 412 Mass 188
[1991]), recognition of a Jehovah's Witness who is competent to refuse a blood transfusion (Norwood
Hospital v. Munoz, 409 Mass. 1 16 [1990]), and questions in a case involving the liability of a physician
who administered emergency medical treatment against wishes of patient as made known by her family
(Shine v. Vega, 429 Mass. 456 [1999]).
393
See dissents in Brophy, Nolan at 442; Lynch at 443; and O'Connor at 448. This is another example of
the hot-button issues which O'Connor mentioned (see above). He, Nolan and Lynch, generally the three
more conservative voices on the Court during the 1980's, may have dissented in this case because the
"kitchen table" around which they were raised may have been more conservative than that of Liacos,
Wilkins, Abrams, and Grcancy. These three justices, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, also made up
the majority in Cass (statutory interpretation regarding death of a fetus and vehicular homicide).
162
the SJC. The Legislature enacted health care proxy legislation instead of a living will
law while the Court adopted a court-centered approach to deciding each question as
opposed to the family/hospital approach of Quinlan. This shared conservatism may
represent a common approach to law-making in the Commonwealth which makes it
easier for the Court and the Legislature to work cooperatively. It certainly leaves open
the door for future court activity as the openness of both of these approaches allows the
law to develop incrementally when the courts of the Commonwealth apply the Health
Care Proxy Act and make other determinations in cases involving medical decisions for
those individuals who have not designated a health care proxy. Last, but not least, the
action which was finally taken by the Legislature matched the policy which the
judiciary had already developed through a long process of common law
development. 394 The pattern of communication in this case was one of a long
monologue followed by a brief response and then another decade or more of legislative
silence as the legislators have taken no further action on this matter since 1990.
The separation of powers in a governmental system allows for a variety of
responses to public policy concerns. The discussion of the three policy areas above
provide three different examples of how the legislative and judicial branches can work
together. The first instance, definition of familial relationships, represents the kind of
policy in which the Court is best situated to adjust the law over time. No broad policy
statement or statutory change may be necessary but as society changes, new situations
3,4
In Volume 22 of the Massachusetts Practice Series concerning Probate Law and Practice, Sean
Dunphy (an Associate Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department in Massachusetts), notes that
the specific legislation adopted in Massachusetts is a "cutting and pasting of legislation previously
enacted in the state ofNew York." (183). While this may be true, it is likely that Massachusetts would
not have adopted the language of the New York statute if it had not comported with the previous practice
in the state.
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will arise which the old law (statutory or common) may not have considered. As each
new question arises the Court responds, adjusting the law on a case-by-case basis. The
second example, the definition of homicide law in the Commonwealth, is an example of
the type of policy which would be best made by the Legislature (even if the
Massachusetts Legislature does not yet think so). It is a policy change which is broad
and comprehensive and not amenable to the piecemeal approach ofjudicial
policymaking. The third policy area, the right to die, represents a hybrid. Like the first
category, it may have been best for the law in this newly emerging field to develop on a
case-by-case basis in the first instance. When the members of the polity arc prepared to
deal with the issue collectively through their elected representatives, there will develop
in the Legislature a sufficient movement to enact legislation to address the topic. With
the right to die, the agreement reached on the Health Care Proxy Act could only deal
with part of the issue. It still leaves much ambiguity with many questions which are
still, perhaps, best addressed through the cumulative process ofjudicial lawmaking.
This still leaves one more kind of division of responsibility which the separation of
powers could create - a more equal sharing of policymaking powers between the two
branches. The closest example to such a dialogue in the last twenty-five years of
Massachusetts history involves the question of governmental tort immunity.
TORT LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY - AN ONGOING
DIALOGUE
The Supreme Judicial Court was particularly active in the development of tort
law during the last thirty years. From 1981 to 1995 cases involving tort claims against
both private parties and governmental entities made up over 1 5% of the Supreme
164
Judicial Court's caseload. Looking at these years in two distinct eras we find that tort
claims have increased as a percentage of the Court's activity over time. From 1981-
1986, cases involving such claims composed 1 1.5% of the SJC's caseload, with the
percentage jumping to 18.2% during the latter years of this study. This increase is due,
at least in part, to the fact that the Court began to chip away at old barriers to tort
remedies in the 1970's. As one staff person noted, «] think probably within the period
you're talking about. .the SJC was creating these new causes of action and knocking
down the tort immunity barriers."395 Chief Justice Wilkins confirmed this view. "Over
the last twenty-five years or so we have made major changes in the tort law of this
Commonwealth, opening up rights of recovery against defendants which were not
permissible under the common law prior to that."396 Beginning in the 1970's, the
Court modified or recommended the total elimination of several sorts of immunity
whose traditions had outlived their usefulness. This included doctrines of interspousal,
parental, and charitable immunity. 397
These changes coincided with increasing codification of tort law. The law of
torts had historically been controlled by common law and its development had rested in
the hands of the courts in the United States. While much of this law in the states is still
common law, by the latter half of the 20th century state legislatures began to codify tort
95
Daniel Johnedis, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 14 April 1999. As the discussion which follows
will show, many of these activities began in the decade before my case analysis begins.
396
Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. This view is found in
opinions of the Court as well. "In recent years, particularly, '[t]his court has frequently had occasion to
effect through its decisions not insignificant changes in the field of tort law'." McStowe v. Bornstein,
111 Mass 804 (1979), 808, citing Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619 (1976), 628.
7
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 6! 9 (1976) (spousal immunity for auto accidents); Brown v. Brown, 381
Mass. 23 1 (1980) (spousal immunity for non-auto torts); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350 (1975)
(parental immunity for auto torts); and Colby v. Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (charitable
immunity).
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law, A description of changes in the doctrine of governmental immunity in
Massachusetts shows that this was not always done willingly. It was not until the SJC
gave the Legislature an ultimatum that a comprehensive approach to the question of
governmental tort liability was developed. The Court had to demand that the
Legislature speak, but the representatives did finally become involved in the
conversation
-
an interesting example of how the separation of powers can force a
governmental department to act, even when other factors may be inhibiting it.
By the early 1970's the SJC was showing impatience with the concept of the
doctrine of governmental immunity, a doctrine which the Court called 'logically
indefensible."3- While hesitating to abrogate this doctrine judicially because of the
piecemeal approach inherent in judicial policymaking, the SJC was clear that sovereign
immunity should be abolished.
We have no doubt as to the advisability of abolishing the rule of
government immunity as applied to the Commonwealth and its political
subdivisions, and we have no doubt as to our power to abolish that
doctrine. We refrain at this time, not merely because we have accepted
the doctrine for many years, but because the comprehensive approach
available to the Legislature is the preferable course. 400
The Legislature, however, chose not to take this "comprehensive approach." As a
matter of fact, they did nothing at all. Becoming even more impatient, the Court issued
an uncharacteristically forceful ultimatum to the Legislature in 1977 in Whitney v.
Worcester.
401
398 An example of this on the federal level is the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C., Sections 2671-
2680) enacted in 1979.
m
Morash and Sons v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612 (1973), 619.
Morash and Sons, 624. This approach is less activist than that of the four high courts cited in this case
which did judicially abrogate this doctrine, Arizona, California, Idaho, and Illinois (619).
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—ZtZQ« ? mtemi0n t0 abr°gate the doctrine of municipalimmunity m the first appropriate case decided by this court after the
doctrnS.^ ^
ltSdf 3Cted definiti^ly as to the
In Whitney neither party had raised the question of the viability of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity but the Court ehose to consider it anyway.403 It had been four
years since Morash and the justices would wait no longer.- The degree to winch tins
stance represented a departure from the traditional deference shown to the Legislature
can be seen in the words of Daniel Johnedis. "One area was governmental immunity.
And...what really shocked me, ^...Whitney v. the City or Worcester.
...And that was
about as close as you get to a confrontation."405
This stance was perhaps uncharacteristic but it was not unique. In 1969 the SJC has taken a similar
SineTul^ h TTt immUmty - HaV 'ng C°mPlained » d— tha h
"
doctrine should be abolished, the SJC warned in Colby v. Carney Hospital (356 Mass. 527 [1969]) thatthe next tune we are squarely confronted by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity doctrine
, ur5 , t°'
1Sh ll " iCamey
'
528
- } The reSult in this case was Cresting as well. Chief
ust.ce Wilkins described it as follows. "For example, we decided to toss out charitable immunity in
ort actions, and said, 'well we're going to do this but we'll give you, the Legislature, time to do it'"We re not going to sort of plow into this because we think you ought to make your judgment on this '
They made a judgment and they limited the liability to $20,000....[T]here's an example where we gave
them discretion to move into an area and then they came up with, 'yes, we will have some liability here
but it s going to be very limited'." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. The moral of the
'
story is, the Legislature may have the authority to act but the justices may not always like what they do
This is a lesson which will become important again in 1995. (See discussion below regarding the 1993
Amendments to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.)
402
403
Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 (1977), 210.
Steven B. Kramer, "Case Comment -- Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding Cases
Pending Legislative Determinations of Law " Boston University Law Review 85 (1978), 821.
404 An indication of the importance of this case is that all seven justices participated in this opinion and
agreed unanimously on the conclusion. As previously noted, most decisions (over 70%) in this era were
decided by panels of five justices.
405
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 14 April 1999. Also see, Daniel J. Johnedis, "The Supreme
Judicial Court and Tort Immunity," Massachusetts Law Review 63 (1978), pp. 75-8 1 . On the other
hand, the language used by the Court continues to be deferential and non-confrontational. Before
declaring its intent to act if the Legislature does not, the Court softens the blow. "We recognize the
delicacy of the tasks with which the Legislature has been confronted, and we now conclude that the
Legislature and the public are entitled to a more specific statement as to this court's intentions."
Whitney, 210.
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The Court did more than demand that the General Court aet; Chief Justice
Hennessey's opinion for the eourt led the Legislature in the direction which the Court
felt that governmental immunity should take, noting «[w]e hope, of course, that the
principles we stress here will aid the Legislature in its deliberations." « Furthermore,
the SJC took the unusual stance of not only explaining how they planned to change the
law if the Legislature chose not to act but also of announcing their intention to make
their abrogation of immunity retroactive to Morash, effectively putting the state and
local governments (and the state's tort lawyers) on notice.407
Before describing the Legislature's reaction to the ultimatum, it is important to
look at the Court's decision in Whitney to see what it has to say about the role of the
SJC in the policymaking process. In the eyes of one commentator, this action seems to
mark the outermost reach of the Court into the legislative sphere.
Rarely if ever, has the court participated in the legislating process to the
degree that it did in the Whitney opinion. Skillfully, the court has used
its power of persuasion, its drafting skills, and its authority to change the
rules of common law to help effect a major revision in an old doctrine
which, in the court's view, unnecessarily infringes on the right of an
406
111
Whitney, 211.
4 7
"While there was widespread and justifiable reliance on the immunity doctrine prior to our decision i
Morash...we think that subsequent to that opinion further reliance was misplaced. Accordingly, if the
doctrine is to be changed by future action of this court, it is our intention to abrogate the principle as to
all injuries which occurred since the publication of Morash on May 14, 1973." {Whitney, 225.) For a
criticism of this action see Steven Kramer, "Prospective-Retroactive Overruling." "The Court in Whitney
proposed to change the law, yet did not decide the case. Impatient with legislative inertia, the court
assumed the role of an interest group advocate, petitioning the Legislature for statutory reform on behalf
of politically underrepresented tort plaintiffs." (838.) A more sympathetic perspective on this problem
was presented by Johnedis. "Unfortunately, during the time it takes for the law of governmental liability
and immunity to be settled (whether by the court or by the legislature) all claims by injured persons
against public officers and governmental entities, including the claims in the Whitney case, will remain
frozen in a state of animated suspension. This period of uncertainty in this important area of the law
seems to be part of the price that must be paid to bring about the modernization of an old outmoded
doctrine complicated by years of piecemeal modification by the legislature and the Supreme Judicial
Court." "The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity," 81.
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injured person to recover from the one who wrongfully caused his
More critical of the Court was Kramer in his BULaw Review article. "In
departing from its role of deciding cases, the court has entered the political process in a
way that exceeds its traditional lawmaking function and undermines the symbolic role
of the court/'409 There is no doubt that this move may have taken place at the
boundaries of the realm ofjudicial power as traditionally envisioned by the justices of
the SJC. In addition, it is possible that there was a strategic element in their use of the
prospective-retroactive plan of action, one which was meant to add some weight to
their words of encouragement. However, when viewed in context, the action of the
justices in this case do not seem quite as dramatic as these commentators have found.
Part of the context involves broader movements in the law at this time. The Court was
not advocating the adoption of an unusual position. As of 1978, the year after Whitney
was decided, most states had enacted some sort of law to limit governmental
immunity. 410
The second contextual factor which needs to be considered in this scenario is
the ongoing relationship which had existed over the years between the Legislature and
the SJC in regard to the law of torts. Tort law had been common law and both the
Legislature and the justices accepted that the Court could change, amend, and adapt the
Johnedis, "The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity/\8 1
.
09
"Prospective-Retroactive Overruling," 837.
410
"Forty-five States have modified and at least partly eliminated the defense of immunity in tort actions
against municipal corporations. All except thirteen States have abolished or limited the defense in suits
against the State." Whitney, 212, citations omitted. By 1995, only Maryland and Mississippi still
maintained the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Mark L. Van Valkcnburgh, "Massachusetts General
Laws Chapter 258, §10: Slouching Toward Sovereign Immunity," New England Law Review 29 (1995),
1092.
169
case
common law until such time as the Legislature dictated otherw.se. In a 1975
involving claims of governmental immunity the Court described the breadth of its
common law powers. Citing Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration ofRights (the
Separate of Powers article), the Court notes that «[b]y tins language the traditional
role of the Massachusetts courts in the operation of the common law is guaranteed,
without regard to the origin of that law before or after 1 780." In a footnote to this
statement the Court cites ten cases from the 1970-1974 dockets in which the Court had
used its common law powers to amend the law of torts in the Commonwealth. 4 " The
fact that the Court was not doing so in this instance stemmed from their recognition that
such a major change in the law would benefit from the fact-finding and deliberative
abilities of the Legislature, as well as from their greater capability to take a
comprehensive approach to the law. Further, mindful of the fact that the Legislature is
the final legislative voice, the Court wanted to avoid the legislative backlash which can
occur if the Legislature is displeased with the action of the Court. Such a legislative
reaction leads to inconsistency and uncertainty in the law for a period of time, a
scenario which the Court claimed to want to avoid. 412
There is one final set of contextual variables which make the actions of the SJC
in Whitney less anomalous. This is the fact that from Morash on both the Court and the
Legislature had been actively engaged in "conversation" regarding the issue of
411
Hannigan v. The New Gamma-Delta Chapter ofKappa Sigma Fraternity, 367 Mass. 658 (1 975), 661
.
See also, Caine v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815 (1975) and Piotti v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 386
(1976).
412
However, as Kramer rightly notes, the Court was itself a source of uncertainty. Threatening to
eliminate governmental immunity retroactively to Morash, potential plaintiffs and defendants from
actions which occurred between 1973 and 1978 were left in limbo until the Legislature did act.
"Prospective-Retroactive Overruling," 833-836.
170
changing the doctrine of governmental immunity in Massachusetts. Several cases came
to the Court in the years between Morash and Whitney which raised questions of
governmental immunity. In each case, the Court avotded making a final determinate
on the matter, deferring to the Legislature. Most telling was their opinion in the 1975
case ofHmnigan v
.
Kappa Sigma Fraternity in which the Court repeats the position it
first presented in Morash.
Although we reaffirm our authority to abolish sovereign immunity we
accede to the Commonwealth's argument that we should continue to
retrain, at leastfor the present, from doing so. Only about twenty-three
months have passed since the Morash decision. In the meantime
legislation to the same end has been filed and has been referred to the
Judical Council. For all of the compelling reasons we offered in the
Morash opinion, it is preferable that the Legislature should act to
accomplish this necessary change. We shall continue to refrain until the
Legislature acts or until events demonstrate that it does not intend to
act.
In addition to the continuing patience of the Court over these four years we have
the fact that the Legislature was considering legislation regarding this matter. The
Judicial Council, a statutory body created to advise the Legislature on matters affecting
the judiciary, had considered the matter and made formal recommendations in the
Fiftieth Report of the Judicial Council.414 In addition, there had been five House bills
filed on this matter in 1974 and a bill each in the House and the Senate in 1977. With
all of this activity there had been ample opportunity for the Legislature to use its fact-
gathering and deliberative skills to come up with a comprehensive plan of action (or
413
367 Mass. 658, 662 (emphasis added). The Court also refrained from taking this action in Caine v.
Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815 (1975).
14
Public Document No. 144. Per Hannigan, this report was issued in 1974. According to the opinion in
Irwin v. DYS, 388 Mass. 810 (1983), it was issued in 1975.
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inaoon) to address the matter. By this point the Court obv.ously felt i, was toe to fish
or cut bait.
415
The Legislature finally responded in 1978 with the Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act (MTCA), a law which closely followed the principles found in Whitney with two
exceptions.416 The first was the establishment of a $100,000 limit on individual
recovery. The second involved the question of retroactivity. While the Court had
declared its intention of making its new rule of law retroactive to Morash should the
Legislature refuse to act, the MTCA was retroactive only to the date that Whitney was
decided. The bottom line, however, was that the Legislature finally acted to set the
parameters within which it may be sued for actions taken by its organs and officials.
Additionally, it adopted the major changes in this area of law which the Court had
proposed
- replacing the immunity for acts which occur "in pursuance of the common
good" with a discretionary-ministerial distinction in determining liability which was
widely accepted by other jurisdictions. Additionally, it added nonfeasance to
malfeasance as a basis for suits against individual public officials. In both instances,
A history of the development of the law regarding governmental immunity can be see in Irwin v DYS
The opinion was written in response to a question certified to the Court by the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts as to whether the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act represented an
agreement to waive immunity from suit in Federal court. To answer the question Justice Lynch, writing
for the Court, presents a history not only of the most recent actions of the Court and the Legislature in
this realm but also of the origins of the elimination of some sovereign immunity a century earlier. What
is most interesting for purposes of this research is that the description of this history in Irwin shows that
the development of this law in this field has been the result of legislative-judicial interaction from the
beginning. "Following close on our decisions rejecting a contract claim not founded on the payment of
money...(1887), and hold that the statute did not permit recovery to reimburse a town for certain
expenditures...(1887), the Legislature amended Pub Sts. c.195, Section 1 (1882).. ..We construed this
amendment as demonstrating a legislative intent 'to extend the jurisdiction of the courts to claims which
had not been included [per our interpretation] in the previous statute...." (814.)
416
1978 Massachusetts Acts, ch. 512, amending MGL c. 258. The formal name of the act was "An Act
Establishing a Claims and Indemnity Procedure for the Commonwealth, its Municipalities, Counties and
Districts, and the Officers and Employees Thereof." According to the SJC, the law was also modeled on
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346 (b), 2771 et. seq. (1976). See, Vasys v.
Metropolitan District Commission, 387 Mass. 51 (1982).
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the Court had been trying to find a system which balanced the right of individuals to
pursue remed.es when wronged with the need to ensure continuing fiscal viability of
the state and the Legislature accepted these principles in full.4" In the Court's eyes
there is obviously a strong correlation between the their opimon in Whitney and the
MTCA as evidenced by the following statement: "To determine the intended scope of
GL c. 258, § 10 (b), we have stated that the language in Whitney v. Worcester should be
our guide."418
The Whitney-MTCA exchange did not end the judicial-legislative dialogue
about the development of the law of governmental immunity. It only changed the
parameters of the discussion as it moved from the realm of common law to that of
statutory interpretation. In a law review article written several years after passage of
the legislation, Suffolk Law School Professor Joseph Glannon identified no less than
seven major points which the law covers in part but which leave a variety of questions
for future interpretation.
419
It is, of course, the courts which will be forced to answer
these questions in the first instance. Glannon describes this process as an "enigmatic
task of applying this language to claims arising out of a wide variety of public
functions[.]"420 As distinguished from the right-to-die legislation, however, the Court
For a more thorough discussion of these points see Joseph W. Glannon, "Governmental Tort Liability
Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act of 1978," Massachusetts Law Review 63 (1978), 7-22. It is
interesting to note that the ease with which the Legislature adopted the court's proposal undercuts
arguments that this is the kind of policy reform which requires the comprehensive attention that only the
Legislature can give. This argument assumes that the procedure of a Legislature, with committees to
consider legislation and the input of various individuals at the hearing stage, is better able to develop
comprehensive public policy. In this case, however, the General Court simply accepted the standards
which the Court had developed.
418
Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1985), 753 citing Irwin v. DYS, 388 Mass. 810 (1983).
419
Glannon, "Governmental Tort Liability."
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has been interpreting the statute in the midst of an ongoing eonversation since the
Legislature has rematned acttve in this discussion, enacfing 22 amendments to the Ae,
stnee its passage ,n 1978. Most of these amendments have been relatively simple and
non-controversial. Twelve deal, with further defining who is a public employer and a
public employee for purposes of the «.« Another seven involved clarifications
regarding jurisdiction and presentment procedures"2 and another three involved
providing legal counsel or indemnification to public employees who are subject to
actions under this Act. 423
While the Legislature was fine-tuning the legislation, courts were dealing with
the application of the law and its amendments. In approximately one hundrerd of these
instances between 1981 and 1995 these questions moved up the ladder to appear on the
docket of the SJC, giving the Court ample opportunity to continue to participate in the
development of the law. As with most of the amendments enacted by the Legislature,
many of the Court's decisions dealt with minor questions regarding proper presentment
procedures and of defining who is a public employee.424 Beginning in 1982, however,
the Court began to interpret the law so as to limit the liability of governmental units
through the public duty rule. First used in Dinsky v. Framingham, it allows the Court to
deny a claim in cases where the public official has a duty to the public in general but
420
Joseph W. Glannon, "The Scope of Public Liability under the Tort Claims Act: Beyond the Public
Duty Rule," Massachusetts Law Review 67 (1982), 159.
421
See St. 1980, c. 151; St. 1980, c. 315; St. 1981, c. 179; St. 1981, c. 403; St. 1983, c. 345; St.
1983, c. 537; St. 1991, c. 412; St. 1992, c. 343; St. 1993, c. 110; St. 1993, c. 467; St. 1998, c. 459.
422
St. 1979, c. 1; St. 1982, c. 176; St. 1983, c. 343; St. 1984, c. 279; St. 1987, c. 343; St. 1988, c. 217; St.
1989, c. 161.
423
424
St. 1979, c. 396; St. 1980, c. 261; St. 1983, c. 345.
It is likely that some of these SJC decisions were the impetus for legislation as the Legislature acted to
codify a Court decision or to clarify what the Court had decided wrongly in regard to these issues.
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not to the individual pontiff- In Dinsly the Court applied the public duty rule in
holding that the eity was not liable to the owners of a single-family home for water
damage due to building improprieties which the Dinskys allege should have been
discovered during an inspection required by the Board of Health. 426
Once again, this presents the Court as a policymaker, but one who exercises its
power cautiously. As with the Court's role in encouraging the abrogation of immunity,
the public duty rule enjoyed widespread national support as a method for providing
some protection to local and state government coffers from overly litigious citizens. In
addition, the Court was not the first in the conversation to establish an exception to
governmental liability. Section 10 of the MTCA as originally written established four
liability exclusions, the most notable being the discretionary action exception which has
been recognized by almost all jurisdictions who have abolished immunity.427
The provisions...shall not apply to.. .any claim based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee,
acting within the scope of this office or employment whether or not the
discretion involved is abuse.428
4
- 386 Mass. 801 (1982).
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For an analysis of Dinsky see Glannon, "Beyond the Public Duty Rule." Glannon asserts that this
application of the public duty rule did not mark any wholesale move away from governmental immunity.
Further support for Glannon 's thesis can be found in the fact that only four of the seven justices of the
SJC participated in the decision. During the years when the Court hear cases in panels, the full bench
often heard important questions.
7
Kevin J. O'Malley, "Governmental Tort Liability: A New Limitation on the Public Duty Rule in
Massachusetts? Irwin v. Town of Ware" Suffolk University Law Review, 19 (1985), 668
4
Section 10 (b). This still leaves the question for the courts, however, as to when an action is
discretionary. The other three exceptions involve any public employee who is exercising "due care" in
the performance of a statutorily or regulatorily defined action; any intentional tort of a public employee;
and lawful collection of any tax or property by a law enforcement official. According to Professor
Glannon, these exclusions are similar to ones found in the Federal Tort Claims Act. ("Governmental
Tort Liability," 1 1.)
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In addition, the cautious approach to policymaking can be seen ,n that the Court
chose to adopt the public duty rule in "the most sympathetic type of case" possible.-
The Court applied this principle to a situation in which the damage involved only
property interests, the harm was not caused directly by the town itself, and the
plaintiffs were in a position to protect themselves from this problem with their own
inspection of the property prior to purchase.
The adoption of the public duty rule in Dinsky indicates a move on the part of
the SJC to limit governmental liability.430 The majority of the justices on the Court
showed that it was only a minor limitation, however, when it chose not to apply the
public duty rule only two years later in the case ofIrwin v. Ware 431 Here the Court
decided not to apply the rule in the case of a police officer who had chosen not to
remove a potentially drunk driver from the road, leaving the town open to liability
claims by plaintiffs who were injured in an accident with the driver. In his opinion for
the Court Chief Justice Hennessey noted that the Dinsky ruling was to be read narrowly.
In Dinsky we relied in part on the principle that the negligence of a
public employee occurring within the scope of his employment will not
support a private action against the public employer where the
employee's duty of care was owed to the general public only. Arguably,
this principle contains a seed which could reintroduce a broad-based
municipal tort immunity.. ..Clearly, such a broad reading of our Dinsky
opinion runs directly contrary to the spirit ofGL c. 258 and our decision
in Whitney v. Worcester. We did not intend our language in Dinsky to
be so read. 432
Glannon, "Beyond the Public Duty Rule," 160.
430 One commentator has viewed the Dinsky decision as follows. "It seems ironic that the same court
which actively advocated the abrogation of sovereign immunity would later adopt the public duty rule in
Massachusetts." Van Valkenburgh, "Slouching Toward Sovereign Immunity," 1093. It wasn't exactly
"the same court." Three of the justices who participated in the Whitney decision were no longer on the
Court when Dinsky was decided.
431
392 Mass. 745 (1984).
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Interestingly the opinion in Irwin, one which seems to fit the intent of both the
MTCA and the Court's previous ^Dinsky rulings, created more controversy than did
the opimon in which the Court adopted the public duty rule to limit liability. This is
indicated by the existence of two relatively uncommon occurrences. First there were
four amicus curiae briefs filed in this case, two promoting a limited view of liability
and two promoting an expanded view.- Secondly, while occurring in less than .0%
of the cases, a dissent was filed in this case.- Writing for himself, Justice Lynch and
Justice O'Connor, Justice Nolan shows how quickly a new rule can become the
accepted norm. 'The court has essentially abandoned the public duty rule and has
imposed a new 'common law duty' upon police officers while still using the rubric of
the public duty rulc....lf the court thought it wise to follow this path, I suggest that it
should have summoned the courage to abolish explicitly the generally accepted rule in
public service cases."435 Adopted by the SJC only two years earlier, the public duty
rule had already become an accepted limit on governmental liability.
Most interesting from a separation of powers perspective is the fact that the
Legislature seemed to let this debate play itself out in the courts. Mad the Legislature
been displeased with the adoption of the public duty rule in 1982 or, conversely, of its
limitation in 1984, it could have enacted legislation to change the policy set by the SJC.
4 2
Irwin v. Ware, 155. (Citations omitted.)
Amicus curiae briefs were filed in only 435 (12%) of the cases between 1981 and 1995. In this case
briefs were submitted by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Massachusetts Municipal
Association, the City of Boston, and the Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. (Irwin v. Ware, 746.)
434 i-x* • •
Dissenting opinions were written in 318 cases (8.8%) between 1981 and 1995.
435
776-777.
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>hcy were paying attention to this Held of law. I, wasn't un.il 1993, again at the
-ttgation of the SJC, tha, the Legislature entered this conversation in any meaningful
way, and when they did i, was with a hang, moving the Commonwealth as eU.se as h
has been to governmental immunity since 1978. This most recent conversation
between the Court and the Legislature highlights another way in which the Court and
the Legislature differ in their policymaking roles: the Legislature is much more
responsive to local concerns, and no concern is more local than the budgets of cities
and towns.
This most recent interchange between the two branches began in 1992 when the
Court issued its Opinion in Jean IV. v, Commonwealth.™ The decision, issued "by (he
Court," was accompanied by lour concurring opinions, a very unusual occurrence for
the SJC. At the heart of the debate was the question of whether the Commonwealth
should maintain the public duty rule as an exception to governmental liability, with four
justices opting for its elimination and three arguing to maintain the rule.437 As with
previous debates, however, the question was not over whether the Court had the
authority to be involved in this policy but over the substance of the policy question.
The only way in which the Court's role was debated was in regard to how the public
duty rule should be abrogated. Justices Liacos and Grcaney opted for an approach
similar to that used by the Court in Whitney, announcing their intention to eliminate the
36
414 Mass. 496 (1992). The case involved claims against the Commonwealth by a mother and her
children who were involved in an attack by a man who was mistakenly paroled from a Massachusetts
prison.
437 r.Concurring opinions by Liacos (497), Wilkins, joined by Abrams (514), and Greaney (523) argue lor
elimination of the rule. A concurrence by O'Connor, with Nolan and Lynch joining (515) promote the
continued application of the public duty rule.
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rule at a tor date so that the Legislature would have the time to take any action they
felt was necessary to prepare for this. "The Legislature, nevertheless, should be
afforded an opportunity to consider whether it wishes to respond to this anticipated
change by passing additional limitations on liability. We therefore announce our
intention to abolish the public duty rule at the first available opportunity after the
conclusion of the 1993 session of the Legislature.»™ Wilkins, with Abrams, would
have eliminated the rule effective immediately. Lacking a majority in favor of that
action, however, they concurred with Liacos and Greaney.
Since their adoption of the public duty rule in 1982 the Court had grappled with
the competing interests at the heart of this debate. On the one side is the principle
underlying the intent of both the Court and the Legislature in eliminating governmental
immunity: one who is negligent should bear the cost which that negligence imposes on
others. In the case of governmental liability, this operates somewhat like an insurance
policy, with the whole governmental unit bearing the cost rather than the individual(s)
who were harmed by the government's negligence. On the other hand is the concern
which enabled the doctrine of governmental tort immunity to outlive its ancient
common law origins in the maxim that "the king can do no wrong" - numerous or
extensive claims against a governmental unit, especially in light of the unique roles
which governments play (i.e., police and fire protection) could quickly bankrupt a
community.439 The adoption of the public duty rule in Dinsky, followed by the special
relationship exception of Irwin v. Ware, show how the Court attempted to balance these
438
Liacos concurring, 499.
43
}
The Legislature obviously recognized this interest as well when they incorporated exceptions,
including the discretionary function exception, into the original MTCA.
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two interests. By the time the ease ofJean W. had reaehed the Court there was a
confusing line of eases whieh, aeeording to Professor Cannon, had "not managed to
draw an intellectually defensible Hue between immune 'public' dut.es and actionable
negligence."- In the eyes of the Court, it was time for the Legislature to step in and
aet. While they were willing to eliminate the publie duty rule on their own, they once
again gave the Legislature the opportunity to take whatever action they thought
necessary to protect the fiscal interests of the state and local governments.
The period given to the Legislature to appraise the scope of GL c. 258 inlight of today s decision will permit governmental entities to be heard
and public policy to be evaluated. Additionally, our past decisions which
disclose the expansive, and at times unusual, nature of claims that can bebrought under the present statute provide a basis for legislative
consideration of the scope of the statute.... [T]he opportunity for
legislative reflection on a statute which has up to now posed difficult
problems ofjudicial interpretation and application persuades me to join in
[this] resultf.j"
The Legislature acted with the passage of legislation in January of 1994 which
added six more statutory exceptions to the MTCA, effectively writing into law the
public duty exception.442 This result should come as no surprise. The pressure from
governments, especially local cities and towns, to the proposal to eliminate the public
duty rule caused the legislators to respond accordingly. This was clearly not the
position the majority of the Court would have wanted. The justices, however, are
aware that while they have a voice in the making of public policy, they are not the final
.
They can only encourage the Legislature to do what they think is in the bestvoice
"The Mass Tort Claims Act: Analysis and Update," Massachusetts Law Review 75 ( 1 990), 64.
11
Jean W. v. Commonwealth, Greaney concurring, 525.
12
St. 1993, c. 495, §57.
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interest of the state. As the Court noted in the following exceipt, what the Legislature
does is final. Here the Court was responding to a claim that despite the faet that the
Legislature had only made governmental liability under the MTCA retroactive to
Whitney, the Court should aet on its original plan and allow for liability claims against
the Commonwealth to extend back to the Morash decision in 1973.
Zltt^lT}°T plaintlff s line of ar^ument in this -2 on *e Premise that this court in Whitney stated that itwouM act if the Legislature failed to abolish governmental immunityWhUney permits no such reading. It stated only our intention to act If theLegislature failed to act definitively. Even a statutory affirmation of
w,!
emle immUnity W°Uld Clearly have been definhive actionWhen Whitney is read correctly, it becomes even more clear that we
should not modify the law not established by a comprehensive statute.443
Twenty years later the SJC is no less likely to modify this amended law despite the fact
that, at least according to one critic, the 1994 legislative amendments have
"reinstitute[d] the public duty rule, distancing the government in Massachusetts from
the taxpayers for whom it is supposed to operate by, in many cases, precluding inquiry
into the possible negligence of governmental employees."444
This story of the development of governmental immunity in Massachusetts
shows that the Supreme Judicial Court has a legitimate policymaking role to play in
both common law development and statutory interpretation. In making these common
law decisions, however, the Court has been ever mindful of the fact that the Legislature
may be the appropriate body to develop a more comprehensive body of law in a field.
They have encouraged, and at times even demanded, this involvement, but they have
always stopped short of imposing their will on the Legislature. It is perhaps because of
443
Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 914 (1979), 915.
444 Van Valkenburgh, 1108.
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this general respect and deference wh 1Ch the Court has shown to the Legislature
the years that the Legislature responds reasonably to judical ultimatums (both in
Whitney and in Jean W.) As the 1994 legislate amendments to the MTCA indicate,
however, the Legislature will always be more likely to p lck the course of action which
is most favorable to local, parochial interests In the case of governmental immunity,
some (including some SJC justices) would say this has come at the expense of what is
best for the individual citizens of the state and for governmental accountability overall.
Regardless of the position one takes on the policy question, however, the
interaction between common law and statutory law in a system of separated powers
allows for policy to be set by that institution which is most effectively structured to act
at various points in the policy-making process. In this light it leads to a sharing of
powers rather than a conflict over lawmaking authority. Before statutory law has
developed in a field the common law allows the courts to make law slowly, on a case-
by-case basis. Once the need for fuller legislative action is seen by the Legislature then
more comprehensive action can be taken. When the statute is enacted the Court again
takes over by interpreting the statute in specific applications until such time as the need
for legislative revisions becomes necessary.
The examples presented above show the system to be neither one of conflict,
with each side striving for power, nor necessarily of regular interaction. Rather, these
examples show the Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Legislature to have a
relationship which has more often been marked by avoidance and deference than either
conflict or cooperation. For reasons of apathy, political cover, or inability to overcome
internal divisiveness, the examples above show a Legislature which avoided action for
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as long as possib.e and a Court which acted, bu, only ou, ofnecessity. The one
confron.at.on in .h.s area of law came no. from branches smuggling to take power to
themselves bu. from the state's high court forcing the Leg.sla.urc to take responsibility
for abolishing governmental immunity in tor, actions.
"Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition" should perhaps be rephrased as "necessity must be made to
counteract avoidance."445
The Supreme judicial Court has been involved with the Legislature in making
policy in a variety of areas through their power over the common law and over statutory
mterpretation. In both of these instances, however, the power is clearly shared, with the
Legislature having the final say. In the next Chapter we turn to shared powers in which
the Court has the final say - tne field of constitutional interpretation.
The original quote comes from Madison's Federalist #51. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), 322.
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CHAPTER 5
The Supreme Judicial Court and the General Court of Massachusetts have
worked together over the years to make policy in important areas of law which
Intimately affect the citizens of the Commonwealth. The definition of family, questions
of an individual's right to die when faced with catastrophic medical conditions, and
issues of public responsibility to individuals when the government has been negligent
in its duties have all been strongly influenced by decisions of the SJC. Despite the
Court's involvement, however, the final authority in the development of policy in these
cases was ultimately in the hands of the legislature. The interaction between the two
branches generally has been cooperative, with the SJC often leading the way. The
Legislature has not tended to "pull rank," but the reality of a legislative check on
judicial activity shapes not only the debates surrounding the legitimacy ofjudicial
policymaking in these cases but also influences judicial activity. Justices feel freer to
decide policy questions knowing that if the legislators do not agree with their position,
it can be changed.446
The same is not true of questions of constitutional interpretation, especially
questions ofjudicial review. These questions are different than those involving other
avenues ofjudicial policymaking in a system of separated powers. This difference is
largely a matter of degree, with statutory and common law cases lying more clearly
6
As Justice Lynch noted, "when we're interpreting a statute, the Legislature has the last word."
(Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.) Conversely, Chief Justice Wilkins noted the caution
with which the SJC generally approaches constitutional questions. "It's [judicial review] an effort that
has to be undertaken with substantial restraint and most of the standards that apply to deciding the
constitutional issue are very favorable to the Legislature. That we don't expect them do more in most
instances than do something that at least has some reasonable, rational basis. (Interview by author,
Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.)
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Within the Jud lclal "circle of authority," leaving final policy decisions in hands of the
more democratically accountable branches. On the other hand, questions ofjudicial
review go to the heart of the debate over the appropriate role which the judiciary should
Play in a democratic system of government, with the judical circle lapping over into
the legislative and executive realms of authority.
The separation of powers framework on judicial policymaking which is
provided in Chapter
1 provides some perspective on judicial review and the role of the
judiciary. The efficiency theory of separated powers may provide a particular
justification for this exercise ofjudicial authority if one accepts the argument that there
is a special relationship between a court and its constitution.447 This relationship was
assumed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison™ Invested with the
special duty of interpreting a constitution, a high court which did not declare a statute in
conflict with the constitution to be void would be derelict in its duties. A similar stance
can be seen in the decisions of the SJC over time. "[W]hen it is clear that the statute
transgresses the authority vested in the Legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of
the court, a duty from which they cannot shrink without profaning their oaths of office,
to see and to declare the invalidity of the statute." 449 Of course not everyone accepts
447
The Madisonian theory of separation of powers, one which sees this structure as a way of balancing
three co-equal branches, appears to be no different when applied to judicial review than in application to
other forms ofjudicial policymaking.
448
1 Cr. 137 (1 803). Marbury was the first case in which the Supreme Court declared an act of Congress
to be unconstitutional.
4
Salisbury Land and Improvement Company v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371 (1913), 373. Chief
Justice John Parker presented the same view in the earliest years of the Court's history. "[WJhenevcr it
manifestly appears to the judiciary power that an act, complained of, does in fact violate the Constitution,
or affect the rights of individuals in a manner which is repugnant to its character and principles, there is
no doubt that such act must be declared void and inoperative." Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 25
(1815), 253. In a recent interview, Justice Lynch voiced the same opinion. "I suppose the ultimate
power of the SJC is to interpret the state Constitution. Now, the executive's got to do that and the
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that this specia. connection exist, From the early years of the 19* century there has
been debate on this point. Just.ce Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said ,n
1825,
»
[i]t will not be pretended, that the legislature has not, at least, an equal right with
the judiciary to put a construction on the constitution nor that ether of them is
infallible."450
The libertarian theory of separating powers also has a close connection to the
role of the judiciary in constitutional policymaking. It provides the justification for this
judicial responsibility in that protecting minont.es can often best be done by the least
democratic branch, and the principles underlying this protection are most clearly
delineated in the United States in written constitutions.451 Ifprotecting these principles
is essential to America's system of government, then the judiciary ,s justified in using
this power to check the legislature.452 No matter which theory one uses to justify the
power ofjudicial review, however, it is more problematic than other forms ofjudicial
policymaking because the voice of the courts is thought to be more definitive in
questions of constitutional interpretation. Before we turn to look at the truth of this
claim in regard to the SJC, it is important to step back from this specific arena to look at
general criticisms ofjudicial review in general.
Eakln v. Raub, 12 Sargeant & Rawle 330. From Gibson's perspective, one which has been advocated
over the years by those who encourage judicial restraint, the ultimate responsibility for keeping elected
legislators from overextending their authority lies with the voters, not the judiciary. For a recent appraisal
of the involvement of the president and the congress in constitutional interpretation on the federal level,
see Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
51 The judiciaries are the least democratic branch in the one-quarter of the political systems in which the
justices are appointed to office. This includes both Massachusetts and the federal system. Even in those
states with elected judiciaries there is generally less attention paid to judicial elections than to other state
electoral races. See Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press
1980).
452
Rarely do challenges to the authority of the president or a governor entail libertarian questions. But
see, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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THE PROBLEM OF RJDICIA1 REVIEW ,iw a nP,„nrY
Judicial policymaking in non-constitutional realms can be overturned by acts of
a legislature. Whether the elected officials are acting to correct what they see as an
erroneous interpretation of a statute or developing new statutes to take the lead in
questions previously left to the domain of the courts through common law, the
legislative voice is the final determinant of public policy. In interpreting its
constitution, however, a high court has the final say - To a large extent the criticisms
ofjudicial review focus on the process by which policy is made while the defense of
this power rests on the substance ofjudicial policymaking.
The most obvious critique of this process is that many justices who make policy
do so virtually unchecked by the citizenry. While courts may not always make
decisions which are antithetical to majority concerns, the possibility always exists for
these institutions to develop as oligarchic entities within a democratic system of
government. Specific examples from the Supreme Court's past which are often used to
highlight this problem include various decisions of the conservative Court of the 1930s
which struck down popularly enacted legislation of the New Deal, criminal justice
decisions of the liberal Warren Court which were widely attacked by politicians of the
day, and the still controversial Roe v. Wade.454
453
As Justice Jackson said regarding the role of the United States Supreme Court, "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are final." (Brown v Allen 344 U S 443
[(1953].)
454
Cases of the 1930s include: A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
( 1 935) (declaring the National Industrial Recovery Act to be unconstitutional); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) (declaring the Agricultural Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter
Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (declaring the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act to be
unconstitutional); and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (declaring a New
York minimum wage law to be unconstitutional). Cases from the 1960s which angered political
conservatives included those affecting criminal due process rights. They included: Mapp v. Ohio, 367
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A second line of criticism ofjudicial review deals less with checking the
potent,, abuse of power by the judiciary than it does with encouraging the use of
democrat, power by the citizens. From this perspective the process of democracy is
important but this process involves more than just elections. It is also a political system
which works best when there are a variety of avenues for public involvement, and
incentives for such activity. The larger the area for public participation, the more likely
it is that individuals will enter the arena and participate in the process. This
participation takes forms as varied as dinner table debates and public protests. All
avenues wh,ch encourages citizens to think about the principles of democratic
government and the kind of policies they want the government to enact should be wide
open and welcoming. When tne justices of the courts make policy decisions they move
the question under consideration from the public realm to the more remote legal arena,
a forum in which fewer citizens participate. This argument was prominent in the
opinions of Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of the foremost proponents of limiting
judicial power out of deference to the democratic process.455 The following is an
example of this view.
U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (applying Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigents to states); and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
Mass. 436 (1966) (requiring that certain rights regarding self-incrimination and right to counsel be read
to criminal suspects). Also of concern to conservatives were the opinions prohibiting prayer in school as
an infringement of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See School District ofAbington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In all of these cases, as well as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
1 13 (1973) (protecting a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy in the first two trimesters),
many claimed that the Court was enacting policy contrary to what "the public" wanted.
455
There are some who will say that Frankfurter's restraint was a sham, and that he was no less willing to
impose his ideology on the Court than other justices. For this position, sec Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
For a view which is more sympathetic to Frankfurter's stated judicial philosophy see, Micheie DeMary,
"Judicial Decision Making: A Democratic View," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the New
England Political Science Association, May, 1996, Northampton, MA.
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Focusing attention on constitutionality lends to make
rejected a illiberal, because repressive and envenoming may well notbe unconstitutional. The ultimate reliance for the deepe STofcivilization must be found outside their vindication inTe! courts of
A final criticism ofjudicial review which focuses on process is that the judical
branch of government is the leas, qualified to make policy. The judiciary operates
under an adversarial process with a narrow spectrum of participants. This, combined
with the relatively closed nature of the judiciary, is contrasted with the way in which
legislatures are structured. Whether i, be Congress or the state legislatures, they arc
able to gather the kind of information and bring together the type of expertise that is
necessary to decide how best to develop the kind of laws which legislators feci their
constituents want.457
most
While the criticisms ofjudicial review take a procedural approach,
defenses of that power are substantive in nature. This is partly because judicial review,
an inherently non-democratic process, is difficult to justify in a democracy. There arc,
however, two procedural responses to critics. One says, "they all do it," while the other
responds, "but we're really just like them." While both arguments focus on the
similarities between the three branches, they do so from opposite perspectives, one
seeing all branches as somewhat non-democratic, the other seeing all three as being
democratic by varying degrees. The first argument correctly recognizes that no branch
of the government is purely democratic. There are non-democratic elements in the
456
Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 555.
457
This argument parallels "efficiency" arguments under separation of powers theory.
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operate of the other two branehes as well, even if representation is aceepted as
demoeratie. For example, on the federal level we find accepted procedures like the
filibuster in the U.S. Senate, the use ofexecutive agreements by the president, or the
development of law by administrative agencies on both the state and national levels.
There are also ongoing questions about the degree to which elected officials represent
"the people" as opposed to representing only certain people, namely those with money
who contribute to campaigns. From this perspective, the non-democratic elements of
judicial policy-making are no worse than those elements in other branches.458
The second argument also sees similarities with the other two branches, only in
this case proponents see the appointed judiciaries as at least indirectly democratic.
While appointment ofjudges may not make them directly accountable, their selection
by the executive of the country or state, often with secondary approval by another
elected body acting in an executive capacity, is good enough. This is usually paired
with the argument which James Madison put forth so well over 200 years ago.
"[peculiar qualifications being essential in the members [of the judiciary], the primary
consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these
qualifications."459 Selecting justices by an appointment process allows for the legal
expertise which is generally accepted as necessary for adequate performance of one's
While only anecdotal, the following quote from an article on the Speaker of the Massachusetts House
of Representatives, Thomas Finneran, provides an example that even the elected branches aren't
necessarily representative of the views of the citizens. "Last year, Finneran stymied overwhelmingly
popular measures to raise the minimum wage in Massachusetts, ban ATM surcharges and reform
HMOs." Leslie Miller, "Finneran Takes on All; No Exceptions," New Bedford Standard Times, February
4, 1999, A3. The degree of power held by the leadership in both houses of the Massachusetts legislature
has often been criticized by political opponents.
459
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New
York: Mentor Books, 1961), 321.
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duties as ajudge while still ensuring indirect accountability through appointment and
removal by elected officials.
The strongest arguments for juchcial revlew, however, focus not on the process
by which decisions are made but on the outcome of the process. Even if the process is
less than purely democratic, the dec, S1ons winch the judicial branch reach often are
more in tune with democratic government than a look at the process alone would
indicate. One of the most well-known of these substantive responses is found in Robert
Dahl's seminal work, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
National Policy Maker."460 Drawing its theoretical support from the judicial
appointment process, Dahl hypothesized that the Supreme Court would most often use
its powers to support the law-making majority in the nation and would only use its
power ofjudicial review to strike down legislation after this law-making majority had
diminished. Analyzing all cases in which the Supreme Court overturned congressional
legislation, he found substantial support for his hypothesis. Despite the non-
democratic appearance ofjudicial review, its outcomes rarely challenged a
contemporary congressional majority.461
Dahl's research has been criticized over the years on a wide variety of grounds:
for inconsistencies in its theoretical assumptions, for selectivity in the data used to
support the conclusions (e.g., excluding judicial review over the states), and for
460
Journal ofPublic Law, 6 (1957), 279-295.
An interesting twist on this argument is found in Mark Graber's "The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary," Studies in American Political Development, 7 (1993), 35-73. He
does not argue that the Court's decisions are majoritarian but that the Court is most often forced to make
decisions when the majoritarian institutions won't act. "Historically, the justices have most often
exercised their power to declare state and federal practices unconstitutional only when the dominant
national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some dispute." (36)
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deriving conflicting conclusions from the findings.- What is most interesting about
these eritieisms is that they tend to rest on an alternative justification ofjudicial review.
Challenging the notion that the exere.se ofjudicial revtcw is not particularly dangerous
since the outcome rarely poses a threat to contemporary democratic policies, these
critiques find that judical review does sometimes challenge contemporary lawmaking
majorities and that this is specifically why judicial review is necessary. This argument
for the existence of such a power in a democracy rests on the assumption that the
United States is not just a democracy but a constitutional democracy. A written
constitution establishes some things which are intended to be beyond the reach of the
majority, including the liberties guaranteed by the bill of rights of the federal and state
constitutions. From this perspective it is the job of the justices of the nation's courts to
uphold the constitutions despite popular sentiment to the contrary. They should take a
countcrmajoritarian position when it is necessary to protect minority rights and
liberties.
463
must
Leading to a similar conclusion is the theoretical argument that democracy
be defined as more than majority rule. If the majority decides to eliminate free speech,
for instance, many would argue that democracy in that political system could no longer
exist. The justices are justified in their use of power to strike down such legislation, not
only because the Constitution says so but also because the elimination of free speech
means the end of democracy. Again, the judiciary is seen as the protector of essential
462
See, for instance, Jonathan Caspar, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," American
Political Science Review 70 (1976), 50-63 and David Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and
the Supreme Court," Wisconsin Law Review, (1973) 790-846. I know of no comparable studies of
appointed state supreme courts. This could be because of the criticisms of Dahl's work, or it could be
one of the many areas on state court life which have yet to be studied.
463
This is very similar to the libertarian theory of separation of powers as it is applied to the judiciary.
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components of democracy through its non-democratic power ofjudicial review.
Without this power there would be no entity which could stand up to the power of the
majority as represented in the actions of the executive or the legislature. Again, it is the
substance of the judiciary's decision which justifies their use ofpower.464
JUDICIAL RFV1FW IN l\1 \ SSACHPSFTTS _ RACKCROIIN.^
Many of the concerns regarding judicial review are the same whether one
speaks of an appointed judiciary on the federal or state level. The fact is that
individuals who are only indirectly accountable to the populace have the most
definitive voice in interpreting and applying the polity's fundamental political charter,
setting important directions for the state or federal government. 466 There is one
essential difference, however, which provides a theoretical basis for the hypothesis that
the SJC may be less constrained by democratic concerns in the exercise ofjudicial
review than is the United States Supreme Court. This is the relative difference between
464 tu- iTins argument docs raise an tnteresting question. When the Court is confronted with a challenge to a
lundamcntal democratic liberty and does not strike it down, are they then acting illegitimately?
465
It should be noted that the judicial review in this chapter focuses on the SJC's use of this power to
strike down acts of the stale legislature, not local ordinances.
"'"
1 use the term definitive to mean two things, that it is the most prominent and that it is generally final
(barring constitutional amendments). First, the voice of the high court is usually the loudest. The
expectation on the part of both the justices and other actors in the political system is that justices arc the
experts on their own constitution and what they say should be given special deference. This is not to
deny that there are ongoing debates in legal and academic circles regarding the degree to which justices'
views should control constitutional discourse. However, even (hose who would promote a broader base
of citizen involvement in constitutional discourse begin with the justices' point of view as the starting
point. For instance, in the introduction to his treatise An Introduction to ( 'onstitutional Interpretation,
Lief Carter posits the following question as central to the purpose of his text. "How can we tell whether
the Court interprets the Constitution well or whether we should amend the document?" (New York:
Longman, 1991), 1. This expectation appears to be the same whether talking aboul State or federal
courts. In the second componcnl of defmitiveness, of course, the slates differ if interpreting the U.S.
Constitution as their voice in that regard is not final,
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the processes * Massachusetts and on the national level for "correcting" constitutiona,
errors on the part of the respective high courts.
THE SJC - LESS FINALITY?
Concerns of the citizens that a high court has erred in delineating statutory or
common law can be remedied through the legislative process. While constitutional
interpretations can be overturned by amendments, this process is more cumbersome and
therefore less likely to be followed than the procedure ofmaking changes via the
normal legislative process.- While this is not a simple task, it is certainly easier to
accomplish than amending a constitution. This is clearly the case on the federal level
where the two-step process ana the requirement of superiorities at both steps make
amending the United States Constitution an almost insurmountable undertaking. The
fact that only twenty-seven amendments have been added to this document since 1789
is representative, at least in part, of the intentionally challenging nature of the
amendment process.
An argument could be made that state justices need be less constrained in
exercising authority in the realm of constitutional interpretation since the constitutional
amending process varies between the two levels of government. While still more
difficult than the normal legislative process, and while the process varies from state to
467
This is, to some degree, truer in theory than in practice. As noted in Chapter 4, legislatures may not
always make statutory corrections either. This could be due to lack of awareness, time constraints,
legislative roadblocks, or other political factors. As Ellen A. Peters, Chief Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court has noted, "the sobering reality [is] that, despite recurrent grumbling by legislators, the
legislature rarely overturns the judicial construction of a state statute." (Intergovernmental Perspective
Fall, 1991,22
It should be noted that the decision of a high court can also be overturned by a later court. This may
happen more frequently, but the process for this change is no more democratic than with the original
opinion.
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state, amending a state constitution is invariably easier ,o do than amending the federal
document. The frequency with which state constitutions are amended provides some
proof for this. State constitutional scholar Alan Tarr has described the contrast as
follows.
Moreover, the most dramatic constitutional developments [on the federal2;:r largdyth0Ut formal "tional amendntl2^enCa! Stat6S haVe r6gUlarly reV1Sed and amended theirconstitutions. Only nineteen states still retain their original constitutions
and a majority of states have established three or more As of 1996 9 500
overtEft t^ Pr°P°Sed t0 *"*m institutions ander 5,900 adopted
- an average of almost 120 amendments per state. 468
Massachusetts is one of the nineteen states with its original constitution but it is average
in the number of times it has amended this document: 1 17 amendments have been
added since 1780. 469 This averages out to one amendment every two years. While
hardly a breakneck pace, it is a more common occurrence than the once every twelve
year pace of amending the U.S. Constitution which has been the case on the federal
level since the addition of the Bill of Rights in 1791.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MASSACHUSETTS - A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Debates over the exercise ofjudicial review have gone on for over two
centuries. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has been involved in this
debate from the earliest years. 470 The justices first recognized their authority to
468
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1998)
22-23.
469
The 1 1
7
th Amendment was added in 1990. See Chapter 2 for a description of the constitutional
amendment process in Massachusetts.
470
While there is little indication that this authority is suspect in the Massachusetts political system
today, there was more heated debate about this question in the Constitutional Convention of 1917/1918
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exercise judicial review in 1805 in the ease of Montfort v . While upholding the
statute under ehallenge, none of the three justices who wrote op.nions seriatim were
hesitant ,o decide whether the statute ,n queshon violated the right to trial by jury
guaranteed by art. 1
5 of the Massachusetts Declarator, of Rights * The Court first
declared an ac, of the Legislature to be unconstitutional in ,814 in Holder, , James.™
As with the United States Supreme Court's power ofjud.cial rev.ew, i, was another
several decades before the SJC declared another legislative act to be unconstitutional
*
However, beginning in 1849 and running through 1936 the justices were fairly
representative to the Convention from Haverhill. "I hope that we shall not lis e^to2" members of the
—
°
f
-
—* «*- wh, ;r
ludicmwAet of r78Q71^ ^ *"^^ Supreme COurt had declared § 1
3
of theJ diciary Ac 1 9 to be unconstitut.onal m Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137 (1803). It is interesting to
note, however, that the SJC references Marbury in discussing the history ofjudicial review in
"
Massachusetts. Without in any way trying to invade the rightful province of the Legislature to conduct
its own business, we have the duty certainly since Marbury v. Madison, to adjudicate a claim that a law
and the actions undertaken pursuant to that law conflict with the requirements of the Constitution " Colo
v. Ireasurer and Receiver General, 378 Mass. 550 (1979), 553.
472
Justices Thacher, Sewall, and Sedgwick participated in this case which is similar to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (1796) in which the justices upheld
the carriage tax in question but did not hesitate to make this determination, implying that they had the
right to find the tax to be unconstitutional as well.
The pertinent portion of art. 15 reads as follows: "In all controversies concerning property, and in all
suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and
practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacredf.]"
473
1 1 Mass. 396. The SJC found that "a resolve of the legislature.
. .suspending in favor of a particular
creditor against a particular estate the statute of limitations protecting administrators,
was... unconstitutional as not being 'according to standing laws' as provided by Article 10 of the
Declaration of Rights." James M. Rosenthal, "Massachusetts Acts and Resolves Declared
Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts," 1 Massachusetts Law Quarterly 301
(1916), 301.
474
Sohier v. The Massachusetts General Hospital, 3 Cush. 483 ( 1 849) (taking property for private
purposes). On the federal level, the Supreme Court first used its power ofjudicial review in 1803 in
Marbury, and then not again until 1 857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 1 9 How. 393.
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consent in exercising judicial review, striking down sixty-nine statutes for an average
of approximately one statute every two years.- This is about the same level at which
the United States Supreme Court overturned actions of the Congress in these years,
with seventy-three statutes overturned during the 139 year period from 1801 to 1940™
This historical data adds support to an assumption that during the years under
study the SJC would continue to employ its power ofjud1C1al review. 4- Reviewing the
numbers shows this to be true. From 1981 to 1995 the SJC overturned thirty-one aets
of the Leglslature for an average of two statutes per year. This increase again parallels
activity on the federal level, with fifty-one statutes being struek down in the 29 years
from 1969-1998. (See Table 5.1 below for a comparison.)
The historical information on judicial review comes from Rosenthal, "Massachusetts Acts and
Resolves Declared Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts," [containing data
covering the years from 1804 to 1916] and James M. Rosenthal, "Massachusetts Acts Declared
Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1916-1936," 20 Massachusetts Law
Quarterly (1936), 44-49.
476 Supreme Court data in this paragraph comes from David M. O'Brien, Storm Center, 5 th ed. (New
York: Norton, 2000), 30. The pace of Supreme Court activity, however, has been less'consistent While
overturning only 2 statutes from 1801 to 1865, 71 were overturned from 1865 to 1940. While I know of
no general source of information on this question from other state high courts, Harry Stumpf and John
Culver provide a somewhat contradictory view in The Politics ofState Courts (New York: Longman,
1992). "The conception ofjudicial review in this early period [19
th
century] was what legal historian'
Kermit Hall called 'departmental,' the power being used primarily as a protective measure against
legislative and executive encroachments on the province of the judicial department. Thus, although
legislative supremacy was generally honored, state supreme courts tended to focus on issues of
separation of powers in which judicial territory was being threatened (135)." A review of statutes
declared unconstitutional in Massachusetts during this time period show frequent use of the power of
judicial review in other than a 'departmental' way.
477
The available historical data ends in 1938. However, there is no reason to think the Court would
suddenly stop this activity after 125 years.
197
TABLE 5.1 - A Comparison of | e?MMw Artlm , „„„,
by the Sunr.n,. ....hl...,
< n„ r, nf
">-Mrt« t.nn ,1
"uniui;
and the United States Supreme Court
COURT AND YEARS
Supreme Judicial Court
1805-1936
United States
Supreme Court
1801-1940
Supreme Judicial Court
1981-1995
United States
Supreme Court
1969-1998
NO. OF STATUTES
OVERTURNED
69 statutes
73 statutes
31 statutes
51 statutes
AVERAGE NUMBER
OF STATUTES
DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PER YEAR
.56 statutes/year
.52 statutes/year
2 statutes/year
1 .7 statutes/year
The numbers above show a close quantitative parallel between the activity
levels of both high courts. A slight difference emerges, however, if we look at numbers
from particular years. The SJC has been a little more consistent in its use ofjudicial
review over time. This can be seen by comparing data from different eras.
198
Per Year. IXni.lonn™
1
-
73
1921- 1930
1910- 1921
1889- 1910
1874- 1888
1865- 1873
1836- 1864
1801- 1835
0-4 0.6 0.8
No. of Cases/Year
The general picture of the SJC which emerges from this historical data is of a court
which consistently uses its power ofjudicial review to keep the legislative branch in
check while never averaging more than 1 statute declared unconstitutional per year, a
relatively restrained approach.
The historical data also provides some interesting information regarding the
basis on which the SJC declared these statutes to be unconstitutional. Of the sixty-nine
statutes discussed in the Rosenthal articles, thirty-nine or 57% were declared
unconstitutional based on the Massachusetts Constitution alone.479 This should come
478
Data on the United States Supreme Court comes from David O'Brien, Storm Center. Massachusetts
information comes from Rosenthal's two articles on Massachusetts Laws declared unconstitutional
between 1804 and 1936.
479
Another 1 1 (16%) were overturned on federal constitutional grounds; 3 (4%) were struck down on
both state and federal grounds; and the specific constitutional basis for the SJC's actions were
undeterminable in 17 cases or approximately 25%. It is interesting to note that 12 of these 17 were
statutes declared void as unconstitutional takings, but Mr. Rosenthal never lists article 10 of the
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as no surprise if one looks at the history of the U.S. Constitution since the primary
limitation on state activities, the 14* Amendment, was not added to the federal
document until 1868. In addition, the use of the 14th Amendment to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states did not become prominent until well into the 20 lh century.
However, recent scholarship on the "discovery" of state constitutions beginning in the
late 1970s often makes it feel as though state high courts had never before interpreted
their own constitutions. These data are a reminder that there is a large body of
precedents which exist in the jurisprudence of most states on which justices can draw in
rediscovering their state constitutions. 480 While the specific findings from the data
analyzed for this project will be discussed in more detail below, it can be noted here
that approximately 50% of those statutes which were overturned as unconstitutional
during these years were also based on the Massachusetts Constitution. In comparison
to the 1 800s the contemporary court has overturned a slightly higher percentage of laws
with a slightly lower percentage of the cases relying on the state's constitution 481
There is one way in which the available historical data shows the activity of the
Court in the 1800s to vary from that of the Court in the 1980s. This is in the type of
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as the basis for striking down the law. Article 10 reads, in part, as
follows. "And whenever the public exigencies require, that the property of any individual should be'
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor." As the just
compensation clause of the 5 th Amendment was not applied to the states until 1897 (Chicago, Burlington,
and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226), the four takings cases decided before then
must also have been decided on state constitutional grounds -- this would mean that 62% were decided
without consideration of the U.S. Constitution.
480
Justice Brennan reminisced about this change in his seminal article on state constitutions written
almost 35 years ago. "In those days of innocence [when he served in the New Jersey courts], the
preoccupation of the profession, bench and bar, was with questions usually answered by application of
state common law principles or state statutes. Any need to consult federal law was at best episodic."
"State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights," Harvard Law Review 90 (1977), 489-502,
at 489.
481
See, Donald Lutz, "The Purposes of American State Constitutions," Publius 12 (1982), 27-44.
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laws being overturned. Using a similar method of categorization for the two time
periods, the types of laws declared unconstitutional can be categorized as follows.482
FIGURE 5.2 - Categories Of i ,ns Overturned ^ the S "
Two Different Tim P Periurh
70.00%-rf
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%+
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Criminal Private Public
Types of Cases
1804-1936
E 1981-1995
One of the biggest differences can be seen in Figure 5.2. Six criminal statutes
were found to be unconstitutional in the first 132 years that the SJC was using its power
ofjudicial review; only 9% of all statutes overturned during that period of time. In
contrast, 35% (1 1 statutes) of the laws which the Court voided from 1981-1995 dealt
with criminal statutes. This matches broader national trends in the business of state
supreme courts as presented in the longitudinal study of Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman,
and Wheeler. 483 In their analysis of 100 years of state supreme court activity, the
authors found that the last years of their study (1940-1970) showed a substantial
increase in criminal matters coming before the state high courts, especially during the
1960s. "Criminal Law Cases were 9-10 percent of SSC [state supreme court] business
482 i •
~ Analysis of the categorization of cases involved in constitutional challenges from 1981-1995 will be
presented in more detail in the section which follows. The information here is presented only for a
historical comparison.
Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman, Stanton Wheeler, "The Business of State
Supreme Courts, 1870-1970," Stanford Law Review 30 (1977), 121-156.
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in the 1930s, ,4-, 7 percent in ,he 1945-1960 period, and a starting percent „ l96S
and 1970."484
WithiD thC Categ01
^
0f "Private law" are found a variety of eases, most
prominently those relating to business transaetions and contracts, employment
praetiees, tort elaims, and probate and family law. The most interesting differences in
the type of laws being challenged in these two time periods deal with the
business/contract category and probate and family law. In the latter category the
difference is more of a "curiosity," as several of the laws be,ng challenged in the early
years dealt with certain acts concerning specific marriage and divorce situations over
which the General Court still had some authority, with the SJC having original
jurisdiction in some of these cases.485 The business/contract category made up over 2/3
of the private law statutes struck down in the 1800s but none of those voided during the
latter years. These cases represent challenges to the constitutionality of legislative acts
concerning public contracts (i.e., bridge operations) as well as special acts affecting the
distribution of property between individuals. It is hard to imagine such statutes being
enacted today. The following two descriptions are representative.
C. 57, Statutes of 1847 - "Takes property without compensation from A
and gives it to B, under guise of confirming defective deeds."
C. 315, Statutes of 1853 -- "Grading private way and imposing lien on
abutting lot owner for costs thereof in invitum" found to be a taking of
private property for public use without compensation.486
484
Kagan, et. al., 146. It is difficult to compare the other categories because the types of categories
which I used and those used by Kagan were too different to do an accurate comparison.
485
For instance c.377 of the Acts of 1869 was described by Rosenthal (1916) as follows. "Special act
declaring A and B husband and wife void when, at time of act, A had been divorced by X, and hadn't
secured permission of Supreme Judicial Court to remarry as provided by General Statutes" (305).
486
Rosenthal (1916), 303-304.
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Perhaps most ,n,eres,ing in the comparison of the kind of laws strnck down in
these two time periods is the similarity in the types of oases whieh make up the public
law category. Two-thirds of the pnblic laws overturned during both time periods
concern taxat.on or state regulation. Whi.e the ground for overturning statutes in these
two categories vartcd, the willmgness of the SJC to overturn statutes essential to the
operation of government has remained consistent, indicating a steady view of the Court,
under the Icadcrsh.p of various justices over time, to use its power ofjudicial review,
even in situations which challenge the power of its counterpart, maintaining its equal
status with the state legislature.
JUDICIAL RFVlF.w i v MASSACHUSETTS. 198M995 - FINDINGS
A variety of factors led to the original hypothesis with which this research
began, that the SJC of Massachusetts would freely exercise its power ofjudicial review
to strike down legislation during the fifteen years under study. First, while concerns
about the democratic process may constrain justices who are appointed to their position
and therefore lead justices to limit their activism, the fact that state constitutions can be
more easily amended may free the justices of the SJC from this constraint.487 This
hypothesis was supported by more specific information on the SJC itself. Historically,
it has consistently used this power since 1 805 and in recent years it has been known to
Studies have actually provided mixed results on the effect ofjudicial selection on the activism of state
court justices. See, Staci L. Beavers and Craig F. Emmert, "Explaining State High Courts' Selective Use
of State Constitutions," Publius 30 (2000), 1; Staci L. Beavers and Jeffrey S. Walz, "Modeling Judicial
Federalism: Predictors of State Court Protections of Defendants' Rights Under State Constitutions, 1969-
1989," Publius 28 (1998), 43; Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie, and John Kincaid, "State High Courts,
State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey," Publius 16 (1986),
141; Craig F. Emmert, "An Integrated Case-Related Model of Judicial Decision Making: Explaining
State Supreme Court Decisions in Judicial Review Cases," Journal ofPolitics 54 (1992), 543; and James
P. Wenzel, Shaun Bowler, and David J. Lanoue, "Legislating from the State Bench: A Comparative
Analysis of Judicial Activism," American Politics Quarterly 25 (1997), 363.
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exercise this power to challenge the legislature in policy areas as controversial as
abortron and the death penalty- Further, as was shown ,„ Chapter Four, the justices
have shown a wiUingness during this tune period to play a co-equal policymaking role
in «hc interpretation of statutes and the development of common law. All of these
factors led to an expectation that the SJC would be activist. Th,s hypothesis, however,
proved to be wrong. No matter what cu, off point one chooses for defining a court as
activist, there is little doubt that the thtrty-one cases in which the SJC struck down
legislation from 1 98
1
to 1 995 do not qualify the Court for criticism from advocates of
judicial restraint.
The SJC decided 3,660 cases from 1981 to 1995, an average of 244 cases per
year.
4*9
In only thirty-one of these cases did the SJC declare a statute enacted by the
General Court to be unconstitutional. 490 This represents less than 1% (.85) of the total
caseload during these years. For a fuller understanding of what this finding can tell us
about the role of the SJC in a system of separated powers, two questions need to be
answered: why, and so what. The "so what" question can be assessed by looking at
these thirty-one cases in more detail. What the Court did and how the legislature
responded to this activity will give a better sense of the true impact ofjudicial review
on public policy concerns. Before looking at this, however, the "why" deserves some
488
Both cases were widely reported at the time and are generally well-known among the interested
public. SJC decisions in these cases will be discussed in more detail below.
489 As noted in the discussion of methodology in Chapter 1, analysis for this study was done on only full
opinions by the Court. The 336 rescript opinions issued by the SJC were not included in the analysis. It
is highly unlikely that the Court would choose to strike down a statute as unconstitutional in a rescript
opinion.
490
The Court also struck down local ordinances during this period. However, as cities, towns and other
units of local governance are creatures of the state and not co-equal political partners, these opinions
were not considered.
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attention. This question can be answered in part by looking at the first step winch is
necessary for a statute to be challenged: someone must raise the question.
WHY SO FEW? CONSTITUTION.! n.iESTmNSMni ,rilTTftTMr|r
Citizens challenged the constitutionality of a state statute in less than 5% of the
cases heard by the SJC between 1981 and 1995.- This fact helps to explain, at least in
part, why the SJC struck down so few state statutes in this time period - the justices are
rarely presented with the opportunity to do so. It is possible, of course, that plaintiffs
raise such questions on appeal but that these cases are decided by the Appeals Court.
The SJC has a great degree of discretion over its caseload and the justices could simply
refuse to hear some of these cases. 492 Based on interviews with the justices, however,
this seems highly unlikely. When asked whether the Court would be likely to take
cases raising questions of constitutionality, former Chief Justice Wilkins said, "[y]es,
unless it's a really far-fetched item, we would normally deal with something like that;
we would take it." 493 This sentiment was echoed by Daniel Johnedis who, as chief staff
counsel for the SJC from 1972 to 1990 worked closely with the justices to coordinate
Such claims were raised in 1 78 of the 3660 cases decided by the SJC. Since the number of cases
involving the challenge to a statute was developed by reviewing the 3660 opinions of the Court, it is
possible that questions of constitutionality were raised by the parties but the SJC chose not to discuss
them. After reviewing all cases, however, the practice of the Court seems to be to acknowledge such a
claim, even if it only deserves cursory attention in the final opinion.
492
See Chapter 4 for a more thorough discussion of the case selection process.
493
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. In my review of cases I found that the SJC will
even entertain somewhat offbeat constitutional claims. My favorite argument is found in Commonwealth
v. Rodney M. Taylor, 413 Mass. 243 (1992) in which a challenge to the criminal law which more harshly
penalizes certain narcotics offenses when they occur within 1,000 feet of a school was raised on 14 lh
Amendment equal protection grounds, claiming the law discriminates against inner-city drug dealers
where schools are closer together. This claim was denied by the SJC.
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case selection. », thl„k we wouid general,* take
.hose, if .here was an attack on a
statute[.]"494
Assuming, then, that the SJC did ehoose to hear most eases raising a question of
judtcial review of a legislative aet, eitizens of Massachusetts only rarely challenged the
constitutionality of legislation. This fact gives some indicate that the actions of the
state legislature are generally accepted as legitimate unless citizens are prohibited from
raising their concerns in a court of law because of access barriers, especially a lack of
financial resources.495 It can be assumed that individuals and organizations with
substantial resources will pursue their claims, but that many potential constitutional
violations will affect those least able to afford to bring a case to court in the first place,
much less to pay for an appeal. While not denying the difficulty of pursuing an appeal,
the activity of amicus curiae participants in a substantial portion of the cases which are
decided by the SJC proves that there are organizations available to help in the pursuit of
a viable constitutional claim. Amicus briefs were filed in 12% of the cases decided in
the fifteen years surveyed. Even more indicative of the fact that outside organizations
are interested in participating in cases raising constitutional claims is the fact that
parties were over two times as likely to be participants in these cases as in cases in
which no challenge to a legislative statute was involved. (See Table 5.2 below.)
494
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 14 April 1999.
4 5
It should be noted that accepting an action as legitimate is not the same as agreeing with the oucome.
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TABLE 5.2 - Amicus r,.ri ae Participation on the S.1C, 1 981-1 995
Total Nn r>f
Cases
No. of
Cases w/
Amicus
Briefs
Percentage of
Cases
w/Amicus
Briefs
All Cases 3660 435 12%Cases Raising a
Challenge to
Legislation 178 51 28%
The amicus briefs filed in these cases were from over 350 different
organizations. The large majority participated in only one or two cases. However, of
the seventeen participants who filed more than five briefs over these fifteen years, five
were likely to take on challenges on behalf of those without the financial resources to
pursue an appeal. These include the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the
Committee for Public Counsel Services (the state's public defender agency), the
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Massachusetts Tenants
Organization, and the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, a mental health
advocacy organization. It is likely that a valid constitutional concern over a
legislatively enacted statute would eventually be brought before the Supreme Judicial
Court.
496
Other parties who filed more than five briefs during this period were: the Attorney General's office,
Conservation Law Foundation ofNew England, Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys,
Massachusetts Association of School Committees, Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents,
Massachusetts Bar Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, Massachusetts Municipal Association,
Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers Association, Massachusetts Teachers Association, New England
Legal Foundation, and the Women's Bar Association.
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The fact that few cases raise constitutional challenges to legislative authority
does not mean that once the legislature has acted, political controversy ceases. It may
very well continue in another venue, even moving to the judicial realm.497 This does
not mean, however, that it will rise to the level of a constitutional challenge. With
apologies to Tocqueville, while political questions in the United States may often
become legal questions, not all legal questions raise constitutional challenges.498 The
reality is that most legislation, even if it becomes a part of a legal controversy, will not
involve constitutional questions. After all, the Legislature is aware of constitutional
limits. Perhaps their own integrity, reinforced by the possibility of being reviewed and
criticized by the state's high court, means that state legislators will rarely enact
legislation which clearly violates the constitution.
Data from the SJC's caseload in the 1980s and 1990s, however, indicate that some
types of cases which come to the Court are much more likely to raise constitutional
questions than are others. As Figure 5.3 below indicates, cases involving public law
questions are more likely to raise questions ofjudicial review before the SJC than are
private law questions.499 Interestingly, criminal matters make up approximately the
It is interesting to note that as questions move from one venue to another there is a transition in the
conflict. To some degree the transition is from the language of substance to that of process. Examples of
this include the almost annual challenge by the automotive insurance industry to the rates set by the
Commissioner of Insurance. While there is no doubt that what the insurance industry is looking for is a
different substantive outcome (higher rates), the opinion of the SJC reads like a primer in administrative
procedure. Another example can be seen in questions involving ballot initiatives. Some of the most
heated political debates in Massachusetts between 1981 and 1995 centered around ballot questions such
as the Bottle Bill, the Term Limits Initiative, the Prevailing Wage Law and the Stop Nuclear Waste Act.
All of these questions came to the SJC before they were voted upon by the public, not to determine their
wisdom, but to determine if the required procedures for placing a question on the ballot which is
delineated in article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution were met.
498
"There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a
judicial one." Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer (New York: Harper and
Row, 1969), 270.
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same percentage whether analyztng the full caseload of the Court or only those cases
ratsing questions of the constitutionality ofstatu.es." Since the private law category
deals with many areas in which common law is still prevalent, or which concern the
interpretation of a specific document, i( should no, be surprising that these cases raise
fewer constitutional claim s.
FjGURE 5.3 - Types of S.IC cases comparpH - Percentage of totalcas^ercentaee of c,^ 55555 statutejEj^Steg
overturned - 1981-1995
% caseload
% cases challenged
% overturned
Private Public Criminal
Types of Cases
A further analysis of the categorization of the SJC caseload in these years
indicates that there are three types of cases which make up almost sixty percent of all
cases containing constitutional challenges: cases involving criminal law (32%), cases
concerning state regulatory legislation (15.7%), and state tax laws (1 1.2%).
General headings used to categorize cases were private, public, and criminal. Twenty cases fell into a
miscellaneous category, but all others fell into one of these three. The private and public law categories
were further divided into subcategories. Categories making up private law cases include: business,
contract private employment, insurance, probate and family, real property, and private tort claims. Public
law cases include cases involving the state budget, civil liberties claims (non-criminal), civil rights, court
supervision, democratic process, education eminent domain, public employment, executive authority,
local issues, social services, state regulation, taxation, and torts involving public entities.
500
Note that most criminal cases raise constitutional questions, but many of these involve the application
of the law by law enforcement officers or lower courts. Whether the 4 th Amendment required a warrant
in a specific circumstance is not a question ofjudicial review as it has been defined for purposes of this
project.
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Before moving on to a look at how the SJC decided these cases involving
questions ofjudicial review and what this tells us about the SJC in a system of
separated powers, there are two pieces of particularly interesting information which can
be gleaned from a review of the kinds of arguments raised by appellants in their
challenge to legislate actions, both of wh.ch indicate that the practice of law does not
necessarily follow the academic commentary on the same. First, while scholars of state
supreme courts have written treatises on the increasing tendency of some state courts to
rely more and more on their own state constitutions in setting the parameters of
legitimate authority of governmental actors, it is interesting to note that practicing
attorneys are not always reading the treatises. 501 Even in a state like Massachusetts
which is considered to be one of the leaders in the development of an independent body
of constitutional protections, 502 laws challenged before the SJC were slightly more
likely to be challenged on federal than state constitutional grounds. 503 Further, even
when state claims were made, they were most often paired with federal claims as in the
following: "These claims are that, under State and Federal constitutional provisions
concerning due process of law and equal protection of the laws, it is a violation..." 504
This provides a reminder that what justices do is only a part of the picture: they cannot
This author is not immune from this comment, having contributed her own treatises, as will be seen in
the discussion at the end of this chapter on the SJC's participation in the new judicial federalism.
502
See Barry M. Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press
1991).
503
For every claim raised under the state constitution, 1 . 1 claims were raised under the federal charter.
Data for this comes from reading of SJC opinions in which the justices present their perspective of the
arguments raised.
504 News Group Boston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 627 (1991), 632.
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work ,o develop an independent body of state constitutional law unless an appropriate
argument is made on appeal. 505
There were two exceptions to this general trend. First, independent state
arguments were made when dealing with provisions for which no counterpart can be
found m the federal charter. Most frequently challenged under separate constitutional
claims were laws which deal with limits on the state's taxing power and those which
affect the delegation of powers, particularly to the legislative branch. 5'* The second
exception is found in the appeals brought by certain members of the criminal defense
bar, particularly those who are associated with the state's public defender agency, the
Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS). This agency has been in the forefront
of encouraging Massachusetts attorneys to make clear, independent arguments for
using provisions in the Massachusetts Constitution to protect rights of defendants
facing trial on criminal charges. In cases where defense attorneys have trained with, or
worked for, CPCS, the Court is much more likely to note that the constitutional
Some would argue that the justices of the states' high courts should be more proactive in this regard
One of the foremost proponents of this perspective is Hans Linde, former Justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court. "Every state supreme court, I suppose, has declared that it will not needlessly decide a case on a
constitutional ground if other legal issues can dispose of the case. The identical principle applies when
examining that part of the state's law which is in its own constitution. In my view, a state court should
always consider its state constitution before the Federal Constitution. It owes its state the respect to
consider the state constitutional question even when counsel does not raise it, which is most of the time.
The same court probably would not let itself be pushed into striking down a state law before considering
that law's proper interpretation. The principle is the same." "First Things First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights," University ofBaltimore Law Review 9 (1980), 383. Linde's view is still a minority view
among state high court justices.
506
Part II, c.l, §1, art. 4 requires that taxes be "proportional and reasonable" and Article 44 of the
Amendments (enacted in 1919) prohibits progressive taxation. Questions regarding the general
authority of the legislature are challenged under Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights (requiring a
separation of powers) or Part II, c.l, §1, art. 4 which authorizes the legislative power in the following
words. "And further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said General Court,
from time to time, to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable Orders, laws,
statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions... as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of this Commonwealth." This language granting legislative authority is obviously much broader for a
general purpose government than in the case of the more specific grants of authority granted to the U.S.
Congress, a government of limited powers, in Article I, §8 of the U.S. Constitution.
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argument was made either solely on state grounds or that two separate arguments were
made, one federal and one that the state constitution provides greater protection. 507
The second interesting difference between general academic discourse and the
practice of law deals with question of due process. In any text on constitutional law
one will read of the demise of the doctrine of economic substantive due process in 1937
in the famous case of West Coast Hotel Company v. Parish. Here the U.S. Supreme
Court, reversing years of conservative economic rulings, upheld the constitutionality of
a Washington State minimum wage law against a charge that it violated liberty of
contract as protected by the due process clause of the 14 th Amendment. 508 While this
may be true in state constitutional law as well, not all attorneys are aware of this. Well
over 100 claims were made during the 15 years under analysis that the law under
challenge violated either the federal or state due process guarantees. 509 While many of
these dealt with procedural questions, numerous claims were also made that certain
In a treatise developed for a seminar at the annual Massachusetts Bar Association meeting in 1987
William Leahy, then Deputy Legal Counsel for CPCS, made it clear how important this is. "The debate
is most interesting for any number of perspectives; for Massachusetts criminal law practitioners,
however, its import is crystal clear. If you represent a defendant asserting a constitutional argument, you
must cite and argue separately the pertinent provision of the Declaration of Rights. If you are a
prosecutor, you must be prepared to respond with more than simple reliance on federal precedent." "The
State Constitution: A Sleeping Giant Awakens," paper presented at the MBA Annual Meeting
Sturbridge, MA, May 30, 1987.
508
300 U.S. 379. Most texts follow this up with a discussion of the cursory attention given to any such
claims in the years post 1937, using Williamson v. Lee Optical, 384 U.S. 483 (1955) as an example of the
fact that almost any economic regulation is acceptable under the due process clause. In this case the state
of Oklahoma passed a law (much to the pleasure of ophthalmologists) that only a licensed
ophthalmologist could fit an individual for glasses.
The liberty of contract which the 14 lh Amendment protected previous to 1937 was also the source of
declaring several Massachusetts statutes to be unconstitutional in the early 1900s by the SJC.
509 The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, in part "No state shall deny to any person. . .life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." In Massachusetts there is no one portion of the
Constitution which contains a due process clause. Rather, the Court has located these rights as follows.
"We have historically taken the view that the principles of due process of law in our State Constitution
are embodied in articles 1, 10, and 1 12 of the Declaration of Rights and in Part II, c.l of the
Constitution." Mary Moe v. Secretary ofAdministration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629 (1981), 33.
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statutes, particularly state regulatory statutes, should be struek down under due process
guarantees beeause the law was arbitrary or failed to serve a public purpose. While
none of these claims were successful, it is interesting to see that the argument is still
made. 510
Looking at this first step which is necessary before a question ofjudicial review
is brought to the SJC provides a reminder of the one way in which the judiciary is quite
different from the other two branches of state government in the realm of policy-
making. Unlike the Governor or the General Court, the SJC must wait for a question to
be raised, and only rarely do citizens in Massachusetts challenge the authority of the
legislature on a constitutional basis.
JUDICIAL REVIEW - THE COURT'S RESPONSE
The justices of the SJC have little control over what questions are brought
before them. Once questions are raised, however, the manner in which the justices
handle this ultimate judicial power tells us something about how the justices view the
role of the Court in the state's system of separated powers. As with their activities in
common law development and statutory interpretation, the justices approach their
responsibility firmly but with restraint. While they may not exercise this power
frequently, the instances when they do so indicate that they will not hesitate to act when
they feel it is necessary.
A similar observation was made by Hans A. Linde when he was surveying arguments made before the
Oregon Supreme Court in the 1960s. "Nevertheless, attacks on regulations under claims that may be
conveniently lumped as 'substantive due process' continue to be pressed." "Without 'Due Process':
Unconstitutional Law in Oregon," Oregon Law Review 49 ( 1 970), 2.
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The overall impact ofthe SJC on public policy questions in the Commonwealth
can be measured boih qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitatively, one can present
the numbers in two different ways. On one hand, of the cases in which the
constitutional legitimacy of a statute is questioned, the SJC struck down the law 17% of
the time. In comparison to other state supreme courts, the SJC appears to be average,
with most state high courts upholding challenged legislation over 80% of the time. 51
1
Another way to look at these numbers, one which also makes the SJC appear well
within the mainstream in its use ofjudicial review, is to recognize that the justices
found an average of two statutes a year to be unconstitutional. During approximately
this same time period the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 1 .7 statutes per year (sec
Table 5.1 above).
On the other hand, of the 3660 opinions which the SJC issued from 1981 to
1995, only .85% resulted in the Court declaring a statute to be null and void. If one is
wondering how much impact the state's high court has on public policy questions
through an analysis of its use of the power ofjudicial review, the numbers would
indicate that it is minimal. In some ways this evaluation would be borne out by a closer
look at the thirty-one cases in which a statute was struck down by the Court for in many
of these cases, the overall effect of the justices' actions was minimal. Former Justice
O'Connor described some of these instances as follows. "I remember very well there
were cases where all we were saying to the Legislature... [was] you can't put the comma
511
Craig T. Emmert, "An Integrated Model of Judicial Decision-Making: Explaining State Supreme
Court Decisions in Judicial Review Cases," Journal ofPolitics 54 ( 1 992), 551. Emmert lists eight state
supreme courts as the most activist, overturning challenged laws at least 30% of the time. These states
are: Alaska, Kentucky, Montana, Oklahoma (civil), Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, and West
Virginia.
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there.
.
.remove the comma and you're all set.- While the Justice was obviously
exaggerate three of the cases in which portions of recently enacted drug statutes were
overturned came close to this description. In all three the Court struck sections of
newly enacted drug laws.- In all three instances the challenged statute was found
unconstitutionally vague because of conflicts in sentencing provisos which violated
due process guarantees. These are problems which the legislature could (and did)
correct easily.
514
This is not to deny the importance of this problem. As the Court
noted, "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of due process that '[n]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes'." 515 If the
Court did not play this role, even with seemingly minor corrections, the rights of
individuals could be violated more and more often, whether intentionally or not, by
legislative action. However, the effect of this action does not really pose a threat to the
state's democratic system of government as judicial review which is aimed more
directly at the substance of legislation may.
One way of distinguishing more dramatic cases ofjudicial review by the SJC
from more routine uses of this power is to take a cue from the justices themselves. As
discussed in Chapter Four when reviewing the unique Single Justice session, justices of
512
Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999.
513
Commonwealth v.Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 (1982); Commonwealth v. Marrone, 387 Mass. 712 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326 (1983).
514
It is interesting to note that the SJC found declaring a statute to be unconstitutional to be the more
restrained option. "To permit these defendants to be resentenced under the main paragraph would require
us to resolve a fundamental ambiguity in the statute against these defendants and to engage injudicial
lawmaking. That course is not open to us....Consequently, the statute is void for vagueness."
Bongarzone, 336.
515 Gagnon, 569 quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 1 14 (1979).
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were
the SJC usually sat in panels of five during these fifteen years. 516 There
instances, however, in winch all seven justices would participate in a case. While the
reason for which all seven sat was not always readily apparent from a review of the
opinions, there were many times in which the decision was less routine. The full court
issued opinions in less than 9% of the cases from 1981 to 1995. Seven of these were
cases in which a statute was declared unconstitutional, over 20% of these cases.
Further indication of potential importance of an opinion is the existence of a dissent.
This occurred in 9% of all cases during these years. Six of these were in cases in which
a statute was declared void, 19% of such cases. Of the thirty-one cases in which a
statute was struck down, approximately one-quarter attracted the attention of the full
court, a dissenter, or both. This means that in almost three-quarters of the cases in
which the justices of the Court overturned a legislative act , the justices themselves
viewed the question as relatively routine, having limited impact and falling easily
within the recognized realm ofjudicial authority. In addition to these drug cases, the
twenty cases described below merited little extra attention from the justices and could,
therefore, be labeled as routine. 517
In addition to the drug sentencing cases noted above, five more statutes were
declared unconstitutional because of violations of due process. This included statutes
which deprived individuals of property without the protection of a jury trial, 518 a statute
516 Over seventy percent of the decisions of the SJC between 1981 and 1995 were issued by panels in
which only five of the seven justices participated.
517
1 recognize that using these cues from the justices as a method of separating important from less
important cases is somewhat arbitrary. Several of these "routine" cases had a significant impact on the
state's systems of taxation and criminal justice, and on the fiscal condition of the Commonwealth.
518
Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. 198 (1982) (trial under forfeiture statute for
drug offenses must take place with a jury - art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights) and Waltham Tele-
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which allowed for videotaped testimony of certain child witnesses,™ a statute which
put the burden of proof on the parents ,n certain procedures terminating parental
rights,
520
and a legislate amendment which imposed rctroac.tvc liability for certain
injuries Equal protection violations were found in the state's law regarding the
procedure of determining whether an mdtvidual is a "sexually dangerous person"- and
in a statute which provides attorneys fees only for certain cases heard before
administrative law judges. 523
Conflicts involving questions of federalism led to eight additional statutes being
challenged and struck down. One law were found to conflict with the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 524 while another conflicted with the Federal
Parental Kidnapping Act. 525 One statute which gave hiring preference for certain state
jobs to state residents was voided as a violation of the privileges and immunities
Communications v. James O'Brien, 403 Mass. 747 (1989) (procedure for compensating owner of rental
property for installation of cable lines must include a jury trial - article 15 of the Declaration of Rights).
519
Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534 (1988) (violates confrontation clause of art. 12 of the
Declaration of Rights).
520
Petition ofDSS to Dispense with Adoption, 389 Mass. 793 (1983) (violates due process as established
by Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 [1982]).
521
St. Germaine v. Pendergast, 416 Mass. 698 (1993) (violation of fundamental fairness in violation of
art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights).
522
Commonwealth v. Arment, 412 Mass. 55 (1992) (distinction between commitment proceedings for
sexually dangerous person as distinguished from other commitment procedures).
523 Murphy v. Commissioner ofthe Department ofIndustrial Accidents, 4 1 5 Mass. 2 1 8 ( 1 993).
524 Commonwealth v. Federico, 383 Mass. 485 (1981) (ERISA prohibits criminal punishment for certain
acts). Neither this case nor the following fit an exact definition ofjudicial review in which the Court
declares the statute unconstitutional. They are instances, however, of the Court overturning a state
statute (even though on federal statutory grounds) and can be seen as important to judicial-legislative
relations in the state. 1 have, therefore, decided to include them in the data set.
525
Archambault v. Archambault, 407 Mass. 559 (1990) (statute cannot allow interference of a
Massachusetts court once custody proceedings have begun in another state).
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guarantee of Article IV of the U.S. Constitute52" and another two laws regarding
taxation were found to v.olate the Congressional supremacy ,n the realm of interstate
527
commerce.
- Free speech and press protections tmder the Firs. Amendment were
found to be violated ,n two relattvely routine cases, one mvolving a differential
treatment of newspapers in a tax on manufacturers528 and another prohibiting charitable
organizations from using paid telephone operators to solicit contributions."' Finally,
the Contract Clause was found to prohibtt the state from requiring state employees to
participate in money-saving furlough program as it v.olated nego.tated employment
terms.
530
Provisions specific to the Massachusetts Constitution were the basts for striking
down statutes in the last four "routine" cases. 531 The right to vote guaranteed in article
three of the Amendments was the basis for the challenge to a law whtch did not allow
an exception for registration for prison inmates domiciled outside their home town. 532
526
527
Massachusetts Council ofConstruction Employers v. City ofBoston, 384 Mass. 466 (198
T
American Trucking Association v. Secretary ofAdministration, 415 Mass. 337 (1993) (fuel tax) and
Perini Corporation v. Commissioner ofRevenue, 419 Mass. 763 (1995) (method of computing assets for
corporate excise tax)
528
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner ofRevenue, 410 Mass. 188 (1991) (unjustified burden on the
press).
529
Planned Parenthood League ofMassachusetts v. Attorney General, 391 Mass. 709 (1984) (statute
restricts content of speech and is not narrowly enough drawn so violates l sl Amendment).
530
Massachusetts Community College Council v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 126 (1995).
531 One other case which didn't "fit" into any of the above categories is Massachusetts Wholesalers of
Malt Beverages v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 441 (1993) in which the Court struck down a portion of
the state's newly enacted bottle bill as being a taking without just compensation. This applied only to the
distribution of unclaimed bottle deposits from before the law was amended so had only a limited impact.
532
Cepulonis v. Secretary ofthe Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930 (1983). Article 3 was added in 1821 to
eliminate the property requirement for voting. The inmates could also have based their argument on
Article 9 of the Declaration of Rights which contains the blanket guarantee of the right to vote for all
qualified citizens in Massachusetts.
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The prohibition on a progressive tax structure in Massachusetts was the basis for
striking down a law which taxed assets from savings accounts of over $100,000
differently from accounts containing under $100,000, 533 while requirements that all
taxes on property be proportionally assessed were the basis for another. 534 In the final
case the Court applied art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights which guarantees a
government of separated powers to guard the judiciary against the encroachment of the
legislature when an act was passed to restore an eminent domain proceeding which a
trial court had originally dismissed. 535 It is interesting to note that it is only in this case
and that involving legislative intervention injudicial proceedings regarding child
custody that the Court adopts a less than deferential tone toward the Legislature.
Firmly defending judicial territory, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court in Spinelli.
The Legislature may, in some circumstances, provide a legislative
remedy where the courts have determined there is no judicial remedy. It
may not, however, instruct a court to provide a judicial remedy when
that court has concluded that there is none, without violating art 30 of
the Declaration of Rights. 536
For the most part, however, the language of the Court indicates a great degree of
respect and deference for the actions of the Legislature. Even in these relatively routine
Commissioner ofRevenue v. Lonstein, 406 Mass. 92 (1989). In addition to attempts to amend the
state's constitution (which have yet to prove successful), advocates of progressive taxation have tried a
variety of methods to enact a "fairer" tax. This was a creative attempt, but the justices weren't fooled. As
Chief Justice Liacos said on behalf of the Court, while "the legislature has considerable discretion in
designating different classes of property for the purpose of setting tax rates.
. .the discretion is not
unlimited." (94)
5 4
Guaranteed in the Massachusetts Constitution at Pt. II, c. 1
, § 1 , art. 4. Emerson College v. City of
Boston, 391 Mass. 415 (1984).
535
Spinelli v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 240 (1984).
5ib
Spinelli, 243. And in Archambctult the Court chided the legislature as follows. "The assumption of the
1987 amendment that other States' courts will be unwilling or unable to protect children in custody
disputes is unwarranted."
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cases one finds language like the following. "We address this suggestion [statutory
construction] first so as to avoid the constitutional question if it is fairly possible to
deC1de the case on other grounds."- Or, "[w]e are mindful of 'our duty to construe a
statute in a way to avoid Constitutional problem'." 538 While the justices are willing to
act as necessary, they will be cautious and conservative in their approach. This
approach to judicial review was summarized well by former Chief Justice Wilkins.
Ifs an effort that has to be undertaken with substantial restraint and most
of the standards that apply to deciding the constitutional issue are very
favorable to the Legislature, that we don't expect them to do more in
most instances than do something that at least has some reasonable
rational basis. So, when they are out of line, that's our function It's
indispensable.
These routine applications ofjudicial review once again point out that the
justices of the state's high court can be involved in incremental policy-making without
necessarily engendering conflict. Looking back at the three theories surrounding the
separation of powers which were presented in Chapter 1, the efficiency perspective can
help to explain the relative ease of these interactions. It is true that some of these cases
could be understood from either a libertarian or Madisonian perspective. Many did
involve the Court ensuring that individual liberties were protected from actions by the
majoritarian branch of government (whether these be the right of a criminal defendant
to confront her accuser or the right of a wealthy citizen not to be taxed progressively).
A few others kept the legislature from imposing on the realm of other governmental
entities, whether it be the City of Boston, the justices of a Massachusetts trial court, or
537
Globe Newspaper, 192.
™Waltham Tele-Communications, 751 citing Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790 (1982).
5W
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
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the Congress of the Un.ted Sta.es. However, i, is beeause the Court is best piaced to
cons,der the application of speeific laws to specifie individuais that many oftee
problems eonld be identified. Withont attempting to look a, the motives of the
legislature in enacting these laws, it can be safely assnmed that in many of these laws
the unconstitutional effect was secondary to the original purpose for the law. For
instance, i, is unlikely that the legislators planned to create conflicting sentencing
provisions in drug statutes in v.olation of due process. This was simply an oversight.5"
The division of responsibilities between the branches helps to ensure that such
oversights can be corrected.
There are some cases, however, in which the potential political impact of the
justices' decisions is greater. 541 Using potential measures of the justices' own views,
eight of the opinions issued by the SJC from 1981 to 1995 in which an act of the
legislature was overturned rated higher on the political Richter scale. Seven of these
cases involved all seven justices and six of them involved dissents. 542 Another
indication of the broader significance of these cases is that half of them involved parties
This may not apply to all of the statutes discussed above. Exceptions which come immediately to
mind include the child videotape testimony law and the tax laws.
541
This is not to deny that each of the above-mentioned decisions had an impact, sometimes on many
individuals. Changing tax laws, allowing prisoners to register to vote, giving landlords a right to jury
trial when the actions of a local cable company result in a taking of a portion of their property, allowing a
defendant to have a jury trial in her drug forfeiture case - these all had an impact on citizens in the
Commonwealth. In terms of political fallout, however, most of those cases were less important.
54
~ There is no guarantee, of course, that these factors represent an accurate insight into the justices'
views. Why all seven justices chose to participate in a case was not always evident. In addition the
dissent of one justice may not really raise the case to a level of political importance. Similarly, five
justices may participate and agree on cases in which the political fallout may be greater than expected.
The opinion on the legislation regarding videotape testimony is one example. I worked for a child
advocacy agency in Massachusetts and I remember that many in the advocacy community, as well as the
state's prosecutors, were less than pleased with the decision. Conversely, the defense bar felt the right
decision had been made to interpret art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights to guarantee a face-to-face
confrontation.
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who filed amicus curiae briefs representing a variety of parties. While some of these
cases were more controversial than others, they all indicate that while cautious ,n their
use of power, the SJC and its justices are not afraid to use the power ofjudicial review
when they feel it is necessary to uphold constitutional protections.
Two of these cases are particularly good representations of the forceful yet
cautious approach of the Court and the dialogue which can occur with the Legislature
in constitutional questions. In 1988 the SJC, by a vote of 4-3, struck down on the basis
of overbreadth a statute which made it a crime to photograph a nude minor. As Justice
Wilkins noted for the majority, the law under question "makes a criminal of a parent
who takes a frontal view picture of his or her naked one-year-old running on a beach or
romping in a wading pool." 543 The three more conservative members of the Court
dissented from this decision, with Justice O'Connor finding that posing children is
conduct and not speech and is therefore not protected by the First Amendment. 544 The
General Court didn't like the result either, and lost no time in amending the statute to
cover only those instances in which the photographic representation was done "with
lascivious intent." 545 Upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, the SJC was
left to determine if the statute as applied to the defendant in question was overbroad
(and found it was not). 546 When asked to consider for the first time on reargument
whether the statute could stand on its face under art. 16 of the Declaration of Rights, the
543
Commonwealth v. Oakes, 401 Mass. 602, at 605 (Oakes I).
4
Oakes I, O'Connor dissenting at 605. Justices Nolan and Lynch joined in the dissent.
MS
546
Added by Statute 1987, c.294, §1.
As the legislature had amended the statute prior to oral argument before the United States Supreme
Court, the overbreadth issue on which the Commonwealth had appealed to the Supreme Court was found
to be moot.
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SJC refused to eonside,- ,he defendant's argument as h had,,', been raised n, a „n,ly
manner.
The second ease in which the justices exercised their power ofjudicial review in
as restrained a manner as possible involved a challenge to the Commonwealth's newly
enacted stalking statute.- The Court agreed with the appellant that the statute as
written was unconstttuttonally vague and the defendant's claim must prevail. However,
Justice Wilkins, writtng for all seven justices, developed a construction of the statute
Which would, prospectively, eliminate the problem of consftuttonalhy. It is
appropriate lor this court to interpret a statute prospectively to eliminate uncertainties m
-ts construction and in order to reflect the presumed intention of the Legislature."548
Rather than strike down the statute in tins instance, the Court felt reasonably confident
that the intent of the Legislature could be determined in such a way as to construct the
statute for future application in a way which would avoid constitutional problems.549
To this point the reader could be left with the impression that the justices' use of
judicial review rarely presents a true challenge to the authority of the Legislature since
in the few instances when they do strike down a statute the intent of the Legislature is
rarely affected in the long run. There were six cases decided by the SJC from 1981 to
1995, however, which reinforce the tact that the Court will challenge the Legislature
when it feels this is necessary. These cases each represent classic instances ofjudicial
review in which the justices say to the legislators, "we know what you arc trying to do
547
Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 4 1 8 Mass. 543 (1994).
54x
Kwiatskowski, 547.
549 /-t •
Contrast this with the Court's action in Gagnon, Marrone, and Bongarzonv in which (he justices fell n
necessary to strike down the drug statutes being challenged as the legislative intent could not be
determined from contradictory clauses.
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ormer
an
and you can't do that." The first two of these, while not affecting broader
constituencies, clearly challenged the Legislature's political desires, fa the first,
state senator George Bachrach challenged the validity of a statute which prohibited ,
individual from using the tern,
"independent" on nomination papers and ballots ,n state
elections,550 In a 4-1 decision, the SJC struck down this obvious attempt by the two
major parties to eontro. the election process as a violation ofprotections in both the
Federal and State Constitutions regarding freedom of speech, association, and equal
protection.551 Justifying the Court's use ofjudicial review in this ease,
.lust.ee Kaplan
quoted Archibald Cox, Lawrence Tribe, and former Chief Justice Burger on the
importance ofjudicial review to protect the democratic process. The quote from Tribe
presents a particularly clear enunciation of the vital role the judiciary must play in such
instances in this system of separated powers.
Constitutional review of election and campaign regulation amounts in
latge part, to accommodating the fear of a temporary majority
entrenching itself with the necessity of making the election a readable
barometer of the electorate's preferences. It is not surprising, therefore
that the vigor of judicial review of election laws has been roughly
proportioned to their potential for immunizing the current leadership
from successful attack. 552
This view was not shared by the entire Court. Justice Braucher, writing in dissent,
called the majority's actions "an example of premature, unnecessary, and mischievous
judicial interference with democratic procedures."' 51 Despite this argument to the
550
Bachrach v. Secretary ofthe Commonwealth, 1X2 Mass. 268 (1981 ).
551
irom
As Justice Kaplan noted in the majority opinion, "[ultimately the 1979 regulation might he expected
to discourage from the beginning an appeal to voters on grounds of the candidates' independence fri
established parties and thus to protect those parlies from a conventional style of criticism and attack
(276.)
v
Bachrach, 261 quoting L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 774 (1 978).
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contrary, the majority had no difficulty informing the Legislature that their attempt to
control the legislative process for the benefit of those in power was unconstitutional.
A second case which involved battles between individual political players was
also deeded in 1981 in a rare 4-3 decision.- In the Fiscal Year 1982 Budget the
Legislature had conditioned the allocation of Local Aid funds to Boston on the
maintenance of a specified level ofpolice and fire protects in the City. To put the
political implications of this case in context, it is important to remember that this
occurred short.y after Proposition 2-1/2 (provision for limiting local property taxes)
was enacted by the voters. There were struggles going on in cities and towns
throughout the Commonwealth over how to live within the limits which 2-1/2 imposed,
and unions representing various groups (including police and fire) were particularly
active at this time. There is little doubt that this provision was added to the budget by
Boston area legislators at the urging of fire and police associations in their community.
On the other side, of course, was the government of the City of Boston which bristled at
being told how to allocate its budget in such detail. The constitutional challenge to this
action was based on article 89 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution,
commonly called the Home Rule Amendment. Boston argued that since no such
limitation was imposed on any of the other 350 cities and towns in Massachusetts this
was not a "general law which apppl[ies] to all cities and towns, or to a class of not
fewer than two" as is required by the Home Rule Amendment. Four justices of the SJC
agreed, but instead of eliminating the conditional language and allocating the money as
553
Bachrach, Braucher dissenting, 28 1
.
Mayor ofBoston v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 384 Mass. 7 18. Less than 2% of the cases
decided in these years resulted in a full court dividing so evenly.
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the City of Boston had requested, the Court struck down the entire line hem, effectively
stopping Local Aid from going to Boston until the Legislature acted again.
Recognizing the repercussions of this action, Justice Wilkins wrote for the Court, "[w]e
are aware of the disruptive consequences of the result we reach in this case... It is,
however, often precisely when seductive, extraneous pressures are most intense that the
need is greatest forjudges to focus on constitutional principles." 555 While the condition
was eliminated, focusing on constitutional principles meant the majority of the Court
alienated both the Legislature and the City of Boston with its decision. Clearly the
Court will stand up to other political actors when it feels so compelled.
Three justices dissented in the Boston Local Aid case. 556 Chief Justice
Hennessey, writing for himself and Justices Lynch and Liacos, determined that the
challenged phrase in the budget was only a "condition upon a grant of money" and not
an "obligation or mandate." 557 In a second dissent, Justice Liacos, joined by Justice
Lynch, saw this case as presenting a conflict between two provisions in the Articles of
Amendment, art. 63 which outlines the budget procedure and art. 89, Home Rule.
Again, in the face of alternative arguments and political pressure from a variety of
Boston v. Treasurer, 20.
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It is interesting to note that the Court split on this case along atypical lines. The three most
conservative justices who often dissented together were Nolan, Lynch, and O'Connor, occasionally
joined by Hennessey. Liacos and Abrams dissented together most often on what could be called "the
liberal wing" of the Court. In this case the majority included Wilkins, Abrams, Nolan, and O'Connor
while Hennessey, Lynch and Liacos dissented.
557
Boston v. Treasurer, Hennessey dissenting, 726. This argument is not unlike that made by the United
States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole (483 U.S. 203 [1987]) in which the majority determined
that congressional action to withhold transportation funds from states which refused to raise their
drinking age to 21 offered only "mild encouragement" to states and presented no mandate. The argument
is even less plausible in the Massachusetts case, however, since cities and towns are very dependent on
the state's annual allotment of aid to supplement income from property taxes.
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sources, the majority of the justices of the SJC acted to protect the autonomy ofch.es
and towns as provided for in the state's constitution.
In two other cases decided during these fifteen years the SJC again struck at the
heart of the Legislature's intent and, in these instances, the legislative intent was clearly
backed up by a variety of organized interests in the state. In 1993 a 7-0 Court struck
down the state's newly enacted amendments to the state's bail statute as a violation of
the due process clause of the 14* Amendment.- As the train of events is described in
the opinion written by then Chief Justice Liacos, Governor Weld had submitted a bail
reform bill to the Legislature which closely mirrored the Federal Bail Reform Act
which the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld in United States v. Salerno in 1987.559 The
primary change to existing bail law in both the state and federal amendments was to
allow the j udicial authority to consider the potential dangerousness of the individual
charged when setting bail. However, the bill proposed by the Governor contained
procedural safeguards which the U.S. Supreme Court found essential in upholding the
constitutionality of the federal law. In contrast, "[t]he Legislature chose to eliminate
the procedural protections that were originally incorporated in the Governor's bill." 560
The Court acknowledged that the Legislature may have done this out of a very real
concern for the major burden these safeguards would put on the state's criminal justice
system in which there are over 100,000 bail releases a year in police stations and
county jails alone, as well as over 5,700 arraignments per week in District Courts
558 Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667 (1993). It should be noted that the majority opinion in this
case is representative of the high quality opinions which Chief Justice Liacos often wrote, particularly in
criminal matters. He cites not only the appropriate federal and state precedents, but also draws on a
variety of cases from sister courts and from law reviews to fully develop the Court's opinion.
559
481 U.S. 739.
560
Aime, 683.
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throughout the Commonwealth,- In effect the SJC said to the Legislature ifyou want
to tighten up the bail reform measures you must ensure that it contains sufficient
safeguards to aeeord with due process protections, regardless of the costs. The justices
refused to bend to the political desires of the Governor, State Legislature and
prosecutors from throughout the Commonwealth, and to the general public's desire to
"get tough on crime," in the face of a challenge to the due process rights of thousands
of arrested individuals who regularly face bail proceedings in the Commonwealth.
The second case in wh.ch the Court faced not only the will of the Legislature
but also the desires of an organized constituency involved a tax statute in which the
forces for progressive tax reform again attempted to circumvent the state's
constitutional requirement that all taxes be uniform. 562 Tax reform advocates included
those individuals who joined together to file an amicus curiae brief in favor of the law:
the Massachusetts Human Services Coalition, Massachusetts Fair Share, the state
employees union, two teachers' unions, the League of Women Voters, and Senator John
Olver, Senate Chair of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 563 Arrayed on the other side
of this political battle was the appellant, Massachusetts Taxpayer Foundation, likely
joined by other anti-tax forces in Massachusetts, most notably the Citizens for Limited
Taxation. The 1985 amendment to the state's tax statutes which was under challenge
instituted a progressive tax exemption. By a vote of 5-2, the SJC struck down this law,
561
Aime, 684. The information was compiled by the Attorney General and District Attorneys of the state
who filed an amicus curiae brief in this case. Representing the defense community in amici were the
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.
562
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation v. Secretary ofAdministration, 398 Mass. 40 (1986).
563
Members from these organizations and a variety of other liberal, advocacy, and human services
groups in the state worked together in the 1980s and early 1990s as the Tax Equity Alliance for
Massachusetts (TEAM).
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noting that while art. 44 allows the Legislature to enaet reasonable exemptions "based
on ability to pay," they must still be uniform. The unmistakable effect of these
exemptions was to institute a progressive tax structure in violation of the Constitution.
As Justice Lynch said for the Court, "[whatever may be the merits of the system
commonly described as the graduated income tax, it is prohibited by article 44." 564
Dissenting in this case, Justice Wilkins, writing for himself and Chief Justice
Hennessey, determined that legislative restraint should have led the justices to uphold
the statute, particularly since article 44 contains an inherent conflict between the
requirement for uniformity and the allowance of reasonable exemptions.
I would have thought that this court, following its own precedents
would have expressed deference to the Legislature's judgment as to what
exemptions were reasonable in this circumstance.
. .Where this court
addresses 'a constitutional challenge to a tax measure, we begin with the
premise that the tax is endowed with a presumption of validity and it not
to be found void unless its invalidity is established beyond a rational
doubt'.
.
.The Legislature's judgment that a minor exemption should be
apportioned according to each taxpayer's ability to pay falls in the range
of reasonableness within which the Legislature is entitled to act. 565
This case represents perhaps the most surprising exercise ofjudicial review by
the SJC since it concerns not a fundamental right which requires the state to meet a
heavy burden in order to act, but a tax law which must pass only a rational basis test.
Despite this fact, the Court found this statute to be unconstitutional, a clear reminder
that the exercise ofjudicial review need not always lead to a "liberal" outcome.
The last two cases in which the Court exercised its power ofjudicial review
were the most politically charged. In these cases the Court rendered opinions dealing
64
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, 48.
565
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Wilkins dissenting, 49, citing Andover Savings Bank v.
Commissioner ofRevenue, 387 Mass. 229 (1982), 235.
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wit* .he volatile issues of abortion and the death penalty. The Court's decision on the
abortion question shows no, only the Court's willingness to challenge the authority of
the Legislature but also its independence from trends set on the national level.*" Its
decision on the death penalty shows exactly how involved In the state's policy-making
process the Court can become.
In 1981 the SJC issued a decision in Moe v. Secretary ofAdministration and
Finance which challenged the provision of the Fiscal Year 1980 and 1981 state budgets
which prohib.ted the use of state Medicaid funds for abortion services in language very
similar to the Hyde Amendment which the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld as
constitutional against an equal protection challenge in Harris v. McRae in 198 0. 567 In
this case the Court was asked not only to overturn an act of the Legislature, but to do so
in a way which ran contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The controversial nature of
this question is evident from the large number of amicus briefs filed by parties on both
sides of this question. 568 In the face of this pressure, the Court agreed with appellants
who argued that treating medically necessary abortions differently than other medically
necessary child birth services imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of a
fundamental right in violation of the due process protections of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. Justice Quiroco, writing for the majority, noted that "the
Legislature need not subsidize any of the costs associated with child bearing, or with
m
This independence will also be seen in the Court's development of state constitutional law in the
movement known as new judicial federalism which is discussed at the end of this chapter.
5(17
448 U.S. 297.
6
Eight amicus briefs were filed in this case. Only four other cases had eight or nine such briefs filed
from 1981 to 1995. Briefs were filed by Preterm, Inc., Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights,
various religion professors, Planned Parenthood Federation of American, Boston Women's Health Book
Collective, certain Massachusetts physicians, certain members of the General Court with the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, and the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts.
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health eare generally. However, onee it chooses to enter the constitutionally protected
area of choice, it must do so with genuine indifference." 569 The Court also had to
defend its actions against an argument made by the state that a judicial decision on this
matter would violate the separation of powers as guaranteed by art. 30 of the
Declaration because it would interfere with the Legislature's control over the
appropriations process. Quiroco stated that the Court had "never embraced the
proposition that merely because a legislative action involves an exercise of the
appropriations power, it is on that account immunized against judicial review... Clearly
the relief sought by the plaintiffs is within our power to grant." 570
Chief Justice Hennessey dissented from the Court's decision, finding the
majority's distinction from Harris to be unconvincing. In his dissent the Chief Justice
issues a clear statement that the majority had crossed the line which distinguishes
between judicial and legislative authority. "It is clear to me that the majority thus
equate a financial inducement toward childbirth with an obstacle to a woman's freedom
to choose abortion. The logic fails. It may be an appropriate argument to address to the
Legislature but it is not a valid premise for a conclusion of unconstitutionality." 571
Dissenters in the final case for discussion were also concerned that the SJC was
needlessly striking down a statute, first because the question was not yet ripe and
second because an interpretation of the statute which would have saved it from
constitutional infirmity was possible. Neither view carried the day in Commonwealth v.
Colon-Cruz, the case in which the SJC struck down a Massachusetts death penalty
569
Moe, 654.
570
Moe, 642.
571
Moe, Hennessey dissenting, 662.
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statute for the third time.- The first decision was in 1975 when a majority of the
Court determined that a mandatory death penalty statute for rape-murder violated the
art. 26 prohibition against eruel or unusual punishment.573 Then in 1977 the Justices
issued an Advisory Oplnion to the House on a pending death penalty bill. Five of the
seven justices signed the Opinion which said, in part,
c
H
o
0
urtTn
8
otrrtrid^8 v,evs was expressed * a *****urt i ONealll, the undersigned Justices answer that art 26 of the
Declaration of Rights.
.
.forbids the imposition of a death penalty in thisCommonwealth m the absence of a showing on the part of the
Commonwealth that the availability of that penalty contributes more tothe achievement of a legitimate State purpose - for example, the
purpose of deterring criminal conduct - than the availability in like
cases of the penalty of life imprisonment. 574
Paying little heed to the Opinion of these five justices the Legislature passed Chapter
488 of the Acts of 1979, a bill very similar in its provisions to the one the justices had
considered in their 1977 advisory opinion. This law was challenged in 1980 in the case
of District Attorney ofSuffolk County v. Watson and by a 6-1 decision the justices
struck down the statute as being a violation of art. 26, finding that it violated
contemporary standards of decency and that the punishment was arbitrarily applied. 575
After Watso.n the conflict spread beyond the Legislature and the Court to the
citizenry when in 1982 voters approved an amendment to the Massachusetts
Constitution which effectively overturned the SJC's interpretation of art. 26. Art. 1 16
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution reads as follows.
572
393 Mass. 150 (1984).
573
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242. Art. 26 reads as follows: "No magistrate or court of law,
shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual Punishments."
574
575
Opinion ofthe Justices, 372 Mass. 912 (1977), 917.
381 Mass. 648. The history of the death penalty in this paragraph is drawn largely from Chief Justice
Hennessey's opinion for the Court in this case.
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nlZ 1 6 Constltu,i0"' ho^er, shall be construed asProhibiting the tmpos.tton of the punishment of death. The general eourtmay, for the purpose of protee.ing the general welfare oftheSTuthonze the
.mposition of the punishment of death by the courts of iawhaving junsdicfton of crimes subjeet to the punishment of death.
The people had spoken and established that contemporary standards of decency in
Massachusetts obviously did not preclude the sentence of death. The story does not end
here however.
In December of 1982 (less than six weeks after the constitutional amendment
had been approved by the voters) the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into
law the death penalty statute which was considered by the Court in Colon-Cruz. The
Court had three questions to face when confronted with this case. The first was the
threshold question ofjurisdiction in which the Court decided by a 4-3 vote that
although the case was before the Court on an interlocutory appeal and no penalty of
death had yet been issued, the ramifications of the Court's decision in this and other
cases was serious enough that it should be answered at this time. 576 Justice Wilkins
dissented on this point, citing his concurrence in Watson. "The court's approach
unnecessarily 'presents a constitutional confrontation between its views and those of the
Legislature. I would have preferred not to identify such a conflict unless and until the
circumstances of a particular case make it unavoidable'." 577
576
393 Mass. 150 (1984). There were four justices in the majority (Hennessey, Liacos, Abrams,
O'Connor), three who dissented on jurisdictional grounds (Wilkins, Nolan, and Lynch) and two who
dissented on the constitutional questions (Nolan and Lynch). Chief Justice Hennesssey also wrote a
concurrence which will be discussed below.
577
Colon-Cruz, Wilkins dissenting, 181, citing Watson, 674. In Watson, Justice Wilkins concurred
because of the jurisdiction question, but ultimately agreed with the majority on the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty under art. 26. In Colon-Cruz he dissented on the jurisdiction
question and made no mention of his view of the constitutionality of this new statute.
As Chief Justice, Wilkins showed a strong concern for the administrative problems facing the state's
judiciary so that in addition to constitutional concerns, Justice Wilkins was aware of the challenges a
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The second threshold question confronting the Court was whether art. 1 16 of the
Amendments prohibited the SJC from considering a death penalty statute at all
Argument was made by the Commonwealth that the voters, in enacting this
amendment, had intended to shield any death penalty statute from scrutiny by the Court
on any grounds. The majority determined, however, "that our invalidation of this
statute is [not] equivalent to prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death." 578
Finally the Court moved to the question of the constitutionality of the statute
itself. Appellants argued that the statute violated defendant's art. 12 rights to a jury trial
and to be free from self-incrimination. 579 Writing for a 4-2 Court on this question,
Justice Liacos interpreted the statute as allowing for the imposition of the death penalty
only when the defendant has been found guilty after a jury trial. The penalty of death
could not be imposed if an individual chose to plead guilty to murder in the first degree,
thereby potentially encouraging an individual to plead to the same so as to avoid the
possibility effacing the death penalty. As Liacos noted, "[t]he General court may not
authorize the imposition of the death penalty in a way which needlessly chills
defendant's art. 12 rights." 580
death penalty statute presents to the judicial system. "We haven't gotten to that [another death penalty
statute] and it will be a tremendous burden on this Court and on the judicial system and prosecutors and
Committee for Public Counsel Services and everybody to have capital punishment." (Interview by
author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.)
™ Colon-Cruz, 159.
579
The relevant portions of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights read as follows: "No
subject shall... be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself...And no subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property', immunities or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers..."
Colon-Cruz, 171. It should be noted that the Court chose to interpret art. 12 of the Declaration
independently from interpretations of similar federal protections, although footnote 33 on p. 171 refers to
federal guarantees. "Although we rest our decision solely on State constitutional grounds... our review of
the orders of the United States Supreme Court since Jackson [United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
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Justice Nolan dissented, joined by Justice Lynch. While he agreed with Wilkins
that the Court should have declined to hear the case since it was before the court
prematurely, he found the other two questions of such import that he would respond to
the substance of the Court's opimon. Nolan dissented on both points, finding that art.
1 16 of the Amendments should preclude the SJC from making any determination on the
constitutionality of a death penalty statute, whether based on an art. 26 complaint or art.
12. And finally, he determined that the statute could be interpreted so as to allow for
the death penalty in cases of both trial and a plea, thereby eliminating the constitutional
violation on which the majority based its decision. 581
Perhaps most interesting in terms of the ongoing dialogue between the SJC and
the Legislature on this topic is the concurrence written by Chief Justice Hennessey.
Recognizing that this appeal was in some ways similar to an advisory opinion, he took
this opportunity to address not only art. 12 concerns about this statute but also a variety
of other constitutional claims which had been raised by appellants and amici. 582 These
(1968)] persuades us that the result we reach would be mandated by the Federal Constitution also "
Liacos, who wrote for the Court in Colon-Cruz, had encouraged his colleagues to do this in Watson
While the language of the Eighth Amendment... and art. 26... is not identical, our decisions have utilized
Federal precedent in interpreting our own constitutional provisions....While I do not disagree with this
approach, it is also likely that the Constitution of this Commonwealth may have a separate and distinct
meaning which is to be interpreted and enforced by this court."
58
1
This is one of the few cases decided by the SJC during the fifteen years which I studied which could
have been different because of an individual appointment. The two justices who dissented on the
constitutional question, Nolan and Lynch, were both appointed by Governor King, a conservative, pro-
death penalty Democrat. Justice O'Connor was also a King appointee. In the Interview by O'Connor I
asked him about the appointment process. During the process he was, of course, interviewed by the
Governor, first for the vacancy which Lynch filled. "I had, In talking with [Governor] King... I was a
very strong advocate of no abortion and no death penalty. And he was with me so much on the abortion
question.
.
.he was clapping, clapping when I told him. But when he heard the other, he didn't feel the
same way. So I figured that's the end of that. And I didn't get the appointment anyway. But then
another appointment came up eight months later[.]" (Intervew with author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May
1999.) O'Connor was appointed to that vacancy. If King had appointed a third death penalty opponent,
Colon-Cruz might have ended differently (although in that instance Wilkins might have sided with the
majority on the constitutional question).
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included questions regarding the vagueness ofthe statute, consideration of whether the
statute allows for meaningful appellate review, the quest.on of whether the penalty is
proportional to the deed in all instances provtded for under the statute, and a discussion
of the adequacy of the indictment procedure under the death penalty statute.
If it is assumed that the Legislature may intend to construct a
constitutional death penalty statute, it is preferable that the court should
speak now rather than a year or several years hence... By reason of the
course we have chosen, the opinion of this court, as well as the briefs ofthe many persons and organizations who have addressed the court in this
case, are available to the Legislature and to any other concerned
person.
Hennessey's concurrence provides a good example of the cooperative role which the
Court and the Legislature can play. While striking down this death penalty statute, the
justices recognizes that the Legislature may want to enact another in the future. To
ease this process Justice Hennessey (contrary to strict rules of appellate review)
provided guidance so as to avoid the need for further discussion in the future before a
constitutional law is finally enacted. 584
From 1975 to 1984 the SJC and the Legislature were involved in an ongoing
conversation (debate?) over the development of a death penalty statute in
582
Five amicus curiae briefs were filed in this case. Two separate briefs from two of the
Commonwealth's district attorneys (Delahunt of Norfolk County and Flanagan of Suffolk County), and
one each from the Attorney General, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee (predecessor of the
'
Committee for Public Counsel Services), the Boston Bar Association, and Massachusetts Citizens
Against the Death Penalty.
As Liacos notes in the majority opinion, while a fundamental principle of appellate review is that "a
court should only consider the issue dispositive of the case," he does recognize the value of Hennessey's
opinion which technically went beyond this principle. "We add that we consider the partial summary of
other areas of constitutional concern by the Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion, to be helpful in that
his comments and suggestions may alert the Legislature to other issues it may wish to consider, should it
decide to take further legislative action." {Colon-Cruz, 153-154.)
Colon-Cruz, Hennessey concurring, 1 80.
584
It should be noted that while the Massachusetts Legislature has considered various death penalty
statutes since 1984, none had been enacted as of 2001.
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Massachusetts. One of the more interesting questions which comes out of a review of
this interaction is why there was not more fallout from the Court's decision in Colon-
Cruz. After all, the Legislature and the citizenry had continuously made their views
known that the Massachusetts system of criminal justice should include the death
penalty as a punishment for the most heinous of crimes. While the Court made a clear
legal distinction between the original art. 26 basis for declaring such a statute
unconstitutional and the art. 12 basis for finding a specific statute to be constitutionally
suspect, the result was the same. The popular will was thwarted. Justice Lynch
provided an interesting answer when asked about the lack of legislative response to the
1984 decision. "Because the Legislature itself, I think, is so delicately divided on the
subject of capital punishment. 1 mean, when the Court dealt with a bill that had been
passed, 49 or 50 percent probably agreed with the Court." 585
Justice Lynch's response not only provides insight into this specific question,
but it also serves as a reminder of when the Court is the most effective as a
policymaker. As with the SJC's common law activities in tort law and in the right to
die cases of the 1980s, 586 the Court often has the most impact when the Legislature has
difficulty acting. Whether because of close divisions between legislators as may have
existed in regard to the death penalty and right to die, or because of a political desire
not to act if possible (as with questions of governmental immunity in tort claims and
perhaps, for some legislators, with the right to die), the Court's voice is often filling the
void or deciding a close call rather than taking the polity in a direction it clearly does
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
These developments were discussed in Chapter 4.
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no, wan, ,o move, jud.cial policymaking may not be as undemocratic as critics often
fear.
SEPARATION OF POWFRS THE EFFECT of iUDIriAI . rf.vifu,
The SJC employed its power ofjudicial review sparingly in the years under
study and, except for a couple of "big bang" cases, the impact ofjudicial review on
policy questions affecting the citizens of the state was limited. Again, this is not to say
that this power is unimportant. As Justice Nolan noted, "[tjhere has to be somebody to
say what you've done, Mr. Legislator, is violative of the Constitution. And we say so,
and it's our job to say that. That really is the power of the Supreme Judicial Court." 587
Knowing that the SJC is there as a watchdog may be enough in many instances to keep
the Legislature from enacting what may be an unconstitutional law. In addition, even if
the Legislature rarely needs this, there are instances where they may inadvertently
overstep their boundaries (or in which, as Justice Lynch described these instances,
"reasonable minds may differ"). 588
All of the thirty-one cases in which the SJC exercised the power ofjudicial
review between 1981 and 1995 could be seen as ways to keep the Legislature in check,
avoiding the potential tyrannies which the separation of powers was developed to
avoid. As detailed in Chapter 1, one form of tyranny is that in which the minority in
government impose their will on the majority. These cases most often involve cases in
which the Legislature has stepped into the realm of another political actor; seven of the
cases analyzed involved such considerations. Four cases involved actions by the
587
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.
588
" Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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Legislature which the Court found to interfere with the authority of the U.S. Congress,
while a sixth case found the Legislature stepptng into territory reserved under the state's
constitution to the cities and towns. 58' The prototypical exercise ofjudicial review for
this purpose occurred tn Spinelli when the Legislature was interfering with judicial
activities, reinstating an eminent domain proceeding which a lower court had
dismissed. Clearly the Court should act to protect the judicial domain from
encroachment by the Legislature. Finally, in the sixth such case, while one could argue
that Bachrach
,
the case involving the use of the term "independent" on nomination
papers and ballots, is a civil liberties case, it seems to fit well in this category since
there's little doubt that the bill was enacted to protect those in power from electoral
challenge.
The other twenty-four cases involved the Legislature overstepping its
boundaries (in the eyes of the Court) and moving into the areas of citizens' lives which
are protected from all government activities. Ten of these cases clearly involved
criminal due process rights, 590 while another two involved the right not to have one's
property taken without just compensation. 591 Laws in three cases were found to violate
equal protection or due process guarantees in various judicial and quasi-judicial
settings,
592
one denied prisoner's the right to vote,593 and one was found to infringe on
589
Federal conflicts existed in Commonwealth v. Federico (ERISA); Archambault v. Archambault
(Federal Parental Kidnapping Act); and American Trucking Association and Perini Corporation
(interstate commerce). Interference with Boston activities occurred in Mayor ofBoston v. Treasurer and
Receiver General.
590
Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, Commonwealth v. Gagnon, Commonwealth v. Marrone,
Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, Commonwealth v. Oakes, Commonwealth
v. Bergstrom, Commonwealth v. Arment, Aime v. Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski.
591
Waltham Tele-Communications and Massachusetts Wholesalers ofMalt Beverages
.
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free speeeh rights ofprivate charitable organizations 594 In addition, women's privacy
rights were protected in Moe, the privileges and immunities of state citizenship were
protected in Massachusetts Council ofConstruction Employer, and contract rights of
state employees in Massachusetts Community College Council While it is easy to
consider civil liberty claims as only encompassing liberal outcomes, the four cases in
which the property rights of individuals, or the right to be free of progressive taxation,
were upheld by the Court are a reminder that minority interests of a different kind are
also protected by the state constitution. 595
The justices of the SJC clearly accept the exercise ofjudicial review, with all of
its antidemocratic tendencies, as legitimate in a system of separated powers, limited
though their practice of this power may be. 596 This is not the only influence the Court
has on public policy in the state through the development of constitutional law,
however. In order to understand the overall role which the SJC plays in state public
policy questions as the interpreter of the state's constitution it is necessary to look at the
degree to which the SJC has involved the state of Massachusetts in the movement over
the last twenty years known as "the new judicial federalism."
592
Petition ofDSS to Dispense with Adoption (1983), Murphy v. Department ofIndustrial Accidents and
St. Germaine v. Pendergast.
593
Cepulonis v. Secretary ofCommonwealth
5 4
Planned Parenthood v. Attorney General
595
Emerson College v. City ofBoston, Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation v. Secretary of
Administration, Lonstein v. Commissioner ofRevenue, and Globe Newspaper Company.
596
1 would emphasize that this assessment is only a statement on the overall impact ofjudicial review on
public policy questions in juxtaposition to the dominant role played by the Legislature. For those
individuals involved in these questions, and for those who may come after, the impact of the Court's
activities are vital. Overall, the Court seems to remember the words of Sir William Blackstone -- "Every
wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a monarch, a nobility, or a
popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny." Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, Volume 2, Bk. iv.
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SJC AND THE NEW JIinidAL FFDFR 41 ism _
AN INDEPENDENT VOIPF 5
^
The principle of separated powers affects judicial activity by setting the context
for intra-state relations. At the same time, however, the Court is influenced by the
activities of other courts in the nation through the principle of federalism. Over the last
thirty years this principle has been the subject of a substantial amount of discussion by
judicial scholars who have been interested in the new judicial federalism which refers
to the "new" practice of some state courts using provisions in their state constitutions
and bills of rights to develop an independent body of constitutional law separate from
that which has been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court under the U.S. Constitution
and Bill of Rights. 598 The SJC of Massachusetts has been an active participant in this
movement, one which is important for a variety of reasons to understanding how the
SJC sees its role in the state's political system. First, as was noted in the previous
section of this chapter, the state's high court is generally conservative in using its power
of constitutional interpretation in overturning acts of the Legislature. Looking at the
SJC's involvement in the new judicial federalism reminds us that the Court, while at
times restrained, does not operate out of a fear of challenging standards established by
597 Much of this section draws from two unpublished papers which I have written: "Protecting the
Individual: Search and Seizure in the Massachusetts Constitution" presented at the New England Political
Science Association, April, 1994 in Salem Massachusetts; and "Banned in Boston? Free Speech Under
the Massachusetts Constitution," presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association, November,
1994 in Providence, Rhode Island.
598 n
See chapter 1 for a list of works which discuss this movement in general. To see this as a new
movement is perhaps a misunderstanding of history. As noted earlier, before most of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights were applied to the states, liberties were only protected from state infringement by state
constitutions as interpreted by state courts. A reminder of this can be seen in the reliance on the
Massachusetts Constitution in many of the statutes declared unconstitutional before 1936. Another
reminder of this can be seen by the fact that 17 states had recognized the exclusionary rule as a
constitutional guarantee under their own state constitutions as early as the 1920s. (Massachusetts was not
one of these.) 9Charles Johnson and Bradley C. Canon, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact
[Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984], 43.)
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other authorities in the political system. As will be shown, the Massachusetts Court has
often challenged trends set by other states and by the federal courts. A look at this
activity of the Court also provides a reminder that looking to judicial review as the sole
measure of a state supreme court's level of activity in the state's policy-making process
via constitutional interpretation would be misleading. At least in the case of the SJC,
the law which the Court has developed in constitutional questions which do not present
a challenge to a co-equal branch of government is as vital to the policy of the state as is
its activity in questions ofjudicial review.
A third reason for taking a brief look at the SJC and new judicial federalism is
that it provides another example of the way in which the system of separated powers in
Massachusetts tends not toward conflict, but toward cooperation. As noted in Chapter
One, the system of separated powers is generally assumed to generate conflict, with
each branch struggling for power. This is sometimes the case. There was certainly an
extended debate between the SJC and the Legislature over the death penalty in
Massachusetts, for instance. However, when one branch or another operates within its
"area of expertise," there is less conflict and more cooperation. It does not mean that
other branches always agree with the outcome, but they do recognize the other branch
is operating within its accepted "circle" of responsibility. As will be shown below, this
has largely been the case with SJC's participation in the new judicial federalism,
particularly in extending state rights to criminal defendants beyond those provided by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the last thirty years.
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THE^SSS^S^ CONST,T,TION, AND THE RIGHTS OE
New judicial federalism was, until the early 1990s, defined predominantly as the
practice of state high courts using their own constitutions to provide greater protection
to citizens under their state constitutions than was provided under the U.S. Constitution
by interpretation of an increasingly conservative Supreme Court. The assumption was
that this was a liberal movement. Looking to its origins, this wasn't a surprising
assumption. A renewed interest in state constitutions occurred shortly after Warren
Burger ascended to the position of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court ,n
1969. The shift in leadership on the Court from Earl Warren to Burger, combined with
the appointment of Harry Blackmun in 1970 and Justices Powell and Rchnquist in
1972, sent tremors through the civil libertarian community. There were serious
concerns that the liberal advances won during the Warren Court era, especially in the
area of criminal due process rights, would be wiped out by the Burger Court. Civil
libertarians began to look elsewhere for continued protection of individual rights. A
call went out to state supreme courts to fill the void. They were encouraged to sec that
state constitutions be "taken out of the drawer," dusted off, and reviewed carefully as an
avenue to develop a jurisprudence of state constitutional law which would continue to
protect individual rights. One of the chief proponents of this measure was Justice
William Brennan who found himself more and more frequently in the minority,
dissenting from decisions which were eroding rights won under the Warren Court. In a
now famous article written in 1977, Justice Brennan issued "a clear call to state courts
to step into the breach left by the federal courts in protecting rights." 599
599
"State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights," 503.
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The assumption that a return to state constitutions would necessarily have a
liberal effect, however, overlooked the fact that calls for a renewed emphasis on state
courts and constitutions did not come from the liberal end of the spectrum alone.
Moderates and conservatives also advocated an increased role for state courts. Chief
Justice Burger promoted a greater reliance on state courts. With Justice Harlan, he
encouraged the federal courts to restrain their actions and allow states to "experiment
and innovate, particularly in the criminal justice area."600 While still an associate
justice, Rehnquist had encouraged state autonomy in the judicial realm as a means of
maintaining states as viable political entities. In general, the attitude of the Burger
Court was one of non-interference in matters considered to be "local, in areas such as
criminal justice, education, apportionment, censorship, welfare assistance, interstate
commerce, and labor-management relations." 601
The degree to which the conservative origins of the new judicial federalism
influenced its outcome were seen in Barry Latzer's extensive fifty state study of 20
years of state court activity in criminal law. 602 He found that most of the decisions of
state high courts in which they rely on their own constitutions do not have the liberal
results which many who advocated the movement would expect. Instead, many of the
state high courts tended to interpret their own constitutions to match the conservative
600
Stanley H. Friedelbaum, "Independent State Grounds," in State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the
Federal System, Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, eds., 3 1 . It has been suggested that Chief
Justice Burger's desire to see state courts take on increased responsibilities came from a practical desire
as well; he saw it as a mechanism for controlling the Supreme Court's caseload. See Susan P. Fino, The
Role ofState Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1 987),
2.
601 Mary Cornelia Porter, "State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court: Some Old
Inquiries for a New Situation," State Supreme Courts, Porter and Tarr, eds., 8.
602
State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (New York: Greenwood Press, 199 1 ).
244
interpretations whieh were being developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the late
1970s and 1980s. Most interesting for purposes of this study is that Latzer found only
Massachusetts and Alaska matched the expected outcome of liberal interpretations of
the state constitutions.- In the twelve cases in Latzer's study in which the SJC had the
option of accepting or rejecting the federal lead in interpreting the state's Declaration of
Rights as it affects criminal defendants, it chose a more liberal path 75% of the time. 604
This clearly shows an independent court willing to chart a path separate from other
courts on both the federal and state levels.
In all of these cases the SJC was developing state constitutional law (and
effectively determining policy in the criminal justice field) and, most interesting of all,
these decisions rarely brought the Court into conflict with the Legislative branch. In
most instances these cases involved the justices of the state's high court keeping local
law enforcement agencies in check and overseeing the application of the law through
the state's trial courts. Furthermore, as the discussion of search and seizure law below
will indicate, the liberal results of this SJC activity were sometimes done in conjunction
with the Legislature rather than in opposition to it. Of the nine cases in which Latzer
found the SJC rejecting Supreme Court precedent, only one brought the justices into
conflict with the Legislature. This was in 1980 when the SJC interpreted the "cruel or
603 A variety of interesting studies have sprung from Latzer's work, trying to find an explanation for these
variations in the new judicial federalism. See, for instance, Beavers and Walz, "Modeling Judicial
Federalism;" Beavers and Emmert, "Explaining State High-Courts' Selective Use of State Constitutions;"
and James G. Cauthen, "Expanding Rights under State Constitutions: A Quantitative Appraisal," Albany
Law Review 63 (2000), 1183.
604
Latzer, 157-191, passim. Massachusetts rejected the U.S. Supreme Court lead in nine cases and
followed it in three. There were other states who rejected more federal precedents in interpreting their
own constitutions, but all except Alaska also adopted an even larger number of conservative positions
from the federal courts. As a result the percentage of cases in which they rejected Supreme Court leads
was well below the 75 percent cut-off point which Latzer used to distinguish what he called "rejectionist"
states."
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unusual punishment" protection of art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights differently than
the Supreme Court was interpreting the Eighth Amendment in 1980.605 This makes it
clear that mterbraneh conflict need not be present for significant policymaking to occur.
Of the nine U.S. Supreme Court precedents which Latzcr found the SJC had
rejected between the late 70s and early 90s, two dealt with search and seizure, two with
arrest, two with effective representation of counsel, one with self-incrimination, one
with jury make-up, and one with the death penalty. 606 Cumulatively these decisions,
issued between 1979 and 1989 (similar years to much of this study), maintained the
more liberal approach to criminal defense issues which had been representative of the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s. 607 A look at the way in which these nine
cases were decided indicates that the justices were aware that these were important
decisions. Five of the cases were decided by a full panel of seven justices (and another
5
District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648.
606
The search and seizure cases will be discussed in more detail below and the death penalty decision
was discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. The cases in which the SJC rejected other federal
standards are: Commonwealth v. Robinson, 403 Mass. 163 (1988) (maintaining the Aguilar-Spinelli test
for warrantless arrest based on an informant's tip); Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788 (1985)
(requiring probable cause for a Terry stop rather than a lower standard); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406
Mass. 135 (1989) (adopting a less stringent prejudice prong for the test of ineffective counsel than that
which had been developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 [1984]); Commonwealth v. Hodge,
386 Mass. 165 (1982) (adopting a stricter standard regarding conflict for co-representation than in Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 [1981]); Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790 (1982) (rejecting
Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 [1972] and calling for a more liberal requirement of transactional
immunity in exchange for testimony); and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 (1979) (rejecting
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 [1965], thereby making it harder for the prosecution to exclude
prospective black jurors).
607
While Latzer's study ended in 1 989, the SJC has not backed away from this position. In 2000 the
justices issued an opinion in Commonwealth v. Mavredakis (430 Mass. 848) in which they determined
that art. 1 2 provides greater protection to attorney-client contact during interrogations than the Supreme
Court required under the 5 th and 6th Amendment in Moran v. Burbine (475 U.S. 412 [1986]). In
describing this opinion, Donald Harwood, appellate counsel to Mr. Mavredakis in this case, noted the
ongoing commitment of the SJC to protecting individual liberties. "Mavredakis was argued on
November 1 , 1999, the first day of the newly constituted Supreme Judicial Court [Marshall as new Chief
Justice to replace Wilkins]. The court's thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion underscores its
commitment to the protection of individual liberties provided for in the Massachusetts Constitution, and
signals its refusal to be swayed by current pendulous trends eroding the rights of the accused." ("SJC
Protects Right to Know of Attorney Contact," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, March 20, 2000, 1 1
.)
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by six)
-
this contrasts with the fact that in the total caseload less than 12% of all cases
were decided by seven justices. The other indicator is the presence of concurring and
dissenting opinions. Five of these nine cases contained a, leas, one opinion in addition
to the majority opinion.
It is interesting to note that only the death penalty decision brought about any
real response from the other political actors in the state. The reaction of the Legislature
to the SJC's decision in Watson is evidence of the fact that they could have responded
with proposed amendments to the Constitution if they had so desired. This is exactly
what happened in several states in regard to decisions by their high courts. For
instance, California, Florida and Michigan adopted amendments limiting the reach of
the exclusionary rule under state law, effectively making the federal interpretation of
the 4th Amendment the fullest possible extent of protection for citizens in these
states.
608
So why was there less conflict in Massachusetts? While it is never possible
to say with certainty why something did not happen, there are at least three possible
explanations: the Legislature didn't know what the Court was doing, the Court and the
Legislature were working cooperatively, or the Court was careful to limit its policy-
making to ways which would not bring it into conflict with the state's elected officials.
The first of these explanations can be rejected as out of hand. While Latzcr's
study wasn't issued until 1991, it had been the subject of discussion in Massachusetts
legal and political circles for at least ten years. Some of the earliest articles on the
See Latzer, State Constitutions, 36-38 for a review of these three amendments. The changes brought
about in the jurisprudence of Florida and California were so dramatic that Latzer compiled different data
for each court, one set from before the amendments and one set for after. The pre-amendment court of
both Florida and California, like those of Massachusetts and Alaska, were high-rejection states, adopting
more liberal standards under their state constitutions. After the passage of the constitutional
amendments, however, both states became much more likely to adopt the more conservative standards of
the U.S. Supreme Court when interpreting their own constitutions.
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movement coincided with the 200th anniversary of the Massachusetts Constitution ii
1980 while others followed throughout the decade, many in widely read legal
publications such as the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly and the Massachusetts Law
Review m It is unlikely that the Legislature was unaware of these decisions. The
second explanation, however, may partly explain the lack of conflict over SJC
policymaking in these cases, as can be seen by the Court's activities in the area of
search and seizure law.
TOGETHER °
SEIZURE
"
™E SJC AND THE LEGISLATURE WORK
Three opinions handed down by the SJC in 1985 provide a good picture of the
development of search and seizure law in Massachusetts under new judicial federalism.
Two of these cases, Commonwealth v. Sheppard {Sheppard Iff 0 and Commonwealth v
Upton (Upton II
f
1
were opinions handed down after the Supreme Court had
overturned the original decisions and remanded the cases to the SJC for further
action.
612
In both instances the defendants had brought challenges claiming of illegal
searches under the 4th Amendment and under art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights. In
Some of these works include: Henry Clay, "Human Freedom and State Constitutional Law: Part One,
The Renaissance," Massachusetts Law Review 7 1 (1986), 161-172; Clay, "Human Freedom and State
Constitutional Law: Part Two, The Process," Massachusetts Law Review!] (1986); Edward F.
Hennessey, "The Extraordinary Massachusetts Constitution of 1780," Suffolk Law Review 14 (1980),
873-886; Herbert P. Wilkins, "Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation
to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution," Suffolk Law Review 14 (1980), 887-930; and
Alexander Wohl, "New Life for Old Liberties - Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: State
Constitutional Law Case Study, New England Law Review 25 (1990), 177-214.
M(, 394 Mass. 381.
611 393 Mass. 363.
612 Commonwealth v. Sheppard (I), 387 Mass. 488 (1982); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981
(1984).
Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562; Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).
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the original eases, the SJC had deeided in favor of the defendant, basing their opinions
on U.S. Supreme Court precedents under 4 Ih Amendment constitutional law. The
Supreme Court overturned both cases in light of the modification which had been made
in 4th Amendment jurisprudence in Illinois v. Gates.™ On remand, the SJC chose to
base its opinions squarely on independent and adequate state grounds. In his opinion
for the majority Justice Wilkins makes this point clearly, shielding the opinion from
further review by the Supreme Court with a "plain statement."614
While choosing to exclude the evidence in Upton but not in Sheppard, in both
cases the Massachusetts justices clearly rejected the "totality of the circumstances" test
of Illinois v. Gates and continued to use the Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining when
probable cause exists to issue a search warrant on the basis of a confidential tip.
Interestingly, while it was a constitutional decision they clearly tied their decision to
both art. 14 and a Massachusetts statute, GL c.276, §2B, thereby incorporating
Legislative policy into their decision. Sections 2A and 2B were added to Chapter 276
in 1964 to incorporate the exclusionary rule into law. This addition "reflected the
effects of the decision in the Mapp case, and of a succession of decisions of this court
which were made necessary by that case." 615 The Court notes, however, that the
General Laws do not establish a standard for probable cause, and for that the justices
613
462 U.S. 213 (1983) (creating a more lenient, "totality of the circumstances" test to consider in
issuance of a search warrant based on an informant's tip in place of the two prong test from Aguilar v.
Texas (379 U.S. 108 [1964]) and Spinelli v. U.S. (393 U.S. 10 [1969]).
614
In Michigan v. Long (463 U.S. 1032 [1983]) the Supreme Court had made it clear that it would
continue to abide by the "independent and adequate state grounds" principle which it had enunciated in
Murdoch v. City ofMemphis (20 Wall. 590 [1875]), refusing to consider a question of law when the state
court had made its decision on state law, as long as the opinion contained a "plain statement" of this
intent.
1 Commonwealth v. Monosson, 35 1 Mass. 327 (1966), 330. Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643) was the case
which applied the exclusionary rule as a necessary remedy for 4 lh amendment violations to the states.
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look to art. 14 (and find the Aguilar-Spinelli standard is required). It is an interesting
opinion, weaving together constitutional and statutory requirements in upholding the
state's independence from federal law.
The Court added one more interesting twist to this picture in a third search and
seizure case decided on independent state grounds later that same week. In
Commonwealth v. Ford, the SJC reiterated that the standard of probable cause required
by art. 14 in cases involving a confidential informant could only be met by the two-
pronged, Aguilar-Spinelli standard. Further, it decided that while Chapter 276 of the
General Laws required exclusion, so did art. 14. One can't help but wonder if the
majority of the justices who supported this move were preparing the way in case the
Legislature should choose to change their mind on the importance of the exclusionary
rule in Massachusetts. While it would then still be required under federal constitutional
law, that is very different from setting an independent state legislative or constitutional
basis for this protection. The ideal is to have a legislative-judicial united front on this
controversial protection; but if that should fail, the SJC wanted to have an independent
constitutional basis for protecting individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures in the Commonwealth. Their concern was for naught, however, as the
Massachusetts Legislature, unlike its counterparts in California, Florida, and Michigan,
never took steps to narrow the exclusionary rule.
616
Part of the reason that there was
616 As noted above, Latzer found that the SJC charted an independent course on two search and seizure
questions in the 1980s. One was the rejection of the totality of the circumstances test. The second was
Commonwealth v. Blood (400 Mass. 61) [1987] in which the Court rejected Supreme Court precedent
regarding electronic surveillance. In a stirring commentary on the importance of the right to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Chief Justice Liacos (the foremost civil libertarian on the Court
during the years under study), wrote for the majority. The SJC determined that warrantless electronic
surveillance with one-party consent is prohibited by art. 14 despite the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v.
White (401 U.S. 741 [1971]). Liacos' criticism of the Supreme Court gives a flavor of the sometimes
caustic tone he could adopt. "To gauge the likely impact of unfettered surveillance on the individual's
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little conflict between the Legislature and the judiciary, despite the SJCs fairly
vigorous policy-making activities since the 1980s, could be because the Legislature is a
partner with them in defending the liberties of citizens in Massachusetts.
THE SJC AND FREE SPEECH - A MORE RESTRAINED VOICE
The SJC has continued to actively use the Massachusetts Constitution to provide
an extra layer of protections for persons who are charged with a crime. Interestingly,
however, the Court has not been nearly as active in developing an independent body of
constitutional law in other areas. In a previous project which analyzed SJC opinions
involving free speech claims under art. 16 of the Declaration of Rights decided between
1978 and 1994, very little independence from federal standards was found. 617 In almost
all of the 43 cases in which the SJC had the opportunity to develop an independent
body of state constitutional law under the Declaration of Rights, the Court opted instead
to decide the cases based on First Amendment doctrine. In only two cases during these
years did the SJC decide a case based solely on art. 16. In one a clear distinction could
be made between the federal and state constitutions while in the other a state law
required that a decision be based on art. 16.618 The interesting question, of course, is
sense of security, and to appreciate the absurdity of the White rationale, one need only imagine the kind
of person who does think it reasonable that his every word is overheard and seized for use against him
. .
.
[The court then quotes the definition of paranoia found in the American Handbook ofPsychiatry before
concluding.] The world of the White thesis is a topsy-turvy one in which the paranoid's delusory
watchfulness is the stance held 'reasonable'." (Blood, 73-74 [emphasis in original].)
617
Art. 16, as amendment by Amendment 77, reads as follows: "The liberty of the press is essential to the
security of freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in the Commonwealth. The right of
free speech shall not be abridged." Interestingly, while the original document protected the press, the
specific protection of speech was not added until 1948.
1
In Commonwealth v. Sees (374 Mass. 532 [1978]) the SJC declared that a local ordinance prohibiting
nude dancing on premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages was a violation of art. 16, noting that the
state guarantee could be distinguished from the federal guarantee in this regard because of the control
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why the difference between SJC decisions in criminal justice questions and those
involving free speech claims? While some explanation may be found in the different
areas of law, a partial explanation may rest also in the role which the SJC has adopted
for itself as a policymaker in the system of separated powers in Massachusetts.
As Latzer's work looked only at criminal justice questions, there was some
assumption that the predominantly conservative bent which he found might be limited,
and that in other civil liberties claims state high courts would be more willing to chart
new ground. 619 However, later studies have found this to be inaccurate. Studies by
Beavers/Walz and Cauthen find, instead, that state high courts are more likely to look
to their own state constitutions in areas where the retreat from protection of rights by
the Supreme Court has been most pronounced. In a study of 25 randomly selected state
supreme courts, Cauthen looked at 21 different areas of law over 25 years and found
the highest level of state constitutional activity in cases concerning free exercise of
religion, jury trial, and search and seizure. Two of these were clearly associated with
severe retraction of rights by the U.S. Supreme Court. "Higher levels of state
constitutional policymaking in the free exercise and search and seizure areas suggest
that state supreme courts are more willing to extend rights in 'reactive' settings where
courts are only restoring a right previously guaranteed by the federal courts."620 This
over liquor regulation granted to states by the 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In Batchelder v.
Allied Stores International (388 Mass. 83 [1983]) the SJC was asked to determine if art. 16 rights had
been violated in a claim raised under the state's civil rights act. While finding that art. 16 could be
implicated in the case, the SJC decided the question (whether a shopping mall could prohibit an
individual from using its facility to gather signatures for nomination papers) could be decided under art. 9
(guaranteeing free and fair elections).
619
See Michael Esler, "State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law," Judicature 78 (1994), 255.
i
620
James Cauthen, "Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Qualitative Appraisal," 1 183.
Cauthen raises an interesting point based on this finding. As state courts in most of these cases are only
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would provide some explanation for the difference between the SJC's stance on
criminal justice and free speech questions. While the Supreme Court has undoubtedly
become more conservative in its rulings regarding the rights of criminal defendants
over the last 30 years, a similar trend in free speech protections has not been evident.
Perhaps the SJC felt no need to chart an independent course in protecting free speech
claims.
A second explanation may lie in the differences which exist, or do not exist,
between the Constitution of the United States and its counterpart in Massachusetts. The
traditional practice ofjudicial decision-making is to determine federal constitutional
questions before questions raised by state constitutions. 621 The SJC follows this model
carefully.
622
While art. 16 is similar in language to the First Amendment, many of the
provisions of the Declaration which involve the rights of criminal defendants are
lengthier and worded differently than the cognate provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
This gives the SJC grounds on which they can distinguish federal from state protections
to develop a separate body of state law.
Having looked at constitutional questions which the SJC has addressed from the
late 1970s through the mid 1990s, however, I would present a third piece of the
explanation for the difference between the Court's decisions in these two general areas
of law. This is that policymaking while overseeing the activities of a criminal trial
falling more squarely within the generally accepted "circle" ofjudicial responsibilities.
reclaiming rights which had previously been protected by the Supreme Court, federal constitutional law
is still controlling the development of state constitutional law in the U.S. Similar findings were reported
in the 1998 study of Beavers and Walz.
6J
This is despite Hans Linde's call for state high courts to reverse this order.
622
The only exception to this practice which I have found was in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz.
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This is not to say that there is no debate on these questions among the other branches of
government (as there was with the death penalty), but that the SJC, which looks at these
procedures on a case-by-case basis in the course of hearing appeals, delineating the
exact lines of relatively complicated questions (i.e., when does probable cause exist to
justify the issuance of a search warrant on the tip of a confidential informant), is
accepted as a legitimate policy-making partner in the state's political system.
In acting as the interpreter of the state's constitution, whether this be in
conducting judicial review or in charting an independent course from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the SJC could be said to walk softly but carry a big stick. Avoiding judicial
overreaching, the justices exercise their power firmly but with restraint. The lack of
conflict which their policymaking efforts have engendered indicate that the justices
generally manage to stay within the judicial circle of authority.
The role which the SJC adopted in developing constitutional law for the
Commonwealth between 1981 and 1995 was not very different from its role in statutory
interpretation and common law development. Despite the potential differences
between these types ofjurisprudence based on questions of democratic accountability,
the judiciary continued to exercise its power, but was willing to "converse" with the
Legislature while doing so. This ongoing cooperation could be connected to the final
realm ofjudicial-legislative interaction to be discussed. This is the dialogue which
occurs when the SCJ is asked by the House or the Senate to render an advisory opinion.
We turn now to this.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SJCAND ADVISORY OPINIONS:SFPAR 4 T/0N OF POIVFR* VIOLATED?
The Supreme Judicial Court issued an average of 244 opinions per year from
1981 to 1995. In only five percent were questions ofjudicial review raised, and in less
than one percent did the justices of the high court actually declare an action of the
Massachusetts Legislature to be unconstitutional. The degree to which these judicial
activit.es ultimately thwarted the will of the people's elected representatives was even
smaller as the Legislature could easily have accomplished its goal by enacting minor
modifications to several of the law declared unconstitutional by the SJC if it had so
desired. In light of the SJC's relative willingness to participate in the state's policy
process through its responsibilities in the area of common law and statutory
interpretation, and considering the streak of independence from the U.S. Supreme Court
it has shown in interpreting the state's constitution, the limited use ofjudicial review is
somewhat surprising.
Like all judiciaries in the United States, the SJC is a passive institution, waiting
for questions to be raised before addressing them. 623 It is difficult to say with any
623
As noted in Chapter 5, however, the Court, can try to influence what comes to its attention by the way
in which it handles cases and the "messages" it sends in its opinions. In previous research I have done on
search and seizure and on free speech protections in Massachusetts, I frequently found footnotes in
opinions like the following. "The defendant correctly asserts that the court has left open the possibility
that it will retain the automatic standing rule ofJones which the United States Supreme Court overruled
in United States v. Salvucci" (Commonwealth v. Mora, 402 Mass. 262 [1988], 266.-) This seems to
present a clear message to attorneys who may have an appropriate case in the future that they may want
to raise this question. In some cases the justices are critical of attorneys who seem to have overlooked
their "messages." An example can be found of Commonwealth v. Eagleton, 402 Mass. 199 (1988). "In
his brief the defendant makes no argument worthy of the name based on the cognate provision in art. 14
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. At oral argument, the defendant said he did not rely on the
State Constitution but had concluded that the reasonable search and seizure standards under the State and
Federal Constitutions were the same for the purposes of this case. We need not decide whether that
conclusion was correct." When asked during an interview whether the Court did sometimes send
messages about the kind of cases and arguments they wanted to hear, Mr. Daniel Johncdis said this did
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certainty why some cases are brought to their attention while others are not. It is
possible that few eases involving judicial review are raised because the Legislature is
careful to avoid such problems. Given the ambiguous nature of constitutional
interpretation (and the fact that many legislators are at least as interested in getting
votes as they arc in scrupulously following constitutional limitations) however, one
wonders if there may not be other reasons, either contributing to the Legislature's
carefulness or independent of that, which could help to explain the absence of
constitutional conflict between the Legislature and the SJC. One contributing factor
could be the relatively unique authority which the SJC has to issue advisory opinions
under the Massachusetts Constitution.
Article II of Chapter III of Part Two of the Constitution describes this authority.
"Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the Governor or the Council, shall have
authority to require the opinions of the Justices of the supreme judicial court, upon
important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions:'624 It is possible that concerns
about the constitutionality of a law which in most states (and on the federal level)
would come to the court after the bill had been enacted, arc resolved in Massachusetts
before the Legislature takes final action. A look at the advisory opinions issued by the
Court was kind of concerned about... the quantity of evidence that was allowed in through the hearsay
rule, and he said 'we invite,' in that opinion he specifically said, 'we invite' counsel who had like cases
to address this particular issue." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 14 April 1999.
624
This section of the Constitution was amended by article 85 of the Articles ofAmendment in 1964. As
originally worded, the authority to request opinions was said to lie with the legislature and "the Governor
and Council." According to one scholar, this language was generally ignored and the justices routinely
answered questions asked by the governor alone. Beginning in 1912, however, the Court began to
demand that such requests come from the Governor and the Council. This was the practice until the
language was changed to "Governor or the Council" in 1964. Sec, Cynthia Farina, "Supreme Judicial
Court Advisory Opinions: Two Centuries of Intcrbranch Dialogue," in Osgood ed., The History ofthe
Law in Massachusetts, 353-392. Farina's article, which looks at the Massachusetts experience with the
advisory process from 1780 to 1990, is the source of much of the historical information in this chapter.
See also, Mel A. Topf, "The Origins and Harly History of the SJC Advisory Opinions," Massachusetts
Legal History 7 (2001), 21-54.
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justices in the 1980s and early 90s shows that this may sometimes be the ease. 625
Before looking at the specifics of these cases, however, it is necessary to put this
unusual power in perspective - how does it fit in a system of separated powers?
MAINTAINING SEPARATION - THF FEDERAL APPROaph
All students of constitutional law are familiar with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision to refuse to issue advisory opinions in the early years of the nation's history.
In 1 793 Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State to President Washington, wrote to
the justices requesting their opinion on questions regarding U.S. involvement in the
ongoing war between France and Great Britain. In a letter to the President, Chief
Justice Jay responded on behalf of the Court.
We have considered [the] letter written by your direction to us by the
Secretary of State [regarding] the lines of separation drawn by the
constitution between the three departments of government. These being
in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a
court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments
against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions
alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the
President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to
have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive
departments. 6"6
Even if all advisory opinions would have come to the SJC as questions ofjudicial review, however, it
would not substantially affect the numbers. There were only 33 advisory opinions from 1981 to 1995.
This would have increased the number of cases involving judicial review from 178 to 209 (5% to 6% of
the total caseload).
626 Quoted in Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker, Constitutional Lawfor a Changing America: Institutional
Powers and Constraints, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001 ), 95 For an interesting appraisal of
the advisory role ofjustices in these years, one which sees the refusal of the Jay Court to be as much a
political position as a philosophical statement on the separation of powers, see Stewart Jay, Most Humble
Servants: The Advisory Role ofEarly Judges (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). James
Thayer also saw this response as pragmatic. "It was, perhaps, fortunate for the judges and their
successors that the questions then proposed came in so formidable a shape as they did. They were
twenty-nine of them, and they fill three large octavo pages.... Had they been brief and easily answered,
the Court might, not improbably, have slipped into the adoption of a precedent that would have engrafted
the English usage upon our national system." Quoted in Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory
Opinions," 355.
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The Supreme Court has maintained this position ever since. A clear statement
of this can be found in Muskrat v. United States, "The judicial power.. .is the right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in
courts of proper jurisdiction/' Justice Day then distinguished between the act of
declaring a law to be unconstitutional in the course of normal litigation and the act of
giving an advisory opinion. 'The exercise of [judicial review]..
.is not given to it as a
body with revisory power over the action of Congress, but because the rights of the
litigants in justiciable controversies require the court to choose between the
fundamental law and a law purporting to be enacted with constitutional authority!.]"627
This has not always stopped some Supreme Court justices from engaging in
advising within the context of deciding an actual controversy. An example of this is
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents ofthe University of California v. Bakke in which he
offered advice on what type of affirmative action program might be constitutionally
acceptable. 628 Using the opinion in a controversy legitimately before the court to make
suggestions to a legislature is not a practice confined to the federal level. 629 Chief
Justice Wilkins, discussing the activities of the SJC, noted that Massachusetts justices
occasionally engage in this practice as well.
There are some areas where we may feel it helpful not simply to decide
the given case and discuss policy considerations applicable to it, but to
6 7
219 U.S. 346 (1911). This limitation refers only to the formal powers of the Court. Individual
justices have advised presidents and legislators even while serving on the bench. For a summary of such
activities, see David O'Brien, Storm Center, 87-100.
628
43 8 U.S. 265. Such activity did not go unnoticed. Powell was criticized by his colleagues for taking
similar actions in Bellotti v. Baird. See Justice Stevens footnote in this opinion. (443 U.S. 622 [1979].)
As an example, see Chief Justice Hennessey's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Colon Cruz,
393 Mass. 150 (1984) in which he offers suggestions for rewriting the state's death penalty statute so it
will pass constitutional muster.
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go on and talk about related matters that are likely to come up in
subsequent cases which will follow whatever we've done..
.. Sometimes
it s very helpful to lay out a road map as to how these things can behandled. Sometimes you stick your neck out and you don't have briefs
on the point and you've thought the best you can about it but yconclude that you didn't really take note of the fact that some
would come up which makes whatever you've said either wror
ing
on
more likely, not as universally applicable as you thought at the time you
wrote it. J
The refusal of the U.S. Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions is justified
a variety of grounds. One argument against such a practice could be found by looking
at the original intention of those who framed the Constitution. At the Constitutional
Convention a proposal to establish a Council of Revision involving Supreme Court
justices which would exercise a veto power over acts of the legislature was voted upon
and rejected four different times. 631 James Madison, one of the proponents of this
measure, recognized there to be two concerns to including justices in what would
eventually become the veto power of the President. First, "that the Judges ought not to
be subject to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might give on the
exposition of them." Secondly, he noted the concern that "the Judiciary Department
ought to be separate and distinct from the other great Departments."632
While the original intent argument would apply only to the federal courts, the
theoretical concerns underlying the exercise of this power could be applied to all high
630
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. Justice O'Connor was not as willing to endorse the
use of dicta. When asked what activities the Court should refrain from, he gave the following answer.
"Well, we should only decide... the issue that's before us and not reach out.... [T]he rulings we make are
supposed to be necessary to the decision of the case." Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May
1999.
1
It is interesting to note that the delegates from Massachusetts voted against such a proposal all four
times even though their own state constitution had contained a provision allowing for advisory opinions
since 1780. This could be because the delegates saw a difference between a veto power and an advisory
power, although there are legitimate separation of powers concerns in either instance.
632 Quoted in Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History ofthe Constitution (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1990), 77.
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courts in a system of separated powers. From the legislators' perspective, this power
can bring the judiciary into their realm - a clear violation of the understanding that the
legislature alone should make the laws. From the judicial perspective, an advisory role
for the justices could create a conflict between advising and their authority to
impartially interpret and apply the laws which come before them in a judicial
proceeding. How can one be impartial about a law one has had a hand in making?
And, will attempts to do so damage the reputation of the Court? A problem which is
ancillary to this involves the non-adversarial nature of an advisory request. Can the
justices reach a sound conclusion when they are not presented with information by two
sides, each with a vested interest in achieving their respective results?
Considering these problems - interference with the legislative process, conflict
with the judicial process, and the lack of an adversarial proceeding - how does one
justify the continued use of the advisory process in Massachusetts and the nine other
states in which this power is exercised?633 Some would argue that it can't be done. A
particularly strong criticism of this power is found in an article in the Detroit College of
Law Law Review. In this piece Mel Topf raises a series of concerns about this process
in an article entitled, "State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial
Review."
An aura of illegitimacy has always shadowed state supreme court
advisory opinions. In a constitutional system characterized by
J
3
This is obviously a theoretical question in those states with a constitutional provision like that in
Massachusetts. The other states whose constitutions contain advisory opinion provisions include:
Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. In Florida and
South Dakota only the governor is empowered to ask questions. Two states also have statutory
provisions which allow for advisory opinions: Alabama and Delaware. (Topf, "State Supreme Court
Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," Detroit College ofLaw Law Review 2001 [ 2001],
101-137, at 101.) An article in The National Law Journal indicates that almost half the states allowed or
required advisory opinions at one time (although there is no citation to support this position). Fred
Strasser, "Advisory Opinions: Legal Rarity," September 12, 1988, 3.
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constraints, the advisory opinion process has always been disturbingly
unconstrained. The ex parte nature of advisory proceedings has raiseddue process concerns persistently at least since 1820. Further, the extent
to which advisory opinions infringe on separation of powers has been
addressed at least since the 1787 Federal Convention and the rejection of
advisory opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1793. The absence of
adversarial procedures in the advisory opinion process has raised case
and controversy questions and called attention to the hypothetical
abstract, fact-deficient, prospective and unfocused nature of the
questions addressed to the advisory justices. Advisory opinions tend to
compel the justices' engagement in policy and politics, because most
advisory opinion provisions are mandatory upon the justices
challenging public confidence injudicial impartiality and independence
At the same time, the advisory process impinges on political activity of
the executive and legislature, and limits public participation in political
issues as the very availability of the process invites the political branches
not only to pass on controversial matters to the justices, but also to
surrender their obligation to independently assess the constitutionality of
an act.
A look at the Massachusetts experience with advisory opinions provides at least
a partial response to many of these concerns. The criticisms of Topf, and the
assumption of most who teach about the Supreme Court's unwillingness to issue
advisory opinions, rest on assumptions regarding the separation of powers which see
this structure as being inherently conflictual. The Massachusetts system provides an
alternative view - an advisory process which leads to discussion and collaboration
rather than conflict.
THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE - A REBUTTAL
There is little doubt that theoretical criticisms of the advisory opinion process in
a system of separated powers have some validity. Despite concerns about the conflict
Topf, 101
.
This is the opening paragraph of his article. While the quote is unusually long, it contains
almost all possible concerns regarding the advisory process. I would agree with Topf on part of his last
concern, that the legislature and executive may use this "to pass on controversial matters to the justices,"
just as they do in Massachusetts in common and statutory law with questions like the right-to-die. I hope
to show that his other concerns, however, do not play out in practice in Massachusetts.
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between these opinions and the institution of the separation of powers, the
Massachusetts Constitution contains provisions for both. While requiring the SJC to
give advisory opinions upon request, this document also contains language
guaranteeing a clear separation of powers between branches in Article 30 of the
Declaration of Rights.635 It is interesting to note, however, that an advisory power in
the hands of the SJC is no more inconsistent with a strict system of separated powers
than is the governor's veto power. Much of the difference from a contemporary
perspective lies not in theoretical arguments but in custom. Since all 51 political
systems in the United States have long experience with an executive veto, it is studied
not from a theoretical perspective but as a political practice. A look at the way in
which the advisory process has been practiced in Massachusetts is important to show
how theoretical concerns can be accommodated in practice.
HISTORY OF ADVISORY OPINIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS
Looking at the history of the advisory opinion process in Massachusetts
provides a reminder of the evolutionary way in which political institutions in America
have developed. An opinion issued by the SJC Justices in 1878 presents a brief history
of this process as it was inherited from Britain. It is interesting to note that while
concerns about maintaining the independence of the judiciary are not new, they did not
preclude British justices from participating in the advisory process.
This article [establishing the advisory process]... as may be inferred from
the form in which it was originally presented, evidently had in view the
635
"In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men."
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usage of the English Constitution, by which the King, as well as theHouse of Lords, whether acting in their judicial or in their legislative
capacity, had the right to demand the opinions of the twelve judges of
England. The practice of the Stuart kings, in taking extrajudicial
opinions of the judges upon questions about to come before them
judicially, was an unconstitutional abuse of the royal authority in this
respect. But, since the Revolution of 1688, so sturdy an asserter of theindependence of the judges as Lord Holt joined with the other judges of
the time in opinions to King William III upon the extent of the
pardon.
.
.and as late as 1760, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice Willes and
other judges, gave an opinion to King George II upon the jurisdiction of
a court martial[.]"636
It was a familiarity with this historic practice which probably led the framers of the
Massachusetts Constitution to include it in their charter in 1780. This is particularly
likely if it is remembered that the shift from "state" governance under colonial rule to
that under independence was very subtle, particularly in the judicial realm. 637
Recognizing this historic connection is not to say that the practice was without
its critics. During Massachusetts' 1820 Constitutional Convention the committee on
the judiciary recommended repealing the advisory opinion process. 638 As eminent a
judicial figure as Justice Story, perhaps reflecting his experiences on the U.S. Supreme
Opinion ofthe Justices, 126 Mass. 557 (1878), 561-562. All SJC advisory opinions are simply
referred to as either Opinion ofthe Justices or Opinions ofthe Justices (when the opinion contains a
concurrence or a dissent) so this will be eliminated in future cites in this chapter. The cases will be
distinguished by their citation and year.
637
See Chapter 2. This is the conclusion which was reached in an earlier study of the advisory process as
well. "Some commentators have suggested that John Adams and others involved in drafting and
adopting the Constitution of 1780 would have perceived no incongruity between advisoiy opinions and
separation of powers because such opinions to the King and House of Lords were common in English
practice and because Montesquieu, whose views on separation of powers greatly influenced early
Americans, had held up the British constitution as a model." Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory
Opinions," 354, citing a 1918 study by an A. Ellingwood entitled Departmental Cooperation in State
Government.
638
This committee included two individuals who were to be future justices of the SJC. (Farina,
"Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 355.) This attempt, as well as another in the
Constitutional Convention of 1853, failed. The reason for the failure was likely unrelated to the content
of the proposal, however. See Farina, 356-357.
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Court, spoke out against this practice at the Convention, seeing it as a violation of the
principle of separation of powers.639
Mr. Story, of Salem, said that it was exceedingly important that thejudiciary department should in the language of the constitution be
independent of the other departments; and for this purpose, thai it should
not be in the power of the latter to call in the Judges to aid them for any
purpose. If they were liable to be called on, there was extreme danger
that they would be required to give opinions in cases which should be
exclusively of a political character.... The power of calling on the judges
tor their opinion may be resorted to in times of political excitement with
the very view to make them odious, and to effect their removal from
office
...
It ought not be in the power of the other departments to involve
the judiciary in this manner.640
This quote points to a concern which no longer seems to occupy the minds of the state's
justices. While there arc potential separation of powers concerns about the advisory
process, the judiciary seems to have gained a sufficient degree of respect as a co-equal
branch of government that there is no longer a worry that the justices will be drawn into
a political fray by another branch just to entice the justices into a situation which may
damage their reputation. 641 This may have been a legitimate concern in 1820, but today
In "The Origins and Early History of Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions in Massachusetts,"
Topf presents an interesting appraisal of Story's role at the 1820 Convention as the first vocal opponent
of this process in recorded Massachusetts history. Topf connects this concern to what he calls Story's
"vision of a legal science."
640
Journal ofDebates and Proceedings ofthe Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1820-1821, at
72 (Boston, I s ' ed. 1853). (Quoted in Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions, 355.) The
following comment from a 1908 article written by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Maine
provides a similar view. "However diligent and sincere their [justices'] efforts to give correct answers,
they will give offence. If not openly accused they may be suspected of partisanship, of undue sympathy
with a class or some powerful interest, or with some political or economic dogma. The submission of
every such question is fraught with danger to the dignity of the Court and the reputation of the Justices
for judicial integrity and impartiality." Lucilius A. Emery, "Advisory Opinions from Justices," Maine
Law Review 2, quoted in Topf, "State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial
Review," 1 19.
641
In interviews, each of the justices was asked whether s/he had ever been concerned that the
Legislature would use the "checks" at its disposal to retaliate for an SJC opinion. To a person, the
justices noted that this was not a concern. Representative was the following quote from Justice Nolan.
"No, I'm bold enough to say that that not only was never discussed, but I don't think it was ever
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Justice Story's concerns seem outdated. This provides an example of how the
institution of the separate of powers has pers,sted over the years while its purposes
have changed. While some of the partisan interplay between legislators and executives
on both the state and national level indicate that these concerns are still valid in some
instances, the concern has diminished as regards the judiciary. 642
Two other concerns deserve more attention: whether advisory opinions promote
judicial interference in the legislative sphere and whether this process compromises the
judicial process itself. A look at the development of the advisory process since 1780
will show how the justices have adapted it to concerns over these separation of powers
issues.
ADVISORY OPINIONS - THE PROCESS
Were the justices of the SJC justified today in being concerned that the
legislature or the governor may look to harm them by the questions they present
through the advisory process, they have developed a mechanism to protect themselves.
Beginning in the second half of the 19 lh century the justices began refusing to respond
to certain requests if the question in their eyes did not present an "important question of
law" or a "solemn occasion." While both of these phrases had been in the Constitution
since 1780, it wasn't until 1877 that the justices used these terms for the first time as a
basis for refusing to answer a question in their advisory capacity which was otherwise
considered." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999. This is not to say that there has not been
some tension over the years in regard to administrative matters as was seen in Chapter 3.
h4
~ An example of this kind of interaction between executives and legislators can be seen in the game of
"chicken" which is often played around the executive veto -- Clinton's shut-down of the government in
1996 was a case in which the executive came out on the top in the game.
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properly proposed to them* ,„ lhc words of one commcmmo ,. m fa(
involved a ease which presented a "patent attempt to shortcut the adversary process."'""
It was perhaps this blatant attempt by one individual to abuse the advisory process
(with the acquiescence of the House of Reprcsentattves) which led the justices to break
with over one hundred years of consistently answering every question proposed to
them."5 Assuming that this was not the first such abuse of the process, the question of
why this assertion of power happened at this time and not earlier is difficult to ascertain
with certainty. It may simply reflect the development of a more mature set of
relationships between the judiciary and the other two branches of government in
Massachusetts. In Farina's words, "it reflects a progressively stronger sense ofjudicial
confidence and independence vis-a-vis the other branches, as well as an increased
sophistication in manipulating constitutional doctrine.""6
The fact that the advisory process has always presented a challenge to the
system of separated powers may help to explain this development. Originally, the
justices would respond to all questions presented while occasionally noting a reluctance
643
22 Mass. 600. This is not dissimilar from the practice used by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid
appeals coming to it from the state high courts by determing that they present no "substantial federal
question." Both are techniquest to give the respective courts more control over their docket. On the
federal level the need for this formula practically disappeared when almost all mandatory appeals to the
Supreme Court were eliminated in the Act to Improve the Administration of Justice. (See, Abraham, The
Judicial Process, 1 80.
644 r-1 • *
Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 380.
45
There appears to be some confusion about the first time this occurred. Farina's article contains a chart
of the percentage of cases over the years in which the justices refused to answer some or all of the
questions proposed in a request. (A request for an opinion can contain more than one question.) It shows
that in the 1810s they answered only some of the questions of a request in approximately 35% of the
cases. (Figure 1 1, 372.) However she makes no mention of these cases in the text. Topf also cites the
1877 case as the first refusal by the justices to answer a request. ("State Supreme Court Advisory
Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," 120.)
6 6
Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 374.
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because of a particularly strong separation of powers concern in specific cases.647 The
impact of the justices' responses in these cases was seen as limited by the tact that
advisory opinions were (and are) not binding. Speaking as a collection of individual
justices, these opinions do not have precedential value. Distinguishing these from
opinions of the Court, Justice Lynch said that when issuing an advisory opinion, "the
theory is that we're acting like a law firm [to the requesting body]."648
Upon analysis of the advisory opinion process in several states, Topf criticizes
the development of such a jurisprudence of refusal to answer questions, in part
questioning why the justices should have the responsibility for making this
determination and not the party asking the question. 649 He finds it to be an offshoot of
what he argues was evidence that despite what was said, advisory opinions were
generally treated as binding. 650 Less critical of the process, Farina hypothesizes that the
Following is an example. "As we have no means, in such case, of summoning the parties adversely
interested before us, or of inquiring, in a judicial course of proceeding, into the facts upon which the
controverted right depends... [an opinion] would be cont.ary to the plain dictates ofjustice, if such an
opinion could be considered as having the force of a judgment, binding on the rights of the parties But
as we understand that the session of the legislature is drawing to a close.. .and as an opinion upon an
abstract question, without any investigation of facts, and without argument, must be taken as an opinion
upon the precise question proposed, which cannot affect the rights of parties, should they hereafter be
brought before the court in a regular course ofjudicial proceeding, we have thought it best, without
further delay, to submit an opinion upon the questions proposed." 46 Mass. 596 (1844), 597-598.
M
* Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999. As a result of this, the signature of each of the
participating justices is contained on advisory opinions and the actual author is not identified. There are
occasional dissents which are also signed by each dissenting justice. There were dissents in 12% of the
advisory opinions issued from 1981 to 1995 (4 of 33). This corresponds with Farina's findings that 90%
of these opinions from 1780 to 1990 were unanimous. ("Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions,"
371
.) This is only slightly higher than the 9% dissent rate in the SJC's "traditional" opinions from 1981
to 1995.
649
This was the same question raised by the Massachusetts General Court. In 1 889, shortly after the
justices began refusing to answer some requests, the legislators adopted a resolution which read, in part,
as follows. "That the House of Representatives does not acquiesce in the conclusion of the justices as the
limitation of the authority of the House to require the opinions of the justice; and affirms the authority of
the House, under the constitution, to require their opinion upon said questions." (Quoted in Farina, 375.)
650
The precedential value of these opinions today will be discussed in more detail when reviewing the
impact of advisory opinions on judicial process which is discussed below.
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concerns regarding the advisory process wh.ch were expressed in constitutional
conventions to 1820 and ,853 led justices to be more cautious to avo.d future
criticisms.- These faded efforts a, "reform" may a,so have encouraged any justices
who were supporting the constitudonal proposals to eliminate this power to develop
their own method of keeping it within acceptable bounds to a system of separated
powers. 652
If the justices were going to refuse to answer questions unless they met the
constitutional requirements of presenting a "solemn occasion" or "an important
question of law," how were the other departments of government to know what this
meant? When may they expect to have their questions answered? One year after its
first refusal the justices provided an answer to this question which has remained the
basis of their jurisprudence on advisory opinions ever since.
The opinions of the Justices can be required only 'upon important
questions of law,' not upon questions of fact; 'and upon solemn
occasions,' that is to say when such questions of law are necessary to be
determined by the body making the inquiry, in the exercise of the
legislative or executive power entrusted to it by the constitution and laws
of the Commonwealth. No other limit of the authority to require the
opinions of the Justices is expressed in the Constitution. In giving such
opinions, the Justices do not act as a court, but as the constitutional
advisers for the other departments of the government, and it has never
been considered essential that the questions proposed should be such as
might come before them in their judicial capacity. 653
651
652
Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 374.
From a separation of powers perspective, it is interesting to note that in refusing to answer certain
questions, we see the Court removing itself from the exercise of political power rather than fighting for
more.
653
26 Mass. 557 (1878). The last sentence of this description also points to ways in which this power is
not limited. Other justiciability thresholds which must be met for traditional judicial cases need not be
met for advisory opinions. An obvious example would be concerns regarding ripeness.
It should be noted that this is the same opinion which establishes the history of this process back to
the Stuart kings. The extensive discussion of this power is different than in most other advisory opinions,
and provides an interesting example of the justices' recognition of the need to justify the changes they are
making in the advisory process.
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The justices adjusted the process of deeding advisory opinions in seeming
response to concerns regarding separation of powers. As.de from continuing to develop
the standards for when to respond to requests, the advisory opinion process is practiced
today in basically the same way as in the 1 870s.- The potential for a conflict with the
system of separated powers
,
however, remains. These include two specific concerns:
whether advisory opinions bring the judiciary into an unacceptable degree of
involvement with the legislative process and whether the process allows the legislators
to avoid responsibility for decisions they should be making. The analysis in the pages
which follow of the twenty-eight substantive advisory opinions issued by the SJC
between 1981 and 1995 show that neither of these theoretical problems present a great
challenge to either the judiciary or the legislative branch in Massachusetts. 655
THE ADVISORY PROCESS - ENCOURAGING JUDICIAL LEGISLATING?
In some ways the concern ofjustices being too involved in "policy and politics-
is no different from concerns about judicial review.656 In one way this practice could
be seen as more legitimate in that it is specifically established in the state's
A more detailed look at the kinds and numbers of questions which the justices refuse to answer is
presented in the discussion of the conflict between advisory opinions and the judicial process which is
found below.
655
While there were 33 advisory opinions in these years, live of these were cases in which the justices
refused to answer any of the questions proposed. Aside from an indication of when justices may refuse
to answer questions, these opinions presented no substantive information. These opinions are all called
Answer ofthe Justices, as distinguished from the title Opinion ofthe Justices which is used in those cases
in which the justices do answer some or all of the questions. These 5 Answers to the Justices can be
found at: 399 Mass. 1201 (1987); 401 Mass. 1234 (1988); 406 Mass. 1220 (1985); 409 Mass. 1201
(1991); and 413 Mass. 1219(1992).
This quote comes from Topfs criticism in "State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate
Judicial Review," 101
.
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constitution."" This provides another indication that at least in Massachusetts the
concept of separation of powers has been an evolving concept. When the General
Court was allowed to be involved in a variety ofjudicial matters into the 1800s, would
an advisory process seem so unusual?- It is also interesting that the move away from
such a blending of powers to a greater "specialization" within the branches involved not
one branch pushing the other to give up certain duties but each branch choosing to give
up certain powers. On one hand the Legislature stopped its involvement in divorce
proceedings on its own while the justices limited their involvement in the advisory
process by their own refusal to answer certain questions. This is not the "ambition
countering ambition" view of separation of powers with which we are most familiar.
Assuming, then, that judicial review, whether constitutionally sanctioned or not,
is a legitimate power of the Court, how does the advisory process involve the justices in
the legislative realm to any greater degree than does judicial review? In a "traditional"
opinion of the Court in 1988 the SJC decided that a legislative provision which allowed
for videotape testimony of certain child witnesses in criminal proceedings violated
defendants' article 12 rights to confront witnesses against them. 659 In 1989, seven
justices signed onto an advisory opinion which declared that a proposed law which
would allow certain out of court statements of child witnesses to be admitted in
evidence would similarly violate article 12 of the Declaration of Rights. 660 Looking at
Perhaps that turns the title of Topf s article on its head - Judicial Review as Illegitimate Advisory
Opinions?
658
See Chapter 2 for a discussion of these responsibilities of the Legislature.
659 Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 412 Mass. 534.
660
406 Mass. 1201
.
As with tort reform and the death penalty, these two cases provide an interesting
example of the ongoing dialogue which can occur between the SJC and the Legislature. When the Court
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the degree ofjudicial involvement in the legislative sphere, how do these two decisions
differ? In regard to legitimacy, there seems to be no difference.
There does seem to be a pragmatic difference, however. As Justice O'Connor
noted, if an unconstitutional bill becomes law, it could entail an expenditure of time and
money by various actors which may ultimately be for naught when the law is later
challenged before the court and struck down.
I think it's a good idea that we have that power [advisory opinionsl
because otherwise what you're saying is go ahead and do it and down
the road we 11 tell you you couldn't. And on a difficult issue.
. .to say
well, go do it and we'll spend fifty million hours and fifty million dollars
and we 11 get everybody's hopes up or everybody mad at you anddown the road we're going to say, well you can't do that, that doesn't
make any sense.
A perfect example of how such a problem was avoided involved two advisory
opinions from 1960 which dealt with the development of certain land in the Back Bay
area of Boston. 662 That land is known today as the Prudential Center, a major area for
offices and shops in the city. Millions of dollars were involved in this development,
declared that videotape testimony out of the defendant's view was unconstitutional, legislators attempted
to accomplish a similar goal (protecting an alleged child victim from the potential harm of testifying in a
sexual abuse trial) in a different way. Again, however, the justices indicated (this time in the advisory
opinion) that this would not be acceptable. The Legislature persisted. In 1990 the Legislature enacted
Statute 339 which presented a modified version of the bill found to be unacceptable to the 7 justices in
the 1989 advisory opinion. In Commonwealth v. Colin C. (419 Mass. 54 [1994]) the justices were asked
to rule on the constitutionality of this new statute. Since the case was remanded on other grounds they
refused to answer the constitutional question directly. However, as questions would be raised about the
applicable statute (G.L. c.233, §81) on remand, the Court addressed some possible concerns. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Liacos said, "[t]he present statute, for the most part, seems to address the
concerns we expressed in Opinion of the Justices, supra. We would, however, impose a further
requirement for the use of child hearsay statements pursuant to the statute. We believe that, if a child
witness's out-of-court statements are to be admitted substantively, there must be other evidence,
independently admitted, that corroborates those hearsay statements." (62.)
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Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999. Chief Justice Wilkins voiced a similar position.
"It [advisory opinion process] provides a handy means of straightening out a problem before it becomes a
problem - to clear up some issue which, once the bill is passed might have to produce a lawsuit, and
during the time of the lawsuit's life, which could be years, everything is up in the air." Interview by
author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
662
341 Mass. 738 and 341 Mass. 760.
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and the state's role was essential. These opinions of the Court were, as Chief Justice
Wilkins noted in an understated way, "beneficial »663 A key concern regarding this
project (and other renovation projects of the 1960s and 70s) was whether this was a
project sufficiently imbued with a public interest to justify expenditure of public funds
or whether this was an attempt to aid private investors under the guise of urban
renewal. 664 The importance of the role of the justices in this instance can be seen from
the following quote contained in the first of the opinions.
The Governor's message points out that "The [Massachusetts Turnpikel
Authority has conferred at length with the Prudential and has developed
an arrangement, formally approved in principle" by Prudential; and that
Prudential has formally voted and publicly stated that if the proposed
legislation, including the tax exemption and indemnity provisions is
enacted and its constitutionality assured by an advisory opinion it will
go ahead with its part of the project."665
The justices found several problems with this proposed legislation, but they
were problems which could be rectified. 666 The opinion outlines these problems, and
then closes with the following paragraph. "To question 1 we answer 'No.' The other
questions are so interwoven with question 1 that no answers are presently required. We
must answer only with respect to the pending bill. Many of the questions ifdirected to
663
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
664
This is the political formation of the question. The legal questions were much more complicated. The
two advisory opinions included a total of 21 questions which were presented to the justices.
665
341 Mass. 738, at 747-748. This is an example of how the advisory process may be viewed as
binding. This is despite that fact that the justices, citing Bowe v. Secretary ofthe Commonwealth, 320
Mass. 230 (1946), continue in the next sentence to warn the parties that these opinions are "are advisory
in nature, given by justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisors of the other
department of government and without the aide of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do
not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis."
6
Proposed legislation for this opinion was House Bill No.3093, "An Act authorizing the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority to finance and construct, in connection with the construction of its turnpike into
Boston, a public truck terminal and a public garage in Boston, and providing for operation of such
terminal and garage, leasing rights to construct and use building units and other improvements, service
charges to the city of Boston, and related matters."
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an appropriate till relating to a clearly defined projectfor a putUc purpose would
present themselves in a different aspect.""7 The bill covered by the second .960
advisory, S.634, "An Act concerning the development or redevelopment of blighted
open areas, deeadent areas and sub-standard areas by urban redevelopment eorporat.ons
w.th special provisions for projects in the eity of Boston," was generally found to be
constitutionally acceptable by the justices. In 1961, after a final version of this law had
been enacted, a suit was brought seeking declaratory relief against the Prudential Center
project. The SJC found the project to be constitutional on all challenged grounds.
Chief Justice Wilkins described this interchange as follows. In the advisory opinions
the Justices said, "No, you haven't got it right.. .but if you did this, turned this knob and
pushed that button.
.
.you'd be OK." He further explained, "And then they did that, and
just to make sure a lawsuit was brought because [an] opinion of the justices is not a
decision of the Court[.] A lawsuit was brought just to get a declaratory judgment that
we really meant it when we said it the first time."668
From a purely pragmatic perspective, the advisory process allowed this
complicated public-private transaction to proceed more smoothly. It helped to
guarantee the kind of certainty that investors are looking for when engaging in
transactions involving large sums of time or money. Since the nature of this legislation
6
757, emphasis added.
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. An even earlier example of this was shared by the
Chief Justice in his interview. "There was an advisory opinion early on with respect to the
constitutionality of compulsory motor vehicle insurance, covering a wide range of issues. [Opinion of
the Justices, 271 Mass. 582 (1930).] [It] put all of them to rest, and it wasn't for decades, I think that's
the right word, before somebody even thought to challenge in court anything that related to what had
been decided." Perhaps decade is more appropriate. A Lexis search under "motor vehicle liability
insurance" and "constitutional" shows that the first challenge to the statute as applied appears to have
been in 1940 (Mulligan v. Hilton, 302 Mass. 5) and to the statute on its face in 1941 {Service Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. v. Aronofsky, 308 Mass. 249).
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is such that it would have been challenged after passage whether the Legislature had
requested an opinion or not, the degree ofjudicial involvement is no different than in
exercising judical review. This same view could be held of three of the advisory
opinions which the justices wrote between 1981 and 1995. These opinions all involved
proposals for establishing or coordinating large scale financial investments. The first
opinion concerned the development of a "Massachusetts Development Bank" to
provide funding and support for needed infrastructure repair in the state. 669 Before the
state began assessing the corporate tax to fund this bank it made sense for its
constitutionality to be reviewed in advance. Would there have been great harm in this
instance if the question of the statute's constitutionality had not been raised until after
passage of the act? Perhaps not, but since the Legislature was concerned about the
"urgent need to repair, rehabilitate, and replace unsafe and outmoded highways,
bridges, tunnels" and recognized that "governmental units within [the Commonwealth]
...are unable to undertake these infrastructure projects," its desire to create "new
revenues and new financing mechanisms" would be met most surely by guaranteeing
that all potential problems with the bill were ironed out in advance. 670
The same could be said for the second example which involved a proposal to
change the source of funding for the Massachusetts Convention Center Authority.
According to the justices this proposal to set aside a portion of the state's receipts from
the hotel-motel tax to fund the Authority would violate article 63 of the Articles of
669
393 Mass. 1209 (1984). While the justices found no constitutional problems with any of the proposed
questions, the Mass/Bank was never developed. This case, like several others raised in these years,
makes one wonder why the Legislature asked for the justices' opinion and then did not pass the law.
670
1 21 1.
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Amendment which establishes procedures for budge, and appropriation matters.6" The
proposal was never enacted.
Another example of an advisory opinion serving as a pragmatic response to .he
challenges facing the Legislature in attempting to implement its plans was found in .he
justices' response in 19X7 to a series of questions on proposed legislation for
restructuring the state's savings bank life insurance system/'72 As this legislation would
change the existing savings bank life insurance system and would affect all banks in the
Commonwealth, it is clear that it would have faced challenges at some point. This
simply enabled legislators and those involved with the banking industry to eliminate all
potential problems a little earlier in the process. In this case the justices found there
were no problems with the legislation. The bill was enacted in 1990.673
It is interesting to note that this was one of only three opinions out of the 33
issued in these years in which a) the justices issued an opinion stating that the law
would be constitutional and b) the bill was eventually enacted. Overall, in ten of the
thirty-three statutes under consideration by the justices in their advisory capacity they
found no constitutional problems. Three were eventually enacted, one was enacted
with substantial changes (unrelated to any comments by the justices), and three were
''
' 396 Mass. 1201 (1985). The politics behind this proposal are more complicated than one might
expect. The Massachusetts Convention Center Authority, created in 1982, was a special project of the
powerful Senate President William Bulger, and its operation created controversy throughout the 1980s.
Part of this was due to the fact that Fran Joyce, the Executive Director of the Authority, was a close
friend of Bulger. In addition, the Authority was involved in questions of replacing Boston Garden, a
"sacred" Massachusetts institution. Bulger may no longer be President of the Senate but Joyce is still the
subject of conflict. Sec, for instance, Steve Bailey, "Downtown/Steve Bailey; and the Winner Is..."
Boston Globe, May 3, 2000, 1)1
.
672
401 Mass. 1211. The same questions had been raised in 1986 but the justices had
"regretfully... declined to answer the questions" since they had been submitted to the justices loo late in
the legislative session for the justices to solicit briefs from interested parties or to thoughtfully consider
the questions. (Answer of the Justices, 399 Mass. 1201, at 1205)
673
Statute 1990, chapter 449.
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never enaeted. < (The other three, eoneerning the governor's veto authority or
questions on the initiative and referendum process, are more procedural than
substantive and will be discussed below.) Even when the justices give their stamp of
approval the legislators may not always choose to act.
In looking at the legitimacy of advisory opinions in a system of separated
powers, it appears as though the process is at least as legitimate as that ofjudicial
review. If separation of powers was intended, at least in part, to further the efficient
operation of government, and if most Americans have come to accept that the justices
have an expertise (even if they are not the only experts) in constitutional law, the
advisory opinion process is perfectly logical and consistent with this institution. When
combined with the pragmatic benefits already noted the argument that advisory
opinions involve the judiciary too deeply in the legislative realm is weakened. At least
in those cases in which the question of a law's constitutionality is almost certain to be
raised by interested parties after the bill has passed, the only thing that changes is the
timing of the question. This should not affect the legitimacy of the justices' activities,
although it may affect the legislative process - so we turn to that question next.
THE ADVISORY PROCESS - LETTING THE LEGISLATURE OFF THE
HOOK?
One point which should be noted from the start is that if the legislative process
is affected in any way, positively or negatively, this happens almost exclusively at the
The other opinions involving statutes which were eventually enacted are 408 Mass. 1201 (1990) (the
constitutionality of tax on services) and 408 Mass. 1215 (1990) (clarifying titles on certain Nantucket
property). One enacted with changes was 390 Mass. 1201 (1984) (amending state's anti-discrimination
statutes to include sexual orientation). Three which considered legislation which was never enacted
include the opinion on the Mass/Bank discussed above and two opinions involving the question of
settling title questions regarding certain Boston tidelands (383 Mass. 895 [1981] and 383 Mass. 927
[1981]).
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request of the Legislature itself. While this may not justify any negative effect, it is
different from the process ofjudicial review. However, even if advisory opinions
produce no greater interference by the judiciary in the legislative sphere overall, there is
still the possibility that the ability of the Legislature to request adviee from the justices
may be detrimental to the process established by the separation of powers. 675 In one
way this concern is similar to Justice Frankfurter's concerns about judicial review -
once the court becomes involved the degree of broader political participation in a
question diminishes. 676 In the words of Topf, the advisory process "limits public
participation in political issues as the very availability of the process invites the
political branches not only to pass on controversial matters to the justices but also to
surrender their obligation to independently assess the constitutionality of an act."677
If one looks back at the advisory process in Massachusetts over time, however,
these concerns are not borne out. From 1780 to 1990 the justices issued less than two
advisory opinions per year. If the 1981-1995 era is any indication, the numbers have
increased minimally, to 2.2 opinions per year. 678 With thousands of bills considered by
the State Legislature each year, the fact that questions are raised on only two pieces of
legislation shows that advisory opinions are only a part of the legislative process,
I have been referring predominantly to questions propounded by "the Legislature." This needs some
clarification. In the fifteen years under analysis 16 sets of questions came from the Senate, 14 from the
House of Representatives, and 3 from the Governor. Therefore, questions which come from "the
Legislature" are really coming from one house or another. Of the three answers to the Governor, two
dealt with the constitutionality of specific legislative acts which the Governor was considering vetoing,
and only one dealt exclusively with Executive authority. This one will be discussed in more detail
below.
676
Justice Frankfurter's position is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
677
"State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," 101
.
678
Farina's data in "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions" shows that while the average is less
than two per year, "the vast majority of requests have come since 1910." (357)
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leaving ample opportunity for broader public participation in policymaking. Added to
this is the fact that many of the opinions which the justices issue under their advisory
power are informed by a variety of amicus briefs. There was substantially more amicus
participation in these cases than in the SJC's "traditional" caseload. While there were
briefs filed in 12% of all traditional cases and in just under 30% of those cases raising
questions ofjudicial review, amicus curiae briefs were filed in almost 70% of the
advisory cases. 679 These questions actually benefited from more public participation
than those raised in cases involving "traditional" judicial review. Over 104 briefs
involving 144 parties were submitted for consideration by the justices in the thirty-three
advisory cases decided between 1981 and 1995. These bills benefited from the full
range of participation in the legislative process and from additional public input at the
Court.
680
The other way in which advisory opinions may affect the legislative process is
that they may allow legislators to avoid their responsibility for independently assessing
the constitutional legitimacy of their actions. The fact that the SJC makes
pronouncements on the constitutionality of statutes should not excuse elected officials
from considering the relationship between their actions and the constitutional
679
Data compiled by author. This extensive involvement should not be a surprise as the justices must
hear from amici if they want to create some semblance of an adversarial process.
680 An example of this extensive involvement can be seen in a 1986 opinion (397 Mass. 1 20 1 ) in which
the Senate presented seven questions to the justices on a bill which was drafted to implement an initiative
measure regarding citing of facilities for storage or disposal of low-level radioactive waste which was
approved by the voters in the 1982 election. First the voters spoke; then the Senate gave full
consideration to the bill to implement this; then fifteen interest groups and industry representatives filed
eight amicus curiae briefs for the justices' consideration. The justices found several problems with the
proposed bill. In 1987 the Legislature enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act
(chapter 549) which must have resolved the constitutional concerns as there have been no cases brought
to the SJC in which the constitutionality of the act has been challenged. Considering the array of
interests on both sides of this question (environmentalists on one side and various utilities and hospitals
on the other) we can be certain that any constitutional concerns would have been raised.
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framework within which they operate.- If the Legislature ean pass these questions off
to the justices before a bill is enacted, it is easier for them to shirk their responsibilities.
All justices recognized that this possibility exists. Justice Nolan, as was his wont, was
most direct in noting that there may be specific instances when the Legislature may
have used the process for more political reasons. "Once in a while we got the
impression that they were trying to drop a hot potato on us, which is all right. They
have every right to drop hot potatoes on us as long as it's a solemn occasion[.]"682
Using different language, Justice Abrams also recognized this possibility. "If they
[legislators]... have a... real constitutional dilemma it is helpful to be able to say that the
court says we can't do it. Especially if they have constituencies that are pushing [for
their] support."683
To determine whether this creates any problem for a system of separated powers
it is helpful to look at some of the opinions which could conceivably be seen as falling
within this category. There were eight advisory opinions issued between 1981 and
1995 for which this would be a plausible explanation as to why the questions were
raised. Having already seen in Chapter Five that there were, over the years, a number
of attempts to enact some form of progressive income tax despite constitutional
prohibitions, it should not be surprising that there were also advisory opinions dealing
When asked whether the Legislature has a role to play in constitutional interpretation, Chief Justice
Wilkins said that while they do have a responsibility to the Constitution, "they also may feel that... it's
not their job to resolve close constitutional questions." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
There are many legal theorists who are critical of the assumption that the constitutional discourse should
be confined to the courts. See, Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Awayfrom the Courts (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000) and Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers
and Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001 ).
682
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.
683
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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with this question. Parties encouragmg progressive tax reform filed a bill in 1981 to set
the state income tax as a fixed percentage of an individual's federal tax and in 1982 the
Legislature considered a measure to institute progressive tax exemptions. In both
instances the House of Representatives requested an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of the statute in light of article 44 of the Articles of Amendment. The
justices found problems with both bills.-4 In 1986 the constitutionality of a statute
establishing a structure of progressive tax deductions, a statute not unlike the bill which
the justices considered in their advisory capacity in 1982, was challenged in a case
before the Court. The Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. 685 It is hard to
see how the Legislature's asking for the justices' opinion on the two bills in 1981 and
1982 shows the legislators to be any less concerned about the constitutional
ramifications of their actions than in 1985 when they passed the law which was struck
down the following year by the SJC. One could just as easily argue that the legislators
were being more conscientious and, facing what they may have seen as a close
constitutional question, turned to the justices for advice. Is this any more damaging to
the legislative process or more challenging to an understanding of democratic
accountability than is passage of a bill later declared unconstitutional?686
This is not to deny that there may be instances in which it is "helpful" in the
words of Justice Abrams for the justices to handle some of what Justice Nolan would
684
383 Mass. 940 (1981); 386 Mass. 1223 (1982).
685
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation v. Secretary ofAdministration , 398 Mass. 40.
686
The fact that a bill regarding progressive tax exemptions was sent to the justices for an advisory
opinion in 1982, while a bill on the same subject was enacted without such a request in 1985 may,
however, reflect the increase in political power of the progressive tax reform lobby in Massachusetts.
Loosely organized in the early 1980's, a variety of advocacy groups joined together in the mid-1980's to
create the Tax Equity Alliance of Massachusetts (TEAM) to better coordinate efforts in working toward a
more progressive tax structure in Massachusetts.
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call "hot potatoes." For instance, in 1984 the Senate sent questions to the justices on
S-2166, "An Aet to increase opportunities for Massachusetts residents on state-funded
projects." This bill was not unlike the statute which had been struck down as
unconstitutional in 1981 under the Article IV privileges and immunities Cause of the
U.S. Constitution.687 Initiated because of the unemployment problems facing the state,
the bill would have given preference in hiring to state res,dents in certain publicly
funded contracts. Considering the Court's opinion in 1981 it was not likely that they
would reach a different conclusion in 1984 (and they did not). 688 Perhaps the
legislators could have just said this to those most interested in the legislation (worker
and union interests). Rather than confront good campaign contributors, however, it
may have been easier to pass the bill along to the justices for their advice. In a similar
vein, the request from the House of Representatives in 1994 asking whether a certain
campaign finance bill would limit rights of free speech and association under the U.S.
Constitution could have taken the heat off the legislators. While many of the elected
legislators may not have been in favor of this bill which would limit the amount of
money candidates for state office could raise in non-election years, publicly stating
one's opposition to a bill called "An Act for accountable politics" would not be an act
of smart politics. Getting a statement from the justices that this bill ran contrary to First
Amendment protections as established by precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court got
them "off the hook."689
687
Massachusetts Council ofConstruction Employers v. Mayor ofBoston, 384 Mass. 466.
ft8K
393 Mass. 1201.
689
418 Mass. 1201. While not as certain, it is likely that two other requests were motivated by concerns
of political expediency. Not unlike questions on campaign finance reform, the Senate raised questions in
1985 on a proposal to impose criminal penalties for violations of confidentiality of certain proceedings
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The 1987 request for an opinion on a bill which would have allowed tax
deductions for educational expenses at both private and public schools was similar.
The "anti-aid" amendment in the Massachusetts Constitution (art. 46 of the Articles of
Amendment) is more specific than the language of the Establishment Clause in the
First Amendment
- any aid to private schools (secular or parochial) is prohibited. It is
fairly clear that the proposed bill would have violated this amendment. Asking the
justices for this opinion enabled the legislators to "consider" this legislation (pleasing
the parochial school constituency) while never enacting it (keeping the teachers' unions
happy). 690
One other opinion issued in these years which clearly involved a controversial
issue concerned a House request on the constitutionality of a bill to provide for
voluntary prayer or meditation in public schools. Five of the justices, following
Supreme Court precedent on the Establishment Clause, stated that the bill would violate
the First Amendment. 691 In addition, these justices found the bill to be "almost
indistinguishable in substance from the statute this court held unconstitutional in Kent
before the State Ethics Commission. (The justices determined that the proposed bill would violate free
speech rights protected by the First Amendment - 396 Mass. 1211.) While the legislators may have
known that this statute was unconstitutional, it doesn't look very good to be voting against strenethenintr
conflict of interest laws.
Avoiding unnecessary political conflict could also have been the motive behind a 1982 request in
which the Senate asked for an opinion from the justices on a bill which would have established
procedures by which counties could establish charters. There has been conflict over the reform of county
government over the last 20 years and the conflict is of the type that is particularly challenging to the
Legislature. Rather than dividing officials along party lines, differences often result from geography. It
may be more "cost-effective" for the Legislature to see if the proposal is constitutional before expending
political energies to resolve these differences. In 387 Mass. 1209 the justices found that a portion of the
bill would violate the Home Rule Amendment.
690
401 Mass. 1201.
691
387 Mass. 1201 (1982). Justices Nolan and Lynch issued a separate, dissenting opinion on this
question, finding this bill to be indistinguishable from the action of using public funds to pay chaplains
for the House and the Senate when part of their responsibility is to open the sessions of the respective
bodies with a prayer which the SJC upheld in Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 378 Mass. 550
(1979).
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v. Commissioner ofEducation, 380 Mass. 235 (1980)." It may have been possible that
the representatives were looking to the justices to make just this determination so they
could tell the interested constituencies that "no matter how much we may want to enact
this legislation,
'the court' tells us we can't." This case, and the seven discussed above,
are cases in which one can assume that the legislators may have been looking to the
justices to "get them off the hook."
There was one other opinion which could appear at first glance to be a case of
using the advisory process to assist the legislators out of a politically challenging
situation, although the legislators' incentives are less clear upon further analysis. It
concerned their 1984 request on the constitutionality of H.6665, "An Act eliminating
certain discrimination on the basis of sexual preference." The challenge was aimed
specifically at the portion of the statute which would provide criminal penalties for its
violation. The Senate asked whether the term "sexual preference" is unconstitutionally
vague and therefore void under due process guarantees. The justices found no such
problems with the proposed law. 692 This does not seem to be the response for which
the Legislature was hoping. First, the Senate sent the request to the justices on
November 15, 1983. Considering the fact that the bill could not be considered after the
first Wednesday in January when the new legislative session began, and that there were
two major holidays before then, the legislators could have been hoping that, absent a
substantive response to their liking, the justices would refuse to answer due to a lack of
• 693
time. It is interesting that the justices, instead, did respond, although not until
692 390 Mass. 1201.
693
The justices were clearly aware that the Legislature may occasionally time their requests in this way.
Representative of this is Chief Justice Wilkins comment. "Occasionally one may have the sense... that
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January 3
r
,
one day before the new leglslative session was to begin. At the risk of
reading too mueh into the timing, this could have been an instance of the justices
wanting to respond, but not wanting to force the Legislature's hand. 694 The presence of
amicus briefs indicated that there was active political participation on this question, so
perhaps the justices wanted to assist the Legislature with this timing while still
responding to the question. 695 The Legislature took a good deal of time considering the
justices' response. It wasn't until five years later in 1989 that the G.L. c.272, §92A
which criminalizes discrimination in public accommodations was amended to include
sexual orientation.696
While suppositions can be offered in almost one-quarter of the cases (eight out
of thirty-three) that the Legislature was taking advantage of advisory opinions, most of
the justices clearly felt that neither the Legislature nor the Governor abused this
process. Chief Justice Wilkins noted that "on balance the advisory opinion system has
worked very well." This was echoed by Justice O'Connor when he said the requests
"always seemed legitimate to me." Justice Abrams, however, was a little more critical.
When asked if she thought that over the years the advisory requests she'd seen were
the request for an advisory [opinion] is sent over here as a way to kill it. . .they will send it over late
enough so they hope we won't answer it in time, before they prorogue. We occasionally disappoint them
by answering it rather more promptly than they'd hoped." Interview by author, Boston MA 23 April
1999.
694 Of course there could also be nothing more to the timing than the fact that January 3 rd is when the
justices finished their opinion. As the saying goes, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.
695 Amicus briefs were filed for consideration by the justices on these questions by: Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders, Inc., the Massachusetts Gay Political Caucus, the Massachusetts Teachers
Association, and The First Church of Christ Scientist in Boston.
696
Statute 1989, c.5 1 6, § 1 5. It is also interesting to note that rather than adding sexual orientation to a
list of characteristics, the following language was added: "sexual orientation, which shall not include
persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children as the sex object." This addition adds more
weight to the assumption that the Legislature was feeling "conflicted" about this piece of legislation.
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generally ones she eonsidered to be reasonable uses of that power, she responded as
follows. '<] don't think there is a general rule. I think that sometimes the Legislature
sends us this because they don't want to do it. Sometimes they send it at the end of the
session and then we say 'not a solemn occasion.' Sometimes they send it because they
really don't want to do something."697
None of the seventeen advisory opinions discussed to this point necessarily
skewed the legislative process. These opinions simply changed the timing of the result.
While the legislators could have been using the process in a few of these instances to
avoid political damage, it was generally in cases when they knew (or should have
known) that precedent would likely have led to striking down the law. This is not very
different from the Legislature enacting a law which they know to be unconstitutional
under an assumption that the justices will strike it down, thereby saving them from
having to make a hard political decision - the federal flag burning statute comes
immediately to mind here. 698 Furthermore, in several of these cases the early decision
of the justices could assist the Legislature (and other parties with a financial or other
interest in the opinion) in responding as needed to ensure that their goals could be met
constitutionally. The advisory process in practice appears to pose no greater threat to
Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999; Justice O'Connor, Interview
by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999; Justice Abrams, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May
1999. Justice Lynch also made the following interesting observation about this process. "I've noticed
that we frequently get more requests for advisory opinions in election years than in non-election years.
And... I'll leave it to you to figure out why that is." (Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.)
h9x
In 1989 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute which prohibited desecration of the American
Flag as a violation of First Amendment freedom of expression. (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.) There
was a fair degree of public outrage at this decision. Congress responded, in part, by enacting the Federal
Flag Protection Act that same year, a law which the Court also struck down. (17.5. v. Eichman. 496 U.S.
3 1 0[ 1 990].) One can't help but wonder if the legislators would have been so willing to enact the law if
they couldn't depend on the Supreme Court to uphold First Amendment freedoms. For a history of this
conflict, see Robert Justin Goldstein, Burning the Flag: The Great 1989-1990 American Flag
Desecration Controversy (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996).
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the legislative process than does judicial review and, in some cases, may have
pragmatic benefits which make it a better option than judicial review.
The similarity between the two processes can be seen by looking at two requests
to the justices which involved proposed criminal statutes. The questions raised in these
cases were identical to those which a defense counselor would raise after the law had
been enacted. In all three cases it is apparent that the state's elected representatives
were seriously considering the constitutional ramifications of their actions. Far from
allowing them to renege on their responsibilities, these questions show the legislators to
be actively engaged in a dialogue with the justices on the constitutional legitimacy of
their actions. For instance, the Senate asked for an opinion in 1992 on a proposed piece
of legislation which would affect the rules of evidence in criminal proceedings,
allowing the refusal to take a breathalyzer to be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial.
This seems like the perfect case for the legislators to ask for advice from the justices as
the elected representatives could be unsure of the answer to the question. The U.S.
Supreme Court had determined that such a procedure would not violate the 5 th
Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination but the SJC had been providing
greater protections to Massachusetts residents through the cognate provision of the
Declaration of Rights. Particularly if there would be some way to "save" the
legislation, wouldn't it make sense for its proponents to save time and find this out in
advance? In this instance, the justices informed the Legislature that the bill would
violate art. 12 of the Declaration.699
6 9
412 Mass. 1201. The protection against self-incrimination was also the subject of the 1989 opinion
involving the proposal to allow for the admission of certain out-of-court statements of child witnesses in
criminal trials which was discussed above. (406 Mass. 1201 [1989].) In light of the SJC's determination
that a statute involving child witnesses was found unconstitutional the year before, the request for an
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The Legislature would perhaps have benefited similarly on a response to their
request for an opinion on a proposed bail reform statute in 1988. The justices refused
to answer, however, as they had received the request too late to "permit interested
parties to prepare and file briefs, and to permit sufficient deliberation by the Justices
thereafter."700 The legislators did not choose to resubmit questions when they
considered a similar bill in 1992. Perhaps their time would have been better spent if
they had since the SJC struck down this law in Aims v. Commonwealth™ What if the
justices had made this statement in an advisory capacity in 1988 rather than as a full
opinion of the Court after the law had been enacted in 1993? Would this have
interfered substantially with the legislative process? It is hard to see how. Again, there
is little difference between the practice ofjudicial review and that of issuing advisory
opinions. While one can be critical of both powers, it is difficult to see how the
advisory opinion practice in Massachusetts is more damaging to the legislature in a
system of separated powers than is the practice ofjudicial review. 702
In looking at the final nine advisory opinions issued in the 1980s and early 90s,
the justices play what may be considered their "ideal" role in a democratic system of
separated powers. Four of these cases concerned questions of overseeing the
democratic process while the other five involve the justices as arbiters between the two
opinion on the new legislation also seems quite reasonable. This shows the Legislature engaging in a
dialogue with the justices in an attempt to accomplish a goal but to do so within the limits set by the
federal and state constitutions.
700
Answer ofthe Justices, 401 Mass. 1234, at 1235.
701 414 Mass. 667 (1993).
702
It is possible, however, that passage of legislation puts more pressure on the Court to uphold
legislative action. The Court's willingness to act on questions like the death penalty in a way which
challenges the Legislature and the voters, however, makes this questionable.
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more democrat, branches of government. Even individuals who are concerned about
the rarmfications ofjudicial policymaking would generally be more accepting of
judicial activity in these realms. And a closer look at the cases will show that to the
degree that one can make a distinction between process and substance, the justices
place themselves consistently on the process side of these questions.
Four advisory opinions can be categorized as involving democratic process
questions
- two entail questions about the initiative and referendum process, one about
the Home Rule process, and one about ballot access. All four asked the justices to give
advice on procedure. For instance, the Home Rule Amendment prohibits legislation
substantially affecting only one city or town in Massachusetts unless it falls into one of
three categories. 703 While it was clear that the bill under consideration in the 1993
request would not be acceptable under two of the categories, the justices were asked
whether it was acceptable under the third. As the Home Rule Amendment exists to
protect the local governments from encroachment by the state, the role of the justices in
this instance is really one of "referee," making sure the Legislature doesn't overstep its
bounds and impose its will on residents of a locality against their will. In this instance,
the justices decided that a proposal to study the possibility of incorporating certain
wards in Boston into a new city was not a vote to officially create a new city and
therefore could not be considered by the Legislature. 704
703 *
Article 89 of the Article of Amendment. A bill affecting one city or town may be enacted: a) at the
request of the locality; b) upon request of the Governor with approval of 2/3 of both houses of the
Legislature; or c) if it deals with the creation or dissolution of a city or town.
7J4
416 Mass. 1201
.
There were other options open to proponents of this law, even if the Legislature
chose to follow the justices' opinion. As noted by Representative Byron Rushing, sponsor of the bill, "if
the SJC rules that the bill is illegal, advocates could either lobby the City Council to pass a home-rule
petition or raise private money to fund the feasibility study." Adrian Walker, "Panel OK Predicted for
Secession Vote," Boston Globe, June 2, 1993, 26.
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The two requests sent to the justices in these years regarding the initiative and
referendum proeess are very similar to the nineteen procedural questions on this
process which came to the Court through the traditional route during these same years.
The only difference is that it was the legislators who chose to ra.se questions as to
whether the proposed referenda were allowable under art. 48 of the Articles of
Amendment rather than interested citizens who filed suit after legislative approval to
remove the question from the ballot before the election. 7- One involved the perennial
question of tax reform in which the primary question was whether a proposal by a
legislator offered in constitutional convention was different enough to qualify as a new
proposal or whether it could be considered as an amendment to a citizen initiated
proposal. 706 This is the kind of question in which the advisory process can make the
organs of government function more smoothly. If the justices said it was an
amendment to a citizen initiative, passage would require a vote of one-quarter of the
legislators meeting in convention. If it was considered a new, legislative proposal, it
would need a majority vote to pass. In this instance the justices were of the opinion
that the legislator's proposal was substantially different and therefore, in order to be
enacted, it would need a majority vote of the convention. 707 Expediency is certainly not
the measure by which one assesses the validity of the advisory process, but when
Except, of course, this docs allow legislators to avoid taking a vote on this question.
706
As opposed to most of the previous cases involving tax questions, however, this proposal concerned
tax limitation reforms and not progressive tax reforms. Not surprisingly, tax limit proponents, with a
politically popular position, have been much more likely to use the initiative process in Massachusetts
than have progressive tax proponents.
707 386 Mass. 1201 (1982).
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expediency ean be gained with little to no affect on the legitimacy ofthe outcome, the
practice can be worthwhile. 708
The fourth and final advisory opinion involving a democratic process question
is politically the most interesting. In this instance it was actually the Governor who
requested the justices' opinion on a bill which had been enacted by the Legislature and
was awaiting his action. The bill would have allowed an individual who followed
certain procedures to have her name placed on the Democratic State Primary Ballot
despite a state party rule which required any candidate for statewide office to obtain a
vote of at least 15% of the delegates at the Democratic State Convention to be placed
on the primary ballot. What makes this question so interesting is that the Governor, Ed
King, was a Democrat (who was running for reelection) and the large majority of the
House and Senate were also Democrats, yet this bill would have taken control of the
ballot away from the Democratic Party. The justices of the SJC found the bill to be a
violation of First Amendment association rights as established by Supreme Court
precedent. Governor King vetoed the bill and the Legislature did not override. 709 The
result of the advisory process was to leave the nomination process in the hands of the
members of the Democratic party rather than under the control of elected Democrats
serving on Beacon Hill.
The remaining five advisory opinions of this era dealt specifically with
questions in which the Legislature and the Governor were in conflict. While the
708
The second question involving a proposed constitutional amendment concerned whether a term limits
proposal violated certain state or federal constitutional guarantees so as to be precluded from
consideration by the initiative process. It is not surprising that the legislators would offer questions on
this proposal before voting on it in constitutional convention. This is another possible example of
legislators using the process in hopes of avoiding a difficult vote. In this case, the justices were no help
since they said the amendment did not violate article 48. (413 Mass. 1201 [1992].)
709
3 85 Mass. 1201 (1982). Governor King lost the primary election to Michael S. Dukakis.
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decision ofthejust.es in these eases would surely affect the outcome, no matter what
they decided the proeess eould not be seen as undemocratic - it was just a matter of
which democrat, braneh would prevail. The most common question raised in these
cases concerned the Governor's exereise of the line-item veto as provided for in article
63 of the Articles of Amendment. 710 In each instance either the House or the Senate
asked the justices to determine if a veto override was necessary in light of their
asserting that the veto(s) under question were beyond the Governor's authority. For the
specific items involved this was an important question. If the veto was illegitimate, the
Legislature would not have to come up with the two-thirds vote necessary to override a
veto.
In developing their answers to these questions the justices seemed to be guided
predominantly by a concern with maintaining a balance between the Governor and the
Legislature in the appropriation process, drawing on their view of the intent the
Constitutional Convention which drafted art. 63 of the Articles of Amendment which
details the budget process.
An examination of the Debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1917
reveals that the framers of art. 63 were agreed on at least three
fundamental points. First, they intended to give the executive a central
role in the State budgetary process; second, they recognized that
appropriation bills are by their nature unique; and third, they agreed that
the unitary executive veto granted in Part II, c.l, Section 1, art. 2, of the
Constitution could not provide an effective mechanism for balancing
proper legislative and executive powers with respect to the State
budget.
7 "
710
The following cases involved such questions: 384 Mass. 820 (1981); 384 Mass. 828 (1981); 41
1
Mass. 1201 (1991); 419 Mass. 1201 (1994). It is interesting to note that there were three different
governors during the time of this study, two Democrats and one Republican. These differences over the
use of the veto power occurred during the tenure of all three executives: Edward King (Dem), 1978-
1982; Michael S. Dukakis (Dem), 1983-1990; William Weld (GOP), 1990-1997. (He resigned in July to
pursue nomination by President Clinton to be Ambassador to Mexico. The nomination eventually failed
due to opposition by Senator Jesse Helms).
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The question generally involved a determination of whether the vetoed section
was "general legislation included in a general appropriation bill"712 or if the veto would
"alter the legislative purpose" of the appropriation. 713 In the first instance the veto is
necessary because, without it, the Legislature could make any general legislation "veto-
proof by attaching it as an outside section to the annual appropriation bill, shifting the
balance of power strongly in their favor. In the second instance, however, the
Governor's veto would allow her to direct the use of funds. This is beyond her power
under the line-item veto in which she can only reduce or eliminate an expenditure. 714
In these cases the justices advised that thirteen of the challenged vetoes were within the
Governor's authority and nine were not. For our purposes, however, the specific result
is less interesting than the fact that the justices exercised their power in these cases with
primary concern for maintaining the constitutional balance between the Legislature and
the Governor. This concern can be seen in their opinion regarding a veto by the
Governor of a portion of an outside section. This would be similar to allowing the
Governor to have a partial veto over general legislation. The justices' desire for
balance can be seen in their discussion of the problem with such a situation.
[I]f the Governor were to have veto power over portions of outside
sections, his veto power over general legislation in outside sections
would exceed his veto power in the normal course. The Justices have
never been asked, and are not now being asked, for their opinion on
whether general legislation properly may be attached as an outside
711
384 Mass. 820 (1981), 823-824.
712
384 Mass. 820 (1981), 825. These are generally called the "outside sections" of the budget.
713
411 Mass. 1201 (1991), 1212.
714
The exact language of section 5 of article 63 reads as follows. "The governor may disapprove or
reduce items or parts of items in any bill appropriating money." The discussion of this matter in
constitutional terms has focused on the definition of the term "item."
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are
approbation Wl...b* we are of the opinion that,assuming the propriety of outside sections, the Governor's veto powerwith respect to them ought not be greater than it would be if thos
sections had been separately enacted. 715
A system of separated powers assumes that there will be three branches which
relatively equal in their power relationships. These requests regarding the budget put
the justices in the position of ensuring that this relative equality would continue to exist
between the Governor and the Legislature. 716
At the risk of being repetitive, it is hard to see exactly how the practice of the
legislators presenting these questions to the justices for their advice can negatively
influence the legislative process. Of course it is hard to imagine exactly what would
have happened in any of these cases if the advisory process had not existed. In many
instances if the law had been enacted it would eventually been brought to the Court as
a question ofjudicial review. The change in timing which the advisory process allows,
moving the role of the court from after enactment to before, could affect the internal
dynamics of the House and the Senate and, thus, the outcome of the process. If, for
instance, the legislators had to spend a great degree of time resolving a political
controversy over the constitutional interpretation of the Anti-aid Amendment or the
Home Rule Amendment, that would leave less time for enacting other legislation. Or
715
411 Mass. 1201 (1991), 1216.
716
Three additional advisory opinions involved legislative-executive struggles. In two of these, the
justices refused to answer the questions raised, one because the proposed bill, "An Act to reorganize
certain departments and offices of the commonwealth to make the operation of government more
efficient," was no longer pending in the Legislature {Answer ofthe Justices, 409 Mass. 1201 [1991]) and
the other because the questions had been dealt with in an opinion of the full court issued earlier that year
{Answer ofthe Justices, 4 1 3 Mass. 1 2 1 9 [ 1 992]). In a third opinion the justices advised the Governor
that the bill awaiting his signature, "An Act requiring legislative approval of Federal options which
substantially change public benefit programs," amounted to a legislative veto and would operate as an
infringement on the Governor's authority. (384 Mass. 840 [1981].) The Governor vetoed the bill with
no repercussions in the Legislature.
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perhaps too mueh political capital would be expended on a bill which the party leaders
eould have sent off to the justices in hopes of delaying action, affecting the rest of their
legislative agenda. These scenarios (and hundreds more) could be imagined but they
are really no different than the other structural mechanisms through which the
Legislature and its members work on a regular basis. It does not negatively affect the
legislative process or the legitimacy of the Legislature's actions. Rather, it provides
one more piece in the political superstructure in Massachusetts, a piece which both
houses of the Legislature have found it useful to employ from time to time in assessing
the constitutionality of their own actions.
DANGER TO THE JUDICIARY?
Advisory opinions may not affect the legislative sphere, but as Justice Story
indicated, they could bring disrepute to the justices and the SJC. After all, Chapter III
of the Massachusetts Constitution says the Governor, Legislature and Council may
"require the opinions of the Justices of the supreme judicial court." This would seem to
give the justices little control over these questions. The wrong question could put them
in a politically untenable position, whether or not the questioner intended this result. In
addition, the differences between the advisory process and the traditional judicial
process could lead to a lack of respect for the judiciary overall. Again, however, a look
at the process in practice shows that these theoretical problems are, in actuality, less
daunting than we might expect. Over the years the justices of the SJC have developed
procedures for avoiding potential threats to their independence, authority, or integrity
from advisory opinions. The justices are aware that the advisory process is different
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from the traditional judicial process and have developed mechanisms for adjusting to
the potential pitfalls caused by these differences.
One of the greatest limitations of the advisory process is that the justices are
asked to respond to a question(s) without the benefit of the adversarial process to assist
them in sorting through all sides of an issue. To compensate for this the justices, over
the past 35 years, have regularly issued a call to interested parties to submit amicus
briefs on the questions. This practice seems to have been instituted in 1967 regarding a
proposal on legislative reapportionment. 717 From 1981 to 1995 over two-thirds of the
opinions had the benefit of some amicus participation; a total of 144 parties participated
in briefs in these twenty-three cases. If one excludes the five cases in which the justices
issued no opinion, there were only five advisory opinions (15%) from the justices in
these years which did not have the benefit of amicus participation. While the justices
cannot guarantee equal participation on both sides of a question, they make every
attempt and will delay their deadline for submitting such briefs to accommodate
interested parties.
718
Amicus briefs were filed by governmental authorities including
both houses of the Legislature, the Governor and the Attorney General, by public
353 Mass. 790. According to Farina, this was the first modern example of this practice although a few
such requests can be found in earlier cases. Today the SJC's webpage contains a link entitled "Amicus
Invitations." <www.state.ma.us/courts/courtsandiusaes/courts/suprcmeiudicialcourt.>
718
See 41
1 Mass. 1201 (1991). "We invited interested persons and organizations to file briefs on or
before October 4, 1991, and thereafter approved requests to extend the deadline to October 9, 1991."
(1202.) Even greater accommodation was made in a 1989 question on allowing certain out-of-court
statements of children to be used as evidence, when the August 28 th deadline was extended to September
28 th and then again to October 4 th
. (406 Mass. 1201.)
Justice O'Connor noted the importance of hearing all sides of an issue. When asked if the justices see
that both sides of an argument are represented, he said "[we] try to. I mean it would be unjust, really, [if
we didn't]. They [legislators] want us to really think it through and advise them, and so [if] we get
everybody to help us who stands on one side of the beam and ignore everybody else... [that would be
unfair]." He goes on to note that this semblance of fairness is important for a two-fold reason. "[A]part
from just feeling an obligation to be fair, the system would generally break down if people lost respect
for the Court, for the SJC." Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May 1999.
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interest groups such as Common Cause and the Coalition for Basic Human Needs, and
by industry and trade groups such as the Associated Industries of Massachusetts. This
practice not only gives the justices the benefit of reading contrasting positions, but also
provides some assurance that that individuals and organizations most directly affected
by the proposed legislation will have a chance to be heard by the justices. 719
The advisory process has a second problem which could negatively affect the
integrity of the judiciary. On the one hand, the assumption which is probably most
essential to a fair judicial process is that the justices perform their duties as impartially
as humanly possible. If the justices face the same question in their official capacity as
they had faced in their advisory capacity, how assured can the parties be that the
justices will not already have made up their mind on the question involved? This is a
two-fold problem. If the justices reach the same conclusion in both instances, they may
appear unwilling to consider the question in light of the appellant's specific situation.
If they reach a different conclusion, however, they face the embarrassment of seeming
to change their minds. This problem has been addressed through two, related practices.
First, opinions of the justices do not have precedential value. The justices are aware of
the difference between advising on a statute in the abstract and making a decision on a
law in the context of a concrete situation and thus try not to bind themselves through
the advisory process. 720 Chief Justice Wilkins recognized this problem. "[It] could be
71
This process may thereby help to avoid a concern on the part of the public toward advisory opinions.
Even if not happy with the result, citizens may be more satisfied with the process.
7
"°Topf s criticism of advisory opinions in Massachusetts and other states focuses primarily on the
nonbinding doctrine. "Advisory opinions are taken as binding by virtually everyone including at times
the advising justices. Like that which looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck,
advisory opinions have looked, behaved and sounded like adjudicated decisions, and have not
unreasonably, been perceived and employed, as such." "Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as
Illegitimate Judicial Review," 129-130. I would argue that while it may be easy to make the distinction
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[that] the circumstances under which the problem comes up, in real life circumstances,
permit us to glve a much more thoughtful, introspective, logical answer »™ On a
concrete level this recognition helps to avoid any embarrassment in a justice deciding
one way in an adv,sory capacity and then seeming to reverse herself in a full opinion.
While in reality it may be more difficult for a justice to be impartial when a
similar question comes before her a second time, the repeated admonition that the first
opinion is only advisory helps to counter this problem. In addition, the justices employ
different standards when reviewing the constitutionality of an act in an advisory
capacity than they do when asked to exercise their power ofjudicial review. First, and
most obviously, the justices can only assess the facial validity of a statute in an
advisory capacity. It can't be assessed "as applied" since there has been no application.
"The Justices, of course, can say that §23 is not facially invalid as applied to future
conduct. A statute is facially invalid only if it would be vague in all its applications." 722
With this distinction, justices could advise that a proposed statute may be constitutional
on its face while the specific application of the law in a factual setting established in a
trial court proceeding may be unconstitutional. As a result the justices could make one
decision on the constitutionality of a statute on its face in an advisory opinion while
finding a variety of applications of the same law to be impermissible under the
constitution without feeling bound by a previous decision or appearing inconsistent.
between the two fuzzy, there is still a line of distinction which the justices try to reinforce with the
procedures described below.
721
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
722
396 Mass. 1211 (1985), 1213.
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The second distinction in process is that the presumption of constitutionality
which predominates in questions ofjudicial review is not held by justices in issuing
advisory opinions. "Unenacted legislation, when considered by the Justices in an
advisory opinion, does not benefit from the presumption of constitutionality that applies
when the Supreme Judicial Court considers a postenactment constitutional challenge to
legislation."723 Again, the difference between the way justices handle advisory
opinions and opinions of the Court provide justification for any difference between her
views in an advisory opinion and the way that same justice may vote in a decision of
the Court. Further, it provides a different framework for assessing the question so that
justices can approach the question from a fresh perspective, unbiased by an opinion
they may have made in an advisory capacity.
The fifteen years of advisory opinions assessed for this study indicate that the
problems created by the justices' consideration of the same question in an advisory
capacity and then in a real controversy before the Court are more theoretical than
actual. Of the 33 bills on which an opinion was requested, only seven were enacted
into law in the years which followed. 724 Three of these involved bills with which the
justices found no constitutional infirmities and which were enacted in substantially the
same format as requested. 725 These have presented no problem with impartiality
•723
401 Mass. 1201 (1987), 1205. Presumptions also vary regarding proposed constitutional
amendments. "Since we are asked our opinion on a measure not yet approved by the people as an
Amendment to our Constitution, we do not extend a presumption of validity to the measure (as we would
with respect to an enacted statute or approved constitutional Amendment)." 386 Mass. 1201 (1982),
1217.
724
These seven bills covered eight requests. Basically the same bill was considered in two different
requests.
725
The justices found no constitutional infirmities in answering the questions proposed - that is no
guarantee that the remainder of the bill has no problems. These bills covered the following topics:
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however as no constitutional challenge was raised before the SJC on these bills after
enactment. Two other bills were enacted in substantially different format in later years
(even though the justices had found no constitutional problems with the proposed bills
when they were considered under their advisory power), so any challenge to the bills
would raise new quest,ons for the justices. 726 One addit.onal request involved a reform
of the bail system, but as was noted above, the justices refused to respond to this
request due to time constraints. 727 A similar bill regarding the bail system was enacted
without benefit of advice in 1993, and was struck down by the SJC as unconstitutional
that same year.
728
The final bill involved the admissibility of out-of-court testimony of
certain child witnesses. This bill was substantially modified upon the advice of the
justices to accommodate constitutional concerns. This was the only case in which the
SJC faced questions on the statute after enactment, and in this case it was on a
substantially different bill.
729
In all seven of these cases (eight requests) involving
legislation which the Legislature enacted after requesting advice from the justices, the
SJC was never asked to consider questions raised in regard to enacted legislation which
application of a tax to services (408 Mass. 1201 [1990]); regulating certain tax titles on Nantucket (408
Mass. 1215 [1990]); and an initiative law limiting terms of elected officials (413 Mass. 1201 [1992]).
726
The first concerned the reorganization of the savings bank life insurance system. While the justices
responded to a series of question from the House in 1987 that the proposal then under consideration was
constitutional, the Legislature did not enact changes until 1990. According to the SJC, the 1990
legislation was substantially different. "The bill then pending before the Legislature [1987] is not the
same as the bill that the Legislature enacted in 1990 inserting G.L. C.178A. Nothing that we said in that
opinion (Opinion ofthe Justices, 401 Mass. 1211] bears on the issues on which we decide this appeal."
Dibiase v. Commissioner ofInsurance, 428 Mass. 755 (1999), 757.
The other involved legislation adding the category of "sexual preference" to various anti-
discrimination statutes in the state. As previously noted, the Legislature enacted this law but added
limiting language to ensure that this did not apply to individuals whose sexual preference included young
children. {Opinion of'the Justices, 390 Mass. 1201 [1984].)
727
401 Mass. 1234 (1988).
m Answer ofthe Justices, 401 Mass. 1234 (1988); Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667.
729
Care and Protection ofRebecca, 4 1 9 Mass. 67 ( 1 994).
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was similar to questions raised about a proposed bill. The hypothetical eoneerns about
judicial impartiality never became a reality.
Of the remaining twenty-five requests for advisory opinions coming to the
justices in these years, twenty involved legislative ideas which had not been
implemented through the year 2001.™ All together, this means that the justices had
few opportunities for confronting a similar question in both their advisory and their
traditional judicial roles.
This may rarely occur because the justices have initiated a final mechanism to
protect the integrity of the judicial process while meeting their constitutional obligation
to respond to requests for advisory opinions from the other branches of Massachusetts
government. This is the previously discussed jurisprudence of refusal which the
justices have developed since the 1870s when the justices refused for the first time to
answer a request of the justices which did not present either a "solemn occasion" or an
"important question of law" as provided for in Article III of Part Two of the
Massachusetts Constitution. The frequency with which this occurs has increased since
the justices first began this practice at the end of the 19 th century. In her article, Farina
notes that the justices responded to all questions in almost 67% of the requests
presented to them in the 210 years from 1780 to 1990. However, this number has
dropped consistently from the 1870s on. By the 1980s, justices answered all questions
in a request in only 33% of the cases, no questions in another 50%, and some of the
730
The remaining five requests dealt with the governor's veto power over individual line items in the
annual appropriation legislation. It is highly unlikely that procedural questions about these matters
would ever be raised in a question before the Court after enactment. It never occurred during this era.
This information raises two interesting points. First are questions about the reason the House or the
Senate makes these requests in the first place, especially in cases in which the justices found no problem
with the proposed legislation. One sees, however, that in 14 cases the justices found constitutional
problems with the legislation and the Legislature never pursued the matter further (although there is no
guarantee that this was because of the justices' opinions).
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questions in a request in 17% of the eases. The justices were slightly more likely to
answer all questions proposed if one looks at all of the requests from 1981 to 1995 as
can be seen in the following table.
TABLE 6.1 - Frequency wi th which Justices Respond to
Requests fo r Advisory Opinions 731
Years
Requests w/all
Questions
Answered
Requests w/some
Questions
Answered
Requests
w/no Questions
Answered
1780-1990* 66.6% 24.6% 8.8%
1980-1989* 33% 50% 17%
1981-1995+ 42.4% 42.4% 15.2%
Data from Farina, Supreme Court Advisory Opinions," 372.
+Data compiled by author.
These numbers look slightly different, however, if we look at the frequency
with which justices answered individual questions. The thirty-three cases during the
1980s and early 90s contained 151 individual questions. The justices refused to answer
seventy-two, almost half of the questions presented to them by the House, Senate, or
Governor. The obvious question is why do the justices refuse to answer? Knowing this
gives us some insight into the way in which the justices have limited their use of this
power. These refusal can be divided into four categories: mootness, vagueness,
statutory interpretation, and conflict with pending matters.
Most of the questions which the justices do not answer are moot. This general
category could be applied to fifty of the seventy-two questions to which the justices
refused to respond. Almost fifteen percent of the questions (twenty) were removed
731
I recognize that the division of years in Table 5.1 is somewhat confusing, but the data in Farina's
article is provided either for the entire time period or by decade. The 1980-1989 information is provided
as representative of the continuing decrease in cases in which the SJC chooses to answer all questions
asked. This matches closely with the data I developed for the 1981-1995 period.
301
from consideration when the justices "were informed that, by reason of the actio, of the
Senate, the legislation is no longer pending before the General Court"732 An almost
equal number were not answered by the justices because answers to other questions in
the request had made an answer unnecessary. For instance, when the justices
determined that article 44 of the Massachusetts Declaration prohibited a certain tax
reform, it was not necessary for them to consider whether it would also be prohibited
under article 30. 733 Similarly, after an opinion of the justices that legislation to reserve
a certain percentage ofjobs in state-funded contracts wculd violate the privileges and
immunities guarantee of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, the justices did not go on
and consider the legitimacy of the proposed law in light of the Commerce Clause. 734
Refusal in these instances is related to the general care exercised by the justices
to answer only those questions which are presented by the requestor. ' However, we
express no opinion on whether it would be sufficiently less intrusive to be
constitutionally sound, since that is not the question before us, nor need we consider
whether any provision of the constitution of the Commonwealth might prohibit the
proposed enactment."735 While the justices are willing to meet their obligation to
answer questions upon request, they are very careful not to respond to any more
questions than are asked.
732
Answer of the Justices, 409 Mass. 1201 (1991), 1201-1202.
733
3 83 Mass. 940(1981).
734
3 93 Mass. 1201 (1984).
735
385 Mass. 1201 (1982), 1207. Another excellent example of this can be found in the justices' opinion
on a proposed sex offender registry law which will be discussed at the end of this chapter. (423 Mass.
1201 [1996]).
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Similar to the moot questions are those in wh1Ch the justices find the question is
worded so vaguely that the request sounds more like a fishing expedition than a speeifie
request. This was the ease with four questions the justices chose not to answer. In all
four instances the Legislature raised general concerns that a statute may violate state or
federal due process or equal protection guarantees without specifying which section of
the legislation was of concern or how the bill may violate these limits. The justices find
limitation in the constitutional language regarding advisory opinions.
The words of Part II, c.3, art. 2, of the Constitution, as amended by art
85 of the Amendments, are "clear to the effect that 'opinions of the
justices' may be required 'upon important questions of law ' Those
words mean that the important questions of law must be explicitly
stated: they cannot be left to equivocal implications. An opinion upon a
question of constitutional law cannot be so framed as to be helpful to
legislators without a definite statement of the point of difficulty which
has been developed through hearings and discussion."736
As with many threshold questions injudicial proceedings, however, this line of
demarcation is not always clear. The justices do, at times, refine questions so as to be
able to respond. In one 1985 opinion the justices did just that, noting that "[i]n some
circumstances, the Justices have not been averse to pointing to the existence of obvious
problems in a proposed bill, even when those problems are not clearly and directly
raised by well-formed and specific questions at hand."737 Why the justices choose to do
this in some instances and refuse to answer in others is not clear.
Two questions which the justices refused to answer due to vagueness were of a
different sort, however. Rather than the question being vague, the federal precedent
736
737
386 Mass. 1201 (1982), 1221, citing Answer ofthe Justices, 299 Mass. 617 (1938), 629.
396 Mass. 1201 (1985), 1204. Another example is found in 408 Mass. 1201 (1990). "When
confronted with comparably broad questions, the Justices have requested to be excused from
responding... Mindful of this constitutional limitation on our power and duty to render advisory
opinions, we restrict our response to the important, broad issue, clearly implicit in the Governor's
question[.]" (1205.)
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was unclear so the justices chose not to act. In this case the justices were being asked
about the constitutionality of a state law which would limit the terms of office of U.S.
Senators and Representatives, an issue on which the federal courts had not given much
direction in 1992.- Since the justices of the state courts are not the final voice on the
U.S. Constitution even when exercising their traditional powers, they risk even greater
threat to the prestige of the j udiciary if they venture into a realm where, as Farina notes,
they can only give an educated "guesstimate" of the outcome of a concrete federal
challenge to a proposed state statute. Farina notes the problem with requests for advice
on the constitutionality of proposed bills under the federal charter.
[I]f the motive for seeking advice is to resolve legal uncertainty in order
that action may proceed with confidence, the advantage conferred by the
Justices' speed in rendering an opinion is considerably offset by the
relatively low value, as "security," of their views on federal questions.
Indeed, this is the one category of question in which the Justices' advice
has periodically been ignored. 739
Again, however, the justices don't always refuse to answer questions regarding
federal claims, although the reason for the distinction is clearer here - the justices are
willing to give an answer when they feel that federal precedent is clear. For instance,
the justices gave opinions on three questions raising concerns under the First
Amendment during the years under study. 740 There was sufficient direction from
413 Mass. 1201. The justices did determine that the initiative petition under question was a legitimate
topic for the ballot under art. 48 of the Articles of Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution. It was
not until 1995 that the U.S. Supreme court determined that change to the terms of office of federal
legislators could only occur through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779.
739
"Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 370.
740
3 8 5 Mass. 1201 (1982) (finding proposed law regarding primary nomination procedures would violate
freedom of association of the Massachusetts Democratic Party); 387 Mass. 1201 (1982) (finding statute
for voluntary prayer in school would violate the Establishment Clause); and 418 Mass. 1201 (1994)
(determining that certain campaign finance limits would violate free speech rights).
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Supreme Court precedent, however, to allow thejusttces to make a solid "guesstimate"
of what the Supreme Court would decide should a statute be challenged before i, under
this Amendment.
The last two categories of questions which justices refuse to answer, those
involving statutory interpretation and conflicts with pending matters, touch on items
which would be most likely to put the justices in the untenable position of making a
decision on the same question in both their advisory and judicial capacities. Thirteen
questions raised in these cases involved the interpretation of existing statutes which,
according to the justices, do not present a "solemn occasion" as required by the
Constitution. They have traditionally defined a solemn occasion as follows. "A
'solemn occasion' arises when the answers to certain 'questions of law are necessary to
be determined by the body making the inquiry, in the exercise of the legislative or
executive power entrusted to it by the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth:'741
Interpretation of an existing statute is not necessary for the House, Senate, or Governor
to take action in future legislation. Whether or not a new law should be enacted in light
of the dictates of an existing law is a question which asks "whether it [proposed bill] is
wise or expedient.
.
.
The Justices are not empowered to answer questions bearing on the
wisdom or expediency of proposed legislation."742 Avoidance of such questions,
whether specifically required by the language of the Constitution or not, is wise in light
of problems which advisory opinions can create. Interpreting an existing statute in an
advisory capacity would lead into territory which the same justices are likely to traverse
741
Answer of the Justices, 406 Mass 1220 (1989) quoting Opinion ofthe Justices, 126 Mass. 557 (1878),
1224.
742
385 Mass. 1201 (1982), 1203.
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to their formal, judicial capacity. Abiding closely by this definition of "solemn
occasion" helps them to avoid .he double-edged sword of appearing partial due to
prcv.ous considerations or of embarrassing themselves through a reversal.743
Topf hypothesizes that the development of a docfrine surrounding their refusal
to answer questions winch do no, meet the justices' interpretation of the constitutional
requirements of a "solemn occasion" or an "important question of law" is a result of the
fad thai the non-binding doctrine regarding advisory opinions was increasingly
unrealistic. Farina agrees that while on a formal level advisory opinions cany no
precedential weight, the reality is somewhat different.
[T]he Justices do not change their minds any more readily in the
advisory opinion context than they do in "rear' cases. The legal and
political communities routinely act as ifadvisory opinions are to be
taken as "the law" (in ways as technical as legislatures sending them to
towns or lower court judges citing them as dispositive, to ways as public
as a governor invoking them to justify his position on controversial
legislation). The Court itself is careful to deal with them as significant
expressions of legal principle, even if not literally precedent. Not
surprisingly, given all this, the citizenry does not distinguish between
advisory opinions and real cases. Aspects of contemporary advisory
practice such as the routine solicitation of briefs from interested parlies
confirm and entrench these professional and lay understandings. 44
rhe hypothesis that justices have developed this as a mechanism to overcome
the weakness of the non-binding doctrine is reasonable, and supports a central thesis of
this dissertation: that the relationship between the Legislature and the SJC in
Massachusetts has been one which has evolved in a generally consensual manner.
When the non-binding doctrine alone became too weak to protect the integrity of the
741
There were also two questions which the justices refused to answer regarding a proposal lo amend the
siaie ethics law, as their response could affeel matters pending before the State Ethics Commission. The
justices noted the unfairness of this. "These potentially affected persons are not before us. in fairness,
issues which arise from circumstances already in existence should not he dealt with m a response of the
Justices." 396 Mass. 121 I, at 121 V
744 Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," $98.
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Court, the justices developed a new tool to help accomplish this end. 745 While there is
some indication that this was criticized by some legislators and commentators in the
late 1800s and early 1900s, the right of the justices to make this determination has been
largely accepted by the other branches of government since then. The justices'
involvement in the advisory process, like that in the development of the common law,
the construction of statutory law, and the interpretation of the Constitution, has
developed in a way which gives them control over their role without overstepping then-
bounds. It is again an example of the efficiency goal of the separation of powers
becoming more dominant over time as the conflictual roles take a back seat.
One more piece of circumstantial evidence which suggests that this relationship
has developed cooperatively is the fact that the Legislature rarely enacts a law after the
justices have noted problems, and has not done this since 1977. According to Farina
there were only four advisory opinions issued between 1780 an 1990 in which the
justices suggested that a proposed statute may be unconstitutional but that the
Legislature enacted the law regardless. 746 It is unlikely that this general acceptance of
the justices' advice exists because the Legislature is unwilling to challenge the
judiciary. Instead, it is likely a result of the recognition by both branches of their
respective roles. Since the justices have carved out a reasonable niche in which to use
745
While we may agree about the development of this tool, Topf and I part company on its ramifications.
He is much more critical of the advisory process overall, including the justices' refusal to answer
questions. "It was not only a startling development but doubtfully grounded as well." "State Supreme
Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," 115. Farina takes a more sanguine approach
to this development, emphasizing the pragmatic nature of the development of the advisory process over
time.
746
The four cases were in 1 93 1 , 1 967, 1 975, and 1 977. It is interesting to note that three of these four
involved the justices' interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, an area in which it makes more sense for the
legislators to "second-guess" the justices since they do not have the final say. See Farina, "Supreme
Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 388-391.
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their advisory power, being careful not to overreach, the legislators are willing to accept
the advice of the justices when they do speak. The cooperative relationship between
the judiciary and the Legislature in Massachusetts is a result of this kind of self-
policing in all their interactions.
SEX OFFNDER REGISTRY - am
EXAMPLE OF AN ONGOING DISCUSSION
The closest the Legislature came in the last ten years to acting despite an
advisory opinion to the contrary involves the development of a sex offender registry in
Massachusetts. It is a good case with which to conclude as it exemplifies the ongoing
nature of the discussions in which these two branches engage in the development of
public policy. In 1996 the justices issued an advisory opinion on a proposed statute
which was intended to bring the state into compliance with federal requirements for
receiving criminal justice monies, and to respond to public concern engendered by the
1993 abduction, rape, and murder of a young New Jersey girl named Megan, by
implementing a sex offender registration program. 747 The questions which the Senate
proposed and the justices answered are as interesting for what they do not include as
they are for what they include. The sex offender registration (SOR) program has two
components, registration of the offender with a governmental entity and dissemination
of this information to the public. All four questions raised by the Senate concerned the
dissemination portion of the proposed bill. While the justices found no constitutional
infirmities as the questions were presented, it is obvious from their opinion that they
were not comfortable with the bill. There are at least nine places in this opinion in
which the justices emphasize the limited nature of their response, including at least five
747
423 Mass. 1201.
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references to the faet that "the questions presented to this eourt eoneern only the
notification provisions of the proposed Massachusetts statute."748 Chief Justice Liacos,
while signing onto the original opinion, felt it necessary to write a concurring opinion
to emphasize the limited nature of this opinion.
I write separately to emphasize that what the Senate did not ask about
th.s bi may reveal more about it than what it did ask. This, the opinion
carefully read, points out. It must be made clear that we are not asked to
render our opinion on, among other matters, the constitutionality of the
registration provisions of the bill..
..Thus, I write separately to
emphasize that we have commented, as requested only on certain
selected portions of the bill in a most limited fashion.749
This limited opinion of the justices was issued on July 18, 1996, and the SOR
bill was approved by the Governor on August 5, 1996. The Legislature paid little
attention to the warnings that there may be other sections of the bill which should be
redrafted to avoid constitutional problems. 750 Why the Legislature refused to heed
these warnings is impossible to say. They could have feared losing federal crime
prevention monies, or they could have been responding to political pressure to toughen
certain criminal laws. Had they taken the time to draft a cleaner bill, the years of
dialogue which have gone on between the Court and the Legislature since that time
may have been avoided. On the other hand, if the justices hadn't been quite so
scrupulous about their policy of answering only those questions which are presented,
they might have been able to offer concrete advice on the more troublesome portions of
748
1 2 1 1 . See also at 1 2 1 7, 1 229, 1 233, and 1 234.
749
1243. In addition to the general point that the Senate did not ask about the registration process, Liacos
detailed five specific constitutional questions which could be asked about the proposed bill but which
were not.
750
The warnings were clear enough that Justice Lynch remembered this as an instance in which the
Legislature had ignored an advisory opinion of the justices. "Sometimes we said some things in
advisory opinions and the Legislature has gone ahead and passed it anyway. The Sex Offender
Registration Law now, I think, is an example of that." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
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the bill. Both of these criticisms, however, imply that this situation would somehow
have been resolved "best" if no further court challenges were necessary. This may
overlook the degree to which the dtalogue described below contributes to a greater
understanding of the arguments involved in an issue on the par, of the justices, the
legislators, and the public.
The first serious challenge to the SOR Law arose in 1997. In Doe v. Attorney
General a unanimous Court decided that the law, as applied to a particular individual
(and therefore to all similarly situated individuals), violated his due process rights. In
this instance the appellant pled guilty in 1990 to an offense that was considered a "tier
one" sexual offense, the least serious category of offense under the SOR law. The law
declared that individuals who were categorized as tier one offenders were not entitled to
a hearing or an opportunity to challenge a determination that they continued to be a
threat to minors or others. (Individuals convicted of a tier two or tier three offense were
entitled to such hearings.) The SJC agreed with the plaintiffs contention that "the act
denies him procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution of the
Commonwealth."751 Foreshadowing cases to come, Justice Fried wrote a concurrence
which detailed further problems which were to be found with the law.
Registration and notification may be useful, and in any event are
constitutionally permissible means for protecting the public, but only if
they are narrowly tailored to a grave danger. Indiscriminate extensions
such as appear in this case will only provoke continuous and often
successful litigation. This will burden the courts and the relevant
administrative agency to such a point that the purposes of the scheme
will be delayed and perhaps defeated even in the carefully limited class
of cases to which it properly applies. 752
751
752
Doe v. Attorney General, 426 Mass. 136 (1997), 137.
151. Justices Abrams and Marshall joined in this concurrence.
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In 1998 the SJC heard another important case involving the SOR Board in
wh1Ch the Court determined that while the law can be interpreted so as to meet due
process requirements, this will require a hearing before the Board on each defendant,
after which the Board is to issue findings which are "specific, written, detailed, and
individualized" in support of the classification. Although hearings were anticipated in
challenged cases, such hearings were not specifically provided for in the legislation.
Rather than strike down the law, the Court interpreted the statute in such a way as to
save it, modifying the policy in the process. Before individual hearings could be held,
the additional staff positions and funding for the SOR Board which were pending in the
Legislature would be necessary. 753 The fact that the money was already in the pipeline,
however, indicates that the Legislature may not have been surprised by this decision.
In 1999 the Legislature was considering new legislation to address some of the
concerns raised in the 1997 and 1998 challenges to the SOR Law, but not before the
SJC added one more hurdle for the offender registration process to jump in order to
meet constitutional requirements. In August of that year the Court determined that
defendants were entitled to individualized hearings before the board on the question of
whether they needed to register, effectively overruling the Legislature's determination
that individuals convicted of certain crimes necessarily posed sufficient risk to minors
and others that their liberty and privacy interests could be infringed upon without a
particularized hearing.
754
From a practical perspective, it also meant that the
"The Board currently has five, part-time volunteer members, a staff of 12 and a $500,000 budget. A
proposal pending in the Legislature would create a full-time board with seven paid members to address
the requirement for hearings." Martin Finucane (AP), "Court OK's Sex Offender Registry," New
Bedford Standard Times, July 25, 1998, A8.
754 Doe v. Attorney General, 430 Mass. 155 (1999).
311
registration system was going to face an even greater backlog. These decisions had
serious repercussions for the state's attempt to develop a sex offender registry system.
The Legislature finally responded to all of these eomplaints when it enacted a
new law on September 10, 1999.- Th ls new law was again delayed by a preliminary
injunction issued by a Superior Court judge in a class action suit challenging its
constitutionality. Judge Xifaris found the requirement that individuals register by
providing the Board with their name and present address, without being provided the
opportunity for a hearing as to whether they should be registered, was a violation of due
process. His decision was overturned, however, when a closely divided Court (4-3)
determined that the new statute was constitutional on its face. 756 However, in a sign of
continued challenges, Justice Cowin, while siding with the majority, issued the
following statement in her concurrence. "I would hold that the statute, while facially
valid, may be susceptible to 'as applied' challenges which individuals would have
standing to bring based on their constitutional right not to have their liberty infringed
by indiscriminate identification of them to the police as 'sex offenders'."757 It is clear
that the dialogue will continue.
• Statutes 199, c.74. The law also increased penalties for certain sex offense crimes and reinstated a
civil commitment procedure for "sexually dangerous persons" which had been discontinued in 1 990. It
is interesting to note that news coverage in one of the two major Boston papers, The Boston Herald, was
highly critical of the Legislature in this process, but not of the Court. For example, the editors made the
following comments in a September 13, 1999 editorial. "The bill was signed just two days before the
state would have lost some federal crime aid funds....This point has been the sheer irresponsibility of the
Legislature over many months in failing to replace the system largely struck down last year by the
Supreme Judicial Court." (26) A December 2, 1999 editorial from the Herald conveys a similar
message. "First it was the Legislature's fault. Despite advisories from the state's highest court the
Legislature went ahead and passed a not terribly well crafted sex offender registry law. The Supreme
Judicial Court not surprisingly wasted little time striking it down." (40)
756
Three of the justices in the majority were not on the Court when the SJC had decided on these issues
in 1997, 1998, and 1999: Francis Spina, Judith Cowin, and Martha Sosman. They were all appointed by
Governor Argeo Paul Celluci in 2000. One of the dissenters, Robert Cordy, was also a Celluci appointee.
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Beginning with an advisory opinion in 1996, the justices and the Legislature
have been involved in the development of a poliey for protecting the communily
against dangerons sex offenders whde still guarding the rights of all citizens. The
justices have used their power of statutory construction and constitutional interpretation
in responding to acfions of the state's elected representafives. And while there has been
occasional disappointment voiced by the state's law enforcement officials from tune to
time, the Legislature has remained publicly silent, accepting that both institutions of
government have a role to play in a system of separated powers. 758
7^7
Roe v. Attorney General, 434 Mass. 418 (2001), 445.
758
This conclusion is drawn from a Lexis search of all articles from the Boston Globe and Boston Herald
from 1996 through June, 2001.
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CHAPTER 7
SEPARA TION OF POWERS IN MASS i CHI jkfttv
COOPERA TIQN OVER COMF1 irr ^
A system of separated powers presents a potential framework for delay and
conflict. Traditional discussions of the origins of such a system on the federal level
generally emphasize the benefits of separating powers as a mechanism to ensure that no
one body of government becomes too powerful. American government texts, when
moving beyond a basic description of the system of separated powers with checks and
balances, tend to emphasize the founders' fears of tyranny and quote Madison in
Federalist #47, noting that «[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."759
The emphasis is on the competitive atmosphere engendered by such a system, with
each branch struggling to gain power, a case of "ambition countering ambition"760 in a
system of "Competition by Design." 76 ' There arc nods to the reality that for any policy
to be enacted some cooperation is necessary, but it is viewed largely as forced
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New
York: Mentor, 1961), 301.
760
Federalist Papers, Federalist #51, 322. This is probably the best quote to highlight the potentially
competitive nature of a system of separated powers. What is often forgotten, however, is that the
Federalist Papers were written as propaganda to convince voters ofNew York to ratify the new
constitution. Since the predominant fear about the proposed government is that it would be too powerful,
it is not surprising that advocates for the proposal would emphasize the way in which separation of
powers would limit government. That does not necessarily mean, however, that this was the only goal
of a system of separated powers.
761
Stcphcn J. Rockwell and Peter Woll, American Government: Competition and Compromise (New
York: McGraw Hill, 2001), 131. This is the title of their section of an American government text which
discusses the constitutional structure of the U.S. government.
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cooperation: when ihe branches do work together, they are involved in bargaining and
negotiation rather than a discussion. 762
In extending this perspective to appointed judiciaries an additional factor is
added to the mix. This is concern over the undemocratic nature ofjudical
policymaking. The picture that emerges is of a judiciary struggling to exert power
within the policymaking process, with its actions having questionable legitimacy. This
description may be slightly exaggerated, but it is not so far from reality that one cannot
recognize it in criticisms of the United States Supreme Court found in works like
Robert Bork's Tempting ofAmerica and Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous
Branch?62 While the question of the legitimacy ofjudicial policymaking in a
democracy is the focal point of these works, the criticisms often refer to a problem of
judicial supremacy, implying that the desired apportioning of powers within a system of
separated powers has been distorted by improper judicial activity.
Whether or not this is a valid concern with respect to the United States Supreme
Court is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, the results of this study, an in-
depth look at the work of a high court in a state-level system of separated powers,
indicates that conflict and illegitimacy are not the necessary outcomes ofjudicial
762
In one text it was interesting to find that the quote used to support this view of the origins of separated
powers came not from the Federalist Papers but from Justice Louis Brandeis' opinion in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). "The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1 787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to
avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, so save the people from having one institution dominate the
government."
763
Bork (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Bickel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
These are only examples of many more such works on the subject. While these two authors represent the
more conservative end of the ideological spectrum, liberals have also been critical of the United States
Supreme Court. See, for instance, Max Lerner, Nine Scorpions in a Bottle, ed. Richard Cummings (New
York: Arcade Publishing, 1994).
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policymaking, whether in the realm of common law, constitutional law, or statutory
interpreter, This chapter will present a summary of these findings, and a discussion
of why the picture ofjudicial policymaking in Massachusetts may be different than
general assumptions of this power might expect.
JUSTICES MAKING LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS- *JC POI ,,rYMA„Nr,
The writings of legal realists of all shades note that courts are lawmakers on
various levels. State courts may have even more of an opportunity to engage in this
practice as the common law is still important to many of the cases which they decide.
And of course high courts, with ultimate authority to interpret the law in their
respective political systems, have the most power of all. The work of the SJC over the
last twenty-five years, with a particular emphasis on the opinions issued between 1981
and 1995, shows that this pattern holds true in Massachusetts.
The general impact of the justices' work on public policy questions in the
Commonwealth should come as no surprise. What is more interesting, however, are the
ways in which this occurs. In almost all instances discussed in the previous chapters in
which SJC opinions were instrumental in shaping policy development, the SJC acted in
active cooperation with the Legislature (as with several tort reform questions), or with
the acquiescence of a Legislature which has either chosen not to act or not to act again
in light of an SJC opinion. It is this seeming absence of conflict that is most interesting.
The effect of a system of separated powers has not been to create conflict and struggle.
Rather, it has been to create a system in which each branch develops policy as
appropriate within its institutional framework. While there will still be cases near the
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edge of the eirele of authority for each branch, they seem to be few and far between in
Massachusetts. Interbranch efforts at policymaking result in a dialogue, not a battle.
The question which arises from this conclusion, of course, is why?
COOPERATION IN POLICYMAKING - HOW HOPS tHE SEPARATUM n.
POWERS FUNCTION?
The picture which this study paints of policymaking in Massachusetts is of a
collective effort between branches. More specifically, on some important policy
questions the state's highest court works with the elected representative in the General
Court to set the direction which the polity will follow. This does not match the general
view of separation of powers as an institutional structure creating a struggle for power
between branches regarding whose views will prevail. 764 If the Legislature and the
public accept that the judiciary has a role to play in policymaking questions, however,
then conflict will not result unless the justices act outside this accepted role. And while
it is unlikely that legislators and citizens think about judicial-legislative interactions in
terms of possible theories for which powers were separated back in 1780, these theories
provide a framework for understanding the role of high courts in setting policy. As
long as judicial activities fit within these theories, conflict is less likely.
SEPARATION OF POWERS - A HELPFUL FRAMEWORK
The activities of the Court described in chapter three show the justices of the
SJC to have had a hand in setting policy in both common and statutory law. In the
realm of common law, the SJC has had an influence on questions of familial roles and
764
The picture in regard to administrative matters is closer to the traditional understanding of the
relationship between branches.
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responsibilities as determined through the laws of probate and child custody and
visitation. It largely has taken the Legislature off the hook in responding to cases
raising right to die questions. Finally, it brought the Legislature into the modem era in
questions of governmental immunity and tort reform by forcing the law to move from
common to statutory law. In general, the efficiency vew of separation of powers can
be seen in these cases. The judiciary is best at handling questions which arise out of
specific cases, and modifying the law in an incremental fashion. When wholesale
change is needed to the fabric of the law, however, the Legislature is best equipped to
do this. In the case of tort reform, it was the Court which recognized and promoted this
position. In all of these cases the justices acted moderately, approaching each question
as it arose and acting only incrementally or, as in the case of threatened action on
governmental immunity in tort cases, after a sufficient period of time has elapsed. If
the justices of the SJC had eliminated governmental immunity on their own in the first
case to come before them with this question, there may have been conflict. Similarly, if
the justices had adopted a blanket approach to the right-to-die question (as did the New
Jersey court in In re Quinlan) rather than the case-by-case approach to deciding these
questions, there might have been more controversy.
The SJC's involvement in constitutional law, whether through the use of
judicial review or the advisory process, has generally been quiet but consistent. While
there were two instances between 1981 and 1995 when a decision of unconstitutionality
affected a question of major public import (state funding for abortion and the death
penalty), the majority of the Court's activity in the area of constitutional law has often
been confined to actions which either did not thwart the overall goal of the elected
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officials or ,n overturning laws ,ha. fairly clearly vtolated constitutional provisions (like
the article 44 prohibition on progressive taxes). And when the Court did act, its
activities fit Cher the Madisonian or libertarian view of separation of powers. From a
libertarian perspective, the justices used then authority to strike down legislation under
their interpretation of the state or federal constitution which would violate the liberties
of a minority. 765 Even less controversial was the use ofjudicial authority to decide
questions of conflict between the other two branches, particularly as regards the
Governor's veto power.
Teg^sIators
EEMENT? SHARED NORMS AMONG JUSTICES AND
While theories of separation of powers may provide an interesting theoretical
framework for understanding why the use ofjudicial power in affecting public policy
may be accepted in some instances and not in others, this still doesn't get to the heart of
the question
- why do the justices and legislators seem to see the role of the Court in
the system of separated powers in the same light? What keeps the justices in
Massachusetts so moderate and the legislators so tolerant?766
It is possible that the tensions between high courts and legislatures with which
most are familiar are drawn from a look at the federal system, and that legislative-
I do not mean to claim that any libertarian use ofjudicial power will not engender controversy. Most
of the controversial decisions of the Warren Court, for an example, could be categorized as such. It is the
combination of this factor and the relatively restrained approach of the Massachusetts justices which
helped them to avoid conflict.
766 One caveat regarding this picture should be highlighted from the start. It is possible that the
cooperation which existed between 1981 and 1995 (with a few views backwards into the 1970s) is a
time-bound phenomenon. Some of the debates from the 1918 constitutional convention mentioned in
Chapter 5 certainly indicate that the judiciary was not always a respected and trusted branch of
government.
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judicial interactions in states are generally more cooperative. One reason for this could
be that the United States Supreme Court ,s more likely to hear arguments in a a larger
number of "hot-button" issues. While the justices and the legislators in Massachusetts
may differ over questions of when the Governor has exercised a legitimate line-item
veto, or even a more political question like how far the Legislature can go in controlling
ballot access for the primary election, these are not the kind of questions which pull
individuals ideologically in one direction or another. An exercise ofjudicial authority
in questions such as these, even if a majority of the legislators disagree with the
outcome, aren't the kind of issues which are likely to engender heated debate. While
discussing a different kind of conflict. Justice O'Connor's response to the question of
why there is so much unanimity on the SJC and so much dissent on the Supreme Court
seems appropriate in this instance as well.
My guess is that more difficult cases go to the United States Supreme
Court than go to us and... I would hate to belittle our effort but I do think
the issues that go to the United States Supreme [Court]...Talk about
screening, they only take things that are both difficult and very
important nationally...and that gets back again to whose kitchen did you
grow up in. You know a lot of them grow up with a certain amount of
value judgment, you can call it moral judgment if you want, but, and
they're the kind of questions that you can't say, "Oh, well, what the hell
then; if three of you think that, good. I'll sign." They're basic
principles that the US Supreme Court is talking about, basic legal which
makes them to some degree basic moral questions. 767
It may be true that the kinds of issues which come to state courts may be less
likely to create conflict with the other branches. However, while the SJC did not
confront a large number of "basic moral questions" in the cases which came before it
between 1981 and 1995, they did confront some, many of which were discussed in
Chapter Five. For instance, the Court confronted questions about funding for abortion
Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 23 May 1999.
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and the death penalty ( 1Ssues which eertainly tend to ereate division), yet a majority of
the justices of the SJC did not hesitate to take a stand contrary to the view of the
majority of the legislators by finding the laws in question to be unconstitutional.768 In
addition, the cumulative affect of decisions of the Court which struck down a variety of
criminal laws (drug statutes, a law to protect victims of crimes who are minors from
testifying in court, or a statute prohibiting the photographing of a nude minor) could
easily have angered a
-get tough on crime" legislator. While the SJC may hear fewer
volatile questions than the United States Supreme Court, they hear some and act on
them as they feel necessary. This does not appear to have created any great legislative-
judicial conflict in Massachusetts.
The story of what happened in New Hampshire in the last few years also
indicates that states are not immune from "hot button" issues which can create
legislative-judicial conflict. In New Hampshire, an issue over which conflict is likely
to occur is taxes. In a 1997 decision which has come to be called the "Claremont
decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that the widely varying property
tax system in the state was insufficient to adequately fund public education services to
which the state's children were entitled. 769 The decision elicited a volatile response
from the electorate and from the New Hampshire Legislature, a classic "citizen"
legislature with many members, representing small districts and serving part-time for
little pay.
770
The political reaction toward this admittedly activist decision of the New
768
While the Legislature may not have reacted to this exercise of authority these opinions did engender
conflict. Moe (abortion funding) was decided by a decision of 6-1 (Hennessey dissenting) and Colon-
Cruz (death penalty) was decided by a vote of 5-2 (Nolan and Lynch dissenting).
769
Claremont School Disrict v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997).
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While the following should be read with caution as I know little about the site, the following quote
from a website dedicated to the actions of the New Hampshire Supreme Court may be indicative of the
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Hampshire High Court would be almost unthinkable in Massachusetts. While the state
capitals are less than seventy-five miles apart, the state of legislative-judicial relations
in the two political systems are worlds apart. There were immediate calls for
constitutional amendments to strip the Court of its authority to hear certain cases, and
for action to be taken by the House of Representatives to impeach the justices.
This reaction to the Claremont decision had barely died down when allegations
of numerous ethical lapses were made against several of the justices of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. While not denying that theie were problems in the way in
which the Court operated, the timing of these two events makes one question their
coincidental nature. The allegations resulted in the resignation of Justice Steven
Thayer, and the impeachment and trial of the Chief Justice, David Brock. 771 While
eventually acquitted on all charges, the remaining tension between the judiciary and the
other branches of government in New Hampshire is still evident. State budget battles
over education funding continue, and calls for reform of the Court by the Legislature
77?
continue.
Hampshire. "The Claremont decision is a judicial power grab, usurping the power of the people and their
representatives to tax and violating the separation of powers.
. ..If we allow this judicial expansion to go
unchecked, within the next few years the court will succeed in completely redefining our Constitution
and will usurp the executive and legislative powers. All power will be centralized in the court."
( http://www.mainstream.net/nhpolitics/coactivism.shtml
.)
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In July of 2000, the New Hampshire House approved articles of impeachment which involved
improper interference with trial court matters and lying under oath before the House Judiciary
Committee. On October 10 th
,
Brock was acquitted by the New Hampshire Senate.
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" This tension is exemplified by a letter which Chief Justice Brock sent to the Governor, Senate
President, and Speaker of the House in September of 2001. The letter opened as follows. "On behalf of
the members of the Supreme Court, I am writing to inquire whether you would have any interest in
meeting with leaders of the three branches of government on a regular basis for the purpose of improving
inter-branch communication. While our Constitution calls for the three branches of government to be
separate and independent of each other, it also recognizes that cooperation is essential for the government
to serve the needs of the people." (A copy of the letter can be accessed at the Court's website,
http://www.state.nh.us/coui1s/suprcmc/prcss
. )
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Not only does this story prove that state supreme eourts can be just as caught up
m heated political battles as the United States Supreme Court, it also shows that even
high eourts with similar institutional characteristics may not necessarily operate with
their counterparts in a system of separated powers as smoothly as in Massachusetts.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, structurally, is almost identical to the SJC,
consisting of five justices (as opposed to Massachusetts' seven), who are appointed by
the Governor with the approval of an Executive Council. They also serve during good
behavior, or until mandatory retirement at age 70. These structural similarities,
however, don't lead to a similar level of cooperation between branches in the two
states, even in regard to the same issue, quality of funding for public education. In
1993 Massachusetts SJC was also faced with a constitutional challenge to the state's
system for funding education. The Court responded with McDuffy v. Secretary ofthe
Office ofEducation™ an opinion which one commentator has called the "best model
to date for third wave judicial analysis....Courts confronted with this issue in the future
could do much worse than imitate the Massachusetts court."774 It was a decision which
criticized the existing funding mechanism and established a high level for the quality
which state-funded education must meet. As ever, the justices were willing to become
involved in making public policy in important ways in the Commonwealth, albeit in a
way which recognized the limitations of their role in the system of separated powers.
The opinion ended in just the way an observer of the Court would predict. Rather than
dictating to the Legislature and the Governor how they should resolve this problem, the
773
4 1 5 Mass. 545 (1993).
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William A. Thro, "Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model," Boston College Law Review 35 (1994), 597-617.
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Court said it was the duty of the Commonwealth to "devise a plan and sources of funds
sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate." Procedurally, the Court remanded the
case to the Single Justice session for oversight. And, according to Professor Dodd of
Suffolk University Law School, the Commonwealth's response came quickly.
^nedSr\°n 19 ' 1993 ' G°Vem0r Wdd 0f Massachusettssigned the Education Reform Act of 1993....Through a series of
amendments to Chapter 71
,
the Act revolutionizes not only the financial
organization of public education in Massachusetts, but also its
educational structure and theory....The scheme is a visionary one, and if
realized, would seemingly more than fulfill the seven indices of
education as required by the Supreme Judicial Court in McDufJy.175
It would take a much more extensive comparison to begin to sort through these
two case on education funding to attempt to determine why the stories are so
different.
776
It may be due to a variety of factors, not the least of which is a different
culture. While New Hampshire is known for its fiscal austerity and its dislike of taxes,
Massachusetts was the birthplace of public education. In a case such as this, these
different histories lead to different outcomes. There is also no denying that the
difference between the professional legislature in Boston and the citizen legislature in
Concord may have an impact. It is possible, however, that relations in Massachusetts
are smoother because of the awareness on the part of the justices of the SJC in
Massachusetts that their role in the policymaking process is limited. As in the question
of eliminating governmental tort immunity, they were willing to make their
constitutional statement and then bide their time while the Legislature developed a way
to adequately fund public education in the Commonwealth. The following comment
775
"An (Adequate) Education for All: McDuffy v. Secretary ofEducation" Advocate 24 (1993), 20-24,
at 23-24.
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This is a study which I have tentative plans to begin in the summer of 2002.
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from Chief Justice Wilkins is representative of this recognition of the special role the
Court plays in the state's system of separated powers.
ChieflS;' mvreSting ' UP there [New H^Pshire], I told David Brock, theJustice, it s easy enough to announce there's a constitutional right to
* 2*TLT- Hfr 18 Renting it. And, for the moment in
which th nk H
g T u u^ 11 mCreaSmg the am°Unt Education at a ratePe°P
" "°
Ught that aCtl°n
'
WhlGh is Sti11 P£nding' are
That there is a high degree of cooperation between the SJC and the Legislature
in Massachusetts is clear. The answer as to why this is the case is not. There are at
least two possible explanations for the fact that the Legislature and the High Court
seem to work so cooperatively in questions affecting public policy. Both are
potentially connected, and they relate to questions of the state's culture. First, it is
possible that actors in both branches of government, many of whom are natives of the
state, have been acculturated to share the same perspective on the role of the three
branches. There may be implicit agreement on the question of what is legitimate in the
"political realm" and what is acceptable in the "judicial realm." A quote from John
Burke presents anecdotal support for this explanation. In discussing interactions
between the SJC and the Joint Committee on the Judiciary when he was the
Administrative Assistant to the Court, Burke described interactions with Representative
Michael Flaherty, then House Chair of the Committee. 778
And it was actually Flaherty who was the one that you could deal with
... .1 must say in my experience with him he never went looking for a
quid pro quo, never said, 'yes, you can have such and such a statute if I
Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. I am not familiar enough with the New Hampshire
case yet to know if the justices of that court share a similar perspective.
778
Except for the Ethics Committees and Ways and Means, all standing committees in the Massachusetts
legislature are joint committees, co-chaired by a Senator and a Representative and with membership
drawn from both houses.
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was worlC
$
^Tu" SOmethln8--[H]e made it clear that heorking m one world, the courts were another world. And there
were, there were things that were OK in the Legislature that were notOK in the courts, He just kept them apart. 779
Obviously a recognition of the difference between the two worlds would not
lead to cooperation unless the view were shared by individuals in both worlds. In part,
the generally restrained, moderate, and incremental approach which the justices of the
SJC take in their approach to the law fits with a view of the judicial realm as a place
where legal reasoning is used to reach decisions; not a world of bargaining as occurs
(and as is expected) in the Legislature. This moderate approach to the law is reinforced
by the broader legal community, and can be seen in the few constitutional challenges
which are raised before the state's high court. For political scientists who have become
jaded by scientific studies which attempt to show that attitude is all that matters in
judicial decision-making, this restraint and moderation may seem like a sham.
However, one cannot sit through interview after interview with the justices and not
think that they believe it in their hearts when they explain the judicial role in terms
similar to those of Chief Justice Hennessey.
This volume focuses to a great extent on what courts do at the limits of
the law where the legitimacy of the court's action may be in question.
We point out that the court as an institution is not good at discovering
the popular mindset. Because, unlike a legislature, a court is not
institutionally equipped to discover the will of the people, the subjective
whim of the judge may control at the edges of the law. It is in these
areas that the legitimacy of the court is problematic, and the wise judge
uses self-restraint.
780
Perhaps even more telling is the language from a 1972 opinion written by then
Chief Justice Tauro. The case involved a clear exercise ofjudicial authority, as the
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Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999.
780
Judges Making Law (Boston, MA: Flashner Judicial Institute, 1994), p. 2.
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justices decided that the courts have an inherent power to bind a county or state treasury
for an expenditure which is essential to the operation of the courts. Recognizing the
potentially charged nature of this opinion, Tauro writes as follows.
We are mindful that exercise of this inherent power is a duty which mustbe borne responsibly. A spirit of mutual cooperation among the
legis ative, executive, and judicial departments is unquestionably thepeople s best guaranty of constitutional government. It is therefore
incumbent upon the members of the judicial department to proceed
cautiously, and with due consideration for the prerogatives of the
executive department and the Legislature, whenever exercise of an
inherent judicial power would bring us near the sphere of another
department.
The second related hypothesis which may, in part, explain the legislative-
judicial harmony in Massachusetts has to do with the concept of shared communities.
Massachusetts is a relatively small state, and it seems as though many of its elected and
appointed officials claim an area within a twenty mile radius of Boston as their home.
It is a geographically close community. Furthermore, many of the state's public figures
attended law school, and did so in one of the five law schools in the Boston area. In
these geographic and academic communities, individual develop shared norms,
experiences, and friendships. Trust is built which may, at later points in life, help to
ease the institutional tensions created by a system of separated powers. Several
references were made in Chapter Three to the role which Cornelius Moynihan is
credited with playing in the passage of the Rules of Civil Procedure because of his
prestige and connection to Boston College Law School alumnae. Another example of
this was conveyed by Chief Justice Wilkins when discussing the budget and the courts.
What has happened recently is, the House particularly has been sensitive
to the needs of the Judiciary and the Senate has been willing to go
along....Sometimes these things are very much a matter of luck and
O 'Coin, Inc. v. Treasurer ofthe County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, at 515-51 6.
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personalities The principle major domo for the Speaker of the 1 louse
used o be a clerk for the SJC for the County of Suff olk. And he cares
Speler^2 ^^ SyStem and he has the ear of*•
A further story is found in Bone's article on the development of the Rules of
Civil Procedure in which he comments on the possible role of another individual in
ensuring that the Governor's office would be interested in reform. "Furthermore,
Governor Sargent's secretary was William Young, now a federal district court judge.
Young had clerked for Chief Justice [Raymond] Wilkins and was teaching a course at
Boston College Law School at the time. He was keenly interested in procedure and
encouraged Governor Sargent to support the bill's passage."783
While these are only anecdotes, a pattern begins to emerge as one anecdote
comes after another. This is especially true as the stories came from a variety of
different sources and were unsolicited. While further research would be necessary to
see how accurately these perceptions of the links in the Massachusetts legal and
political community reflect reality, it is a question worth pursuing.
Is this all, however? Docs this single-state analysis of the relation between a
high court and a legislature have anything to teach us that is more broadly applicable?
It does if wc return to the lens of separation of powers which has informed this work.
First, it is a vivid reminder that while most discussion of this institutional structure
emphasize the conflictual nature of inter-branch relations, such discussions are too
narrow. The Madisonian meaning of separation of powers, one which sees the structure
78?
Interview with author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
"Procedural Rules Reform," footnote 200, pp. 442-443. In this note Bone also conveys the story
regarding Kiernan's reaction to the legislative changes needed to enact the Rules of Civil Procedure as
confirmed by other sources.
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as intended to foment struggles for power which will result in some sort ofNewtonian
balance, may no longer have much impact, at least in the operation of the high courts of
states. In only one ease was there a dear exercise of power by the SJC to protect the
jud.emry from intrusion into its domain.- Even if one also includes in this category
the four advisory opinion in which the Court was asked to referee the budget process by
determining the legitimacy of certain line item vetoes, there was very little activity on
the part of the Court in which this view of separation of powers was prominent. 785
There were times when the SJC played
-protector of liberties" or "guardian of
the Constitution" as envisioned by the libertarian view of separation of powers. This
occurred most frequently in cases raising questions of the constitutionality of a statute,
the action of law enforcement, or the decisions of a lower court judge. The seeming
acceptance of these actions by the Court as evidenced by the lack of public outcries or
legislative action aimed at curbing the Court indicates that this has become an accepted
role for justices to play, despite its "undemocratic" nature. Conflict did not really
develop.
Most importantly, the efficiency view of separation of powers seems to be the
one most strongly reflected in the activity of the SJC. This means that if we look only
for conflict to determine when high courts are taking an active role in developing public
policy, we will develop a picture of the role of high courts which is incomplete. Over
the last twenty-five years the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
7X4
Spinelli v. Commonwealth, a case in which the SJC determined that an act of the Legislature that
attempted to reinstate an eminent domain case after the judicial branch had taken final action was an
unlawful attempt of the Legislature to exercise a power belonging exclusively to the Legislature.
785 t • m
It is possible that the struggles of the SJC to develop more control over the lower courts could fit in
this category as well.
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have engaged in a dialogue with the state's elected representatives over a variety of
public policy questions that arc important to the citizens of the Commonwealth. The
dialogue has rarely dared up into argument. Coopcraiion has been the norm. This is
largely because the players in each branch have respected the limits of their authority.
Unlike textbook notions of separation of powers, however, these limits are no, imposed
by jud.cial-lcgislature struggle, but come from both branches making law by doing
what they do best. For the Court, this means making law slowly but surely in cases
which come before it, recognizing the expertise of the Legislature to make more
wholesale change, but not hesitating to force this action if necessary. The difference in
the law-making roles of the two bodies is a story of what happens when Tocqueville's
observation comes into play - when a political question becomes a judicial question.
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